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Was Slave to Prodigality.
That Noble Sin; whilst Luxury 
Employ'd a Million o f the Poor, 
And odious Pride a Million more 
Envy it self and Vanity 
Were Ministers o f  Industry”
Bernard de Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees (1714)
The recent change in government that ocurred in Mexico, which ended the seventy 
years rule of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI, has generated great expectancy 
and hope among the population especially in regard to reducing corruption, to generating an 
effective and fair application of justice, to consolidating the respect of civil, political and 
human rights of groups such as Chiapas’ Indians, but also in regard to other kind of issues 
completely alien to democratic rule such as better wages, more employment, and harder 
policies against crime. Though in strict electoral terms there is now an acceptable level of 
fairness, openness and a relative equity in party competition, the consolidation of 
democracy in Mexico still needs a long way to go, especially in terms of the strengthening 
of a liberal constitutional rule of law that is evenly applied.
However, there are some important institutions upon which political pluralism and a 
certain degree of accountability can now be supported. At first sight, one might suppose 
that one of such institutions is the mass media, since it is usually believed that the media is 
an almost natural defender of democracy because it is an arena of free debate, a watchdog 
against power abuses and/or a mirror o f the true interests o f society. Indeed the actual 
media in Mexico are better prepared to defend the maintenance of a pluralistic political 
arena, but such an attitude is not the outcome of the media’s democratic convictions.
l l  ' M i l l /
Here I sustain that in Mexico the actual support o f the media to democracy (or at 
least to political pluralism) is the outcome of a coincidence between the media particular 
agenda oriented towards business and profits in a situation o f  growing market competition 
with a context characterised by a growing electoral competition among political parties. In 
this sense, political pluralism was, at most, a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the 
openness in the media. The answers must be better sought in their economic and business 
interests. In his Fable o f  the Bees, subtitled "private vices, public benefits", Mandeville 
recounts how private evil vices such as luxury, greed and envy, all lead to public benefits by 
encouraging enterprise. In the same way, one can state that though the mass media is 
oriented towards the defence of its particular, individual and egoistic interests centred on 
profits, the global outcome could also be a very useful mechanism that helps sustain an 
open and pluralistic political arena indispensable for democracy to flourish.
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Introduction:
Mass Media and Transition
An important amount of literature exists relating the media and democracy, both in 
theoretical and empirical terms. However, for many years there appeared to be almost 
nothing written on the development of mass media in relation to political conditions other 
than democracy -except for some studies on the Soviet media1—and, until very recently, 
there existed very little literature on the media in political transitions.
Scholars who focused their attention on what Samuel Huntington called the “third wave of 
democracy”,1 *3 paid little attention to the mass media in these processes. For instance, in one 
of the most relevant works on transitions from authoritarian rule, the media are never 
mentioned.3 This silence contrasts with the widespread belief among media scholars that 
the media is a crucial element in modem democracies. Nevertheless, it has to be recognised 
that this situation is changing and that since the late 1980s other works have attempted to 
fill this important gap in literature on transitions and democratic consolidations.4
1 See for instance Ithiel de Sola Pool, “Communications in totalitarian societies”, in I. de Sola Pool, Wilbur 
Schram, et.al., Handbook o f Political Communication, Chicago, Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1973. 
‘ Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman,
Univ ersity of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
3 Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, (eds.), Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule, 4 volumes, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
4 Though the list is not at all exhaustive, some relevant recent works are:
For Latin America see: Elizabeth Fox (ed.), Media and Politics in Latin America: The Struggle for 
Democracy. Beverly Hills. Sage. 1988; Thomas Skidmore (ed.). Television. Politics and the Transition to 
Democracy in Latin Amenta, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press. 1993; 
Richard Cole, (ed.), Communication in Latin America: Journalism. Mass Media and Society , Wilmington,
DE, SR Books, 1996.
For Africa see: Gordon F. Jackson, Breaking Story: The South African Press, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 
1993; Louise Bourgualt, Mass Media in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1995. 
For Eastern Europe see: Al Hester and Kristina White, (eds.), Creating a Free Press in Eastern Europe, 
Athens, GA, University of Georgia Press, 1993; Slavko Splichal, Media Beyond Socialism, Boulder, CO, 
Westview Press, 1994; Liana Giorgi, The Post-Socialist Media: What Power the West?, Aldershot, England, 
Avebury, 1995; Patrick O’Neil, (ed.), Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe, London, Frank 
Cass, 1997.
For Asia see: John A. Lent, “Mass Communication in the Pacific: Recent Trends and Developments”, in 
Media Asia, 16, no.l, 1989; Jon Heuvel Vanden and Everette E. Dennis, The Unfolding Lotus: East Asia s 
Changing Media, N.Y., Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, Columbia University, 1993; Sunanda K. Data- 
Ray, “Press Freedom and Professional Standards in Asia”, in Media Asia, 23, no.3, 1996.
Cross-regional works on the subject are: Vicky Randall, “The media and democratization in the Third 
World", in Third World Quarterly, vol.14, no.3, 1993, and the book she edited, Democratization and the 
Media, London, Frank Cass, 1998; Carlos H. Filgueira and Dieter Nohlen, (eds.), Prensa y  transición
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These works have mainly focused on the impact o f the mass media on the processes o f  
transition and democratic consolidation.' Most o f this literature takes as their point o f  
departure questions regarding the contributions of the media to those processes. The 
principle aspect that these latter works on media in transition/consolidation processes either 
assume or try to prove is that mass media has played (or is actually playing) an important 
role in these processes. In this sense, the media is conceived as part of the democratic 
forces that push regimes towards transitions or play crucial roles in the consolidation o f  
democracy. For instance, the work o f Renate Arndt on the Uruguayan press during the last 
moments o f the authoritarian rule argues that the central intention of the media “was 
undoubtedly oriented towards a regime change”.* 6 This is also the position of Juan M. 
Pereira and Manuel Trenzado Romero about the role for démocratisation of some 
Portuguese journals, like Diario de Lisboa, the weekly publications 0  Mundo and Expresso 
or the monthly Seara Nova that opposed the pre-1974 regime, and that even after the 
Revolution continued to oppose the Communists, like the weekly Tempo. In the case o f 
Portugal, the authors conclude that “decades of censorship had invested the media with 
powers they did not posses before”.7 In both cases, the democratic orientation of the media, 
or at least their militancy on the part o f the transition forces, is taken for granted and is seen 
as a reaction against authoritarianism. As one author puts it,
[During transitions], given greater political freedom and an attentive public, one would really expect 
the national media to come into their own. Moreover, their part will be crucial, while the
democrática: experiencias recientes en Europa y  América Latina, Frankfurt am Main. Vervuert, 1994; John 
D. H. Downing, Internationalizing Media Theory: Transition, Power Culture, Thousend Oaks, CAL, Sage, 
1996; Patrick O’Neil, (ed.). Communicating Democracy. The Media and Political Transitions, Boulder, CO. 
Lynne-Rienner Publishers, 1998.
3 For instance, see Skidmore, [1993], p.l; O’Neil, [1998], p .l; and Randall, [1998], p.l. The last two authors 
note, however, that the impact of the media for democracy might not necessarily be positive.
6 Renate Arndt, “el rol de la prensa en el proceso de cambio de régimen en Uruguay”, in Filgueira and 
Nohlen, [1994], p.130. In Uruguay, the kind of press that initially contributed more to the Uruguayan 
démocratisation process were the weekly political publications, which were part of what was called 
“alternative media". As Elizabeth Fox states “alternative media” appear when,
People and organizations deprived o f any access to the military-controlled mass media and often eager to 
keep alive a cultural and political resistance to the dictatorships began to use other media like community 
radio and newspapers, local video production and neighborhood theatre. These experiences came to be 
known as "alternative” media because they took the place o f or supplanted information, opinion, and 
entertainment functions o f the mass media. The alternative media were also a form o f expression or protest in 
a society where having an opinion or expressing an idea was dangerous (Fox, [1988], p.26).
1 Juan Montabés Pereira and Manuel Trenzado Romero, “El escenario simbólico del caso portugués”, in 
Filgueira and Nohlen, [1994], p.68.
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international media can only play a marginal role. The transition phase almost by definition must 
involve competitive elections. The media must inform people about the different parties and 
candidates and help them to choose from among them. They should also be the watchdogs, 
exposing instances of electoral malpractice. At the same time, they must help to keep up the 
pressure for change. If much is required of the media, then also they are likely to receive 
unprecedented interest and support from the public.8 9
Whai is seldom explained is why, when and how the media started to “behave like that".'' 
This literature on the relations between media and the political regime has not been 
restricted however, to exposing the media as independent and intervening variables for the 
transition or consolidation processes, it has also explored this relationship citing the media 
as the outcome o f transition and démocratisation. Some studies show that in order to build 
more independent mass media, it is required that the political system itself becomes more 
democratic and grants better conditions for the media and the journalists to do their job.10 1
So here the independence of the mass media is the product and not the producer of 
democracy.11
The answers, however interesting they may be, cannot explain why there are some types of 
media that seem to “behave in more democratic ways” than others. Considering the media 
in such “un-problematised” terms, leaves aside questions regarding internal media 
developments and transformations that may have pushed the media to seek for more 
independence from the political regime. Such independence of the media from the political
8 Vicky Randall, [1993], p.639.
9 An interesting answer to these questions is provided by Chappell Lawson for the case of the printed press in 
Mexico. According to him, one crucial explanation for the printed press abertura relates to the emergence of a 
new culture of professional journalism. New independent newspapers emerged during the 1980s and 1990s 
that refused to enter into collusion with the regime and have tried to stick to professional journalistic 
practices. This is an interesting explanation about the printed presses’ move into independence. One has to 
take into account that the printed press in Mexico is not truly a “massive media”, but quite an elitist one. The 
printed press has an extremely low level of readership and some of its functions in that country have served as 
a space where different sectors of the elite communicate, exercise pressure on the policies, and exchange 
messages In this sense, the importance of the Mexican printed press lies not on the quantity of its public, but 
on the quality of it, and this I think is a basic condition for understanding the openness of this type of media 
(See Chappell Lawson, “El cuarto poder: la prensa independiente en Mexico”, Internet Version on the 
Journalistic Web Site Puiso del Periodismo www.pulso.org/Espanol-'Archivo/hemisphere.htm ).
10 Curiously, this is stated in an article on Mexican mass media. See Ilya Adler, “The Mexican Case: The 
Media in the 1988 Presidential Election”, in Skidmore, [1993].
11 Assuming that the emergence of “free” media is an outcome of démocratisation, simply states that the 
outcome of démocratisation will naturally be the creation of democratic institutions in a tautological fashion.
It presumes a linear explanation. In brief, in many of these “transitional approaches” to the media,
“democracy is the natural outcome of democracy”. Moreover, taking the media either as an independent or a 
dependent variable of a démocratisation process cannot entirely explain the fact that actually the relations 
between the media and the political regime are interdependent. Under certain circumstances one can have
3
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regime depends on a complex series of legal, economical and political factors that might 
restrict the modes in which they select and present information. The degree of their 
independence is reflected more clearly -though not exclusively—in their capacity to decide 
autonomously on how to present political information and material related to politics 
without any kind of formal, informal, direct or indirect restrictions (or threat o f them) b y  
the political regime.
Focusing only on the contributions of the media to transition and consolidation, results in 
an incomplete understanding of the “pass” from an authoritarian to a more independent 
media regime (note that I avoid using the adjective “free”). These approaches cannot 
explain why some forms of media are actually more open and independent than others that 
behave in more cautious manners (i.e. in the way they present political information). 
Attention must be paid on the interests of the media {which are not fixed in time and vary 
depending on the type of media) and their capacity to orient their actions according to their 
interests and preferences within the context of transition. This provides an answer to the 
why, how and when the media should start moving towards a more independent and 
autonomous role from the political regime, i.e. to explore the limits of tolerance in the 
presentation of information.
If one considers the media in such terms, one might be better prepared to explain the 
different roles the media might play in transition and consolidation processes in different 
countries by understanding the specific circumstances that lead the media to create an 
independent space in which they can voice their interests (which may or may not be similar 
to the ones voiced by those in favour of the abertura and democracy). Though the 
presentation of information in increasingly independent and open w'ays might eventually 
coincide with (and hopefully become) a claim in favour of democracy, one should be 
careful not to come to the conclusion that the independent media are “democratic 
defenders” per se.
By considering the interests of the media and the limitations they face in specific contexts, 
one can understand their incentives and strategies to move (or not) towards more 
independence at a certain time. For instance, in the case of the Hungarian press, some 
months after the Hungarian Communist Party transformed itself into the Hungarian
more influence on the other. This is recognised by Vicky Randall in the introduction to her
4
!»WWI mm IHPKJU rmm
Miff
Socialist Party in October 1989, a number of state and party newspapers “began to privatize 
themselves spontaneously, seeking to become independent organizations before a new 
government came to power”.12 Conversely, as this work shows, in the case of Mexico 
television and radio broadcasters began to take a more independent stance only long after 
the transition process had begun.
The media compose a relative autonomous aggregate of actors, each with the capacity to 
define their interests writhin specific contexts that limit their options. Greater openness in 
the forms of presenting information and material on politics might eventually lead the 
media also to become “democratic supporters” themselves, but the linkage cannot be taken 
for granted. Moreover, the coincidence in time between a growing political pluralism or a 
démocratisation process and the media openness in the presentation of news and 
information may not be responding to the same causes. This is why one must focus on both 
internal media changes (where the interests are defined) and the wider context where the 
media are inserted (which limits their action). In this sense at least, the following variables 
must be taken into account so as to understand the forms and rhythms in which news 
broadcasts and other information programmes on politics began to present the voices and 
the positions of alternative political actors:
□ At the external level (the context):
a) The degree in which the traditional mechanisms of control of the media are still 
effective.
b) The impact of the economy and market conditions during the transition on the 
different media organisations (In some countries of the “Third Wave”, it must be 
noted that their processes of transition were accompanied by unusually deep 
economic crisis, which makes this an intervening element in the analysis).
□ At the internal level (the definition o f the media interests):
a) The relations between the media and the political elite.
b) The degree of journalistic professionalism.
c) The uses given to technology in order to expand communication possibilities.
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero______________________________________________ Introduction
Democratization... [1998], p.2.
12 Andras Lanczi and Patrick O'Neil. “Pluralization and the politics of media change in Hungary”, in O’Neil. 
[1997], p.86.
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The External Aspects
A. The degree o f effectiveness o f  traditional control mechanism in transition contexts
Within the context o f transition, it is important to determine the extent to which the 
previous regimes exercised control both by formal and informal means. Probably in all 
cases, the electronic media within a specific non-democratic regime was far easier to 
control than the printed media. Though it may be possible to assume that authoritarian 
regimes were generally less rigorous in establishing tighter mass media control than 
Communist systems, in certain cases, like South Korea previous to the reforms of 1987, the 
regime was successful in creating a comprehensive preventive censorship structure in 
practically all kinds of media.13
In the context of a political transition, many of the traditional rules through which control 
was exercised over the media -especially, but not exclusively, the informal ones—become 
diffuse, simply because unbounded uncertainty is the dominant overall characteristic o f 
such a situation. Two sets o f criteria are crucial for understanding the extent to which the 
regime exercised control over the different types o f mass media, and therefore, during a 
process of transition one must focus on their actual effectiveness in controlling the media. 
One set of criteria is composed by the legal frameworks and arrangements that regulate the 
media; the other is composed by the different forms in which the regime interferes in a 
direct manner in the economy and finances of the media (from direct and indirect subsidies 
to governmental advertising expenditures).
Under authoritarian rule (and also in Communist systems) many governments enacted 
different laws, regulations and statutes that explicitly, or implicitly, restricted freedom of 
expression and subjected the media to the direct or indirect control of the official 
organisations that watched over the ways in which political information and material was 
presented and published. Control was not limited to the media, i.e. to the transmitters or 
presenters o f information, but also included the sources o f  information, centralising it and 
in many cases, only divulging it through official departments and organisations. In many 
cases, only the official version was published and presented in broadcastings without any
possibility of having alternative open and legal sources of information. The result was that 
in many of these countries alternative printed media -or samizdat publications—could be 
found on the black market.
At the same time, some of these regimes decided to intervene directly in the property 
structure placing ab initio the media under public-ownership models, or nationalising them 
once they took power, as in Argentina’s broadcasting in the late 1970s. Some others -e.g., 
Brazil and Mexico— decided to keep a market structure in the media, but established 
different regulations with regard to content, obtaining permissions, licenses, concessions, 
and so forth, depending more on political than on strictly market and economic rationales. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that some of these regimes obliged the different kinds of 
media and/or their personnel to incorporate (or belong) to various organisations that ranged 
from political parties to unions and chambers.
During the transition process, some of these indicators of legal control lose their efficiency, 
either because new laws and regulations are enacted or because, in a context of uncertainty, 
the more informal aspects of these controls become difficult to apply. This is especially the 
case in relation to the centralisation of information. With the transition, new media 
organisations are created and it becomes more difficult to maintain control on the sources 
of information. However, it is not necessarily true that the rest of these traditional 
mechanisms of control completely lose their effectiveness during the transition. And it may 
be the case that even after the transition, some of these old mechanisms are still at work. In 
some former communist countries, e.g. in Slovakia and other south eastern European 
countries,14 these mechanisms were still alive at least until the late 1990s and were only 
masked under new formal rules, which were applied with the same old spirit, for the benefit 
o f a new (and not so new) political elite. This limited the freedom of the press, undermining 
any advance towards a more independent and autonomous media. There are more striking 
cases like Cambodia, where even after the United Nations sponsored free and competitive 
elections in 1993, the government not only enacted new laws (1995) allowing for criminal 
prosecution for the publication of material affecting “national security and political
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero______________________________________________ Introduction
14 For the case of Slovakia see: Andrej Skolkay, "Journalists, political elites and the post-Communist public: 
the case of Slovakia”, in The Journal o f Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol.12, n.4, 1996. This 
same volume dedicates many other articles to the situation of the media and democracy in Eastern Europe.
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stability”, but has not hesitated in using the more brutal forms of repression of the past, 
such as imprisonment and murderer of journalists and editors.IS *
The second set of criteria is composed of a large variety of the State’s economically an d  
financially interventionist policies in the media. This refers only to the ways in which th e  
regime either directly or indirectly affects the financial situation of the different types o f  
media.'6 Authoritarian regimes developed a wide variety o f mechanisms to directly and 
indirectly subsidise and sustain the mass media. In countries where there existed publicly- 
owned media, financing was provided by parties or unions, or directly through executive 
ministries. In contrast, in countries where there existed a privately-owned media structure, 
more indirect ways of subsidising the media were developed. These ranged from 
government advertising, to printing paper provisions, to tax exemptions and preferential 
policies, and to diverse ways o f bribing media personnel. These financial aid mechanisms 
of the regime to the media in some cases became very important for the latter’s survival as 
a business.
During the transitions of the late 1970s and 1980s, in places such as Latin America, many 
of these financial subsidies to the media were severely affected because of the beginning o f  
a process o f privatisation or re-privatisation, and also because the transition coincided with 
a deep economic crisis that affected the capacity o f the State to sustain its usual level o f  
expenditure. In this sense, this set o f criteria relates to the second external variable 
mentioned above: the economic impact of the transition on the media. Nevertheless, one 
should avoid concluding that the economic crisis or the diminished capacity o f the regimes 
to directly and indirectly subsidise the media have had as a consequence the emergence o f  
well defined market structures completely independent o f the regimes. What should be 
determined through this set of criteria is the degree to which the traditional “financial 
supports” are still effective, and the extent to which they might still obstruct the emergence 
of more independent media.
Is John A. Lent, “The mass media in Asia”, in O'Neil, [1998], p. 163.
This must be understood differently from the second external aspect mentioned above that refers to the 
ways in which the general economic circumstances that accompanied the transition have impacted on the 
decisions of the media to support (or not) a more independent media regime, and eventually, a more open 
political situation.
8
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B. The impact o f  the economic context o f  the transition on the media
For this variable one can consider the following criteria: the existence of 
privatisation pressures coming from foreign or large national corporations and the 
emergence of market-oriented attitudes in the media. Of course, both criteria may become 
more determinant within the context of economic crisis and classic IMF policy receipts.
The “Third Wave of transitions” from authoritarian rule have coincided with a general 
liberal (or neo-liberal) economic Zeitgeist in which all economic activities of the State and 
the maintenance o f extended Welfare systems were severely criticised. For instance, in 
Latin America, where the mass media have traditionally been privately owned, the political 
transitions began in the midst of deep economic crisis and with enormous financial debts 
that left their state apparatuses in extremely fragile conditions and almost bankrupt. In some 
other regions, e.g. in Eastern Europe, where the mass media belonged either to the State or 
to the ruling party, the collapse of the regime combined with the precariousness of public 
funds and with the foreign corporations’ interests for investing there.17 Here, the common 
outcome has been the privatisation of the media. This trend has not been exclusive to these 
countries, since many Western democracies where there has been a long tradition of 
publicly owned media (basically in broadcasting) are experiencing pressure in favour of de­
regulation and privatisation.18
The insertion of the media into market structures in the majority of the “Third Wave” 
countries, be it because of a failure of the regimes to establish other ownership patterns (as 
in the case of many Latin American countries),19 20or because of the pressures from foreign 
corporations to enter into those markets (as in the case of many Eastern European 
countries)10 the media is no longer wholly reliant on State funds for survival. The 
privatisation of the media has altered, and generally diminished, their “institutional”
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero______________________________________________ Introduction
17 Commercial pressures to enter the media business from foreign investment groups have been especially 
strong in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
18 This aspect will be discussed in the next part of this chapter.
19 See the conclusions of the work of Elizabeth Fox [1988]
20 See Owen V. Johnson, “The Media and Democracy in Eastern Europe”, in O’Neil [1998].
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dependence and subjection to the regime.21 2This has also changed the power relations 
between the media and the regime, by giving the former an autonomous power base.
In the same manner, during the transition, market-oriented media began at different 
moments, to care more about their audiences and about advertising. With the increasing 
predominance of de-regulation, privatisation and other market promotion policies, the 
media began to seriously take into account the financial criteria to remain in business, and 
these at times ran contrary to the old political criteria that had kepi the media closed. This is 
especially true in market-oriented media within the context of deep economic crisis, when 
economic difficulties might become a pretext for forgetting many of the traditional rules in 
a time when due to transition, they have become relatively diffuse. Trespassing the lines o f  
tolerance could be the only way for some media organisations to remain in the business. 
However one must note that, even though this aspect might be important for the media’s 
independence, it should not be overemphasised. As a number of East Asian countries show 
(for instance Thailand, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore) the fact that there exists a 
market-oriented media structure in which even Western media corporations participate, but 
does not entail the upsurge of more independent media organisations. John Lent describes 
how even when Western corporations enter the East Asian media market (like Murdoch’s 
News Corporation, Time Warner, Dow Jones, etc.), they do not promote more 
independence in the media organisations they acquire, but prefer instead to ally with local 
businesses and industrial, political and military powers, lending them continued support 
and protecting their interests." The market per se is not enough, and intervenient variables 
such as a deep economic crisis, or a political transition process might join forces in an 
attempt to push the media towards greater openness.
21 Though this does not mean that the strong links between mass media and different political groups have 
vanished. These links are translated into mutual favours, support, access to information, etc. The only thing 
that is stressed here is that the control of the regime over the media as an institutional and a priori condition -  
but perhaps not as fact in certain situations—disappears.
22 Lent, “The mass media in Asia”, in O’Neil [1998].
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The internal aspects
Three internal variables in the media are here considered: the emergence of new kinds of 
mediatic and political elite relations, the degree of journalistic professionalism, and the uses 
of new technology. The combination of these factors is important in determining the 
interests of the media and the position taken by the different kind of media in relation to the 
ways they want to publish and/or present political information.
In some cases, the media might still respond cautiously to the ways in which they present 
political information even during the firsts stages of a démocratisation process. For 
instance, in Uruguay more than a year after its foundational elections took place, private 
TV channels still refused to accept paid announcements from human rights groups that 
were protesting the amnesty bill for the military officers who were suspected o f being 
guilty of violations of those rights during the dictatorship. This attitude of self-censorship 
of private media, which had been important for survival during authoritarianism, was still 
prevalent for some time in television broadcasting.’3 Conversely, in the same country, 
Uruguay, the printed press played the opposite role, since from 1980 some printed 
magazines had been leading the way towards the transition and had started to oppose the 
regime.’4
A. The kind o f  relations between media and political elite
Reference is made here to the emergence of a different form of relationship between 
the media elite (owners and editors) and the political elite during the transition. In all 
countries -both democracies and non-democracies included—different types of relations 
develop between the media and political groups. In some cases, as in Sweden for instance, 
many journals and newspapers are directly linked to (and sponsored by) political parties. In 
other cases, these links are more subtle. In Britain an author shows the way in which the 
printed press -especially the one linked to the finance and banking sectors— favoured the 
Conservative Party in their information during the 1980s due to a coincidence of interests.* 245
2j Roque Faraone and Elizabeth Fox, "Political communication in Uruguay”, in Fox [1988].
24 The first important opposition weekly magazine, Opinar, appeared actually in October 1980. Since then, 
until 1984 many more weekly publications that favoured the transition wrere edited in Uruguay.
25 See Greg Philo, "Political advertising, popular belief and the 1992 British general election", in Media, 
Culture and Society, vol.15, n.3, July 1993.
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Except for the democratic purists, there should be no scandal about the fact that certa in  
groups within the media show affinities to certain political groups. The difference with su ch  
linkages in non-democratic regimes is that these relations tend to place the media in a  
position o f subordination, with few possibilities o f altering such a condition, and turning 
the media top officials into accomplices o f the regime. The overall result is that positions 
others than those of the government scarcely get any space.
However, though this might usually be the case in many non-democratic regimes, th e  
subordination of the top media officials is not necessarily determined, and less so in a  
context o f transition. Media top officials (owners included) and the political elite, both in  
the case of market- and public-owned media, may well have different “agendas” and  
interests that influence their behaviour. In some countries, a new generation o f managers 
and owners of media organisations have emerged with the privatisation and the re ­
structuring of privately-owned media. They seem to be “more concerned with economic 
efficiency and the national and international growth o f their companies than with the  
national politics or sometimes even national markets”.26 The private television in Brazil, 
Red O Globo, is a good example. In that country, though the O Globo multimedia empire 
was created during the military dictatorship (and in many ways O Globo top managers and 
owners initially supported that regime), its directors decided to shift its allegiance in favour 
o f the political abertura during the campaign in favour of the direitas ja  in a moment when 
the military were still in control of power,27 and in this way not only generated for 
themselves a new legitimacy in the eyes of the public, but perhaps more importantly, 
secured their privileges before an emerging political elite.* 23 In Uruguay, after the negative 
result of the referendum of November 1980 in which the military tried to legitimise a new 
constitution, a wide variety of political weekly magazines appeared. Working behind these 
weekly publications were many important opposition politicians-to-be, like Jorge Battle
2* Elizabeth Fox. “Conclusions”, in Fox [1988], pgs. 184-185.
■' Direitas ja  was the campaign in favour of holding direct popular elections for the election of Joao Baptista 
Figueiredo for the presidency of Brazil. It is important to note that, though O Globo supported the military, 
since the times of Ernesto Geisel it decided to establish an alliance with the military soft-liners of the regime.
23 See Andre Singer, “Nota sobre o papel da imprensa na transicao brasileira”, in Filgueira and Nohlen [1994]. 
What is remarkable also is the almost spontaneous way in which O Globo directors decided to shift their 
preferences. According to two consistent observers of Brazilian media, Guimaraes and Amaral, they shifted 
from practically ignoring the popular protests to becoming strong supporters of the electoral process, 
encouraging the people to join (Roberto Amaral and Cesar Guimaraes, “Brazilian television: a rapid 
conversion to the New Order”, in Fox [1988]).
and Julio Maria Sanguinetti. The aim of these publications was the gathering and forming 
of a political elite (something that was not new in the Uruguayan printed press) with whom 
the military found a moderate party to negotiate with. A different case is Romania, where 
after the important role played by television during the December 1989 Revolution, which 
ended the dictatorship of Ceaucescu, there still exist many old-regime interests in the media 
and their “new” top personnel that constrain it to develop into more truly independent 
positions.29
Therefore, what must be explained through these variables are the incentives of the top 
media officials to seek or not a more independent relationship with the regime. The 
transition might change the interests o f the owners of existent media. Also with the 
emergence of new media organisations during transitions, their owners might be more 
interested in running their businesses profitably than in coping with traditional rules.
In order to check for the emergence of these “new” attitudes of the media elite, one must at 
least consider the following criteria: the composition of the media elite during a transition; 
the possibilities for new interests to enter the media market; the different forms in which 
the media organisations are privatised and licensed. The subordination and collusion that 
usually (though not always) characterises the media elite in non-democratic regimes cannot 
be assumed to remain unchanged in a context of transition. Conversely, as many cases in 
Eastern Europe show, the transition from authoritarianism does not automatically involve 
the emergence of greater autonomy and security for the media elite to run their businesses, 
either in privately- or publicly-owned organisations.30
B. The degree o f professionalism o f journalists and editors
Usually one of the reasons for the scarcity of studies on the media in non- 
democratic regimes has been that in such polities the mass media lack high standards of 
professionalism in the journalistic work and in news-gathering, either because the
29 Richard A. Hall and Patrick O’Neil, “Institutions, transitions and the media: a comparison of Hungary and 
Romania”, in O’Neil [1998].
j0 Two examples of this situation: Before becoming prime minister of the Slovak Republic, Vladimir Meciar 
promised that once in power, he would ban any journalist who dare to criticise him. The other example comes 
from Poland, when in March 1994, President Walesa decided to fire the chairman of the National 
Broadcasting Company, without the legal rights to do so (Both examples are cited from: Andrew K. Milton, 
“News Media Reform in Eastern Europe; A Cross-National Comparison”, in Patrick O’Neil [1997], pgs.19- 
20).
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journalists have been controlled by the regime or because the journalists have been s im p ly  
unable to develop such standards. According to a widespread liberal interpretation, 
journalistic professionalism in democratic polities is generally conceived of as em bedding 
an “ethics o f impartiality”. In the United States, the American Society o f Professional 
Journalists has created an ethics code that states, amongst other things, that: “Journalists 
should be free of obligation to any interest other than the public's right to know”.31 It is o n ly  
through these attitudes of detachment that the professional journalist becomes the pillar o f  
a “watchdog role” of the media over the political world -which is regarded to b e  
“naturally” inclined to oppose the abuse of powfer.32 Therefore, it wras pointless to s tudy  
professional journalism in non-democratic regimes, since journalism w'as under political 
restrictions.
However, to understand professional journalism as the performance o f an “objective and  
impartial role” in politics, even in democracies, sheds partial light over the complex 
relations between journalists and politicians, in which they are found also to co-operate fo r  
interviews, information, news-elaboration, news-gathering and so forth. It must also b e  
considered that journalists’ attitudes towards politics should be analysed in relation to the  
specific type of media in which they work (it is completely different to w'ork for a business 
publication, like the Wall Street Journal, than to work for a Swedish newspaper closely 
linked to the Social Democratic Party).
In democracies, such as the U.S., there is a growing suspicion about defining journalistic 
professionalism only in terms of values such as objectivity, impartiality and neutrality.33 
Professionalism involves the journalists’ capacity to transmit information in independent 
and autonomous manners, and this has to do with the journalists’ investigative and research
31 Code of Ethics of the Society o f Professional Journalism: htrp://spi.ore'ethics code, asp
j2 See for instance William Rivers, The Adversaries: Politics and the Press, Boston, Beacon, 1970.
33 During the 1996 election season in the U.S., an experiment on the media was conducted in North Carolina. 
With the collaboration of six newspapers and nine broadcasting stations it was launched a project called 
“Your Voice, Your Vote” using some concepts related to w hat has been labeled as “Civil or Public 
Journalism”. According to Philip Meyer-an expert on this new development in journalism-, Civil Journalism 
is based on the need to stimulate citizen involvement in community issues, and this is done through adopting a 
new position that rids journalism of its traditional detachment and start caring about what happens in the 
communities. Instead of focusing on a supposed “objectivity of content”, the stress must be placed on an 
“objectivity in the method” to collect news, and making a reporter’s work replicable. About the North 
Carolina experiment on Civic Journalism see: http://research.unc.edu endeavors>'aut97/diaI.htm About the 
nature and ends o f Civic Journalism see the information published by the Pew Center for Civic Journalism in 
Washington, D.C., or consult its web page at: www.cpn.org/sections/affiliates/pew.html
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methodologies (to compare, contrast, verify, etc.) and with their maintenance o f a 
consistent and coherent position (that is invariably subjective). Any attempt to 
operationalise professionalism only in terms of values becomes problematic because 
concepts like objectivity, impartiality and commitment to truth are ambiguous. As James 
Curran shows, professionalism -in  such terms—means different things to different people, 
and in different cultures, even among the Western societies.34 He differentiates between the 
U.S., where in news reporting the accent is placed on entertainment and disclosure, and 
some Western European countries, where the news reporting give more space to “talking 
heads” and contrasting interpretations of events.35 Which of these is more professional 
becomes difficult to tell.
In this subject, one must also take into account both the pressures that the journalist might 
be subject to in the media organisation in which he/she works,36 and the fact that they may 
have preferences that cannot be ultimately hidden under supposedly objective and impartial 
stances at all time. The degree of professionalism in journalistic work requires then an 
indirect way of operationalisation based on the following criteria:
a) The level of education of the journalists (in a broad sense, objectivity, impartiality and a 
commitment to truth, which are complemented by other technical knowledge);
b) Answers to the classic questions on “who, what, where, when, why and how”,37 plus a 
relative degree of diversity of sources (depending on the topic) must be covered in such 
journalistic work;
c) The existence of the right to information (that guarantees the journalists access to 
information, and at the same time obliges them to inform the individuals);
d) The existence o f legal protection for journalistic independence and autonomy.38
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34 Curran, “Mass media and Democracy: a reappraisal", in James Curran and Michael Gurevitch, Mass Media 
and Society, London, Edward Arnold, 1991, p.98.
35 Ibidem,
j6 Pressures from the media owners and editors may always exist and replace the pressures from the old 
regime. As one author says in the case of the Czech republic mass media (at least since the mid-1990s): 
“Censorship or any other form of direct political control does not exist the Czech Republic. Instances of 
attempted manipulation of the media are, perhaps, fewer and in many cases less blatant than in other Central 
European countries. None the less, some professional media observers conclude that few', if any, major Czech 
publications can claim to be truly independent of either pressures exerted by politicians or the political and 
commercial interests of their owners” (Steve Kettle, “The development of the Czech media since the fall of 
Communism”, in O’Neil [1997], p.44).
37 Mitchell V. Chamley, Reporting, Holt, Rieneheart and Winston, 1966, p.167.
38 For journalists rights see: Tom Baistow', Fourth-Rate Estate, London, Commedia, 1985.
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The emphasis is placed on creating conditions that make possible for journalists with a  
relatively high degree of education to do their jobs in an independent and autonomous w ay. 
If  one considers these four criteria as the possible framework from which professionalism 
might evolve, then it can be acknowledged that in some countries, journalists w ere 
developing professional behaviour even before the transition started. In Poland for instance, 
many journalists used each of the crises of Communist rule (1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980- 
1) to argue that greater openness o f the mass media could help alleviate political tension 
and serve as an escape valve before they led to social unrest.39 Many of these journalists 
were not advocating the end of Communism, rather they wanted to transform some spaces 
within it and secure independence and autonomy in their journalistic work. Since the times 
o f Gomulka,
The new party leadership [...] knew that it needed the support of the print journalists to maintain its 
own position and to prevent a Soviet invasion. This informal bargain and the knowledge that they 
also had the support of the populace gave the Polish journalists, already equipped with an 
established professional ethic, some power in the defense of their work. The journalists repeatedly 
tested the boundaries of the permissible, an arrangement that was fostered by the censorship 
process. The result was a system that allowed for more open reporting and discussion of issues, 
which over time inevitably raised questions about the authority and knowledge of the party. The 
press was therefore part of the system, and yet apart from it: The party needed the press.40
The relationship between journalists and the political world may be seen as a variety o f  
“interactions between two sets o f mutually dependent and mutually adaptive actors, 
pursuing divergent (though overlapping) purposes, whose interrelation is typically role- 
regulated, giving rise to an emergent shared culture, specifying how they should behave 
toward each other, the ground rules o f which are open to contention and conflicting 
interpretation, entailing a potential for disruption, which is often controlled by informal 
and/or formal mechanisms of conflict management” .41
Professional journalism relates then, to the journalists’ level of education and to a 
framework that secures both the right to information and their legal protection against
39 For a rich account on the Polish case see Jane Leftwich Curry, Poland's Journalists: Professionalism and 
Politics, N.Y., Cambridge University Press, 1989.
40 Owen Johnson, in O’Neil [1998], pgs. 109-110, 112.
41 Jay G. Blumer and Michael Gurevitch, “Politicians and the Press: An Essay on Role Relationships”, in Dan 
D. Nimmo and Keith R. Sanders (eds.), Handbook o f Political Communication, London, Sage, 1981, pgs. 
476-477.
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pressure, both from politicians and from media editors and managers. This is how it 
becomes possible to study professional journalistic behaviour in non-democratic regimes. 
As in the case of the relations between top media officials and the political elite, there is no 
reason to assume that these internal actors of the media are necessarily conforming to a 
subordinate role.42
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C. The uses o f  new technology>
This refers to the impact o f new technology on the way in which the political 
information is presented and disseminated. A characteristic o f non-democratic regimes has 
been their attempts to centralise and control information flow and sources. In contrast, the 
introduction and adaptation of new and more advanced technology supposes a reduction in 
the ability of governments to successfully control and centralise information.43 
In recent times, the adoption of new technologies for communication has implied much 
more than only “buying technology”, but also deeper links between local media and some 
multimedia transnational corporations. Joint investments and technological improvements 
that broaden the spectrum of the media become increasingly difficult to control. An 
extreme example is provided by the relatively recent attempts of the government of 
Singapore to control the access of “surfers” to certain internet web-pages and sites.44 Older 
examples are those of the transmissions o f Radio Marti and Radio Free Europe to Cuba and 
the Eastern European Bloc respectively. As technology advances it becomes more difficult 
to control or censure the information flow. The expansion o f technologies such as Digital 
Subscriber Line (DSL) and Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) have meant a huge
4* As Downing shows even in Eastern European Communist countries there was always some space for 
journalists to expand the debates and discussion on public matters (Downing, [1996], pgs. 69-73).
4j The “Soft Technological Determinism” of the media gives another interesting insight into explaining the 
attitudes of the media in moving “towards a more independent media regime” in transition and consolidation 
processes. As stated by its proponent, De Sola Pool, these kind of studies try to avoid a strong technological 
determinism by recognising that technology interacts with other factors, whose influence is reciprocal. 
Therefore, the impact of technology is neither one-directional, nor immediate -and this is why it is called a 
“soft” determinism (hhiel de Sola Pool, Forecasting the Telephone, New York, Ablex, 1983, p.5.). This is 
based on a premise that might seem rather obvious: the diffusion of instruments of communication at a 
distance favours freedom of communication (and conversely, their concentration, monopolisation and scarcity 
act against such freedom). This point is relevant since it is not technology alone, but its diffusion, which -in 
combination with other factors—might explain some of the pressures within the media to look for the creation 
of an independent media regime. See also her Technologies o f Freedom, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press,
1984, where she develops further the argument on technology.
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increase in the speed and the quantity of information that could be transmitted through 
normal (twisted-pair cables) telephone lines.45 Other technologies related to th e  
transmission of information are the satellite and other wireless communications such as  
microwaves through which TV, radio and other broadband services are already available.46 
This translates into increasing possibilities for the individuals to receive a wider variety o f  
information from diverse and alternative sources that, at least in principle, could b e  
contrasted with the official versions of reality. One o f the most striking examples o f th e  
uses o f  such new communication technologies is provided by the Zapatista revolutionary 
uprising in the southern Mexican province of Chiapas in January 1995.
However, as stated above when mentioning De Sola Pool’s ideas on the “soft technological 
determinism”, the adoption o f new technology per se  by the media does not automatically 
carry with it a more democratic access to information and to the media. An interesting 
study that may considered to support De Sola Pool’s premise of the “soft technological 
determinism” is that by Amaral and Guimaraes on the media in Brazil, in which they not 
only document the process o f broadcasting development in that country, but most 
importantly, they also show how the adoption of new technology has failed to produce 
more democratic widespread information and access to the media due primarily to the 
virtual monopoly of the media giant O Globo.47 Therefore, though technology by itself does 
not mean a more “democratic media”, it may act to diminish the capacity o f the regime to 
control and centralise the access of information, and in this way, indirectly favour a more 
independent media regime.
44 See Gary Roldan, “The Internet and Political Control in Singapore", in Political Science Quarterly, vol.
113, no. 1, Spring 1998.
45 Leonard Sussman has labelled these advances as “technology of freedom” due to its impressive potential 
for transmitting and expanding information (L.R. Sussman, Power, the Press and the Technology o f Freedom: 
The Coming age o f ISDN, N.Y., Freedom House, 1989).
46 Though it might be rightfully alleged that certain technologies, such as internet, are only used by a very 
small minority of individuals in the world -which is true—, this fact does not undermine its potentialities as a 
source of de-centralised and alternative communication for minority and otherwise underrepresented voices in 
society. The huge expansion of the internet, the adaptation of its capacities, and related technological 
communication advances can be followed in the web page of the Internet Society (ISOC), at 
www.isoc.org/help/map.
4' Amaral and Guimaraes, “Media monopoly in Brazil’’, in Journal o f  Communication, 44, no.4, Autumn, 
1994.
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Up until this point we have discussed two external and three internal variables for 
understanding how the broadcasting media define their own interests and how their 
behaviour options are limited by the context in which they are inserted. This is quite 
important in understanding the motivations the media have (or not) when they start 
trespassing the limits of tolerance o f the regime, and the timing when they start doing so. 
However, there are other cases when the openness, or at least an attempt to become more 
open, in the media might have been forced by certain circumstances, such as the collapse of 
the authoritarian regime (or the Communist system), independently of the variables above 
mentioned. That was, for instance, the case of Argentina and o f countries such as Romania. 
But in the vast majority of cases, effective autonomy in the media -as measured by the 
ways in which they present the political information and material—is the consequence of 
the interaction of both the internal and external variables considered here (Figure A).
Figure A
Variables Affecting the Media’s Openness in Presenting News and Information on
Politics
(wAv, when and how in a context of transition)
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External Variables:
>  Effectiveness of traditional control 
mechanisms
>  Impact of the economy
Media's Openness
(as reflected on the way 
they present political 
information)
Internal Variables:
> Kind of linkages between media 
and political elite
> Journalistic professionalism
>  Uses given to techn ol ogy
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The Media and the Transition in Mexico
This thesis discusses precisely the above mentioned variables48 in order to understand th e  
conditions that motivated the broadcast media in Mexico to seek higher degrees o f  
openness in their presentation of news and political information. The media’s openness is  
studied in this work through an evaluation of the ways radio and TV news broadcasts 
presented the news and other information material on politics in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
especially during federal electoral seasons (the most explicitly visible periods fo r  
presenting political information on different actors). Additional material was collected 
through eight interviews that only in specific cases will be cited to support the arguments 
developed.49
This thesis aims to provide answers to the following questions: How was the relationship 
between the media and the regime (i.e. the links between media entrepreneurs and the 
political elite, and the exchange o f support between media and regime)? What was the ro le  
of the news broadcasts within the regime and what kind of information did the news 
broadcasts present? Was there any difference between radio and TV news broadcasts? How 
did they report on the official party, the PRI, and the President? How did they report on  
opposition parties and alternative political actors? And most importantly, why and how did 
the news broadcasts start to report and inform on these latter forces (the process o f  
openness on the media)?
One o f the most persistent features of the Mexican post-revolutionary regime (MPRR) was 
its control over the political information and material transmitted through the media. This is
48 With the exception of the professionalism of journalists that is discussed in the final remarks.
49 Only four of them were willing to be cited by name: José Carreño Carlón (Co-founder of the newspaper La 
Jornada and actual Director of the Communications Department at the Universidad Iberoamericana); Raúl 
Trejo Delarbre (Professor of the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences of UN AM and Director of the 
monthly opinion magazine Etcétera; Guillermo Salas Vargas (Corporate Vice-President of the Radio Network 
Grupo Radio Mil)’, and Roberto Ordorica (former General Manager of the newsbroadcast Monitor, of the 
newsbroadcast La Ciudad and owner of the radio local station “La T’ de Ixtapan” [14000 khz) of Ixtapan de 
la Sal, State o f Mexico). The other four interviewees asked not to be cited by name, so they will appear as: 
Top-Executive of Monitor; Top-Executive of Grupo Radio Centro (the largest radio network in Mexico); 
Share-holder of MVS TV {a private microwave TV system); and Top-Executive of Televisa. Additionally 
some of the most persistent difficulties in obtaining information that should be public (like advertising 
expenditures on the media or the records of the National Chamber of Radio and Television) were the distrust 
of those responsible for the keeping of such information because o f a possible misuse of it, the excessive 
number of identity proofs the author must present before examining it, and the open and explicit denial for 
consulting it on the grounds that such information is reserved “for official uses only” (?).
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not surprising since this attitude is characteristic o f non-democratic regimes -in  the 
Mexican case, of a limited pluralistic regime with many features of authoritarianism as 
described by Juan Linz in his analysis of such kind of regimes.” For him these regimes are,
Political systems with limited, not responsible political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding 
ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization 
(except at some points in their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) 
exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.”
However, contrary to what might be expected in a privately controlled media system, the 
political liberalisation process in Mexico did not generate more open, critic and 
independent broadcast media. The political transition and the growing o f political pluralism 
in Mexico were not reflected in these media for years. And when they decided to report on 
such processes and to open their microphones to these alternative voices, political 
opposition parties were already controlling some important local and state governments and 
congresses. Thus, it is possible to say that the political transition was a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for explaining the media’s recent openness. But then, if the explanation 
is not found at the political level, what were the conditions that led these media towards 
more openness and autonomy? And how did they implement these changes?
I sustain that the relatively recent openness of the media in presenting the increasing 
political pluralism on the screens and air waves (especially during electoral periods) is 
better explained by the transformation of the economic conditions in which they 
traditionally developed. The economic context in which these media had to play in the 
1980s and 1990s was not of stability and growth, as it had been for decades, but one of 
recurrent crises and growing competition. These changes at the economic level generated 
incentives for the entrepreneurs, first on radio and much later on TV, for experimenting 
with innovative programme formats (like the “talk-radio”) that gradually reflected on the 
contents as well. Within the context of recurrent economic crises and competition for 
audiences and resources, radio and later TV stations decided to “test the limits of tolerance” 
and shifted their attention to the already existing political pluralism in order to make it a 501
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50 Juan J. Linz, “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain”, in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Mass Politics: 
Studies in Political Sociology, New York, Free Press, 1970.
51 Ibid., p.255.
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profitable business and survive in the market. Democracy became a good business, a n d  
good businesses suddenly supported democracy.
In brief, the combination o f the above mentioned variables in the case of the broadcast 
media in Mexico permits me to sustain that the openness o f radio and television was led n o t  
by the rhythms o f the political transition, but by the economic and corporate interests o f  th e  
concessionaires in a context o f  crisis and competition. The following Graphic A shows th e  
media’s presentation o f information and news (in Italics) in Mexico both before and during 
the political liberalisation process. As can be seen, the openness of the broadcast m edia 
began later than on the press and at a time when the liberalisation process was already w ell 
under way. And it is noticeable also that there are interesting differences between radio and  
television in the ways they started to open spaces for alternative political actors and voices.
Graphic A
Mass Media’s Forms of Presenting News and Information in Mexico 
(The darker the shade the greater the capacity o f the regime to exercise control)
Regime’s “Golden Years ” Crisis J968-1977 Liberalisation Process, 1977-1997
Ideal-Type 
Media’s Openness
Media Informing on 
Political Alternatives
Political Information 
on the Primed Press
Political Information 
On Radio
Political Information on 
TV
Absolutely Closed
Media
1930s-1960s 1968 1976-7 1994 1997 2000
Before discussing the particular features of the abertura on radio and on TV, it is important 
to mention an important aspect o f the Mexican transition. More than a complete 
authoritarianism, the Mexican regime was characterised by a limited political pluralism and 
a limited socio-economic demand articulation through corporatist relations designed-or 
accepted and tolerated—by the State.* 53 Mass mobilisation was organised and channelled 
through institutional arrangements within the official party and this was crucial for limiting 
popular demands and maintaining socio-political stability.” There also existed a large 
variety of formal and informal restrictions to create autonomous and independent 
organisations to articulate political and economic preferences. Corporatism became a 
means of exchange and of control at the same time, leaving little capacity for the mobility 
of those organisations that challenged the rules.
In the case o f popular sectors, it was the regime who incorporated them “from above” 
within the party, with their consequent loss of autonomy.54 They had very limited ability for 
independent manoeuvring and limited strength for formulating their own demands. Their 
incorporation meant a political control that lowered their active participation in the system 
as autonomous social actors since it hindered any possibility for independent leadership or 
for elaborating an alternative mass political project to the regime's.55 This control also 
aimed at reducing the number of demands, depoliticising them and transforming them into 
bureaucratic and administrative matters. It was always easier to deal with administrative 
problems than facing political demands.56
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53 The most accepted definition of corporatism -that of Professor Philippe C. Schmitter—defines it as “a 
system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within 
their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of their demands and supporters”(P.C. Schmitter, “Still the Century of Corporatism?", in 
Schmitter and Gerhard Lembruch (eds.), Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, London, Sage, 1979,
P-13.
53 According to Vincent Padgett the “interiorisation” of history -especially through all mass media and the 
educational system—contributed to the acceptance of the political regime since this is seen as the result of the 
national history (The Mexican Political System, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966, first chapter).
54 One of the most notorious features of the official party was its great capacity to mobilise large numbers of 
its sectorial affiliates for all kind of political acts, meetings and events in its support. However, most of this 
participation may have been induced or incentivated through a variety of means ranging from rewards to 
penalties for those who did not attend.
55 José Luis Reyna, Control politico, estabilidad y  desarrollo en México, Mexico City, Centro de Estudios 
Sociológicos, El Colegio de México, CES Working Paper, n.3, 1974, p.10.
5<> ¡bid., p.25.
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In the case o f autonomously created organisations -like some political parties or 
entrepreneurial organisations—they had to conform to the rules the regime imposed, with 
little possibility o f altering those rules.57 However, the most salient feature o f the regime 
was its impressive ability to incorporate diverse groups and organisations and to develop 
different kinds of exchange relations with them. The regime gave them legal recognition, 
subsidies, and a wide variety of direct and indirect benefits in exchange for their support, or 
their passive acceptance of the rules of the game. In general, this scheme worked well for 
the incorporation through corporatism of the most salient organised groups o f society 
(whether the regime organised them “from above” or whether they organised by 
themselves, but had to accept the regime’s rules). Only in those cases where these exchange 
relations were not enough to maintain the status quo, the regime resorted to more open 
measures o f control that ranged from very a subjective enforcement of the law to more 
repressive measures, though open repression was normally the exception and not the rule.5* 
As many authors agree, perhaps the sector which benefited most from the economic growth 
and the re-distributive policies of the regime in the period between 1950 and 1970 were the 
new urban middle classes.59 These sectors, which were not incorporated neither into the 
party nor into formal organisations directly linked to the regime, satisfied their demands o f 
social and economic mobility through the re-distributive policies of the State.60 During the 
period 1950-1970, these middle classes greatly profited from the economic transformations 
and the expansion of public services and became also the main source of human resources
57 As is discussed in Chapters One and Two, radio and TV entrepreneurs organised in the powerful National 
Chamber of Radio and Television that successfully negotiated their economic interests before the State. 
However, the limits to their power were on the political side, since in exchange for those economic benefits 
they committed their support to the regime’s legitimacy and promotion.
58 Reyna, (1974), p. 10.
59 See: Héctor Aguilar Camin and Lorenzo Meyer, A ¡a sombra de la Revolución mexicana, México City, Ed. 
Cal y Arena, Sixth Ed., 1991; Enrique De la Garza, Ascenso y  crisis del Estado social autoritario, Mexico 
City, El Colegio de México, 1989; Soledad Loaeza, "Las clases medias mexicanas y la coyuntura económica 
actual", in México ante la crisis, Mexico City, Siglo XXI, Vol. II, 1985; Francisco López Cámara, La clase 
media en la era del populismo, Mexico City, Miguel Angel Porrúa/UNAM Colección Las Ciencias Sociales, 
1988.
60 These middle sectors grew from being 16.6 percent of the population in 1950 to 23.4 percent in 1970 
(Claudio Stem, "Notas para la delimitación de las clases medias en México", in Loaeza, Soledad and Claudio 
Stem, Las clases medias en la coyuntura actual, CES Working Paper, no.33, Mexico City, El Colegio de 
México, 1990, p.23). In terms of income, these sectors increased their share from 36.5 percent in 1950 to 43.5 
percent in 1970 (Enrique Hernández Laos and Jorge Córdoba Chávez, "Estructura de la distribución del 
ingreso en México", in Comercio Exterior, no.5, May 1979, p. 12).
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for the constantly growing bureaucratic apparatus and the public service.61 This expansion 
of the State apparatus, and o f its re-distributive policies, within a context of economic 
growth and development, from which even the popular sectors benefited,62 generated a 
society that, in general terms, grew confident on the paternalistic State structures. A natural 
consequence of this situation was that for a long time, the votes for opposition parties were 
better explained due to unconformity and protest against the regime’s performance -in  the 
social and economic spheres—than to a conscious vote linked to opposition parties’ 
loyalties. As one author stresses, it is noticeable that “the record shows that decades of 
growth produced comparatively limited pressures for democracy in Mexico and more 
limited results, [and that] the strongest calls for democratization have come since growth 
had reversed”.63 This is precisely the point: during the decades o f growth (up to the 1970s), 
the regime was successful in limiting the development of autonomous organisations from 
its corporatist network due to a combination of re-distributive policies and eventually other 
more repressive measures. The outcome was that most of all independent and autonomous 
civil society organisations were weakly structured. Instead, what could be clearly seen was 
a society whose most salient sectors and organisations were, either directly or indirectly, 
linked to the regime, and thus habituated to economic, social and political paternalism. Let 
me link this point to the aim of this work.
This thesis’s objective is to discuss the conditions that have moved the media into 
openness, and it asserts that such conditions have essentially been economic factors, not the 
transition which, at most have been a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for abertura. 
But there is a previous question that requires an answer here: why has this media remained 
essentially closed during most of the transition? An answer may be found in this thesis: 
because as long as the regime granted certain economic benefits to the licensees they would 
never attempt to challenge it by pressing for openness and démocratisation.64 The licensees
61 Francisco López Cámara, El desafio de la clase media, Mexico City, Cuadernos de Joaquín Mortiz, 1971, 
p.47.
62 The workers who belonged to unions were granted, at least, minimum salaries, social security, a maximum 
of labour hours and the security of maintaining the jobs. See Jorge Basurto, "Obstáculos al cambio en el 
movimiento obrero", in El perfil de México en 1980, vol.3, Mexico City, Ed. Siglo XXI, 1970, p.54.
6j Daniel C. Levy, “Mexico: suatained civilian rule without democracy”, in Linz, Juan J., Larry Diamond and 
Seymour M. Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries, vol.4, Latin America, Boulder, Lyenne 
Rienner Publishers, 1989, p.486.
64 A different thing is to see if in such case they could have been successful, since there existed also a wide 
variety of mechanisms of media control in the hands of the regime.
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accepted an exchange of political support for economic benefits. This may be clearly seen, 
especially in chapters one and two, which analyse the different economic supports provided 
by the regime to the private media and the political loyalty that the latter were keen to offer 
the regime in exchange for such benefits. However, this is only part o f the answer -the part 
of the answer that matters in this study is the discussion of the reasons that explain the 
recent openness of the broadcast media. The other part of the answer that must be given in 
order to understand the whole context of the media in Mexico has to do with the absence o f  
consistent and organised “pressures from below” in the Mexican transition.65 The transition 
in Mexico has been almost exclusively centred since the beginning on the expansion of the 
electoral arena and the role of the parties in it, leaving in a secondary place the role of the 
“civil society”, which has been extremely weak in articulating demands and pressing for 
démocratisation. Under such circumstances, and perhaps with few exceptions, like in 
Chihuahua’s 1986 election and the calls of 1988 PAN’s Presidential candidate, Manuel 
Clouthier, to veto Televisa’s news broadcasts,66 civil society has not been capable o f  
transforming itself into a real interlocutor before the media. If one considers that the 
political communication triangle is conformed by the interaction among the political 
system, the mass media and civil society (which demands accountability and responsibility 
from the formers), and in the case o f Mexico civil society has been weakly structured, then 
we realise that the mass media have not faced other counterparts but the political system. 
The “dialogue” established between the media and the regime, excluding civil society, 
which was not able to become a real counterpart in such dialogue between the media and 
the regime for decades. In this way, though the main hypothesis of this work is that the 
conditions that moved the broadcast media to openness was the new situation of economic 
competition in a wider context of crisis, one could also add that a condition for their 
closeness for decades besides the convenient economic exchange with the regime (which is 
analysed in the first two chapters) was the weakness of a civil society in demanding more 
autonomous and responsible information.67 Let me briefly differentiate between the 
particular characteristics of the openness on radio and the openness on television.
65 This feature of the Mexican transition will be fully discussed in Chapter Three.
66 See Chapters Four and Five.
67 This does not mean that people did not react positively when spaces were opened on the media, as in the 
case of talk-radio programmes where individuals could call and communicate their opinion on different 
subjects. Indeed, as Chapter Five states, when given the chance people “made use” of radio spaces. But this
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Radio
The process of openness on the radio is rooted in two important changes that occurred in 
the 1980s. On the one hand, there was a wider adoption of innovative forms of broadcasting 
based on talk-radio formats and a positive reaction of the audiences to those programmes. 
These changes in the formats were introduced at first on AM stations due to the growing 
switching of audience’s preferences for FM radio. On the other hand, those initial changes 
in the formats slowly gave way to changes -erratic and timid at first—in the content as 
well. As is discussed in Chapter Four, this eventual transformation on the contents has to do 
mainly with the competition among a growing number of stations in a decreasing publicity 
market. It is interesting to note also how the regime reacts against these experiments on 
radio. A whole variety of mechanisms for controlling the content of the programmes were 
used, but the most recurrent practice was to call up the stations from either the Office of the 
Presidency or the Secretariat of Gobernación. The usual outcome was the dismissing of the 
newscasters or the temporary closure of the news broadcasts (since the stations re­
scheduled them with different names). In spite o f such pressures, some radio stations 
continued with their policy of openness since the ratings were rising and, in a context of 
economic depression and greater competition among the stations for advertisers, this w'ould 
secure their economic survival. There also developed a market for hiring as newscasters 
important and renowned journalists, who were constantly moving from one station to 
another. As Chapter Eight shows this trend in the radio news broadcasts continued during 
the 1990s along with other important measures taken by the owners of the stations and 
networks at the financial level (merging with other stations, selling or buying shares, 
changing the programming of the stations, and so on) in order to adapt better to an 
increasingly competitive market. In this way, the Electoral Reform of 1996, which granted 
the parties the largest amount of resources ever to be invested on broadcast advertising, 
reinforced such abertura on the radio.
individual participation was not transformed into an organised or a consistent collective call for media's
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Television
In the case of television, the openness with regard to political information and news, only 
began in 1997. In sharp contrast with what has been its traditionally closed handling o f  
political information -even during periods of highly visible competence such as the 
elections o f  1994— , since 1997 private television rapidly became a more independent 
source o f political information. The explanation for this openness comes from the 
emergence of competition among TV networks that seriously altered the conditions o f  
quasi-monopoly in which Mexican private TV developed for decades. In 1992 the public 
TV network, Imevision, was privatised and renamed thereafter TV Azteca. But it was not 
until 1995-1996 that true competition between the two largest private consortiums -  
Televisa and TV Azteca—developed its hardest aspects. Competition forced both networks 
to implement new publicity policies, to be more careful in their investments, and to seek for 
new alliances in order to strengthen their positions and raise their ratings. Such competition 
among the networks also coincided with the replacing o f all the top executives in Televisa 
after the death of the main share-holder, Emilio Azcarraga Milmo in April 1997, with new 
young executives led by Emilio Azcarraga Jean, who consistently showed that business, 
and not politics was the main occupation of the company. It was under such circumstances 
that the TV networks were already disputing the resources granted by the 1996 Electoral 
Law to the parties for advertising their positions before the 1997 elections. In this fashion, 
economic competition made the networks turn their heads towards the growing political 
pluralism, since it represented money and good business in a TV market in which the 
rivalry between the two networks became almost a zero-sum game.
This work is divided into three parts. Part I discusses two aspects of the relation between 
the broadcast media industry and the regime in its two chapters. Chapter One focuses on the 
nature of the mutual benefits that were exchanged between media entrepreneurs and the 
political regime. The regime provided strong support for the economic development of the 
commercial broadcast model and all facilities to the media entrepreneurs for running a 
profitable business in exchange for political collaboration. In this sense, the role of the 
news broadcasts was crucial for promoting a supportive image of the regime and silence on
openness from the society.
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all relevant political debates and issues. However, the very same legislation and rulings that 
secured the media those economic benefits contained provisions for controlling 
broadcastings, from restrictions on the contents of programming to highly unclear 
procedures for awarding and revoking the licenses for operation, that served as ultimate 
resource for securing the political loyalty o f broadcasters.
Chapter Two departs from a conceptualisation of the media businessmen as an interest 
group, and then goes on to discuss their creation of a National Chamber of the Radio 
Industry, their close links with some important PRI political groups, and the kind of 
pressure they used to obtain and preserve important economic gains. It also shows the 
limits of this pressure: the political sphere. At the end of the chapter, some impressions are 
given on the usage of a term such as “interest group” for encompassing all the licensees, 
since there were always important differences between Mexico City media entrepreneurs 
and the ones of other provinces.
Part II analyses the information policies taken by the media from the mid-1970s to the 
early 1990s, i.e. during the political liberalisation process and the emergence of opposition 
organisations. Chapter Three describes the political liberalisation process and the growth of 
opposition parties in the context of the frequent economic crises of the 1980s. Chapter Four 
discusses how in this period private television reinforced its political support for the regime 
and its news broadcasts became almost public relations agencies for promoting the PRI and 
the presidents. In spite of the growing importance of opposition parties and actors, Televisa 
restricted all information on them on its screens. In exchange, it received various economic 
benefits, from preferential fiscal treatment to subsidies for sending its transmissions over 
the national terrestrial microwave network and on the Mexican satellite system. In this way, 
due to such supports and its quasi-monopoly over the domestic TV market, the crises did 
not affect Televisa. Conversely, Chapter Five shows how the crises forced a fierce 
competition for survival on the radio market. Among the changes that were implemented on 
the networks and stations was the adoption of new formats and eventually new 
programming that affected the contents o f the news broadcasts as well. It was in this period 
that some radio stations decided to explore the limits of tolerance, since this was improving 
their ratings and their positions within the publicity market. However, though this
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lrepresented the first steps for openness on radio, such steps were still timid and inconsistent 
and they did not conform to the rule in Mexican radio.
P a rt III shows the information policies practised by the media in the period between 1994 
and 2000, a time when the regime effectively lost the ultimate control over the electoral 
arena and true competition developed. Chapter Six describes these political changes and  
how the deep 1995 economic crisis prevented the maintenance of any political measure in  
which the regime could still have the ultimate control over political life. The Reform o f  
1996 was an outcome of this situation, and granted true competition.
Chapter Seven analyses how television abruptly moved from an almost absolute closeness 
on its screens to political openness after 1996. The “incentives” for such move are found 
mainly in the strong competition that emerged between the private networks Televisa and 
TV Azteca and their fight for the publicity market, including the enormous amount o f  
resources granted to the parties by the Federal Electoral Institute for their political 
advertising before the crucial elections of 1997. Finally, Chapter Eight focuses on the 
deepening o f  the trend towards openness on the radio. The continuous growth in the 
number of stations, plus the negative economic effects o f the 1995 crisis, increased the 
difficulties o f many radio stations. The crisis dropped the publicity market share of the 
radio from 12 percent to 9.5 percent, and this became a crucial incentive for experimenting 
with all sorts of programme formulae, among which news broadcasts abertura was a 
successful one.
In Final Rem arks is discussed the state of the art of the links between mass media and 
democracy in Mexico in the aftermath of the 2000 elections by considering the debate on 
the Right to Information in the country.
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Traditional Links between the Mass Media and
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Chapter One
The Commercial Media and the News Broadcasts
Since the mid-1930s, the Mexican post-revolutionary regime took up industrialisation as 
a major revolutionary goal through which economic development would be attained. For 
this purpose, modem entrepreneurial sectors were required and the regime provided for 
the conditions that would help to develop and strengthen them. As part of these sectors, 
broadcast media entrepreneurs received the support of the regime for profitably running 
their businesses for decades.
In exchange for granting favourable conditions for developing the commercial media 
model, the regime would secure a series of political controls over broadcasting. The news 
broadcasts played an important role here, since they served to promote a positive and 
supportive image of the regime while avoiding all relevant debates and information on 
politics. These mutually beneficial exchanges characterised the performance of the media 
for decades.
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first one is a brief historical account of the 
conditions through which the private commercial model of broadcast media was finally 
adopted in Mexico, and supported by some groups of the political elite. Though the 
regime kept a series of legal and political controls over broadcasting, it gave the media 
businessmen all the facilities to run highly profitable businesses. These benefits were 
exchanged for political support. For this -and here starts the second pan—the role of the 
news broadcasts were crucial. These programmes served to present a supportive image of 
the regime and to avoid discussions on relevant political issues .
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The Adoption o f the Private Commercial Broadcast Model in Mexico
In Mexico, the broadcast media appeared in the early 1920s (Table 1.1). By the m id- 
1990s, nearly 98 percent of the population in the country had access to the radio.' In th e  
case o f TV, by the early 1990s out of a total 18 million households, Channel 2 could b e  
seen in 12,528,500 homes; Channel 7 in 11,496,500 homes; Channel 13 in 9,844,200 
homes; Channel 5 in 8,142,900 homes; and Channel 4 in 3,196,400 homes.1 2
Table 1.1
Number of Radio and TV stations in operation in Mexico, 1921-1995
Year Radio Stations Television Stations
1921 4 -
1930 32 -
1940 113 -
1950 195 1
1960 369* 21
1970 603 78
1980 848 285**
1990 1045 568***
1995 1291 ¿42*** *
*In 1952 started to operate the FM radio stations. In 1960 there were 10 FM stations.
**This figure includes 172 commercial TV channels, 2 cultural channels and the 110 channels that 
composed the public network Television de la República Mexicana (TRM).
1 Fernando Mejia Barquera. “Historia mínima de la radio mexicana”, in Miguel Ángel Sánchez de Armas 
(coord.), Apuntes para una historia de la radio mexicana. Mexico City, RMC'Espacio. 1999a. p . l .
2 Antonio E. Zarur Osorio. El Estado y el modelo de televisión adoptado en México, / 950-2000. Mexico 
City, Metropolitan Autonomous University, 1996, p.l 14. Channels 2, 4 and 5 belong to Televisa. B\ that 
time the other two channels belonged to the State through IMEVISION, an organisation that operated the 
State TV facilities. During the Salinas administration (1988-1994) these two channels were privatised.
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***This figure includes 215 commercial channels under concession, 25 “complementary” channels -i.e. 
channels that serve only to link the re-transmission television stations of the networks with the 
telecommunications system—and the 328 public channels under permission.
****The number includes 379 commercial channels operated under concession, 61 complementary 
channels and 102 public channels under permission. These are 1994 figures.
Source: For radio stations, the information was taken from Fernando Mejia Barquera, “Historia mínima de 
la radio mexicana”, in Miguel Ángel Sánchez de Armas (coord.), Apuntes para una historia de la radio 
mexicana, Mexico City, RMC/Espacio, 1999a. For television stations, the information was taken from 
Femando Mejia Barquera, “Historia mínima de la televisión mexicana”, in Miguel Ángel Sánchez de 
Armas (coord.), Apuntes para una historia mínima de la televisión mexicana, Mexico City, RMC/Espacio, 
1998.
Though there is a dispute over who the first broadcaster was, the first broadcasting 
transmissions took place in 1921. Two different broadcasts were made in September 27th 
that year. One by the supervisor of Radio-electric Stations of the General Department of 
Telegraphs, Agustín Flores, and his assistant José Valdovinos, who used public facilities 
for his transmission.3 The other, by the young Adolfo E. Gómez Fernández and his 
brother.4 However, it was a third one, in October, that the people linked to the industry of 
radio and television consider to be the first broadcast in Mexico: that made by the 
engineer Constantino de Támava in the city of Monterrey.5
Private broadcasting was permitted by obtaining a license. Since 1943 there had been two 
kinds of licenses: the “concessions” and the “permissions”. Concessions are given to 
individuals or companies who want to exploit commercially the radioelectric frequencies. 
Permissions are given to individuals and organisations who want to use them for cultural 
or educational purposes without profit. Already in 1922 there was a long list o f people 
who wanted to get a license for radio. A year later, there appeared the first commercial 
radio stations in Mexico, the CYL owned by Raúl Azcárraga Vidaurreta in association 
w'ith the newspaper El Universal, and the CYB, owned by the cigar firm “El Buen
3 Rosalía Velázquez Estrada, “El Estado y la radiodifusión”, Connotaciones, no.l, Mexico City, 1981, p.80.
4 Fátima Fernández Christlieb, Los medios de difusión masiva en México, 10*h Edition, Mexico City, Juan 
Pablos, 1996, p.238.
5 His transmission was registered on October 27th 1921. It is possible that the fact that his name appears as 
the pioneer of radio transmission is due to his personal links with the nascent commercial radio industry 
and to what was later the Azcárraga group. See Enrique Sánchez Ruiz, “Orígenes de la radiodifusión en 
México. Desarrollo Capitalista y el Estado”, in Huella, no.9, Guadalajara, ITESO, 1984, p.9.
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Tono”.6 During its first decade, most radio stations were founded in association w ith  
commercial branches o f American firms such as General Electric, RCA or Marconi. 
These firms and their Mexican associates obviously favoured the development of the  
industry along the commercial patterns of the American radio. In the absence of proper 
regulations, advertising became a de facto way to finance the radio. The first ads were 
aimed at promoting the products of the firms that owned the stations -i.e. “El Buen 
Tono” cigars.7 The programming was also quite similar to transmissions in the U.S., i.e. 
music and radio soap operas. Thus, by the end of that decade, the commercial model had 
been imposed as the dominant practice.
The most important commercial radio station in Mexico, XEW, owned by Emilio 
Azcarraga Vidaurreta, began operating in 1930. The shareholders of this new station were 
Azcarraga with 12.25% of the shares, and the Mexico Music Company, with the 
remaining 87.75%.8 Since the law prohibited that foreigners could obtain radio 
concessions (but not in participating in the constitution o f radio networks) the control was 
handed over to Azcarraga, who immediately affiliated the XEW to the National 
Broadcasting Network (NBC), RCA’s radio division. The major expansion o f Azcarraga 
to the rest o f the country soon followed. In 1938 there were not only fourteen stations 
affiliated to the XEW-NBC, but by October o f that year Azcarraga started operating 
another station, XEQ, which this time he affiliated to the Columbia Broadcasting System 
(CBS) -which by 1945 included seventeen other stations.9 His two radio stations were the 
most important in the country and in 1941 Azcarraga decided to go into business with the 
entrepreneur Clemente Sema to establish the organisation Radio Programmes of Mexico 
(RPM). That same year RPM created the first national radio network, the “Azul
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6 This firm had been founded with French capital from the “Société Financière pour l’industrie au 
Mexique”, which had links also with the Moctezuma Brewery (origin of the powerful industrial Monterrey 
Group), in which the father of the engineer De Támava worked, and with the Laredo National Bank, owned 
by the Briton Patrick Milmo, whose daughter married Emilio Azcánaga Vidaurreta, brother o f Raúl 
Azcarraga.
7 According to a study, it was the CYB in 1929 the first station to cover its expenses and obtain some 
profits through commercial advertising. See Patricia Arriaga, Publicidad, economía y  comunicación 
masiva. Estados Unidos y México, Mexico City, CEESTEM, 1980, (p.224).
8 Since the early 1920s Azcarraga was the manager of the Mexico Music Co., which was a branch of RCA. 
Mexico Music Co. dedicated to selling gramophones and plates and to the distribution of the products of 
the RCA.
9 Luis A. de Noriega and F. Leach, Broadcasting in Mexico. Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1979, p.7.
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Network” leaded by the XEQ -which was part of the Americas Network of the CBS. 
RPM affiliated in a brief space o f time more than 80 radio stations, including stations in 
other South American countries.10 By the late 1940s RPM was not the only radio 
network, there was also the BBC, the Mutual Broadcasting System (which owned the 
Radio Mil Network) and the French station XEB (the old CYB), w'hich was joined by 20 
other stations in the early 1940s. However, the strongest voice in Mexico’s commercial 
radio was Azcarraga’s.11 Moreover,
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The radio gave him the possibility to integrate his businesses: he produced radio and sold the sets, 
he popularised singers, recorded their plates and not only sold them, but also the gramophones on 
which the plates were played. This strategy of vertical and horizontal integration of his businesses 
would be a constant in the future firms of the Azcárraga family...
The Mexican radio model, from which the XEW was the indisputable pillar, followed basically 
the paths imposed by the American one based on the private exploitation of the medium with 
totally commercial aims.12
The development of commercial stations did not prevent the government from operating 
its own stations and from granting concessions to politically organised groups, linked to 
it, and to some public dependencies.13 The CZE radio station, operated by the Secretariat 
of Public Education, began broadcasting in November 1924. Its aims w'ere to support the 
education policy in the rural world and also to disseminate the ideology of the revolution. 
Shortly afterwards many other public stations emerged controlled by different 
organisations and dependencies, from “official working unions”, like the CROM, to the 
Secretariat of Industry, Commerce and Labour, the Secretariat of War and Navy, and the 
recently founded official party, the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), whose station, 
XEFO, was inaugurated in December 31il 1930. XEFO was used to disseminate ihe
10 Amaga, (1980), p.226.
11 For instance: Karin Bohmann, Medios de comunicación y sistemas informativos en México y Mexico City, 
Alianza Editorial, reprinted 1997 (1986); Fernández Christlieb, (1996); Pablo Arredondo Ramirez and 
Enrique E. Sánchez Ruiz, Comunicación sociai, poder y  democracia en México, 2nd Ed., Mexico,
University of Guadalajara, 1987; De Noriega and Leach, (1979).
12 Zarur Osorio, (1996), pgs.17-18.
13 Arredondo Ramirez and Sánchez Ruiz, (1987), p.96.
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doctrine of the party, general news on political affairs and the governmental program m es, 
but it also transmitted some programmes on literature and arts for educational purposes.14
Other public stations appeared in the 1930s, like those o f the Secretariat o f Gobernación  
(the Ministry of the Interior) and the National University, named “Radio U niversity  
XEXX” and founded, as the former, in 1937. By 1940 there were fourteen public rad io  
stations, the highest number they would reach until the 1970s. The increase in th e ir  
number was part of a conscious project -for the first and only time—for using public  
radio with some concrete purposes. Under President Cárdenas (1934-1940) the public  
radio stations were considered as educational tools and their programmes included 
lessons on agriculture, on labour legislation, on national problems, but also on m usic, 
book reviews, and other cultural contents.15
Radio was an important part o f the Cardenista political project o f incorporating and  
educating the masses. However, the ideological aims were not left out of the government 
project. Public stations were used as an influential means for government propaganda. 
For instance, during February and March 1938 the public radio stations were calling fo r 
support in favour of the nationalisation of the oil companies, and later in May they w ere 
used to discredit the cedillista rebellion in the state of San Luis Potosí.
However, as the Cardenista administration ended, the public radio project was cancelled 
by his successor in the presidency, Manuel Avila Camacho (1940-1946), and no other 
public media project was to be developed until the 1970s. Moreover, the government o f  
Avila Camacho sold some of the public stations and the few that remained under public 
control lacked any co-ordination policies and project. A further reason to dismantle the 
public radio project, beyond the ideological differences between the Cárdenas and the
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14 At first the official party station, XEFO, transmitted every Monday evening, a programme dedicated to 
each state of the country; on Tuesdays, it transmitted programmes dedicated to rural and peasant topics; on 
Wednesdays, it was the turn for working class programmes; on Thursdays, some concerts were aired and 
the programmes were dedicated to topics of interest for industrial and commercial entrepreneurs; on 
Fridays, they transmitted history comments and other topics related to the Revolution; finally on Saturdays, 
the programmes were dedicated to children and housewives with topics which included cooking classes and 
child care. (See Mejia Barquera, La industria de la radio y  la televisión y  la política del Estado mexicano. 
vol.l, Mexico City, Fundación Manuel Buendia, 1989, pgs.55-56). However, when President Miguel 
Alemán took office he privatised this radio station.
15 Luis Esparza Oteo, La política cultural del Estado mexicano y  el desarrollo déla televisión, Mexico 
City, SEP, 1981, pgs.17-18.
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Avila Camacho administrations, was the high cost involved in their maintenance.16 For 
example, the arguments given by the government to sell the largest public radio- 
telegraphic station, the Chapultepec Station, were the impossibility of paying for the 
enormous amount of energy that it consumed.17 During the administration of President 
Miguel Alemán (1946-1952), even the XEFO, the radio station of the PRI was privatised. 
In any case, without a public media project, the way was open for the commercial model 
to consolidate almost by default, but it counted then on the explicit support of the regime.
During the 1940s the project of public radio was replaced by the strong support that some 
groups of the political elite gave to the private commercial media model, especially 
during the administration of President Alemán. However, during the 1930s the 
government showed particular interest in participating in the development of television. 
In the following decade these plans were all abandoned, and television followed the same 
commercial pattern as radio.18
During the presidency of Alemán a decisive boost was given to private business in 
general, and the media entrepreneurs profited out of these opportunities also. Apparently, 
when the advent of television was imminent, President Alemán formed a commission 
headed by the poet and w'riter Salvador Novo, and by the engineer González Camarena, 
to study the two most important television alternatives at that moment, the commercial 
model (the American model) and the public model (the British model). The commission 
started its research in 1947 and handed in its report in October 18th 1949.19 This report 
was divided into two parts. In the first one, Novo after describing both systems, discretely 
praises the British BBC model for the quality of its programming. In the second, 
González Camarena, in a more technical style, considers that for both technical and
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16 Marvin Alisky, “Early Mexican Broadcasting", in Hispanic American Historical Review, vol.34, no.4, 
November 1954, p.523.
17 Mejia Barquera, (1989), p.23.
18 It must be remembered that it was in the party radio station XEFO where González Camarena -who was 
a technician in the Department of Radio of the Secretary of Public Education between 1932 and 1939— 
received support from President Cárdenas to continue his experiments on TV.
19 This report remained classified and confidential for more than thirty years (though the law estasblishes 
that no document can remain classified and confidential for more than 20 years). It may now' be consulted 
in the Nation General Archives (Ramo Presidentes, Acervo Miguel Alemán, expediente 523/14).
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economic reasons the American model is more convenient (he had some personal 
interests in obtaining a concession, which he got a few years later).
It seems that President Alemán was personally more in favour of the commercial model 
even before reading the results of this report, since he gave the first concession to operate 
a TV station, XHTV Channel 4 on October 7th 1949, eleven days before the report was 
shown to him.20 As one author underlines, “the decision to adopt the American model, 
with its functional differences, was conditioned by the scheme developed by the radio in 
twenty years o f history, based both on the commercial exploitation of such media and on 
the relationship that existed between radio entrepreneurs and some important 
politicians...” .21
The concession for operating the first private TV station, Channel 4, was awarded to the 
firm Televisión de México, 5.A , property of Rómulo OTarrill, a personal friend of the 
president, who had already obtained the concession o f the XEX radio station in 1947 and 
owned the newspaper Novedades since 1948.22 Channel 4 started its broadcasts in
20 Here it must be noted that private entrepreneurs had been trying to obtain television concessions since 
1946 (Azcárraga among them), but the government of Ávila Camacho decided not to precipitate and all 
decisions in this field were postponed until the administration of Alemán. The preference of Alemán for the 
commercial television model was not only consistent with the dominant model in radio, but also with his 
own interests in becoming (as he did) personally involved in the development of that business.
21 Zarur Osorio, (1996), pgs.32-33.
22 In 1936 Novedades was founded by Ignacio P. Herrerías. During the government of President Avila 
Camacho (1940-1946), this newspaper became the subject of the ambitions of some important political 
groups who wanted to take direct control of it. There seems to be some proof that the brother of President 
Ávila Camacho, Maximino, who was Secretary of Communications and Transports in his brother's cabinet, 
was interested in purchasing the paper. However, the Secretary of Gobernación, Miguel Alemán, who was 
to become the next president, was more successful in imposing final control on Novedades through his very 
close friend Rómulo O’Farrill, Rómulo O'Farrill Jr., and his son Miguel Alemán Velasco (who participated 
later on in the new-bom TV industry). U.S. Embassy in Mexico, “Confidential Letter from the U.S. 
Embassy in Mexico to the Secretary of State, August 29lh 1944” in Confidential U.S. State Department 
Central Files, Mexico. Internal Affairs, ¡940-1944. Pan II: Social. Economic, Industrial, Communications, 
Transportation and Science, Frederick, MD, University Publications of America, 1986, document file 
812.911/8-2944, Reel 64.
According to this same document, the original intentions of the President were to establish a daily 
newspaper in Mexico City at the beginning of his administration, but the editors of the four leading papers 
in Mexico (Excélsior. El Universal, La Prensa and Novedades) became very alarmed about such an idea 
and presented the president with a proposal: if he would give up his plan of establishing a paper, turn 
PIPSA (the official import and distributor of newsprint paper for the press) into the hands of these papers to 
operate it as a co-operative semi-official organisation, they would pledge their support to him personally 
and to his administration (See ibid., p.2). However, the interest o f his brother for acquiring a newspaper 
seemed to continue along his term.
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Spetember Ist 1950 with the transmission of the Annual Government’s Report to the 
Congress.
Shortly afterwards, in 1951, the second commercial television station, XEW-TV Channel 
2, started to operate (the concession was awarded in 1950 to the firm Televimex, S.A.). 
Channel 2 was owned by Emilio Azcárraga Vidaurreta, the radio magnate. Then in 1952, 
a third station, XHGC Channel 5, started operating. The concession of this channel was 
given to the engineer Guillermo González Camarena.23 However, Channel 5 did not have 
enough resources to compete with the other two channels.24
By 1952, O’Farrill and Azcárraga were expanding their television stations in other states 
outside Mexico City by obtaining most of the concessions offered by the State. 
Nevertheless at that time the real competition for advertising and publicity was taking 
place in Mexico City. By 1954, this competition was causing Channel 2 and Channel 4 
some financial difficulties, which in the following year led them to merge their 
companies (along with González Camarena’s Channel 5, that was already operating 
through the facilities of Channel 2) to create a single TV company. In March 23rd 1955 a 
new company was created, Telesistema Mexicano, S.A. (TM), an amalgam of the three 
Channels.25 The chairman of the new-company, Emilio Azcárraga, said then that,
Telesistema Mexicano S.A. is bom as a defence mechanism of three enterprises that were losing 
many millions of Pesos. From now on, all programming will originate in Televicentro, which will 
become the great TV central station. Within a year television will be the primary entertainment 
and publicity industry of the country; and it will even become more important than the film
industry.26
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23 González Camarena broadcasted some experimental programmes with an original equipment of his own 
creation since 1934. In 1935 President Cárdenas gave him the facilities of the official party radio station, 
XEFO, in order for him to continue his experiments. In 1940 he registered a trichromatic television system 
—television based on three colours, red, blue and green—and since 1947 he started working for Azcárraga 
as Chief of Operations. Femando Mejia Barquera, “50 años de televisión comercial en México, (1934- 
1984). Cronología", in Raúl Trejo Delarbre (coord.), Televisa, el quinto poder, Mexico City, Claves 
Latinoamericanas, 1985, pgs.20-25.
24 Emilio Esquivel Puerto, Anecdotario de radio y  televisión, Mexico City, Publicidad Latina, 1970, p.151.
25 The Administration Board was presided by Emilio Acánaga Vidaurreta. The Shares of the new firm 
were as follows: 40% for Azcárraga, 40% for O’Farrill, 5% for Emilio Azcárraga Milmo, 5% for O'Farrill 
Naunde, 5% for Ernesto Barrientos (employee of Azcánaga) and 5% for Ernesto Diez Barroso 
(Azcárraga’s son-in-law). However, though the operation of the channels was under the control of TM, the 
concessions were still under the names of the three original groups, since Article 28 of the Constitution 
prohibits the existence of private monopolies. Arredondo Ramirez and Sánchez Ruiz, (1987), p.l 19.
26 Words of Emilio Azcarraga cited from Boletín Radiofónico, no.62, March 31s1, 1965.
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The expansion of TM started immediately, since that same year was created a subsidiary 
firm -Teleprogramas de México— to produce and to export TV programmes to other 
Latin American countries and to the US. Other local television station were affiliated to 
the consortium through its subsidiary firm Televisoras de Provincia, which by 1969 
controlled 19 other channels in the country. In 1962, TM created, Teleprogramas 
Acapulco, with the aim of producing TV programmes under the direction of Miguel 
Alemán Velasco, son of the ex President. By that time, TM was already penetrating the 
Spanish speaking market in the US through the Spanish International Network (SIN).27
This great expansion of private broadcasting, both of radio and television, was a direct 
product of the regime’s support for that business, as discussed below. But this support 
was highly favoured by the concessionaires, who were eager -and successful—to 
convince the regime that there was no need to develop a strong public media network, 
since they could better serve the regime’s interests with more efficiency. A good example 
o f the concessionaires’ (private licensees’) willingness to be on the best possible terms 
with the president was the insistence in 1953 of Radio Panamericana -linked directly to 
the XEQ station that belonged to Azcárraga—on installing a radio broadcasting office 
directly in the presidential offices (the National Palace) for daily coverage on the 
presidential events and activities. The offer was made by Bernardo San Cristóbal, the 
manager o f the XEQ, who besides offering to cover all the expenses of that station, 
proposed that it become more a public relations agency than an information source for the 
citizens. He explicitly proposed that all information would be taken directly from the 
official bulletins and other official information “that would be previously censored by the 
person [...] designed by the Department of Information and Press of the Presidency”.28
27 For a detailed account on the American businesses of TM -later Televisa—see Nicholas A. Valenzuela, 
“La invasión electrónica en Estados Unidos”, in Raul Trejo Delarbre (coord.). Las redes de Televisa, 
Mexico City, Claves Latinoamericanas, 1988,
28 Cited in Mejia Barquera (1985), pgs.169-170. It was President Cárdenas who created the Autonomous 
Department of Press and Publicity (DAPP) in 1936, whose function was to centralise governmental 
information and to distribute all official information and bulletins to the mass media, both primed press and 
radio news broadcasts. President Ávila Camacho changed the name of the DAPP for General Direction of 
Information (DGI) and placed it within the Secretariat of Gobernación. President Alemán then decided to 
establish press departments within the structure of each official dependency and ministry in order to
But the good will o f the concessionaires to graciously give the regime some support was 
not enough for the latter to feel secure about the loyalty of the concessionaires. The law 
was used by the government to secure such support from the start. The government 
wanted to make clear that: though private entrepreneurs were enabled to benefit and 
profit out of broadcast media concessions, the concessionaires must remain supportive of 
the regime and must promote a favourable image of it.
Since the Constitution of 1857, the general communication systems and roads were 
considered to be the property of the nation and, therefore, they became subjected to what 
was called “a concessions regime”. The railways and the telegraph were all regulated 
through these concessions regime. The definition of the general communication systems 
as national assets subjected to concession was maintained in article 27 of the Constitution 
of 1917.29 This same article states in paragraph six, that the domain of the nation over the 
natural resources is not alienable, and the exploitation, use and profit of them by private 
individuals or investing societies could only be done through legal federal concessions 
given by the Executive through the Secretariat of Communications and Transports (then 
called the Secretariat of Communications and Public Works).
The first legal framework that ruled the broadcast industry was the regulation o f 1923. 
Three years later, in April 1926 President Calles issued the Law of Electric 
Communications (LEC), which refrained the public character of such services, including 
radio industry. Chapter VII of the LEC defined radio as “a public sendee”;30 established
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elaborate the press bulletins containing the official information to be distributed for its publication. Years 
after in the late 1970s, during President Lopez-Portillo administration (1976-1982), there was established a 
General Direction o f Social Communication in each dependency instead of the older press departments, but 
with the same functions. In this way, the ministries and all public dependencies had an office dedicated to 
the distribution of information about their activities to the journalists and reporters.
29 In 1926 the following sentence was added to Article 27, paragraph four (which enumerates the natural 
resources that belong to the nation): “...and the space situated above the national territory in the terms and 
extension that are specified by the International Law”.
30 This definition became very important, since it gave the State not only the ultimate control in terms of 
property -which was already established in Article 27 of the Constitution, which was also explicitly 
reformed that same year-, but more worrying for the broadcasters was the possibility of constant State 
interference in their business (especially establishing the ad tariffs), which would affect the commercial 
character of the programming and broadcasts. Though the government never needed to enforce this specific 
disposition or affected in any way the commercial character of the private radio stations, the sole definition 
of the radio as a public service was uncomfortable for the broadcasters since it was against the “commercial 
spirit” of their business. As will be seen below, in 1960 they were finally successful in changing this 
definition for another more suitable to their interests.
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the conditions to operate and install radio stations and the permissions policy;31 and made 
it possible for the government to take over the stations in case of national emergency. It 
was maintained that only Mexicans or Mexican firms could obtain a radio concession, 
something that will be preserved along all further legislation.
Right from the start, the government wanted to be sure that radio would not be used by 
any alternative political force or group. Article 12 of the LEC restricted the political 
freedom o f speech by explicitly prohibiting “the broadcast of any news or messages 
whose content challenge the security of the State, the public peace and order, the well 
manners (buenas costumbres), the laws of the country, the proper use of language, or may 
cause scandal or attack in any form  the constituted government, private life, people’s 
honour, or that manifestly provoke the commission of unlawful acts, or obstruct justice”. 
In practice, it served to avoid the transmission of messages from political opposition 
groups.
In 1931 it was established that permissions were reserved only for non-profit-seeking 
stations, like the ones operated by public dependencies and universities; the concessions 
were reserved for commercial stations. Concessions, for commercially exploiting the 
radio, would be given for up to fi£y years in order to make the investments in this 
activity more secure. In 1933 the regime issued a series of legal dispositions so as to have 
better control over broadcast contents. On July 10lh there were published in the Official 
Daily of the Federation the Reglamento de Vias Generales de Comunicación. In the 
section devoted to radio, the regulation stated that the State had the faculty to freely 
broadcast through commercial stations any message that it considered worthy to make 
public. How'ever, the most important restrictions for the broadcasters were specified in a 
section entitled “Forbidden Transmissions”, w'hich ratified what has been stipulated in 
Article 12 of the LEC, i.e. that it was strictly forbidden to transmit any information or 
programme that may “attack in any form the constituted government” or to present 
information that may challenge the security of the State (Article 77 of the Regulation of 
1933). Article 78 went even further in restricting political freedoms when stating that it
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31 Which was dependant on evaluations made by the Ministry of Communications and Public Works, 
therefore depending on the Executive power, namely the President.
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was “also forbidden to broadcast, in any open or veiled form, all kinds of personal, 
political or religious affairs”.32 Evidently, this does not mean that politics was alien to 
radio broadcasting, since the regime not only used its own stations for transmitting its 
political propaganda, but also the private stations. The political exclusion was for all 
opposition groups.
The basic provisions for securing the regime the ultimate control over broadcasting were 
thus established in the 1930s. Until 1960 all further legislation on the media sought 
essentially to promote the development of the industry, to provide it with technical 
facilities and to secure the commercial character of the radio. The basic agreement 
between the broadcast media and the regime was settled; the government would promote 
the development and expansion of these private businesses -in  recognition o f the 
commercial broadcast media in Mexico— , in exchange for the media’s support and the 
promotion of the favourable image of the regime. This did not exclude the possibility for 
the concessionaires to advance their economic interests by other means. The following 
section shows how the news broadcasts played a crucial role in this agreement on mutual 
supports between the media and the regime.
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero___________________________________________Chapter One
Presenting Political Information: From Political Support to Balanced Compromise
Maybe the most obvious aspect through which the mass media’s political support for the 
regime could be seen was in the way in which they presented political information on the 
news broadcasts. News broadcasts reflected the concessionaires’ collaboration and 
compromise with the regime through the presentation of information in ways that 
contributed both to its positive image and to maintaining a general political apathy by 
leaving out of discussion all relevant and controversial political debates. With time, 
however, the news broadcasts acquired another complementary purpose. Since the 1960s,
32 The complete Article 78 prohibited also the broadcasting of false information. However, the most 
important prohibition for the purposes of this work were the restrictions related to political information 
referred to above. It may be noted that these political restrictions on information existed since the first 
regulation of 1923, but the prohibition on dealing with religious affairs was added due to the inconvenience 
caused by dealing with such issues in a time when the religious conflicts -incarnated in the Cristero War, 
1926-1929—were still freshly recalled.
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with a completely consolidated private media structure, new technological developments, 
and in the context of the 1968 political crisis, the news broadcasts showed not only th e  
concessionaires’ political support of the regime, but they were increasingly used to  
promote a corporate rationale according to the concessionaires’ economic interests. T his 
section discusses precisely these characteristics of the news broadcasts in Mexico.
As Ben Bagdikian has noted, “for most of the people o f the world, for most o f the events 
of the world, what the new's systems do not transmit did not happen. To that extent, the 
world and its inhabitants are what the news media say they are”.33 This sentence has 
proved to be quite an accurate description of our modem day reality. The mass media, as 
information gatekeepers,34 define what the news is, how it is transmitted and what is 
politically, economically and socially significant. Though the extent to which they can 
influence an individual’s ideas, attitudes and behaviour is still debatable, the media have 
the capacity of emitting the message and show a specific version of reality as the “whole 
reality”. According to Gaye Tuchman, in the same fashion as important decisions are 
taken within the government, the selection and presentation of the news is an elite 
function -editors, journalists, media executives and, in the case of private media, the 
licensees.35 The decision to present or suppress certain information takes into account the 
interests o f the dominant economic sectors, but also those o f certain relevant groups o f  
the political elite. The usual outcome is the media’s support for the overall dominant 
capitalist economy, that is seldom submitted to serious scrutiny and criticism.36
As Iyengar and Kinder show in their famous study on American television: the 
information presented on the mass media -whatever it is— is framed by dominant values
33 Ben Bagdikian, The Information Machines, New York, Harper & Row, 1971, pgs. xii-xiii.
34 The “Gatekeeping Theories” on the mass media analyse the way in which the media institutions select, 
choose and edit the materials to be presented to the audiences focusing essentially on the interaction among 
the members of the media organisations. See for example P.M. Hirsch, "Occupational, Organizational and 
Institutional Models in Mass Communications", in P.M. Hirsch et.al., Strategies for Communication 
Research, London, Sage, 1977. And A. Hetherington, News, Newspapers and Television, London 
Macmillan, 1985.
35 Gaye Tuchman, Making News, New York, Free Press, 1978.
36 Martin N. Marger, “The Mass Media as a Power Institution”, in Marvin E. Olsen and M.N. Merger 
(eds.), Power in Modern Societies, Boulder CO., Westview Press, 1993, p.243. See also Michael Parenti, 
Inventing Reality. The politics o f the Mass Media, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1986 and W. Lance 
Bennett, News. The Politics of Illusion, New York, Longman, 1988.
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and shaped by power elites, and this brings into question all pretensions of objectivity.37 
However, and maybe this is the key point, in a democratic regime this bias in the content 
of the media to favour dominant values and structures is not the outcome of an explicit 
conspiracy between the media at large and the government elite -though certain informal 
and covered agreements might be reached between single groups on certain specific 
issues—, but is more the product of a mutual sharing of values and beliefs that is largely 
unconscious.38 The degree of “explicitness” in the agreements between media and 
political elites makes a difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes. In the 
latter cases, what is presented on the media could very well be the result of explicit 
agreements on, at least, the kind o f information that should not, or must not, be 
transmitted.
As Linz has noted, one o f the most salient characteristics of a stabilised authoritarian 
regime is the lack of extensive and intensive political mobilisation of the population. In 
his own words, “the common citizen expresses little enthusiastic support for the regime in 
elections, referenda and rallies. Rather than enthusiasm or support, the regime often 
expects -even from office holders and civil servants—passive acceptance, or least their 
refrain from public anti-govemment activity”.39 It is possible, then, to talk about the 
existence of a political apathy among the population in these limited pluralistic polities. 
Under such circumstances, the mass media may perfectly well be playing a crucial role in 
the presentation o f political information and material, in ways that help preserve this 
political apathy among the population at large. On this point some comments must be 
made.
The pretension here is not to build on the old debate of mass communication theory that 
refers to the capacity (or lack of it) o f  the media to influence directly on the behaviour of 
individuals.40 In this respect, one must only recall the work of Joseph Klapper -The
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37 Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, News That Matters: American Television and Public Opinion. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987.
38 The argument that political objectivity does not mean political neutrality in the news has been defended 
by Herbert J. Gans (Deciding What's News, New York, Pantheon, 1979).
39 Juan J. Linz, “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain”, in Erick Allardt and Stein Rokkan, (eds.) Mass 
Politics: Studies in Political Sociology’, New York, Free Press, 1970, p.255.
40 The poineer studies on this line of thought were inaugurated by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet during 
the 1940s in the University of Columbia, who analysed the possible effects of the media on individuals
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Effects o f  Mass Communications—in which the author concludes that: a) Mass 
communication is not a sufficient nor a necessary cause o f the effects on audiences; and, 
b) the mass media work more often as reinforcing agents, than as agents of change.41 For 
the purposes of this work it is enough to remain at the level of the elaboration and the 
presentation o f the messages, since the aim is to show the collaboration o f the media with 
the regime through presenting a positive image o f it, through refraining from promoting 
any relevant debate on controversial political matters, and through restricting spaces to 
any other alternative political expression. Therefore, the discussion on the extent to which 
such messages and other political information presented to the audiences were actually 
influential or not remains outside the scope of this work.
For Linz, under an authoritarian regime, the media may vary greatly in autonomy, even 
under the same regime, since the limited pluralism that exists readily generates some 
“islands o f exemption” on which certain kinds of publications, (like church publications 
in Spain, or academic material in Mexico) remain free from government censorship.42 In 
Mexico, in the case o f the licensees, called concessionaires, their relative autonomy and 
power to negotiate their interests will be discussed in the next chapter. Here it is 
important to remark on their relative autonomy and their explicit collaboration with the 
regime that help to explain the content of the news broadcasts to be not by an overt 
imposition o f the regime over the media, but as the outcome of the mutual support, which 
they gave each other. This is why, more than talking about a one-sided control of the 
regime over the media, in the case o f Mexico, it is more accurate to talk about a more or
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during election campaigns. Their work showed the following results (The Peoples ’ Choice, N.Y., Columbia
University Press, 1944):
a) Very few individuals’ ideas are changed during campaigns, and therefore the influential power of the 
media is limited only to reinforcing previous ideas.
b) The campaigns have little effect and they reach mainly those individuals who are already informed 
about politics.
c) The most important influence on individuals does not come directly from the media, but indirectly 
through local opinion leaders.
Another important work on the limited effect o f the media on individuals are reinforeced in the very famous
article o f Bernard Berelson, “The State of Communication Research”, Public Opinion Quarterly, no.23,
1959.
41 Joseph Klapper, The Effects o f  Mass Communications, New York, Free Press, 1960, pgs.8 and 15.
Klapper was pupil of Paul Lazarsfeld.
42 Linz (1970), p.266.
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less explicit collaboration -not completely free from eventual disagreements on economic 
matters—between these media and the regime.
An aspect of that mutually beneficial modus vivendi was the presentation of political 
information and material in ways that favoured the promotion of political apathy. This 
was done mainly through transmitting a positive image of the regime, through refraining 
from promoting any relevant debate on controversial political matters and through closing 
their channels o f communication to any alternative political discourse. These aspects 
served to present an impression of a country in which the only way to do politics was 
through the PRI and its various channels and organisations, in which any opposition was 
a challenge to order and stability, and in which, as an old saying goes, “it was better to 
leave politics to politicians”. Now it is time to see how the media accomplished such 
tasks on behalf o f the regime.
As mentioned before, the Law of Electric Communications o f 1926 explicitly prohibited 
to broadcast certain kind of political information and material (article 12), especially by 
any critic of the constituted regime. Legal restrictions on political information were 
maintained until the Federal Law on Radio and Television o f 1960 (LFRT of I960). 
However, politics -the official version of politics—were always present on the news 
broadcasts. As one scholar notes,
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero_______________________________________  Chapter One
Actually, the political issues were never absent from the radio transmissions in those years [the 
1930s and 1940s], however these kind of messages tended always to exalt the deeds of the so 
called Revolutionary regimes and to create a favourable image of the public officials, especially 
of the president of the republic. When in 1950 it started to work the commercial television, there 
was no law or disposition to regulate the content of its broadcasts... Nevertheless, the 
entrepreneurs who operated the first channels, and the publicity agencies that were in charge of 
the production of the programming, or the newspapers which then sponsored the information 
services in TV, all found natural that this new medium should keep the same attitude of the radio 
with respect to the political contents of the programmes.43
With the advent of television, the government decided to secure its control over its 
contents. In December 1955 a reform o f Articles 32 and 33 o f the Regulation of 1937-42
48
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was passed through which a stricter “technical supervision” was established over 
broadcasts by the Secretariat of Communications and Public Works. The reforms 
established that supervisory visits could be made at any time by officials of the 
Secretariat and that the cost of such visits was to be covered by the concessionaires. In 
case o f “serious irregularities found by the visitors”, the concession would be cancelled. 
Though this regulation moved the Chamber of the Industry o f Radio (CIR) to protest, in 
reality this disposition was more a preventive measure intended to dis-incentivate the 
concessionaires from not attending the official positions, than a disposition intended to be 
effectively used. Actually it became another tool in the arsenal of the regime for 
employing only in special cases.
For almost forty years the news broadcasts on radio, and later on television, were 
sponsored by different private commercial ventures and produced by the newspapers, 
which made o f these programmes a spoken extension of the printed press. Even the 
images that were shown during these programmes were pictures taken from the 
newspapers.* 44 Radio stations and later TV channels sold air-time to different commercial 
sponsors who produced the news broadcasts with information provided by the most 
important newspapers, as El Universal, Excelsior or Novedades. The duration of the news 
broadcasts was very brief, mostly between ten and fifteen minutes, and even by 1969 the 
total transmission time that large TV companies, like TM, dedicated to its news 
broadcasts was only 0.3$ percent of its daily air time.45
The first regular TV news broadcast started in December 5th 1950. Its name was Reading 
Novedades and it w-as conducted by Gonzalo Castellot and transmitted on Channel 4.4Ù It 
was aired at 10:00 p.m. every evening for fifteen minutes. Shortly afterwards there
45 Fernando Mejia Barquera, “Televisión y política”, in Migual Ángel Sánchez de Annas and María del 
Pilar Ramírez (coords.), Apuntes para una historia de la televisión mexicana //, Mexico City, Revista 
Mexicana de Comunicación and Televisa, 1999b, pgs.24-25.
44 José Luis Gutiérrez Espindola, “Información y necesidades sociales/Los noticiarios de Televisa”, in 
Trejo Delarbre, (1985), p.66.
45 Francisco J. Martínez Medellin, Televisa. Siga la huella, Mexico City, Claves Latinoamericanas, 1992, 
p.265.
46 One must keep in mind that since the very first TV transmission politics were present with the 
transmission of the Presidential speech to the Congress and the Nation that Miguel Alemán gave in 
September l il 1950. A little more than a month afterwards, in October 13th, a new programme. Mesa
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appeared on Channel 2 the Noticiero de las 7:45 that preceded the more famous Noticiero 
General Motors -produced by El Universal-- conducted by Guillermo Vela and Pedro 
Ferriz, who was the commercial announcer** 47 Other news broadcasts were the Noticiario 
Pemex, the Noticiario Día a Día -sponsored by the Mercedes Benz and produced by 
Excélsior. The formats were very similar to those used on the radio news broadcasts: they 
presented news taken from the newspapers.
To have a more precise idea o f what sort of information was transmitted on these news 
broadcasts it is necessary to look briefly at how the information was presented in the 
newspapers in those years. In Mexico, there are two Constitutional articles under which 
press freedoms have been nominally protected. Article 6 of the Constitution says that: 
“the manifestation o f the ideas will not be subject of judicial or administrative inquisition, 
but only in those cases in which it constitutes an attack on morals, third person’s rights, 
or when it provokes a misdemeanour or disturbs the public peace”. Also the first 
paragraph of Article 7 says that: “freedom of writing and publishing printed material on 
whichever subject is inviolable. No authority or law shall have the right to establish 
previous censorship, require bond from authors or printers, or restraint the liberty of the 
press, which shall be limited only by respect due to private life, morals and public peace. 
Under no circumstances shall a printing press be sequestrated as the corpus delctC.
However, during the period that runs from the 1930s to the 1970s the printed press had 
almost completely developed under the tutelage of the regime; a relation of dependency 
that has been highly convenient for the newspapers’ survival. As a scholar says,
In the same ways that it “invented” the national bourgeoisie, the Mexican State has been the 
creator of the contemporary press. Without its constant help, without all the money it has spent on 
publicity in the press, the latter could not last beyond its scarce printing paper reserves... More 
than one newspaper has been created with public funds and more than one has been saved when 
the federal government substituted with its own publicity, the retirement of private publicity .48
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redonda (Round Table), was inaugurated and within its format there were regular comments on politics and 
other public affairs.
47 Juan José Miró V., La televisión y  el poder politico en México, Mexico City, Diana, 1997, p.62.
48 Rafael Segovia, “Prensa, verdad y progresismo”, in Razones, n.35, 1981, p. 11.
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This does not mean that in Mexico press freedom was absolutely restricted, or that open 
forms of censorship were the dominant tune in the press. This would be an erroneous 
appreciation of the complex relations between the press and the regime. Criticism was 
always possible to a certain extent, as well as the open debate on certain other public 
matters, as is shown in an exhaustive study on six national newspapers from 1951 to 
1980.49 In general terms, law granted press freedom, but the complexity o f the relations 
between the regime and the press generated a context in which, in the words o f a 
specialist,
More than a governmental control on the press, the true thing is that there is self-control, a kind of 
“environmental censorship” [censura ambiental]. The newspapers know how far they can go, or 
know at least how far they want to go. The eventual mechanisms of control are not used because 
they become unnecessary.50
Since the 1930s this “environmental censorship” was maintained through a wide variety 
of direct and indirect mechanisms from which the press (i.e., its owners, editors, 
journalists and reporters) received benefits -from exclusive information to subsidies and 
other forms o f direct payments and bribes—in exchange for not trespassing certain 
“lines” or for supporting certain politicians. Criticism was thus possible against specific 
policies, programmes or politicians, but never against the regime’s legitimacy, the 
president or the army. The “environmental censorship” (and the complicity it created) 
inhibited the press from autonomous, open and critical political attitudes, so self­
censorship, and not strict supervision, was the norm. The result was that the press in 
Mexico became what has been labelled as a “guided press”.51
Though there was no explicit law on it, the newspapers were “obliged” to print the 
information as received from the official dependencies on the first pages without any 
alteration, leaving only the editorials with the possibility o f making some remarks and
49 See L. Montgomery, “Criticism of the government officials in the Mexican press, 1951-1980”, in 
Journalism Quarterly, n.62, 1985.
50 Miguel Ángel Granados Chapa, Examen de la comunicación en México, Mexico City, El Caballito,
1981, p.9.
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comments on that information. In this way the government reserved for itself the capacity 
to decide how much information was to be released to the media, and how it was to be 
printed. Logically, if  a newspaper became consistently critical of the regime, there always 
existed the possibility to further deny any information to its journalists or to cut down the 
expenditures on advertising. And since there was no right to information,51 2 nor any other 
way of obtaining official information other than the good relations between the media and 
the government, the newspapers had good reason to be careful and respectful with the 
material they received.
Most of the information the papers presented on the government was composed both of 
top ranking official's discourses (including, of course, the president’s speeches), and of 
official dependencies’ bulletins. What is surprising is to find that these “notes” were 
signed by reporters and journalists as if they have written the article or collected the 
information themselves. This practice of publishing the bulletins without alteration or 
comment “contributed in essence to the remarkable uniformity of the Mexican press”,53 
since most of the important papers were publishing basically the same notes in the same 
way on the first pages.
The reporters, who usually received very low salaries, were assigned to specific public 
dependencies in order to cover up the news “generated” within. Governmental officials in 
those public dependencies knew who these reporters were and with time they started to 
receive compensatory payments for their job. The same happened with the journalists 
who wrote regularly on specific subjects. Many of these reporters and journalists were 
included in regular payment lists under the heading of “extraordinary payments” or 
“payments for assistantship” turning this covered form of bribery into a bureaucratic and 
institutionalised procedure agreed on by all parts. Though it is difficult to calculate the 
amounts of money given to them -since it depended on the category of the journalist, on 
the newspaper’s prestige and on the subject to be treated-, some authors calculate that
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51 See Marvin Alisky, Latin American Media: Guidance and Censorship, Iowa, Iowa State University 
Press/Ames, 1981.
52 In Mexico a law that grants the right to information was just beginning to be discussed in the Summer of 
2001, and only in April 2002 it was passed. I will come back on this subject in the conclusions.
53 Bohmann, (1997), p.73.
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often they represented more money than their regular wages.54 Though the practice o f  
bribing journalists and reporters is a common occurrence in Mexico, the “embute” , 
“chayóte”, or “sobre”, as these kind of bribes are known, seem to have institutionalised 
since the times of President Alemán.55
At some other times the journalists themselves set the prices they were going to charge 
for their reports. Of course, this worked better depending on the prestige of the journalists 
and of the newspaper. For instance, the journalist Vicente Leñero clearly notes how at the 
beginning of the 1970s, the prestigious columnist Carlos Denegrí regularly bought some 
space in the Excelsior for the insertion of his column, but all the people cited there were 
previously charged a certain amount of money.56 In many cases, journalists also used to 
write articles by assignment and were regularly paid for them.
Related to this were the infamous gacetillas, a sort of paid publicity but without 
differentiating it from the editorial comments or the normal news coverage. The gacetilla 
was inserted in the following way: a journalist was contacted by a government’s official 
who gave him an already written note (or dictated the exact terms in which it should be 
printed), and the journalist inserted the “note” as a regular news without distinguishing it 
from the rest. The newspapers all devoted different spaces in their pages, at different 
prices, for “inserting information”. For instance, by the end o f the 1960s, the insertion o f 
a gacetilla at the top of the front page of Excélsior had a cost of about one thousand US 
Dollars at that time.57 Often, politicians and other public figures bought these spaces to 
present their own opinions as if they were facts. It was not infrequent that the journalists 
who got the “clients” for such spaces and their advertisements received a percentage of 
the price charged by the newspaper in reward for their mediation. These practices created
54 See Francisco Javier Torres A., El periodismo mexicano. Ardua lucha por su integridad, Mexico City, 
Ediciones Coyoacán, 1997, pp.95-97 and Raymundo Riva-Palacío, “The kept Mexican press", in Nieman 
Reports, n.2, Summer 1992, pp.53-55.
55 Rodolfo Alcaraz, “Sesenta años de periodismo mexicano", Historia y  sociedad, n.6, Mexico City, 1966, 
p.124. Paradoxically, President Alemán himself (due to the influence of Colonel Garcia Valseca) decided to 
officially establish on the 7th of June the “Day of the Freedom of the Press”, celebrating the first one in 
1952. As it was on the “Day of the Voceador”, on this day the President celebrated with journalists and 
editors sharing a lunch in prestigious restaurants and clubs and he would give a speech which was 
replicated by a representative of the organisers.
56 Vicente Leñero, Los periodistas, 3rd printing, Mexico City, Joaquin Mortiz, 1999 (1978), p.73.
incentives for some journalists to devote a considerable part of their time to public 
relations in order to get these kind of clientele instead of devoting themselves to more 
professional tasks.
These bizarre relations between the journalists and the regime were maintained not only 
because o f the low wages, but because in most cases there seemed to be no other way for 
poorly prepared journalists to do their job and collect information in a context of secrecy 
on internal government information. Obviously, the kind of notes published on the 
newspapers were most of the time presenting a highly favourable image of the regime at 
large, and of the specific politicians who paid for it. But if  this sort of arrangement 
between journalists and public officials was not enough to secure the presentation of a 
positive image on public matters, there existed also other sorts of mechanisms that 
directly influenced on the newspaper organisations: publicity.
The most important source of income for the press has been publicity and advertising. 
These, however, quickly became a substantial mechanism for maintaining the 
“environmental censorship” in the printed media. The State, through all its dependencies 
-including the official party—spent huge sums of money on advertising. Though it is 
difficult to calculate the exact amount the State spent on advertising in those years, or 
what percentage that kind of publicity represented for the press -since these amounts are 
kept in secrecy—there are some estimates that calculate that the government ads in the 
press oscillated between 30 and 50 percent of their total ads inserted.57 8 In any case, as is 
shown in Table 1.2, it is possible to calculate the importance of these amount of 
governmental advertising on the press, if one takes into account the prices that the 
newspapers charged for non-commercial publicity insertions on their pages. The prices 
for non-commercial insertions in the press were always between 30 and 50 percent higher 
than those for commercial insertions.
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57 Richard Cole, “The Mexican Press System: aspects of growth, control and ownership”, in Gazette, n.21,
1975, p.70.
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Table 1.2
Prices of advertising and publicity in eleven selected newspapers in Mexico City (th e
prices are in Mexican pesos of 1982)
Newspapers Commercial publicity 
(complete page)
Non-commercial or political 
publicity (complete page)
Even number page Odd number page
El Día, Excélsior, El 
Heraldo, Novedades. El Sol 
de México, El Universal
99,750 107,660 157,500
Diario de México 90,400 103,250 161,800
El Nacional* 101,500 101,500 101,500
Ovaciones (Sports paper) 106,500 110,000 168,800
La Prensa 50,000 52,000 87,500
Uno más Uno** 92,625 99,970 149,500
*Since E¡ Nacional was a newspaper edited by the Secretariat of Gobernación, it was also the only one that 
did not have differentiated prices for commercial and non-commercial ads.
**Some former members of Excelsior founded this newspaper in 1977.
Source: Bohmann, (1997), p.157.
For Bohmann, two consequences may be directly derived from this situation.59 On the 
me hand, a large number o f social and political organisations, including opposition 
political parties, were practically excluded from acquiring publicity and advertising in the 
íewspapers because of the high prices.60 The State was therefore the most important 
‘lient of this non-commercial publicity. On the other hand, if  it was true that the State 
iontributed with 30-50 percent of ads inserted, it is possible to say that the whole
8 John Spicer Nichols, Coyotes o f the Press: Professionalization o f Mexican Journalist, Ph.D. Thesis, 
4inn., University of Minnesota, 1979, p.15.
9 Bohmann, (1997), p.158.
u It has to be said that the prices were set by the newspapers and not by the government. Therefore, for the 
ress it was a form of rising the prices of their subsidies.
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structure of publicity in the newspapers was highly dependent on the non-commercial 
publicity. The outcome of this collusion between the printed press and the regime was, of 
course, the presentation of favourable information that never questioned the regime’s 
legitimacy or the president in turn. Bulletins, speeches and formal discourses composed 
most of the “information” provided by a printed press that was more dependant on 
governmental subsidies and protections to survive than on their readership and sales, 
which in Mexico have always been quite low.61
The information presented on the news broadcasts on radio and TV, based on the 
readership of news taken from the newspapers could not be other than supportive of a 
positive image o f the regime. If bulletins, speeches and other kind of discourses 
composed the main “news” on the dailies, the news broadcasts, being a spoken extension 
of them, transmitted also this kind of “information”. Editorialising was practically non­
existent, and in-depth discussions on politics were not contemplated on their schedules. 
That was the way in which these media were contributing to political demobilisation and 
disinformation. However, by the late 1960s along with this support for the regime, was 
added another function to the news broadcasts that this time responded to the economic 
interests of the entrepreneurs.
After two decades o f successful operations private television had become a key industry 
in Mexico.62 In the 1960s important technological changes were adopted for 
transforming TV production. Though the first video-tape machine was acquired in 1958
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61 Though it is difficult to calculate the actual number of readers, since the newspapers very seldom declare 
their true circulation, in any case one must realise that it must be very low in relation to the total population. 
In 1994 a survey showed that 80 percent of the individuals have as their main source of information the TV 
and only for 15 percent of them it was the newspapers (Enrique Sánchez Ruiz, “El público de la prensa: la 
insoportable levedad del casi no ser”, in J. Carlos Lozano (ed.), Anuario de Investigación CONEIIC, n.l, 
Mexico City, 1994). This has been a constant feature, since also by the end of the 1970s, the Ministry of 
Budget and Planning estimated that the newspapers reached around 13 percent of the population, that was 
9.1 million inhabitants out of a population of 70 million in 1980. However, according to a study of Karin 
Bohmann, even this number is optimistic, since by that year 79 percent of the population older than 15 
years (57%, which summed 39.9 million inhabitants) were illiterate, i.e. 31.5 million people. Since the 
population under 15 years of age (43%, which ammounted to 30.1 million inhabitants in 1980) were not 
considered as regular readers, that figure leaves a reader population of 8.4 million people (Karin Bohmann, 
Medios de comunicación y  sistemas informativos en México, Mexico City, Alianza Editorial, reprinted 
1997 (1986), pgs.122-132).
62 In 1973 television absorbed 44 percent of the total expenditures on publicity and by 1974 it was 
calculated to reach 3.3 million homes, which represented a population of more than 12 million people. In 
Martinez Medellin, (1992), p.58.
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by TM, the profits of its adaptation started to be seen in the following decade. The 
incorporation of video-tape favoured the export of domestic soap operas and other 
programmes. Teleprogramas Acapulco, S.A. was created for that purpose in 1962. Video­
tape transformed also the formats of the news broadcasts, since it became possible to 
present the news with direct images from the places where news occurred and to be less 
dependant on the pictures provided by the newspapers. Further advances came with the 
adoption of colour broadcasting in 1967. The inauguration of the National 
Telecommunications Network (RNT) in 1968 (of which the microwave network system 
was part) facilitated live transmissions of programmes and news broadcasts to different 
parts of the country simultaneously. These technological advances made it easier for TM 
to adopt new formats for news broadcasting along the lines of the most modem trends 
existing in the U.S., like the NBC news programme Today, which combined news with 
entertainment and interviews with public personalities. A good example of these new 
transmissions was the programme Miscelánea Denegrí conducted by the journalist Carlos 
Denegrí, who invited different personalities, even opposition politicians, to “debate” on 
his programme. The weight of his fame was not only due to the irreverent way in which 
he treated issues and even public officials, but also, as previously mentioned, to his 
practice o f “selling his spaces” -bo th  on television and on the printed press- to public 
figures in order to elevate or destroy them.63 Also in 1967, the news broadcast Café 
Matutino -better known as Diario Nescafé—was inaugurated following the same pattern 
of combining entertainment with news, conducted by the journalist Jacobo Zabludowski. 
The duration o f this news broadcast was of 40 minutes and it was transmitted at 7:30 a.m.
These changes coincided with the political atmosphere created by the 1968 crisis. In 
October 2nd 1968 a large number o f  students who were demonstrating on the Three 
Cultures Square, near Mexico City’s downtown, were massacred by military and state 
police forces. Though this episode would prove a watershed in Mexican political life, TV 
news broadcasts did not transmit any information about it. Broadcasting media opted for 
referring to “some disturbances caused by Communist-sympathiser students”, avoiding 
any reference to the shootings that brought about the deaths of a large number-still
63 This attitude is described by Manuel Becerra Acosta, Dos poderes, Mexico City, Grijalbo, 1985, p.45
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unknown today—of youngsters and closed the few spaces that existed for critical 
voices.64
In the case of TM, its top executives considered it necessary to keep a tighter control over 
the news programmes, their content and production. It was thought to be necessary for 
the company to express its own points of view on society’s problems and, therefore, the 
production of news broadcasts by the newspaper must come to an end. The then Director 
General of News Broadcasts in TM, Aurelio Perez, expressed this change when he said 
that,
Until quite recently... we were subjected in great part to the newspapers, who supplied us with 
news and other general information... We were dependent on their criteria to judge the relevance 
o f the news, and this was obviously inconvenient, since in some occasions their aims and interests 
did not coincide with ours...65
These ideas were reinforced by Miguel Alemán Velasco, the key figure behind the 
restructuring of the news programmes in TM, who explained that,
1968 took us by surprise. Suddenly we realised that we did not have a voice, a version, a position 
towards those critical events which we could put forward and sustain before the nation. The 
problem for this enterprise was that it did not have news programmes to canalise its opinion.
The contracts with the newspapers for the production of the news broadcasts were not 
renewed thereafter. At the same time, a new policy of centralisation of information was 
defined by TM, whose example was later followed by other media. For such purposes the 
General Direction of News Broadcasts was created in 1969. The outcome of this policy 
was the ending of the transmission of the news broadcast Su Diario Nescafe, still 
produced by newspapers and sponsored by Nestle, on 28 August 1970, and the 
production of their own news broadcasts.
The duration of the news broadcasts were also lengthened to an hour or more. Until then 
the average duration of a news broadcast was around fifteen minutes. The anchorman of
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and by Vicente Leñero, (1999).
64 Gutiérrez Espíndola, (1985), p.69.
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Su Diario Nescafé, Jacobo Zabludowsky, an experienced journalist who began his career 
in 1950 in the news broadcast o f Channel 2 Noticiero General Motors, became also the 
anchorman of the new 24 Horas in September 1970 (transmitted every evening and 
simultaneously broadcast on XEW radio). With time, this news broadcast was to become 
the most important voice of the corporation and the indispensable reference for knowing 
the official governmental viewpoints in relation to domestic politics.66
Other TV companies, like Televisión Independiente de México (TIM), owner o f Channel 
8, also inaugurated two programmes, the late evening news broadcast En punto , 
transmitted daily from 22:00 to 23:00 p.m., which created a direct challenge with the TM 
programme 24 Horas (especially because it had an agreement with the official news 
agency Notimex for the provision o f news) and a morning transmission called Hoy  
Mismo, which had a duration o f four hours and presented not only news, but also live 
shows and entertainment. Channel 13, owned by Francisco Aguirre of Grupo Radio 
Centro, also inaugurated a news programme called Notitrece, which could not really 
compete with the stronger TIM and TM networks and lagged behind them.67
With the inauguration of this new format for news broadcasting, the concessionaires were 
also creating a voice for themselves and promoting their own interests. As Miguel 
Alemán clearly puts it: “our purpose was... to give [the news broadcast] all the 
information strength so that the people could orient their views in terms of Televisa’s 
point of view”.68 This point of view was guided by its compromises with the regime (by 
the promotion of its positive image), but also by a new feature: the promotion o f its own 
corporate interests. As Gonzalez Molina shows, the presentation of news in Televisa is
65 Antena, no.34, May 1974, p.9.
66 Pablo Arredondo Ramirez, "Opacidad en la ventana electrónica: el proceso electoral de 1988 en los 
noticiarios televisivos" (1991b), in Pablo Arredondo Ramírez, Gilberto Fregoso Peralta and Raúl Trejo 
Delarbre, Asi se calló el sistema. Comunicación y  elecciones en ¡988, Mexico, University of Guadalajara, 
1991, p.141.
6' Channel 13 started to transmit regularly on October 12th 1968. However, by 1970 the channel was 
having major financial problems that led his main shareholder, Francisco Aguirre, to look for new business 
partners. The partner turned out to be the industrial businessman Alejo Peralta, who shortly afterwards 
transferred his shares to the government “in a quite unclear action”. Zarur Osorio (1996), pgs.50-51.
68 Cited in Gabriel Gonzalez Molina, “Mexican television news: the imperatives of corporate rationale”, in 
Media, Culture and Society, vol.9, no.2, April, 1987, p. 174.
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expected to contribute to the promotion of its interests through four aspects:69 1) the 
structured promotion of corporate activity has become entrenched in the occupational 
knowledge of newsmen as a particularly valuable attribute of stories and events. 
Televisa’s employees feel more committed to the organisation than to any other principle 
of objectivity or impartiality. 2) When gathering and selecting the “news”, promotion of 
the corporation’s interests is entrenched in the minds o f newsmen as criteria of 
newsworthiness. 3) There is a consistent neglect of stories with a potential damaging 
effect to the image of the corporation. 4) Certain people and groups receive special 
deferential treatment because of the importance they have for Televisa. Here one can 
nominate, above everyone else, the president in turn.
The defence of their own interests and Weltanschauungen becomes more visible when 
presenting information and news on foreign politics, since one may note a sharp contrast 
with the regime’s positions, (which the media totally supported on domestic affairs). The 
nationalistic and revolutionary discourse of the regime was always maintained in the 
official institutions and it became, in many ways, the core o f the principles that were said 
to be defended and practised by the Mexican foreign policy. Though it was clear that 
Mexico was aligned with the Western powers, the Mexican foreign policy tried to 
distance themselves from open supportive positions and practised, whenever possible, a 
policy based upon legal principles which placed at its core the sovereignty of the nations 
and the self-determination of the peoples (also as a way o f avoiding and discarding 
external criticism on domestic politics). These foreign policy attitudes and discourse 
became very important for internal legitimacy, since it characterised the Mexican 
government -in the international arena—as anti-imperialist, progressive and engaged in 
the fight for the rights of the weak nations against the ambitions of the great powers.70
This formalistic revolutionary and progressive discourse was also present in the public 
radio programmes, which tried to praise the national history, the national heroes, the
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69 Ibid., pgs 175-180.
70 In this sense it should be recalled that Mexico was the only Latin American nation that opposed the 
expulsion of Cuba from the American Organisation of State, becoming an “example” of a progressive 
foreign policy -though in reality all exchanges with the island were dramatically reduced. This action, 
which was more formal that substantial, helped the regime to maintain a progressive image with Left wing 
groups and organisations inside the country.
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“Latinamericanist” vocation and solidarity of Mexico with its “brother countries”, and the 
critical attitudes towards the abuse of power and disrespect for the sovereignty of the 
nations by the great powers. It is noteworthy that the public radio station, Radio  
Education, presented on its news broadcast more international news than domestic ones, 
and the main area it tried to cover was Latin America, displaying also a quite critical 
attitude against American interventionism in the area, like in the Central American 
conflicts.
In sharp contrast, private TV and radio broadcasts, especially those of Televisa, displayed 
an openly pro-American attitude and many of their notes presented information in ways 
that were divergent to the official discourse on foreign policy. In an analysis of the news 
contents at the beginning o f 1984, Jose Luis Gutierrez Espindola shows how in the case 
o f the presentation of international news, what dominates the positions and comments in 
Televisa’s 24 Horas was open anti-communism, the support of the positions o f the 
Reagan government in Central America, and the presentation of material based on local 
American daily life.71 The presentation of information on international affairs showed 
then the divergence between the political interests of the regime with the economic and 
corporate interests of the concessionaires, but in any case, these differences did not 
generated any serious confrontation.
With regard to the information on domestic matters, the content of these new 
programmes did not change radically from what they used to be. They remained 
essentially characterised by an information presented out-of-context, by the trivialising o f 
any relevant information, and by the complete coverage of the presidential activities o f 
the day, and o f the official speeches o f top-ranking politicians with the clear intention of 
promoting a positive image o f the regime. Along with that, a good deal of entertainment 
was also presented as “news”. As one scholar points out during these years, the news o f 
one evening edition of 24 Horas were “the presentation of new Ambassadors before the 
president, the assistance of the president to the dinner that celebrated the “Day of the 
Newspapers’ Street Sellers”, the support speech o f the Chief of the Federal District
71 Gutierrez Espindola (1985), pgs. 83-95. At that time, the foreign policy of De la Madrid was 
emphasising that the conflicts in Central America should not be seen within the East-West confrontation, 
but should be analysed from a regional socio-economic basis.
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Department to his collaborators, the awarding of the national prize of sciences by the 
Secretary of Public Health...”.72 It must also be noted that most of the “news” presented 
in the broadcast originated in Mexico City, since it is the political capital of the country 
and the place where more “speeches could be collected”. The provinces were practically 
absent, except in those cases when the President visited them or in the case o f the 
occurrence of some other “noticeable” event, such as natural disasters or other calamities.
More than serious or relevant news, the news broadcasts presented a sort of informative 
mosaic o f a great number of discontinuous “incidents” without context, explanation or 
analysis, and specifically in the case of domestic political “news”, focused on the 
activities, speeches and other ceremonies related to the Federal Executive-mostly those 
of the president in turn (since the Congress, the Supreme Court and other levels of 
government were practically absent from coverage). Televisa’s 24 Horas is the best 
example, since with all its entertainment-as-news, its fragmentation and trivialising of 
information, it soon became the most important news broadcast in the Mexican 
television. It was the only news broadcast that was regularly visited by top ranking 
governmental officials and the most prominent businessmen. Though 24 Horas became 
the most visible example of the broadcasting media support to the regime, all other news 
broadcasts followed its example in one way or another. Chapters 4 and 5 will show 
precisely how TV and radio news broadcasts helped to support the regime’s image and 
dis-information through their presentation of information on politics, focusing on the 
campaigns.
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Chapter Two
The Broadcast Media as an Interest Group
From its start in the 1920s, the broadcast media have operated in Mexico following the 
commercial model very similar to the one at work in the United States and quite different to 
the ones adopted in most Western European countries. Media became a dominantly private 
industrial activity and media investors are, thus, part o f the wider entrepreneurial classes in 
Mexico. However, though the installations, facilities, equipment and other material and 
resources belong to private companies, the State holds the ultimate property control over 
the media since they operate through federal concessions.
A basic condition in the relationship between the regime and the broadcast media was the 
duality between property and operation. On the one hand, since they are part of the “general 
communication system”, and these are national assets, the ultimate proprietor on behalf of 
the nation is the State; on the other, the private entrepreneurs are entitled to obtain benefits 
and profits out of their operation through the awarding of a public concession. This duality 
was crucial for the regime to maintain the political control over broadcasting, but it also 
became an incentive for the private media entrepreneurs (i.e. the concessionaires) to 
organise and defend their interests, since the rules by which concessions are allocated, 
suspended or cancelled have been highly ambiguous and, therefore, subject to 
circumstantial and discretionary political interpretations.
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first discusses the conception of the media 
concessionaires as an interest group, their creation of a National Chamber of the Radio and 
Television Industry (CERT), their close links with some important PRI political groups, and 
the pressure they exercised to obtain important gains in the legal and the economic spheres. 
It also shows that though such pressure was successful in the economic and legal spheres, 
the regime was never disposed to negotiate its ultimate control over the political sphere. 
The second serves as a warning to be careful with the usage o f a term such as “interest 
group” for encompassing all the concessionaires, since there were always important 
differences between Mexico City media entrepreneurs and those of other provinces.
The CIRTand the Relations between the Concessionaires and the Political Elite
As was said in chapter one, though there was general support from the regime for th e  
development o f a domestic entrepreneurial class, including the private media businesses, 
this did not prevent media entrepreneurs from organising and, along with their close l in k s  
with some political elite groups within the official party, promoting their interests b e fo re  
the State. The media concessionaires created organisations and mechanisms through w h ic h  
they could exercise pressure and established alliances with the political elite. This sec tio n  
discusses precisely these modes o f interaction between the media and the regime. It departs  
from a conception of these media concessionaires as an interest group, followed by  a n  
account on their creation o f the National Chamber of the Radio Industry, an analysis o f  
their close links with some important PRI political groups, and the pressure they exercised 
to obtain important economic benefits.
The discussion about the nature, interactions and scope o f interest groups have not reached 
clear agreements yet,1 but for the purposes of this work I will depart from a very sim ple 
(and classic) definition o f what interest groups are: they are formally organised associations 
which attempt to influence governmental decisions.2 Though this definition seem s 
restrictive, since a great deal o f meaningful connotations o f “interest group” might not be 
comprehended here, it has the undeniable advantage o f identifying such groups by tw o 
“visible” characteristics: they exist in time and space as formally organised associations, 
and their main activity is to defend and promote their interests (which may or may not be 
similar to their members’) by trying to influence public decisions in specific areas. The 
second part of this chapter deals with another quite important dimension o f the interest 
groups that for the moment has been left aside: their internal patterns.
In Mexico, media entrepreneurs have made use of formally organised associations to 
influence the governmental policies on communications, media, and broadcast almost from 
the start. It must be noticed that they were one of the first industrial groups to autonomously 1
1 See for instance: David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interest and Public Opinion, New 
York, Knopf, 1951; Abraham Holzmann, Interest Group and Lobbying, New York, MacMillan, 1966;
Harmon Ziegler and G. Wayne Peak, Interest Groups in American Society, 2nd Edition, Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1972; and Graham K. Wilson, Interest Groups, Oxford, Blackwell, 1990.
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organise to defend their interests before the State.2 3 The first antecedent of a modem 
organised association in this industry was the National Radio League, created in 1922, 
which brought together many of the incipient amateur radio broadcasters. The following 
year this organisation merged with the Centre for Engineers and the Mexican Central Radio 
Club to form the Mexican Central Radio League.4 It was this League which elaborated the 
first federal radio law project -commissioned by President Obregón—and from the start 
they tried to model the development of that industry through commercial patterns. Some 
years later, in February 23rd 1937, the Mexican Association of Radio Stations was 
established. This was transformed, in June, into the Mexican Association of Commercial 
Radiobroadcasters (AMERC), which incorporated twenty stations in the country (10 of 
which were located in Mexico City). Its aim was to defend the “common interests” o f the 
radio broadcasters and “to create a common front in all cases in which their activities might 
result affected”.5 Their “common interests” were, of course, defined by the maintenance of 
a commercial radio model similar, in some ways, to the one existing in the U.S.
In 1936, President Cárdenas promoted a Law of Chambers that established that all the firms 
o f a certain size and importance related to commerce or industry must be affiliated into 
national chambers for their representation and consulting. For each important industrial or 
commercial activity was created a specific chamber. Following this requirement of the Law 
o f Chambers, in 1939 the AMERC joined the Chamber of Transports and Communications 
constituting its radio division. What is important to note here is that, in the same fashion as 
some other important entrepreneurial organisations, like the COPARMEX, the AMERC 
was only recognised, but not created by the State and, in its field of activity, it enjoyed 
certain degree o f autonomy and negotiation capacity. Below I will discuss how the 
AMERC successfully influenced the outcome of the third General Communication Lines 
Law of 1939 on their behalf.
In 1941, during the administration of President Ávila Camacho a new Law of Commercial 
and Industrial Chambers was issued authorising the creation o f specialised chambers in the
2 Robert H. Salisbury, “Interest Groups", in Fred. I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.). Handbook o f  
Political Science, Vol.4, Nongovernmental Politics, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Menlo Pak, CA, 1975, 
p.171.
3 The first radio organisation was created in 1922, fourteen years before Congress passed a Federal Law of 
Chambers, obliging all businessmen to join in (or create) industrial, services or commerce chambers.
4 Fernández Christlieb, (1996), p.89.
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industrial and commercial activities. This enabled the AMERC to transform into the 
National Chamber of the Radiobroadcast Industry (CIR) in December 1941. In 1970 the 
CIR changed its name into National Chamber of the Radio and Television Industries 
(CIRT) twenty years after television was operating in Mexico.
One must note the rapid and autonomous organisation o f the concessionaires as a self- 
conscious group with a clear goal: to establish, maintain and defend the private commercial 
model as the dominant one in the Mexican broadcasting media. In a political regime that 
restricted the freedom of addressing political issues on radio, the entrepreneurs focused 
their efforts entirely on the predominance of a commercial model that could secure 
economic gains. The Chamber served as a direct channel o f communication with the 
government for the solving of disputes, reaching agreements on anything related to that 
industry, and finally for pressing for the maintenance o f a favourable status quo for the 
concessionaires. The second chapter of the statutes of the CIRT, entitled “The Object of the 
Chamber”, states that its purposes are (due to their relevance here are cited only six out of 
nine objectives):
I. - To represent the general interests of the industries of radio and television and o f those 
firms that constitute them.
II. - To study all the matters that affect the radio and television activities as well as to 
provide for the measures that tend to the development of their industry.
III. - To participate in the defence of the particular interests o f their members with the only 
limitations that are established in the Law of Commercial and Industrial Chambers.
IV. - To constitute a consulting organisation to the State in matters related to radio and 
television.
V. - To exercise the right o f petition before the corresponding authorities, be they Federal, 
state or municipal, in order to ask for the expedition or modification o f laws and other 
administrative dispositions that might affect the activities of radio and television.
VI. - To become a referee in case of conflicts among its members.
This part o f the statutes establishes the CIRT as an interest group and lays down the 
guidelines that must be met for defending its interests before the State. Here emerges a 5
5 Mejia Barquera, ( 1999a), p,8.
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero_____________________________________________ Chapter Two
66
relevant question: in what way was the Chamber able to influence governmental actions 
and policies to the advantage of its members?
This involves a question of power; or more precisely, of elucidating what sort of power the 
CIRT have. Steven Lukes contends in one of his major works that the most powerful 
groups in a society are able to protect their interests by exercising control precisely on the 
ways in which the rest of society regards these interests.6 A completely critical attitude 
towards the interests o f the most powerful groups is never fully developed in any society. In 
a capitalist society, some of the most powerful groups are of course the big corporations, 
against whose basic Weltanschauung no one may raise a challenge, or even worse, few 
would be able to imagine a coherent challenge to it. Following this argument, if there is no 
attempt to overthrow the actual capitalist order in developed societies, it is not because the 
workers, for example, have consciously calculated the costs and risks of doing so, but 
because they are completely immersed (and subdued) within the dominant groups capitalist 
values and power.
In the case o f the mass media entrepreneurs, the effects would be even more catastrophic, 
one can imagine, since they are precisely the ones who “elaborate, select, and broadcast” 
the messages to the rest of the society. For the issues in this work, Lukes’ approach is 
problematic in two ways. On the one hand, the mere existence o f a structured organisation 
to defend the concessionaires’ interests shows that, though the regime has a “general policy 
o f support for capitalism”, there have also been in fact some important disagreements 
between the interests of the concessionaires (who are undeniably part of the capitalists 
dominant groups) and those of the regime. On the other hand, though the concessionaires 
have been pressing to defend their interests at the economic level, the regime was 
successful in preventing them from entering in to discussing political matters 
autonomously, which shows their “limited” capacity in ultimately leading the political 
system. Therefore, one might agree with Lukes in general terms about the regime’s 
attempts to favour and support the reproduction of a capitalist system, but to remain only at 
this level would obscure the differences that actually existed between the regime and 
particular capitalist interest groups.
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Bringing the argument back to the interest groups level, Charles Lindblom in his Politics 
and Markets argues that business groups occupy a “privileged position” in relation to other 
interest groups within a market economy.7 Business groups are very influential in these 
economies due to the role o f the businessmen as the main participants in making the 
decisions that determine the prosperity of regions and countries. In this regard, the 
government is compelled to provide the businessmen with the much needed confidence and 
facilities for their investment, which translates into higher economic growth, prosperity and 
employment. In Lindblom’s words businessmen are not “the representatives o f a special 
interest...[but] they appear as functionaries performing functions that government officials 
regard as indispensable”.8 In this sense, the government is not pressed by the businessmen 
in the same fashion as by other interest groups, since being conscious of the importance o f 
their role for economic and social welfare, the design o f the general policies would tend to 
be favourable to them -which means being favourable, in Lindblom’s terms, to the 
prosperity o f society at large. One problem with this view is that Lindblom assumes that all 
businessmen interest groups are (and also the government) always completely conscious o f 
these “superior” interests on behalf o f society’s prosperity. Therefore, all disagreement 
between government and businessmen’s groups could be taken to originate in governmental 
incompetence, inefficiency, bureaucratism, or any other short-sightedness on the part of the 
public officials, which in reality is not necessarily the case. Other problem with Lindblom’s 
thesis is that it is impossible to know whether business interests are capable by themselves 
of influencing governmental policies, or if any such influence is due to their structural 
importance in the economy. Still, another difficulty would be to determine the power of 
different businessmen’s groups in relation to each other, and moreover, it would become 
extremely complex to explain such differences among them in their results without 
resorting to external factors (like governmental preferences or incompetence).
A general disadvantage with the ideas o f  such diverse scholars as Lukes and Lindblom is 
that they cannot provide an explanation as to why there are certain capitalist or 
businessmen interest groups which are more effective than others. Furthermore, even in the 
cases o f always-effective groups (i.e. those who get their interests reflected into public
7 Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets. The World's Political-Economic Systems, Basic Books, New 
York, 1977.
8 Ibid.
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policies) these theories cannot predict just how influential these groups are, since the 
theories become immediately trapped in the dilemma of a parallelism of purpose and action 
between these groups and the government. This poses a practical problem: how to measure 
the power of an interest group, or put it in a different way, how to measure its effectiveness 
in influencing public policy outcomes?
In his very famous work, Who Governs?,9 Robert Dahl argues, in a study based in New 
Haven, that in relatively open systems any group with a major problem, issue or goal would 
make it publicly known. The argument of Dahl then goes on to say that it is possible to note 
whether a group is powerful or not if said group by means o f cover or overt influence is 
frequently successful in initiating policies over the opposition o f others, or when no 
opposition apperas, or is frequently successful in vetoing policies initiated by others. Since 
there is a major difference between the political arenas in Mexico and New Haven precisely 
because the former was then characterised by its limited pluralistic regime, one cannot 
expect to agree with Dahl’s main conclusion in the case of Mexico (that the power in a 
community is widely diffused). However, it is still possible to use Dahl’s method of study 
for observing if the CIRT has or has not been a powerful group, as will be discussed in 
brief.
In the United States, the negotiation tactics most widely used by interest groups to defend, 
protect and impose their interests are carried out through lobbying. The lobbying is not 
always carried out by professional agencies, but it in many cases is carried out directly by 
elite interaction, which most of the time is highly informal. As one author notes,
...American interest group elites may still be expected to contact government officials primarily 
when they have something specific to discuss, some policy question to talk over, or some decision 
to influence. The contact is irregular and ad hoc, and it is quite often shielded from public scrutiny. 
Indeed in American politics the informality is likely to be accentuated by having both the official 
and the nongovernmental elite insist that their visit was only a social encounter between old 
friends.10
This informality poses two kind of problems for the researcher. On the one hand, it might 
lead to overemphasise the influence of a certain group in cases where, there might only be 
parallelism between interests and action. On the other, it poses an analytical problem since
9 Robert Dahl, Who Governs?, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1961.
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it becomes difficult to determine which elite meetings can be considered part of a 
negotiation, and which specific roles are the participants playing. In Mexico most of the 
negotiations between private and governmental elite take place in a context of secrecy and 
informality. Moreover, in the case o f the broadcast media, many important concessionaires 
entered the ranks o f the PRI. There was a coincidence between the media elite with some 
groups of the political elite, the most notorious case being the participation of President 
Miguel Alemán (1946-1952) and his family in the most important private television venture 
in Mexico—Televisa. Let me discuss these interactions between politicians and 
concessionaires.
Until the early 1970s, there were nine major radio concessionaires, top CIRT officials, and 
even media union leaders who also held public charges as PRI Federal Deputies, 
Governors, and Senators: Luis M. Farias, Rubén Marin, Gonzalo Castellot Madrazo, Luis I. 
Santibáñez, Enrique Bermúdez, León Michel, Guillermo Morales Blumenkron, Guillermo 
Núñez Keith and Rafael Riva Palacio. Moreover, there were other close collaborators o f the 
president of TM, Emilio Azcárraga, who occupied important posts in the public 
administration, like Oscar Bravo Santos, who became Director General o f Information in 
the Secretary o f Gobernación in 1958 (he also became federal deputy, Governor o f Nuevo 
León and Major of Monterrey as well) or Walter C. Buchanan, who became Secretary of 
Communications and Public Works in 1959.
Taking this into account the present work tries to solve the problem of how to establish 
with relative accuracy, the power of the media businessmen by using as a basis Dahl’s 
method of observing the extent to which this group was successful in negotiating its views 
on the policy outcomes, even against the opposition of the government (or, at least, o f some 
other political elite members). Dahl’s method is the most useful since, at many times, the 
advancement o f the Chamber’s interests was actually done by directly opposing other 
regime’s projects.
In this manner, one need not search for other interest groups who oppose the CIRT, but to 
focus on the policy projects proposed by the regime itself, then on the reactions of the 
Chamber to them, and finally on the policy outcomes approved and implemented. In this 
way, the basic political framework in which Dahl’s theory inserted his case study -political 10
10 Salisbury (1975), p.210.
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pluralism—, does not condition to it the usage of his method, since it can then be used as 
well in other political contexts. Here three specific cases where there was an open 
disagreement between the concessionaires and the government are examined: the issuing of 
the Federal Law o f Radio and Television (LFRT) of 1960, the issuing of an Executive 
decree establishing new taxes for the concessionaires in 1968-69, and the issuing of the 
Regulation of the LFRT of 1973. In all three cases it was first the regime who presented the 
proposals for legal reforms and the entrepreneurs who responded, and finally modified the 
projects on their behalf.
Previous to 1960, there have been some other cases where the concessionaires pressurised 
the government to modify the original policy projects on their behalf. Maybe the best 
articulated attempt to influence the governmental policies before 1960 took place in 1937- 
9. In September 1937 the Secretary of Transports and Communications, General Francisco 
Mujica, presented a law project meant to replace the Law of General Communication Lines 
of 1932 with a new one (actually, the third one). General Mújica was famous for his ideas 
on the need to substitute entirely the “mixed radio model” with a single public radio system 
dependant on the State. According to the Secretariat of Communications and Transports 
this project main goal was the creation o f a strong public service on the radio that could 
“educate the masses, avoid the commercial criteria in the definition of the programming, 
improve the taste o f the audiences, and prevent the bourgeoisie from imposing its ideology 
on the people”. The AMERC -recently created in 1937—reacted against this project in 
defence of maintaining the commercial radio model. The AMERC directed its pressure 
onto the deputies in charge of the revision and passing of the law and they also wrote letters 
and sought interviews directly with President Cárdenas. The controversy that this project 
aroused meant that it remained for two years in the correspondent Deputy Commission for 
evaluation.n Important modifications demanded by the AMERC were added in the final 
version that was sent to President Cárdenas in 1939. The dominance of the commercial 
model was recognised; the restrictions on commercial advertising were removed; and it 
omitted the tax on radio users. Though the final version of the law maintained the definition 
of the radio as a “public service” against the will of the concessionaires (who wanted it to 
be defined as a “public interest activity”). The creation of a consultative commission for 1
11 A detailed account on this case can be consulted in Fernando Mejia Barquera, (1989), pgs.73-95.
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radio was also accepted. This was composed of three representatives from the Secretariat o f  
Communications and Transports and two from the National Chamber o f Transports and 
Communications (from which the AMERC was part). Through this body all future 
amendments to the law must be informally approved by the concessionaires. But perhaps 
the most important advantage they got was the possibility for them to import without tax all 
the technology and equipment they required for the stations.12
However, in this case it is difficult to see how truly effective this pressure was, since on the 
one hand, Mujica was seriously considered to be a clear forerunner for the presidential 
candidacy as part o f the Left-wing Cardenisia group and he was facing strong competition 
from other more conservative political groups who were opposed to such projects. The 
debates on the Law took place precisely during the nationalisation of the oil industry (1938) 
and the start o f the informal competition among political groups within the party before the 
elections of 1940. General Mujica required the support of President Cárdenas to pass this 
law against the interests not only o f the entrepreneurs, but also against his own political 
rivals in the party. However, it was in these same years when President Cárdenas was using 
all his strength to deal with the recent nationalisation of the oil industry, that he was also 
facing criticism from conservative and entrepreneurial sectors. It is then possible to imagine 
that it might not have been only the effective pressure of the AMERC that finally changed 
the original law project, but a combination of this with the shifting political coalitions 
inside the official party (that were preparing for the replacement of the Cardenistas in 
power) and with the specific political moment characterised by the move towards the 
nationalisation o f the oil industry for which President Cárdenas needed much support and, 
therefore, he might not be willing to open in such moments another front o f dispute. All 
these created a context that favoured less radical measures, though nevertheless is very 
clear that the concessionaires did in fact press on their behalf. After this Law of 1939, all 
further legislation until 1960 was basically intended to regulate technical aspects in order to 
facilitate the development of the radio and it did not endanger the commercial dominant 
model on this medium.13
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In 1959 the government recognised that the Law of General Communication Lines of 1939 
was outmoded since its regulations did not contemplate the operation of television, which 
by that time had been developing for ten years. New changes were required. The 
Commission for Communications and Transports of the Chamber of Deputies elaborated a 
first draft of a new Federal Law of Radio and Television (LFRT) which was to replace the 
Law of 1939. This draft was approved by the Chamber of Deputies and passed then to the 
Senate for its final approval. It was at this point that the concessionaires decided to exercise 
a strong pressure on the Upper Chamber in order to modify the original version of the law 
passed by the Deputies.
The unconformity of the concessionaires was focused on four points. Firstly, in the original 
version of the law, Article 4 defined radio and television as “public services” extending the 
concept already established for the radio in the previous legislation to television. For the 
concessionaires, radio and television should have been considered as “activities of public 
interest”, a concept that enabled them, amongst other things, to maintain the legal faculty to 
fix autonomously-without the intervention of any authority—the prices of the publicity 
fares and to decide to whom they sell air time. The position of the Chamber was expressed 
by its president, Luis Fernández de Soto (who was an advocate that worked for Azcárraga, 
the chairman of TM), when he emphatically said that “radio broadcasting is a public 
interest activity, it is a service to the public, but not a public service”.14 
Secondly, in its original version, Article 59 established that the State could use the 
commercial radio and television channels to freely transmit one hour a day without 
interruption for educational, cultural or social orientation programmes. This point was 
opposed by the concessionaires with the argument that such a disproportionate amount of 
time would inevitably harm their economic interests -affecting their time for advertising—, 
especially since there was no agreement on the time tables to transmit such State time. 
Thirdly, Article 90 of the Law argued for the creation of a National Council of Radio and 
Television chaired by the Secretary of Gobernación and composed by one representative 
from the Secretariat o f Communications, one from the Secretariat o f Education, one from 
the Secretariat of Health, two from the concessionaires and two from the media unions. 
According to Article 91, the functions of this Council were to determine the most
’4 Cited in ibid., pgs. 159-160.
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appropriate time schedules for broadcasting public programmes, to serve as a consulting 
organ to the Federal Executive, to contribute to improve the moralistic, cultural, and artistic 
level of the broadcastings, and to participate in all affairs related to radio and television. For 
the concessionaires, the functioning of such a council would mean the permanent scrutiny 
of their programming and the contents of their transmissions. And, if it was true that, in 
political matters they were unwilling to alter the terms of their tacit agreements o f support 
to the regime and remain “silent”, so to speak, it was also true that they were not willing to 
replace this condition of self-censorship for any external mechanism for censorship. 
Fourthly, the final point of disagreement between the concessionaires and the original Law 
project refers to the daily time allowed for commercial ads. According to article 67 of the 
project voted by the Deputies, there should be a maximum of 20 minutes of commercial 
advertising per hour. This limitation was also refused by the concessionaires. Their main 
arguments were that there was no need for endangering the proper functioning of a 
prosperous industry, especially since it was so important for “the nation”.
Thus, after months of negotiations and constant meetings between the concessionaires with 
top ranking politicians, including the president, a final version of this law, approved and 
passed in the Senate and published by the Executive on the Official Daily in January 19Ih 
1960, incorporated the main demands o f the concessionaires. In this way,
□ Article 4 defines radio and television as public interest activities, which protected the 
radio and television industries from a more consistent interference on the part of the 
State.15 A direct consequence of this definition was that, as Article 53 says, the 
Secretariat o f Communications and Transports “will fix the minimum fare rates” to be 
charged by commercial stations for advertising. The maximum fare rates were left, of 
course, to the market.
□ Article 59 admits only 30 minutes a day for public programmes, which could be 
covered in one single broadcast or at different times during the day, and in this way this 
time (known as State time), w'ould not affect the commercial activities of the stations.16
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In spite of the concerns of the concessionaires for ceding this time for public 
transmissions, it soon became clear that the government lacked the resources to produce 
the programmes required to cover such “State time”. 
q Article 67 replaced any restriction to advertising time with the following phrase: [in all 
broadcasts there] “must be kept a prudent balance between the commercial propaganda 
and the rest o f the programming”. As can be seen, the words “prudent balance” are so 
vague that in reality it was left to the consideration and convenience of the broadcasters 
how prudent such equilibrium should be in each programme.
□ And as for the National Council on Radio and Television (Articles 90 and 91), it has 
actually never met and, therefore, the public programmes -fo r which it was supposed to 
establish the time-tables—have been shown at the lowest rating hours of the day (very 
late at night or very early in the morning), and it has never been defined how to improve 
“the moral, cultural, and artistic level” of the broadcastings -which was, of course, a 
practically impossible task beyond the mere rhetorical level.
Though it is not possible to know the exact terms of the negotiations carried out between 
the Chamber and the governmental officials and parliamentary members, what is clear is 
that the final version of the LFRT was quite favourable to the concessionaires’ interests. 
However, this time it is possible to infer the pressure o f the concessionaires on the one hand 
because this time there existed a previous draft of the law passed and approved by the 
whole Chamber o f Deputies (and one must take into account that at that time there was no 
political fraction bringing into question the actions of President Lopez Mateos, who was in 
his second year o f government). On the other hand, there exists the testimony, some years 
afterwards, o f Deputy Antonio Castro Leal, who was part of the commission that supported 
the original version o f the LFRT, referring to the fact that “the deputies who passed the 
original law felt somehow betrayed by the Senate”, since it was in that Chamber where the 
original law project was modified “due perhaps to the influence of [the broadcast] 
companies” 17
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The Federal Executive will indicate the dependencies that must provide the material to be presented and the 
broadcasts will be co-ordinated by the National Council of Radio and Television” (Ibid).
17 See Antonio Castro Leal, “Radio y televisión”, in Los medios de comunicación de masas en México, Series 
o f Studies, n.10, Mexico City, FCPS-UNAM, 1969.
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The Law of 1960 was highly favourable to the concessionaires* economic interests, as was 
recognised that same year by the President of the Radio Chamber, Guillermo Morales 
Blumenkron, in a public speech that emphasised that the President had given them the 
chance to “vigorously materialise [their] purposes in a law and its respective regulation”.18 
Nevertheless, in strict political terms, the regime maintained the ultimate control over the 
transmissions -and  this was not negotiable. For instance, Article 19 gives the Secretariat o f 
Communications and Transports the faculty to award a concession on radio or television 
guided by “its free judgement”. Article 31, section IX, gives the Secretariat o f 
Communications and Transports the faculty to revoke any concession due to “any failure in 
coping with the requirements of the concession given, not specified in the previous [eight] 
paragraphs” (Italics are mine). Article 96 gives the Secretariat o f Gobernación the faculty 
to visit the stations whenever it considers it pertinent, and Article 97 makes it mandatory 
that the concessionaires attend the observations made by this dependency. Article 101, 
section IV, sanctions “any substantial alteration of the texts, bulletins and material provided 
by the government for transmission”. In this way, the regime could accept the economic 
demands of the concessionaires as long as it could keep the ultimate political controls over 
broadcasting.
The LRPT did not contain any legal disposition that really went against the economic 
interests of the concessionaires, and it gave them all the facilities needed for developing 
their industry. The gratitude of the concessionaires to the government is more than eloquent 
in a speech given by Rafael Riva Palacio, a radio concessionaire, before President López 
during the “Broadcasting Week” in October 1964 Mateos. Riva Palacio said,
Mr. President: when you took office there were some people who showed doubt and fear, Your 
patriotic purpose was not always understood. We, who have the honour of being your friends, had 
faith in you. Time has given us the reason, and by the end of your term you enjoy more sympathies, 
more respect and more strength than any other Mexican in our time. Now that you are preparing to 
leave the highest office of the country, with the spiritual modesty that characterises only those who 
are great in history [sic], you will receive the affection, the admiration and the gratitude of the 
Mexican people, who express the patriotic good that you deserve [sic].19
18 Speech of Guillermo Morales Blumenkron (who was an important member of the PRJ, and who had been 
Federal Deputy, Senator and Governor of the State of Puebla), cited in Raúl Cremoux, ¿ Televisión o prisión 
electrónica?, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1974, p.21.
19 Cremoux, (1974), p,30.
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In economic terms, the LFRT was not the last example of a successful negotiation of the 
concessionaires with the government. The following year, in December 29th 1961, as part 
of the annual Income Law of the Federation, it was established that radio and TV stations 
must pay a tax equivalent to five percent of their gross incomes.20 There was a immediate 
response from the Chamber and, as a consequence of long negotiations that involved the 
Secretariat o f Public Finance, the Secretariat of Communications and Transports, some 
members of the Senate, and the President himself, it was finally agreed that the 
concessionaires were to pay tax equivalent only to 1.25 percent o f their gross incomes.21 
Another case in which the concessionaires favourably negotiated their interests against a 
government initiative occurred in 1969. As in 1961 they successfully modified the criteria 
of the Federal Income Law in relation to their fiscal contributions. In December 30th and 
31sl 1968 there appeared in the Official Daily the Income Law of the Federation for 1969 
and the Budget Project of the Federation for 1969 respectively. In the former, Article 9 
established that all private enterprises functioning under federal concessions for exploiting 
any activity of public interest -as was the case of broadcasting—shall pay the government a 
tax equivalent to 25 percent of all the payments they received for the services they 
provided. This meant that, in the case of broadcasting, the stations must pay 25 percent of 
all their broadcasting services, i.e. publicity and ads incomes. This tax ultimately affected 
those firms and individuals who bought air-time for advertising. But the stations were not 
willing to add to their tariffs -which in some cases were already very high, like those of 
TM—an extra charge for their clientele.
However, the Budget Project, issued one day before, provided a solution. Its Article 16 
stated that an alternative way to pay taxes for firms operating under federal concessions 
was that these firms should cede 49 percent of their shares to either a public investment 
society or to a public trusteeship, which would sell those shares to the public in general. 
Neither option was acceptable for the concessionaires, and a long negotiation process 
started. Though again, the terms of the negotiation are not known, there are some clues that 
show how the pressure of the concessionaires was exercised. According to a very 
prominent media entrepreneur, in those months, in a meeting with President Diaz Ordaz,
20 “Ley de Ingresos de la Federación”, Diario Oficial de la Federación, December 29th 1961.
21 This legal disposition to pay 1.25 percent of their gross incomes appeared in the annual Income Law until 
1979, when it was omitted without any explanation. Mejia Barquera, (1999a), p .l 1.
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Emilio Azcarraga Vidaurreta, who was leading an important number of other 
concessionaires in the negotiation, even threatened the President that if no favourable 
agreement was reached they would renounce in that very moment the concessions which 
they held on radio and TV.22 The outcome of such negotiations was to be seen after six 
months, in June 1961, when a ‘Third way” o f payment was announced. The Decree 
published in the Official Daily established that, along with to the two forms o f payment 
announced in December 1968, the concessionaires could also pay this tax on federal 
concessions by ceding the State the 12.5 percent of their daily commercial air-time for it to 
broadcast its programmes and messages.23 This new air-time that the State obtained was 
called “Fiscal time”.
In economic terms, the concessionaires could successfully defend their interest against the 
regime’s attempt to control their gains. And this victory became more sound since, firstly, it 
was agreed that this “Fiscal time” allocated for public broadcastings was not accumulative, 
thus the time that was not profited by the State per day would be lost. Secondly, as with the 
“State time”, the government was in reality unable to elaborate programmes or broadcast 
any information that could successfully cover the 12.5 percent of daily air time, and 
therefore this payment actually became a fiscal subsidy.24 In any case, the programmes 
transmitted by the government were presented at low-rating times. Thirdly, along with this 
Presidential Decree, a second one was published that same day commanding the Secretariat 
of Communications and Transports to automatically renew all existent concessions for 
another twenty years.25
However, if  the government ceded again to the pressures o f  the concessionaires on the 
economic side o f the regulation, it added two conditions that were not negotiable since they 
tightened its political control over broadcasting: one was related to the concessionaires
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22 Interview with Guillermo Salas Vargas, Vicepresident of Núcleo Radio Mil, August 2000.
23 “Acuerdo Presidencial del 27 de junio de 1969 relativo al pago de impuestos sobre concesiones de 
actividades de interés publico”, Diario Oficial de la Federación, June 28,h 1969.
24 In this regard, though in August 1969 the Federal Television Stations Network was created, and was 
assigned 37 channels throughout the country, it was unable to operate until 1972, when President Echeverría 
transformed it into Cultural Television of Mexico, which later changed its name into Rural Television of 
Mexico and Television of the Mexican Republic. This inconsistency reveals the lack of public alternative 
projects to the commercial television.
25 “Acuerdo Presidencial por el que se autoriza a la SCT a expedir nuevos títulos de concesión a los actuales 
concesionarios en materia de radio y televisión, del 27 de junio de 1969", Diario Oficial de la Federación, 
June 28th 1969.
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obligation to improve the quality of their programming. Though this sounds rhetorical and 
vague, it gave the regime the faculty to supervise their performance on this aspect every 
five years with the possibility o f having the concessions revoked in case of the inadequate 
fulfilling o f this obligation. The other was more concrete: it was agreed that when the 
Executive considered that any material or topic presented -o r about to be presented—might 
result inconvenient for the public peace and order, it could make the concessionaires the 
necessary observations, which are mandatory according to Article 101 of the LFRT, and, in 
case of not attending them, to apply the corresponding sanctions. The regime secured again 
the political control over broadcasting through these dispositions, which actually show the 
limits on the topics it was disposed to negotiate. It is possible that the decision o f the 
regime to have inserted in the Income Law of the Federation the new tax and the 
alternatives it initially give to the concessionaires to pay it, were moved by the recent 
student repression and massacre of October 2nd 1968. The regime wanted to secure stronger 
controls over radio and television, in spite of the fact that the media did not report on the 
massacre in all its crude reality. In these negotiations, the regime was prepared to cede to 
the pressures of the concessionaires on the economic matters, in exchange for political 
discipline.
The third example o f this form of negotiation -in which the government firstly proposed to 
reduce the economic benefits of the concessionaires and control their gains, then the latter 
pressed for maintaining their privileges, and at the end, they advanced their economic 
interests in reward for accepting the political control of the regime over broadcasting—took 
place during the Echeverría administration (1970-1976). The inauguration of this 
government was deeply marked by the recent events of 1968 (when the president was 
Secretary of Gobernación). As will be seen in Chapter Three, the new administration was 
characterised by an intensification of the populist and nationalist rhetoric. In the case of the 
broadcasting media, this discourse was highly critical of the negative impact of private 
television programming on the education of the masses, the formation of citizens and the 
cultural development o f the country.
It is quite telling that on his first day o f government President Echeverría created the 
Under-Secretariat of Radio Broadcasting, as part of the Secretariat of Communications and
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Transports.26 In May 15th 1971 Echeverría criticised the role o f private television in the 
following terms, a masterpiece of his populist rhetoric:
We need that those who manage the mass media understand that the future of the economy, within 
which their sponsors and advertisers labour, is linked to the highest social conceptions of our 
people... If we do not find the way to develop this task of harmony and understanding, what is done 
at school will be destroyed -and it is already being destroyed—outside it (NB: on the TV 
screens).27
By November 1971, top ranking government officials openly criticised the way radio and 
television were operating in Mexico. On November 4th, the Secretary of Public Education 
declared that the Commission for Radio Broadcasting would carefully evaluate the impact 
of radio and TV programmes on the education of the people.28 However, a more radical 
position was presented by a close advisor to the president, Alfredo Leal Cortés, who said 
that if  public opinion was supportive, the government could even consider the possibility of 
“nationalising the media” [sic] -though by law no concession was awarded to foreigners.2^  
Criticism against private television and radio continued and in January 29th 1972 the Under­
secretary of Radio Broadcasting announced that the government was ready to make 
complete use of the 12.5 percent of fiscal air time it had at its disposal by law, and that a 
new and stricter Federal Law o f Radio and Television was already being prepared.30 
Under these circumstances rumours began, that were to be confirmed later on, about the 
recent acquisition by the government o f 72 percent o f the shares of Channel 13 XHDF (see 
Chapter Four). On March 15th it was publicly announced that the government was then the
26 The faculties of such dependency were: To analyse and resolve the petitions for radio and television 
concessions and permissions; to impose the corresponding sanctions in case of violations of the laws on the 
part of the concessionaires or permissionaires; to produce and transmit the programmes of radio and television 
of the Secretariat o f Communications and Transports; and to establish consulting links with the National 
Chamber of Radio and Television.
2' Cited in Jorge Alberto Lozoya, “La TV' estatal en México: notas sobre un intento", in Foro Internacional, 
vol. XIV, no.3, January-March 1974, p.403.
28 El Día, November 4th 1971. The Commission for Radio Broadcasting was the public organ already referred 
to above, which was created in July 1969 and directly dependent on the Secretariat of Gobernación, whose 
task was to make the best use of the 12.5 percent of the fiscal time, to supervise that the concessionaires do 
transmit public programmes on that time, to study the developments of radio and television, and to advise the 
Federal Executive in matters of radio and television. Below it will be seen that some of their functions 
overlapped with the National Council on Radio and Television (created in 1960), and eventually the 
Commission duties were shifted to focus mainly on the edition and transmission of the political parties 
programmes. But as said before, it was never really operating.
29 Excélsior, November 15th 1971.
30 Excélsior, January 30th 1972.
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owner of all the shares of the channel and of some of the radio stations of the Grupo Radio 
Centro, which belonged to the entrepreneur Francisco Aguirre. In any case, the acquisition 
of the channel was the response of the government to its own crisis of legitimacy, since it 
was believed within the presidential closest circles that only by having its own mass media 
could the regime secure the correct transmission o f messages according to its own 
interests.31 The actions of the government to increase its direct participation on television 
did not cease there. One week later, the government announced the creation of the Rural 
Television of the Federal Government composed of a network o f 100 television stations. 
This network was shortly afterwards renamed Cultural Television of Mexico and finally 
Television of the Mexican Republic (TRM). This new trend towards public television in 
Mexico was supposed to promote, according to the government, “social integration and 
modernisation by going beyond the purely commercial character o f private television”.32 In 
this way, the Echeverría administration was apparently defying the traditional status quo 
that had been established between the regime and the media entrepreneurs for more than 
three decades.
The media businessmen did not wait long in expressing their opinions. Through the 
Chamber of Radio and Television (CIRT) they stressed “their patriotism, their role as social 
transmission mechanisms of information and the national character of their 
programming”.33 In July 1972 there took place an important meeting between the president 
and the most important concessionaires in which the latter not only presented a 
comprehensive diagnosis of the programming in order to show that it was in accordance 
with the Mexican taste, but most importantly, they all reaffirmed their complete disposition 
towards co-operating and collaborating with the government.34 That same month saw the 
beginning of transmissions on radio and TV of a series of short adverts which emphasised 
the positive character of the private media both for economic development and for public 
peace. For instance, there was transmitted the following brief spot: “Radio and television
31 The public Channel 11 had been in operation since 1959, though it was not optimum for the Echeverría 
group's interests, since its signal was essentially received only in the metropolitan area surrounding Mexico 
City, and secondly, it was already operated by the National Polytechnic Institute.
32 These words are taken from the inauguration discourse of the public operation of Channel 13 given by its 
director general, Enrique González Pedrero, in January 1974. (Curiously 23 years later he was elected Senator 
by the Democratic Revolutionary Party).
33 Arredondo and Sánchez Ruiz, (1987), pgs. 160-161.
34 Antena, n.12, July 1972, pgs. 1-2.
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collaborate with the administration and the public order by transmitting the voice of the 
government to all the Republic. Radio and television, trustworthy instantaneous 
communication”.35 Moreover, the concessionaires decidedly pointed out that, “in contrast 
to their collaboration to public peace”, there were others which “predicted violence”. In the 
monthly CIRT bulletin, Antena, they clearly stated their position: “More than a century ago, 
the Communist groups predicted violence to create a new society. With Marx’s and Engels’ 
Communist Manifesto there started the systematic attack on the material and spiritual values 
of Western Culture. Private property and the family are attacked, while class fighting is 
exalted in order to inaugurate the dictatorship of the proletariat as a transitory and violent 
stage to transit from a bourgeois society to a socialist society”.36 In this way, not only the 
private broadcasters were sending out a clear message to the ruling elite underlying their 
crucial role in the maintenance o f public peace and order, but they were also pointing out 
who the “true addicts to violence” were: the left-wing organisations and groups. The w'ay to 
reduce the influence of such groups was to convince the regime to “work together in 
harmony” . But the aims of such declarations were also to warn President Echeverría that if 
he insisted upon continuing with his populist rhetoric, the effects would be dangerous for 
the status quo and may bring about unpleasant consequences for the economic 
development. They also wanted to warn those public officials who supported a possible -  
though not probable—nationalisation of the media, that the CIRT was prepared to fight for 
its interests. Thus, the position o f the concessionaires was one o f reinforcing their loyalties 
to the regime and renewing, in closer terms, their compromise with the government’s 
political interests, but at the same time they made clear that any attempt to alter the private 
operation of the media would encounter serious resistance. In accordance to this attitude, 
the concessionaires decided to elaborate a consistent public relations policy “to inform 
public opinion” about the advantages of private property, of the need to oppose “external 
influences”, and the great advantages that the citizens had in “living in a country of 
peace”.37
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35 In Fernández Christlieb (1996), p.133.
30 Antena, n.38, September 1974, p.3.
37 In another bulletin they explained that the real problems for the country were located on the Left: “We now 
live in a time when the followers of Marx, Engels and Lennin consider that private property of the means of 
production is harmful of the majority’s interests. We, in the CIRT, know that such ideas are not true”. Antena, 
n.34, May 1974, p.2.
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Again the government accepted the terms of this mutually supportive approach. On October 
4^1972 it was announced that there would not be issued any new federal law for radio and 
television, but only a regulation o f the existing LFRT of 1960. The government, whose 
intention was never to seriously challenge private property, accepted the terms offered by 
the concessionaires for a “more explicit alliance” in favour of stability and order. The 
media, especially private television, became crucial for such purposes.38 
The Regulation of the Federal Law of Radio and Television (RLFRT), published in April 
4th 1973, showed the renewal of this agreement between the commercial media and the 
regime: the profits o f the concessionaires would not be restricted or controlled, but the 
regime established new mechanisms to secure political control over broadcasting. In this 
regard Article 9 of the RLFRT created a new General Direction o f Information within the 
Secretariat of Gobernación whose task were essentially to “point out the degree of priority” 
o f the programmes to be transmitted during the daily thirty minutes of air time that 
corresponded to the State time according to Article 59 o f the LFRT of 1960 (Article 9 of 
the RLFRT). More specifically, Article 9 authorised the General Direction of Information 
to perform some tasks that implied political surveillance. Some of them were:
1) To co-ordinate the State’s transmissions, indicating the level of priority for each of 
them, and controlling their contents.
2) To oversee that the transmissions presented cope with the legal dispositions, and in case 
they do not, to impose the corresponding sanctions.
3) To authorise the transmission of foreign material or foreign language transmissions.
4) To order nation-wide transmissions through all the broadcasting networks and stations 
o f the material or programmes that the government consider to be relevant.
Other important articles of the RLFRT that must be mentioned for its political relevance are 
the following:
□ As mentioned, Article 59 of the LFRT of 1960 stipulated that the State could use up to 
thirty minutes a day of transmissions free o f any charge on radio and television. This
38 Just to take one example of the constant support that Televisa -whose creation in January 1973 will be 
discussed in Chapter Four -gave to the regime’s permanence, one can cite the strong promotionals that were 
presented on its channels whenever there was a national holiday, in which it was always stressed that Mexico, 
in subtle contrast with many of the rest of the Latin American countries, enjoyed public peace, growth and 
development.
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State time could be used in a single bloc of time or it could be divided up during the 
day. Article 12 of the RLFRT stated that the minimum amount of time into which the 
State time could be divided was of five minutes.
□ Article 36 o f  the RLFRT, section I, prohibited all transmissions that could result in 
being “against State security, national integrity, public peace and order”.
□ As mentioned, Article 90 o f the LFRT of 1960 created the National Council o f  Radio 
and Television (CNRT), as an advisory body to the Federal Executive in such matters, 
composed o f  four members of the federal administration, two representatives o f the 
media and two representatives of the unions. Article 49 o f the RLFRT added a 
permanent secretary to the council and another representative o f the media unions.
□ Article 51 o f  the RLFRT punctuated the faculties of the CNRT, established in a more 
general level in Article 91 o f the LFRT of 1960. Among them was the faculty to ask the 
concessionaires to classify their programming into news broadcasts, sports 
programmes, entertainment, and so forth; and ask them to provide them with weekly 
information on their programming.
□ Article 52 o f the RLFRT, citing the content of Articles 61 and 91 of the LFRT o f 1960, 
reaffirmed that the CNRT would “co-ordinate the transmissions” of the State time and 
would establish the time-tables for these transmissions in accordance with the 
concessionaires, “who will previously be heard on such matters”.
The RLFRT o f 1973 sought to expand theit control over the political contents o f  the 
programming, though at the same time, it sought to grant a beneficial economic status quo 
for the concessionaires. And, in spite o f  the relatively frequent criticisms with which 
different government officials -included President Echeverria—pointed out the deficiencies 
and low quality o f actual programmes, when it came to action it was only to make clear the 
limits o f the presentation of political information and material. Great pains were taken not 
to pull the rope so tight as to endanger the economic interests of the concessionaires by 
altering the dominant private forms of exploitation of public concessions, or by limiting the 
profits o f the entrepreneurs. As long as the concessionaires respected the tolerated political 
limits, their economic interests would not be harmed. In this regard President Echeverria 
was clear when, at the end of his term, he was asked about the possibilities of nationalising
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the private radio, as some of his collaborators suggested at the beginning of his 
administration. His answer was emphatically “No... It seems to me that the 
bureaucratisation would be terrible... That is, the thesis here is very' clear [to maintain the 
concessions on private hands], otherwise we will not be living in liberty, nor in the mix- 
economy model we have proposed’*.39
This sort of understanding between the regime and the concessionaires had been the non- 
written rule for decades. The news broadcasts reflected precisely this collaboration between 
the concessionaires and the regime, since they reflected, on the one hand, the general 
support of the regime’s legitimacy -and to the president in particular--, and on the other, 
they also presented their particular viewpoints on Mexican society, which on many 
occasions turned out to be highly conservative, and opposed to any sort of left wing 
ideologies.40
As for specific advantages conceded to the concessionaires by the RLFRT, one must recall 
that in 1960, when referring to the amount of advertising that could be presented within one 
hour of broadcasting, Article 67 of the LFRT had established only that there must be “a 
prudent equilibrium between the commercial publicity and the rest of the programming”. 
On the RLFRT, Article 41 repeated such a phrase and Article 42 defined how this “prudent 
equilibrium” was to be understood in matters of publicity. In the case of television it states 
that:
a) The total time destined to advertising cannot be more than eighteen percent of the total 
transmission time.
b) Between 8:00 p.m. and the closing of the transmissions the stations can use up to half of 
the total time destined to advertising (9 percent of the total transmission time).
c) The commercial breaks presented during a single programme transmission with natural 
continuity cannot be more than six per hour and each break cannot exceed two minutes.
d) The commercial breaks presented during times in which no single programme with 
natural continuity is transmitted cannot be more than ten per hour and each break 
cannot exceed a minute and a half.
i9 Antena, n.52, November-December 1975, p.3.
40 See Chapter One for the analysis of the entrepreneurial positions in relation to the Mexican regime’s 
foreign policy.
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In the case of radio broadcasting it states that,
a) The total time destined to advertising cannot exceed 40 percent of the total daily air­
time.
b) The commercial breaks presented during a single programme transmission with natural 
continuity cannot be more than twelve per hour and each break cannot exceed one 
minute and a half.
c) The commercial breaks presented during times in which no single programme with 
natural continuity is transmitted cannot be more than fifteen per hour and each break 
cannot exceed two minutes.
As if such restrictions were harsh, Article 43 permitted the concessionaires to ask the 
Secretariat of Gobernación to “authorise a temporary increase in the advertising time 
allowed” upon request and during special transmissions. So, in reality longer advertising 
time could be obtained by the stations. Moreover, the Commission for Radio Broadcasting 
was supposed to supervise the fulfilment of these dispositions, but in reality since the 
beginning the government let the concessionaires exceed those ad-time limits, only 
supervising in cases when governmental authorities wanted to exercise pressure over a 
specific broadcasting station.41 In this way, the regime made it clear to the concessionaires 
that, though the new dispositions might eventually give the State the possibility to supervise 
the contents of the broadcastings, it would continue to support the development and growth 
of the private interests in the industry as long as they did not trespass certain limits and 
maintain their loyalty to it.
These remarks contrast with the conclusions of some researchers like Bohman or Fernández 
Christlieb,42 for whom the economic benefits that the concessionaires obtained are 
explained by the incapacity of the State to defend and impose its own projects and 
conditions vis-à-vis the strength of this private sector. This seems to be a partial remark. 
The 1940s saw the establishment of a convenient collaboration between the regime and the 
private media concessionaires, based upon the economic support given by the former in 
exchange for the media remaining politically loyal to the regime. This arrangement gave
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42 Bohmann, (1997), p. 110; Fernández Christlieb, (1996), pgs. 147-171.
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the concessionaires the possibility to press on the government in order to influence its 
policies and decrees in relation to media economic affairs. However, the regime drew a 
clear line that could not be trespassed: the regime would always secure by all means the 
ultimate political control over broadcasting. And it was not only a matter of legal 
regulation, but one o f political control implied by the legal precepts as well. For the regime 
it was not enough to have a “tacit promise” from the concessionaires of their loyalty. It also 
had to develop mechanisms to secure it. As I have shown, if it was true that the 
concessionaires negotiated with success their interests against the regime’s original 
projects, these gains remained limited within the economic sphere and the regime was 
never disposed to negotiate any concession that might have supposed the loss of the 
ultimate political control over broadcasting.
Though, for the regime the “categorical imperative” was to keep the media loyal to it and, 
at the same time, to reinforce its legitimacy through their transmissions. As long as this 
situation maintained and the concessionaires respected this limit, the different governments, 
with more or less disposition, accepted to negotiate -even to cede to—the demands of the 
media businessmen on the two most important aspects for the entrepreneurs: advertising 
and taxation. Therefore, the strength of this group was located in these aspects, which were 
also the most relevant for them. Undeniably, the concessionaires were successful and strong 
in advancing and defending their interests on these points.
One can finally pose the question of whether or not it was true that there was a 
collaboration between the regime and the concessionaires. If there was, then why did the 
regime attempt from time to time to place tighter controls over the economic benefits of the 
concessionaires? According to what we have discussed here, it might be possible to 
suppose that the real aim behind the “economic controls” that the regime proposed with all 
its projects, was actually directed at reinforcing the more political aspects of control, 
threatening only the economic gains and benefits of the media in order to better secure 
political control. By proposing or presenting a project that contained a list of unacceptable 
regulations on economic aspects for the media, the regime was then able to be flexible on 
such topics in exchange for securing or reinforcing political control. This may sound a quite 
Machiavellian attitude on the part of the regime and also of a long-term consciousness that 
is difficult to prove. Therefore, it remains only a hypothesis.
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What can be seen from the outcome o f the negotiations is that, though the Chamber could 
not alter the terms of the regime’s ultimate political control on broadcasting, the CIRT was 
highly effective in defending the economic interests of the concessionaires. Moreover, it 
was even successful in imposing most of its points of view despite the different 
government’s legal projects to control or reduce its economic profits and benefits. In this 
sense, the concessionaires were, in economic matters, a highly influential and powerful 
interest group.
Some Remarks on the Media Entrepreneurs
This last section seeks to make some remarks about the use o f  a term such as “interest 
group” for encompassing all the concessionaires in Mexico. There were always important 
differences between Mexico City media entrepreneurs and those o f other provinces. The 
differences did not stop at the geographical sphere, but they also called into question the 
apparent unity between Mexico City radio and television concessionaires. Discussing these 
differences is important for two main reasons. Firstly because it serves to highlight that the 
interests defended by the chamber coincided with the interests of its most important 
members -especially Televisa’s or TM’s at that time—and that they did not always reflect 
other members’ interests (especially those of the provinces). Secondly because it serves to 
highlight that the differences between Mexico City’s radio and television concessionaires, 
though not reflecting on a markedly divergent behaviour for decades, will provide for 
dissimilar attitudes in relation to politics in the future. This section concludes by analysing 
the first of these two points. The second is dealt within chapters four (TV) and five (radio). 
In his now classic book, The Logic o f  Collective Action, Mancur Olson analyses the 
formation of interest groups and the motives their members have in joining them.43 
Through simple reasoning he departs from two basic premises: A) When individuals have a 
common interest in attaining a political goal, this takes the form o f a collective good, since 
once it is achieved its benefits can be enjoyed by each individual in the group, regardless of 
how' much he/she contributed individually to it. B) Olson departs from certain assumptions
43 M. Olson. The Logic o f  Collective Action, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965.
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on the rationality o f human behaviour, on their economically self-interested attitudes, and 
on the fact that they have perfect information in a specific moment for masking their 
choices. Olson uses these premises to remark that if all this is true, interest groups are not 
formed on the basis o f  a common interest, since,
If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximise their personal welfare, they will not act 
to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or 
unless some separate incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or group interest, is 
offered to the members of the group individually on the condition that they help bear the costs or 
burdens involved in the achievement of the group objectives.44
Therefore, the question o f whether interest groups will emerge, and how well they can 
recruit members and contributions, depends upon their ability to supply members with 
individual and relatively concrete benefits that lie beyond the discourse on the “common 
interest”. In the case o f Mexican broadcasters, the question on the recruitment of members 
does not represent any debate, since according to the Law o f Chambers, joining the 
corresponding chamber was mandatory for private entrepreneurs. However, Olson’s theory 
is useful for understanding how a dominant group within the CIRT established it own goals 
as the Chamber’s goals, and also how the rest became free-riders most of the time. In this 
sense, the weaker concessionaires did not have to share the costs for the actions taken, but 
at the same time whenever there was a disagreement regarding their goals and those of the 
stronger concessionaires, they did not have the possibility of furthering them. Finally, 
Olson’s ideas are useful not only for explaining the internal differences within a group, but 
also for noting that whenever necessary -and possible—CIRT members would seek to 
advance their own interests outside the general channels o f the chamber. It is helpful to 
consider in further chapters (Chapters 5 and 8) how radio concessionaires had a different 
reaction than the TV concessionaires when economic circumstances changed.
In Mexico, the CIRT became almost from the start “naturally” dominated by the great 
broadcasters, gathered around TM, later Televisa. The first president of the Chamber was 
Emilio Azcirraga Vidaurreta and during the first thirty years of existence, the Chamber had 
fifteen presidents from which nine were directly linked to TM and Televisa.45 The success
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44 Ibid., p.2.
45 Cremoux, (1974), pgs. 16-17.
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of the Azcárraga group was due not only to his ability for expanding to other important 
economic sectors -from tourist services and film production, to the control o f other 
economic organisations, like the National Publicity Association-,46 but most of all to his 
ability to establish narrow links with the groups of the “revolutionary family” that took the 
control o f political power since the 1940s.
The Azcárraga family belong to the entrepreneurial groups located mainly in the central 
part o f Mexico -like the Balleres, Vallina, Alarcon, Legorreta, etc.-, who have basically 
supported the “revolutionary regime” as represented first by the Obregón-Calles group and 
later by the official party’s presidents. In exchange they have obtained enormous benefits 
for developing their industries and businesses. In contrast, the other strong entrepreneurial 
group in the country, the Monterrey group (whose origins date from the late XIX century), 
always had a more critical attitude towards the regime, due to the interventionist character 
of the State in economic matters. Though they never challenged the regime in any direct 
manner, the Monterrey group confronted the regime’s policies in some important 
occasions, like during the Cárdenas and the Echeverría’s administrations, and it supported 
the creation o f the Centre-Right Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) in 1939.47 The 
entrepreneurs of central Mexico preferred to align with the regime and never tried to 
support the political opposition parties. Instead they benefited from close links with the 
political elite, as was the clear case of the Azcárraga family. Though this group led the 
broadcasting media industry, there had been, since the beginning, some important radio 
concessionaires who opposed the leadership of Azcárraga.
46 A key figure within the Azcárraga group was Clemente Serna, owner of local radio stations in Monterrey 
and business partner of Azcárraga in RPM, who occupied diverse charges within the private sector 
organisations, like the National Commerce Chamber (CONCANACO) and the National Industrial Chamber 
(CONCAMIN). When television started in the 1950s he became very important in persuading various 
entrepreneurs to insert their announcements and propaganda in the new medium -in  which not too many were 
confident at the time— and therefore in the great expansion of television. See Mejia Barquera, (1989),
pgs. 170-171.
47 Other revealing incidents that show the opposition of this Monterrey group to the “revolutionary regime” 
was its support of the candidacy of General Almazán, who was running for the presidency against the official 
candidate General Ávila Camacho in 1940. They also opposed the educational policies of President López 
Mateos. (For a study about the relationships between the PAN and the Monterrey group see Soledad Loaeza, 
El Partido Acción Nacional la larga marcha, 1939-1994 : oposición leal y  partido de protesta, Mexico City, 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999). Here it must be mentioned that this industrial group received a 
concession for operating a television station through its firm Televisión Independiente de Mexico (TIM). The 
inauguration of XHTM TV Channel 8 started on September Is' 1968 with the broadcast of the annual 
presidential address to the Congress. A brief period of competition then started in the private Mexican
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Almost from the start o f the radio industry in Mexico there emerged a certain duality 
between the regions and the centre.48 Outside Mexico City there were other regional groups 
who formed important nuclei among the radio entrepreneurs, and who had not shared the 
points of view of Azcárraga both towards the radio industry and towards the political 
regime. Since the late 1930s, some local radio entrepreneurs elaborated a project in order to 
create a ‘‘common front” against the domination of the centre (i.e. o f the Azcárraga group 
and the Mexico City radio industry). One o f the most active promoters of this idea was the 
northern entrepreneur Pedro Meneses, who founded four important radio stations in Ciudad 
Juárez, in the state o f Chihuahua, between 1930 and 1936.49 He favoured the idea of 
consolidating local radio stations and of preventing that the capital's stations -mainly XEW 
and XEQ—absorbed them or make them dependent on them through programming. 
Another entrepreneur who supported the development o f radio alternatives to those o f 
Mexico City was Rafael Cutberto Navarro, owner of a radio station in the city o f Leon, 
XEFM, and who in 1948 decided to found a radio network, Radio Cadena Nacional, which 
became for many years the rival of Azcárraga* s Radio Programas de México, and whose 
headquarters were, paradoxically, located in Mexico City.
In the 1940s many other stations began to appear outside Mexico City founded by both new 
entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs who had initiated in the 1930s but who did not have many 
opportunities to compete against the pressure of the centre. The Comité Coordinador de 
Radiodifusoras de los Estados was founded in the 1950s for the defence of the interests of 
local radio stations. Nevertheless, they could never seriously challenge the power of the 
Azcárraga group, nor impose their points o f view in the Chamber when confronted to those 
o f  Azcárraga. Maybe the best example o f this can be seen in the conflict around the 
installation of re-transmission stations.
During the 1940s and 1950s Azcárraga wanted to install in different provinces some radio 
stations whose only purpose was to re-transmit the signal sent from his Mexico City 
stations, XEW and XEQ. This action was intended to increase the audience of these stations 
and at the same time would permit them to charge Mexico City’s announcers with higher
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television, but it ended at the beginning of the 1970s with the fusion of TM with TIM to create Televisa. This 
will be discussed in Chapter 4.
48 See Fátima Fernández Christlieb, La radio mexicana. Centro y  Regiones, Mexico City, Juan Pablos, 1997,
49 During the early 1950s he got also a concession for television, XEJ-TV in the same northern city.
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advertising tariffs with a minimal operation cost, since the installation o f such types of 
stations did not demand any more than a pair of technicians and operators. The local radio 
concessionaires opposed such stations with the argument that they would generate an unfair 
competition for the clientele, since they could afford to offer the local announcers lower 
tariffs and wider audiences. Many small radio stations were not prepared to compete with 
the quality of the programmes produced in Mexico City, and thus, the establishment of 
these re-transmission stations would make them go into bankrupt. Other argument were 
posed by more important local concessionaires, such as Meneses, for whom these stations 
represented an intervention from the centre and endangered the development o f local 
programming. In any case, the local concessionaires presented their case before the 
Chamber and the Under-Secretary o f Communications and Transports, Walter. C. 
Buchanan. The president in turn o f the CIRT, José Luis Fernández Lara, was also the legal 
counsellor of Azcárraga. Buchanan was also a close friend o f Azcárraga (his brother 
worked for him). The outcome o f the conflict, unsurprisingly, favoured the installation of 
the re-transmission stations by the mid-1950s, accelerating also the affiliation o f local 
station into larger networks in order to survive.
Though the dominance of the Azcárraga family in the radio industry could not be 
challenged by other regional and local concessionaires, in Mexico City there emerged in the 
1940s other important radio entrepreneurs who increasingly won relevant spaces and 
influence within the radio industry. In the 1940s the imminent advent of television 
redirected the interests of the radio giants, especially o f Azcárraga, who started to 
concentrate his efforts on obtaining a concession for the new medium and, therefore, 
leaving some free spaces for other concessionaires to grow.50 In this way, after 1945 the 
two great radio networks, the XEW-NBC and the XEQ-CBS reduced their participation in 
broadcasting activity51 and this created new opportunities for other entrepreneurs to take the 
spaces left by the traditional radio magnates. New radio stations started to appear all over 
the country covering mostly local and regional audiences. New names, like Guillermo Salas
50 An example of this is the fact that in 1948 the works on the construction of a huge building that was to 
allocate the headquarters of Mr. Azcárraga’s radio stations, XEW and XEWW (short wave) and that 
pompously was to be called “Radiopolis”, were called off. When the works were renewed the project they 
were suppose to conclude was replaced by the building of television studies, called Televicentro, which was 
inaugurated in January 1952.
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Peyró, Francisco Ibarra or Manuel Suárez, appeared in Mexico City and became very 
important within the industry. And new radio networks started to compete with Azcárraga’s 
RPM, as Radiodifusoras Unidas Mexicanas, S.A. (RUMSA), Grupo Acir, Núcleo Radio 
Mil, Corporación Mexicana de Radiodifusión, Sociedad Mexicana de Radio, or Radio 
Cadena Nacional51 2
Though by the 1950s the broadcasting industry was highly heterogeneous and there were 
many radio entrepreneurs, the advent of television consolidated the power of the Azcárraga 
group and though this group never did establish a complete monopoly over television 
concessions it became unquestionably the most important media group in the country.53 His 
group dominated the Chamber and greatly shaped its interests, which became “common 
interests” for the rest. Since most of these common interests had to do with the preservation 
o f the private commercial model of broadcasting, the rest o f the members felt themselves 
represented by them, and followed the leadership of TM when defending them. These 
actions avoided the costs of facing adverse government decisions by themselves, but at the 
same time they consolidated the power of Azcárraga's coiporation among the rest of the 
concessionaires. TM became unquestionably the Primus inter pares o f broadcasters. 
Nevertheless this leadership of TM, reflected in the Chambers actions, sometimes obscures 
the divisions that existed therein. If it is true that for most of this period, and seen from a 
general perspective, the concessionaires behaved as a group, the truth is that there were 
always important divisions not only among regions that opposed the pre-eminence of
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51 Alma Rosa Alva de la Selva, “Radio: punta de lanza del consorcio”, in Raul Trejo Delarbre, (coord.), Las 
redes de Televisa, Mexico City, Claves Latinoamericanas, 1988, p.130.
52 By 1970, along these networks, the most important radio networks in the country were also: Radiodifusoras 
Mexicanas (Radimsa), Organización Independiente de Mexico (OIR), Organización de Radiodifusoras 
Mexicanas Asociadas (ORMA), Radiodifusoras Asociadas (Rasa), Radio ventas de Provincia (Ravepsa), 
Difusoras del Pacifico, Unión Radio, Agentes de Radio y Televisión, Central de Emisoras de Provincia,
Radio Emisoras Independientes, Sistema Radiofónico and Radiorama.
53 In 1970 there were also other commercial television channels in operation, like Channel 8 (property of the 
Monterrey Group) and Channel 13 property of the radio entrepreneur Francisco Aguirre. Channel 13 
unfortunately did not have the strength to compete against the two large television networks and its shares 
were finally acquired by the State at the beginning of the 1970s, as will be seen in Chapter 8. Outside Mexico 
City the most important TV network was Telecadena Mexicana that in 1970 had twelve channels in different 
cities. The film producer Manuel Barbachano Ponce founded in 1965 Telecadena Mexicana, which gathered 
local television channels in the provinces. In the early 1970s this network already had fifteen channels 
operating in the central and northern states of Mexico. The channels incorporated to Television Independiente 
de Mexico -five in 1969 and the rest in 1972—in order to have better chances to compete for publicity and 
advertising. However, according to Noriega and Leach, regional and local publicity still preferred to be 
announced in the national television channels -the ones of Mexico City—and by 1975 the network was 
practically bankrupt. De Noriega and F. Leach, (1979), p.23.
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Mexico City, but also among radio and television concessionaires. Their apparent 
“homogeneity” has a lot to do with the maintenance of the more or less stable political and 
economic conditions over the years before the 1970s. But things were about to change, and 
as is discussed in further chapters, the most remarkable changes for the media would occur 
at an economic level, conditioning different answers from radio than from television, for 
facing and adapting to the new challenges. Therefore, though a definition of the 
concessionaires as an homogeneous interest group might seem adequate, at first sight, 
important differences soon become noticeable as soon as the years of economic crisis 
altered the conditions in which the industry had been developing.
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fPart II
Political Liberalisation and Broadcasting, 1970s-
1994
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Chapter Three
The Political Context 1,1970s-1994
Many things changed in the Mexican political landscape after the decades in which the rule 
of the PRI seemed to be uncontested and unchallenged. The Political Reform of 1977 was 
not the first, but certainly was the most important measure for liberalising the political 
arena after the student massacre o f 1968, which directly questioned the legitimacy of the 
post-revolutionary regime. That reform can be considered to be the starting point of a 
political liberalisation process led by a regime still confident of its capacity to re-distribute 
economic and social benefits. Such re-distributive capacities, explained by decades of 
economic growth, gave the regime the overall support of the entrepreneurs and the power to 
incorporate and subordinate the popular sectors.
Political liberalisation was essentially directed towards the transformation of the electoral 
arena and the party system at a time when the pressure for démocratisation was still low. 
Political pressure came mainly from the middle sectors; sectors that had not been part of the 
historical corporatist structures, and whose demands were considered to be easily 
channelled through the electoral arena and the party system. In any case, by the late 1970s, 
opposition parties were still weak and all o f them, including the PAN, had a low level of 
penetration and “representativity” within the society. All these conditions favoured the 
development o f a protracted transition in which, in the absence of strong social mobilisation 
and pressures for political change, originally weak opposition parties had more to win by 
playing within the regime’s rules than by challenging them.1
However, after the total collapse of the protectionist economic model in 1982 and the 
growing incapacity o f the regime to continue with re-distribution, the recently opened 1
1 As Todd Eisenstadt has pointed out a characteristic o f this kind of transitions is that the locus of change 
seems to take the form of continuous and prolonged struggles over the formal institutional playing field: “it 
appears that democratization is a ‘war of attrition’ of the authoritarian incumbents and opposition parties over 
the micro-institutional foundations of the transition... Indeed opposition parties have argued about the fairness 
o f electoral institutions and electoral representation formulas in bids to ’sneak into the back door’ to power 
sharing” (Todd Eisenstadt, “Eddies in the Third Wave: Protracted Transitions and Theories of 
Democratization”, in Democratization, vol.7, no.3, Autumn 2000, p.4). Reynaldo Yunuen Ortega explains 
that “the Mexican transition is characterised as a protracted non-pacted transition, namely a transition that has 
been under way for more than 30 years, through struggle and incomplete reform, in which the governing 
coalition, instead of constructing new rules of the game to make a transition possible, has been fighting
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electoral channels and the opposition parties were increasingly used by different social 
groups to initiate an “electoral dissidence” against the regime by voting against the PRI. At 
first, such dissidence was expressed as a “punishment vote” against the PRI -benefiting 
mostly the PAN— , nevertheless, it slowly moved throughout the 1980s into to a more 
conscious vote for opposition that by the end of the period studied here had created two 
clear alternatives to the PRI, the PAN and the PRD.
This chapter is divided in two parts. The first one discusses briefly the circumstances that 
inaugurated a political liberalisation process in Mexico and its unintended consequences for 
fostering what could be labelled as “the electoral dissidence” during the early 1980s. The 
second part shows the emergence of a more plural political arena during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s with the strengthening of opposition parties.
The Political Liberalisation Process: Circumstances and Consequences
According to O ’Donnell and Schmitter, political liberalisation is a process of redefining 
and extending rights. In their own words,
It is indicative of the beginning of the transition that its emergence triggers a number of (often 
unintended) consequences which play an important role in ultimately determining the scope and 
extension of that process. By liberalization, we mean the process of making effective certain rights 
that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state 
or third parties.2
O’Donnell and Schmitter also admit that liberalisation can exist without democratisation 
and they realise “the precarious dependence [of this process] upon governmental power”. 
They also note that the government may well promote liberalisation “in the belief that by 
opening up certain spaces for individual and group action, they can relieve various 
pressures and obtain needed information and support without altering the structure of 
authority, that is, without becoming accountable to the citizenry for their actions or 
subjecting their claim to rule to fair and competitive elections;... in our discussion, we refer
‘trench warfare’ against opposition parties” (R.Y. Ortega, “Comparing Types of Transitions: Spain and 
Mexico”, Democtratization, Vol.7, no.3, Autumn 2000, p.68).
2 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C  Schmitter, (1986), p.7.
97
wuuuiw
to such cases as ‘liberalized authoritarianism’ (known also by their Spanish name of 
dictablandas)"? The liberalisation of an authoritarian regime implies certain important 
changes --like opening spaces for more autonomous political participation—, but this 
process does not guarantee the breakdown of authoritarianism. In the case of Mexico, 
liberalisation was an alternative for a regime that, in order to remain in power, needed to 
respond to further political demands through opening new spaces for participation 
essentially circumscribed to the electoral sphere.
Why were these reforms circumscribed to the electoral arena? Essentially for two reasons. 
The first reason is that still by the 1970s the party system in Mexico was characterised by a 
dominant official party, a series of semi-official opposition parties (covertly financed by the 
State) and an only truly and very weak opposition party, the Partido Action National, 
PAN. Therefore, the opening of the electoral channels was not considered to represent any 
danger to the position of the official party. Opposition was either fostered by the regime or 
had a low social penetration outside certain quite restricted urban circles, and a good reason 
for this was the fact that all parties were supposed to finance themselves through private 
funds, not public funds, which of course made it more problematic for any opposition to 
develop nation-wide bases of support. At the same time, it was obvious that the PRI was 
receiving support from the regime besides the regular fees and contributions of its 
members. The outcome was a weak opposition without the capacity to penetrate in widely 
diverse social sectors and regions. In the case of the PAN, by the early 1970s its penetration 
outside major urban areas was greatly reduced.* 4
The weaknesses of opposition parties were reflected in their low' ability to present 
candidates for all the electoral districts in dispute, even during federal elections (Table 3.1). 
In the elections of 1961, with a simple majority electoral system, the PAN w'as able to 
present only 98 candidates for the 178 electoral districts.5 Table 3.1 shows that between 
1964 and 1976 only the semi-official opposition party Partido Popular Socialista (PPS)
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' ibid., p.9.
4 For a complete history of the PAN see Soledad Loaeza, (1999).
5 In that electoral process, the PRI won in 172 districts, the PAN in five and the Popular Party in one. For a 
detailed account of the performance of opposition parties in the Mexican electoral systyem see: Manuel 
Alejandro Guerrero, “Los avances de la oposición en el Congreso Federal”, in the Parliamentary 
Encyclopaedia o f  Mexico, series IV El Congreso y  las Políticas Nacionales, vol.II El Congreso de la Unión y  
la Política Económica de México, no. 3, El Congreso en las Reformas Políticas de México. Mexico City,
1998.
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was able on two occasions to postulate candidates for all the electoral districts. This was 
due more to the support of the regime than to its wide militant basis from which to draw 
candidates.
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Table 3.1
Number o f Opposition Party Candidates in the 1964-1976 Electoral Processes
Party/year 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976
PAN 174 176 171 172 135
PPS 166 175 178 194 187
PARM 113 123 114 149 194
Total Districts 178 178 178 194 196
Source: Elaborated with data from Diario de ios debates de la Cámara de Diputados, XLVI Legislatura, 
1964, año I, tomo 1, 30 de agosto de 1964. Diario de ios debates de la Cámara de Diputados, XLVII 
Legislatura, 1967, año I, tomo 1, 22 de agosto de 1967, Diario de los debates de la Cámara de Diputados, 
XLVIII Legislatura, 1970, año I, tomo 1, 29 agosto de 1970. Diario de los debates de la Cámara de 
Diputados, XLIX Legislatura, 1973, año I, tomo 1, 18 de agosto de 1973. Diario de los debates de la Cámara 
de Diputados, L Legislatura, 1976, año I, tomo 1, 24 de agosto de 1976,
A second reason for opening the electoral system as a channel for dissidence was the belief 
that, in any case, it was only a matter o f minority urban sectors’ protests. Since the popular 
sectors, which comprised of the vast majority of the population, were in many ways linked 
-and controlled— by the corporatist networks, and the entrepreneurs were enjoying the 
benefits o f growth and protectionist policies, any independent complaint would come only 
from urban middle sectors. Such claims, being restricted to certain urban groups, could very 
well be institutionally —and safely—channelled through the party system; a system that 
was not considered in itself to represent a real challenge for the regime. The majority was 
believed to be siding with the regime, especially since economic growth was permitting 
intense re-distributive policies through the formal and the informal tentacles o f corporatism. 
Thus, the opening the electoral arena seemed to be a strategic response taking some 
pressure off the system, especially after 1968.
The year 1968 marked the political limit o f a regime that had been relatively successful in 
generating conditions for development without démocratisation. The student rebellion 
served as a serious warning on the exhaustion of the “golden years” of the post- 
revolutionary political agreements that had enabled the regime to consolidate since the
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early 1930s. After the student massacre o f October 2nd 1968, the regime compromised its 
own revolutionary and progressive ideology, since in a way the symbols of the Mexican 
revolution were used to justify repression against its most progressive classes: the middle 
sectors. That moment conditioned a gradual change in the perceptions, in the behaviour and 
in the decisions of all those who lived it, and these transformations altogether started to 
shape a new kind of regime.6 The student massacre became undoubtedly, the first great 
defeat for the regime.
In the years to follow, the regime tried to re-design its relations with society, and to 
elaborate new policies to include the urban middle classes. These classes comprised of new 
social sectors that had been growing outside corporatism, but benefiting of the expansion of 
the State’s policies and of the economic growth. To meet that end, the Echevema 
administration (1971-1976) launched an economic and a political strategy. The former 
shifted the focus from NDP growth -as has been the strategy since the late 1950s—to a new 
emphasis on income re-distribution and employment.7 8This strategy was based on the more
o
active role of the State in the economy and on raising public expenditures. The project
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6 Soledad Loaeza, "1968: los orígenes de la transición", in Han Semo et al-. La transición interrumpida. 
México 1968-1988, Mexico City, Iberoamerican University and Nueva Imagen, 1993, pgs. 17-18.
7 The “Stabilizing Development” strategy (mid-1950s-1969) was designed to promote high growth rates 
combined with low inflation rates in order to support industrial development and at the same time restricting 
public expenditures. Before this strategy, the government had financed its investments mainly through the use 
of monetary policy, which naturally created inflationary pressures. The economic group led by the Secretary 
of Finance, Ortiz Mena, believed that the government should not be responsible of the inflationary process, 
and therefore, government expenditures must be reduced. The alternative to promoting investment was the 
use of a favourable fiscal policy for new investors and firms. It was expected then that this new policy would 
generate a re-investment of utilities, and they also conceded a great variety of fiscal exemptions for 
productive investments. In this way the fiscal policy was used as a promotion tool instead of a collecting 
mechanism, and thus, it created a dam that restricted public expenditures. The State also compromised to keep 
low the prices of the products and services it offered, to concede various subsidies for investments and 
productions, and to maintain a favourable exchange rate Peso-U.S. Dollar in order to benefit inports (since at 
that time Mexican exports were reduced). For a more detailed analysis of this economic strategy see Leopoldo 
Solis, El desarrollo estabilizador, textos de las conferencias dictadas en el Colegio Nacional en mayo de 
1977.
8 Government expenditures were raised, and the public sector expanded; guarantee-fixed prices were 
established for agricultural products; workers received more benefits in education, housing, health and social 
security programmes. The social budget was increased as a percentage of the GDP from 5.9 in 1970 to 9.3 in 
1976; public investment rates grew in areas such as electricity, oil and steel industries from 17.2 percent in the 
1961-1971 period to 39 percent between 1971-1976. The public sector economic participation raised from
11.6 percent of the GDP in 1970 to 17.2 in 1976 (Data from Matilde Luna Ledesma, Los empresarios y  el 
cambio politico, México 1970-1987, Mexico City, UNAM and Era, 1992, p.39, and R. Villareal, et.ai, “La 
empresa pública”, in Bueno, (1977), p.98). As an example of this new role of the State we have the fact that 
between 1970 and 1976 State-owned enterprises grew in number from 84 to 845 (E.V.K. Fitzgerald, 
“Stabilization Policy in Mexico: the Fiscal Deficit and Macroeconomic Equilibrium, 1960-1977”, in
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would be sustained not by a fiscal reform (as was initially considered, but this solution was 
strongly opposed by the entrepreneurs), but by a flexible use o f the monetary policy and 
external loans, which soon created inflationary pressures that along with the populist tone 
and the acquisition o f industries by the government, (some o f them via nationalisation), 
scared the entrepreneurs, who then started to talk about “a crisis of confidence” between 
them and the public sector. The episode ended up with the infamous “financial coup 
d ’Etat” when immense sums o f money were transferred from Mexico to foreign banks,9 
followed by an external debt that rose dramatically from US $ 3,999 billion in 1970 to US $ 
19,000 billion in 1976.'°
As for the political strategy, pompously called “Democratic Openness”, it was designed for 
creating wider spaces for political participation, especially for the middle classes (the main 
participants in the 1968 student mobilisations) who demanded more spaces for participation 
and the securing o f political tolerance. In the words o f Meyer and Aguilar Camin, the 
“Democratic Openness” was,
...most of all, an argument to re-affirm the institutional and ideological legitimacy of the Mexican 
State that had been eroded by the 1968 political crisis... It was the answer to the need of “up­
dating” to preserve what was thought should be preserved... The renovation of the ideological 
legitimacy mechanisms was an important aspect of this change in tune... 11
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The “Democratic Openness” conceded more freedom to intellectual criticism and to the 
printed media; it also tried to grant political tolerance to left-wing groups, to approach the 
university students, and it became the basis from which independent union movements 
(outside the official party and the traditional corporatist networks) were supported by the 
administration itself. This strategy was intended to diminish the accumulated political
Rosemary Thorp and Lawrence Whitehead, Inflation and Stabilization in Latin America, London, McMillian, 
1979, p.45).
9 The idea of a “crisis o f confidence" is very important since it implies the entrepreneurial complaint against 
any possible loss of their privileges (basically to always be consulted before any important decision of 
economic policy) and the predecibility in its economic activities. The entrepreneurs saw as a dangerous 
challenge the State’s economic expansion and the deepening of its populist and nationalist rethoric. For an 
analysis o f  the conflict between the State and the entrepreneus see: Rogelio Hernández Rodríguez, 
Empresarios, banca y  Estado, el conflicto durante el gobierno de José López Portillo. 1976-1982, Mexico 
City: Miguel Angel Porrúa and FLACSO, 1988; Carlos Arrióla and Juan Gustavo Galindo, "Los empresarios 
y el Estado en México (1976-1982)”, in Foro Internacional, vol.XXV, no.2, October-December 1984; Luna 
Ledesma, (1992).
10 For an analysis of the 1970-76 economic project and its failure see Carlos Tello Macias, La política 
económica en México, 1970-1976, México City, Siglo XXI, 1979.
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pressures by meeting the political demands of sectors that were developing outside the 
traditional corporatist channels.
As an important element o f the political strategy of Echeverría, in 1973 an electoral reform 
was passed reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 years of age and the age for being voted 
deputy or senator to 21 and 25 years of age respectively. It also reduced the minimum 
percentage of national voting for parties to enter into Congress from 2.5 to 1.5 percent. 
Also for the first time, parties were legally enabled, though only during electoral times, to 
use radio and TV spaces for transmitting their messages (see Chapters Four and Five). 
Nevertheless, this reform did not provide opposition parties with any real possibility for 
challenging the actual political regime. It was mainly a strategy to re-enforce the regime’s 
legitimacy before certain sectors and a mechanism for preventing opposition parties from 
disappearing completely from the political landscape, thus maintaining the minimum 
democratic formalities. But in spite o f its limits, it is important to notice that it was the first 
reform that defined the electoral arena as the place in which to express and channel 
dissidence, an aspect that would be broadened by the Reform of 1977 during the 
administration of José López Portillo (1976-1982).
With the discovery o f important oil reserves and the sudden wealth it brought, the 
economic project of the López Portillo government balanced upon the maintenance of a 
high rate of public investment with funds coming from external loans in the hope of future 
oil exports. Between 1977 and 1980 the economy grew at rates near 7.5 percent a year, and 
this gave the regime enough confidence to carry out a more comprehensive political 
liberalisation reform whose intention was to widen the spaces for participation -especially 
for the left in order to maintain it within the institutional channels—and to grant more 
balanced, though minimal, conditions for opposition parties to survive and secure their 
presence in Congress.
The Reform of 1977 favoured the creation and registration o f opposition parties more than 
any previous reform in Mexico. Three new parties obtained their registration for competing 
immediately in the 1979 mid-term elections. In the usually obscure words of President *13
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11 Aguilar Camin and Lorenzo Meyer, (1991), p.247.
13 The Democratic Mexican Party, PDM, the Socialist Workers’ Party, PST, and the Mexican Communist 
Party, PCM. Under this same law two other parties competed in the 1982 general elections, the Social 
Democratic Party and the Revolutionary Workers’ Party.
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López Portillo, the aim of the reform was to “improve democratic institutions in order to 
allow minorities to be represented according to their numbers [and to grant that] their ‘ways 
of thinking’ {modos de pensar) can be considered in the decision-making by the 
majorities”.13 There are two important features that must be stressed here. Firstly, the aim 
of the reform was to open a space for the “minorities” who developed outside traditional 
corporatist structures -basically urban middle classes—, since for the government it 
remained obvious that the “majorities” were still represented within the official party.13 4 
Secondly, more facilities were given for organising and preserving political parties. Article 
41 of the Constitution was reformed and, for the first time, it defined the political parties as 
“entities for the national interest” whose main activity is “to promote the people’s 
participation in democratic life”, something that was not recognised in any previous 
legislation. The main points of the 1977 reform were:
□ To make more flexible the procedures for the registration o f new political parties. While 
keeping the possibility that parties could maintain their registration with only 1.5 
percent in any national election, it recognised as well the figure of “political 
associations” (as opposed to political parties), and it allowed party alliances for specific 
elections. Also, the procedure of party registration was to be carried out in the newly 
created Federal Electoral Commission -dependent still on the Executive power— 
instead of in the Ministry o f the Interior. Nevertheless, the president of the Commission 
was the Secretary of Gobernación. This Commission was in charge of the organisation 
and vigilance o f  the electoral processes.
□ To grant a larger amount o f material and economic benefits to the parties. Even 
conditionally registered parties -i.e. parties which have recently been created and had 
won for the first time more than 1.5 percent of the national voting—could be 
represented in the Federal Electoral Commission and state and district electoral 
committees. The Federal Electoral Commission granted also material support and 
financial assistance to the parties for their various campaign activities. Also, the parties
13 Cited in Rafael Loyola Diaz and Samuel León González, “El Partido Revolucionario Institucional: los 
intentos de cambio”, in Jorge Alonso, Alberto Aziz and Jaime Tamayo (comps.), El nuevo Estado mexicano.
II. Estado y  política, Mexico City, Ed. Nueva Imagen, 1992, p.55.
14 López Portillo underlined in a discourse addressed to the Popular Sector of the PRI that “the most important 
challenge that democracy faces in Mexico is precisely the institutional incorporation of the middle classes” 
(López Cámara, 1988, p.50.
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were granted permanent regular access to the electronic media (not limited to electoral 
periods, like the 1973 reform) and support from the Federal Electoral Commission for 
publications.
□ To raise the number of deputies in the Federal Chamber of Deputies. One hundred 
deputy seats were added to the already existing 300 coming from an equal number of 
electoral districts. A new proportional law was passed establishing that opposition 
parties had the exclusive right to compete for these 100 seats. In this way, there 
remained three hundred districts whose deputies were elected by a simple majority vote 
and in which all parties could compete, and one hundred deputy seats to be distributed 
among the opposition parties by proportional representation law.
Perhaps the two most important consequences of the Reform of 1977 were the definitive 
establishment of the electoral arena as the most important legitimate channel of protest for 
non-incorporated sectors -the “urban minorities” when compared to peasants and workers 
affiliated to the PRI. And the fact that the Reform of 1977 was not intended -as all previous 
electoral reforms—to help weak opposition parties to survive in the political arena (whose 
survival has been crucial for the PRI in order not to lead a single-party system and to 
maintain the least “democratic formalities”), but was meant to recognise the existence of 
real, though weak, opposition forces that were claiming spaces for participation and 
representation. While the regime maintained the ultimate control over political life, the 
Reform of 1977 was to transform Mexican political life by showing the spaces where 
political pluralism could find a place: the electoral arena. This openness was the first true 
step o f the political liberalisation process. Ever since -and this must be emphasised—it was 
in the electoral arena, and in the debates on further electoral reforms, where the 
confrontation between the regime and opposition took place.
By the end of the 1970s, the sustained economic growth and development that characterised 
Mexican life during the previous thirty years produced little pressure for démocratisation. 
As said before, such pressure came mainly from the middle sectors; sectors that had not 
been part of the historical corporatist structures, but whose demands could be channelled 
through the electoral arena and the party system. In any case, by the late 1970s, the parties 
-o ther than the PRI—were weak and, including the PAN, all opposition parties had a low
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level of penetration and “representativity” in the society. This situation reflected also the 
lack o f pressure “from below” to open the regime and favoured a kind of protracted 
transition in which the electoral arena became the crucial space for negotiating and in 
which the parties, which were originally weak structures, had more incentives to play 
within the regime’s rules than openly challenging it.15
At the end of the 1970s, with an apparently successful economic performance (created by 
the oil exports), the support of the entrepreneurs and the effective subordination and control 
of popular sectors, the regime decided to implement this political reform to better 
incorporate into the institutional game potentially adversary groups in the electoral arena 
believing that the economic growth would diminish any risk for uncontrolled protests. As 
long as the economy marched on well and there was a large public investment, the opening 
of the electoral arena did not show its hidden potentialities for channelling the vote into 
opposition. But problems were lying immediately ahead for the old structures.
By mid-1981, the economic strategy, almost exclusively based on oil exports showed its 
limits. Oil prices fell disastrously low, leaving the country with an external debt near to US 
$ 85 billion and the gravest capital-flight ever. Protectionism and subsidies could not be 
sustained any longer and the State was unable to continue with re-distribution policies, 
which directly questioned its historical support for the popular sectors. During the next 
year, the constant devaluation of the Peso surpassed 150 percent and inflation rates became 
almost uncontrollable. In the midst o f the economic chaos the government took a 
controversial measure: it decided to intervene in the banking system by expropriating it 
from private bankers in September 1982. For the government, the measure was intended to 
counterbalance financial instability; instead, for the private sector it was the culmination of 
irresponsible populism (which they had gladly supported as long as they were benefited). In 
any case the populist and nationalist components of the post-revolutionary discourse lost its 
significance after the crisis. By 1982, the end of Lopez Portillo’s term the regime found 
itself with a very reduced capacity to cope with its revolutionary social and economic goals 
and with larger spaces conceded to society for political participation through the electoral 
arena. In this sense, if  the Reform of 1977 was the inauguration o f a liberalisation process 
because it supposed a controlled change in the political rules, after 1982 it started to
!i At the end of this period, the emergence of the PRD shows that another position was possible: that of
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generate unintentional consequences that resulted from the combination o f its potentialities 
within a context o f deep economic crisis.
The crisis obliged the new government of Miguel De la Madrid (1983-1988) to design a 
new economic strategy to control the growing inflation and, if possible, to reactivate 
growth. A comprehensive economic liberalisation programme was launched in 1984, but its 
implementation brought a crucial political consequence: it forced the regime to abandon its 
two essential pillars of historic legitimacy: the re-distributive role of the State (and its role 
as the most important economic actor, as well) and its populist-nationalist discourse.* 16 
The “economic realism”, as De la Madrid defined the new project, proved to imply 
restrictive economic policies that excluded the popular sectors, since the old socio­
economic benefits and the social budget at large were dramatically reduced, altering, in 
turn, the regime’s relations with the corporatist structures. The government announced a 
comprehensive privatisation programme of public firms, the reduction o f social investment 
and a decrease on basic supplies’ subsidies. All of these new policies meant the complete 
reform of the popular revolutionary pact and affected the loyalty and support of the masses 
to the regime.17 The ruling elite adopted the Neo-liberal arguments that the European Right 
and the American Republicans used against the Welfare-State models to criticise the 
“populist irresponsible past” in Mexico. The effect of such dramatic changes in the policies 
and in the discourse was the renewed support of the majority of the business groups, but at 
the same time the restriction of resources for re-distribution greatly eroded the regime’s 
links with the corporatist structures.18
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continuos confrontation. This is possible because of relatively stronger political party structures.
16 The birth of the Modem State in Mexico was seen as an outcome of the Revolution, whose natural heirs 
conformed a ruling elite within an official party. The regime monopolised of all the flags of progress ivism, 
populism and nationalism derived from the Revolution discrediting all political opposition who sought 
legitimacy under such principles (Manuel Alejandro Guerrero, Estado y  legitimidad en México, B.A. Thesis 
in International Relations, Mexico City, El Colegio de México, 1995, p.29). The revolutionary origins and the 
popular-inclusive character of the regime were translated into two essential and inter-related elements of 
political and socio-economic consensus, which explain for the high level of stability of the Mexican political 
system and of its political legitimacy. On the one hand, a nationalist and populist political discourse which 
incarnated the “ideology of the Revolution”, and on the other, the active role of the State as the main promoter 
of economic development and as distributor of social benefits for diverse sectors and groups. The project of 
ideological and socio-economic integration supported the political stability and this, in turn, reciprocated 
backing up the socio-economic project directed by the State in conformity to its nationalist and populist 
discourse.
17 Sergio Zermeño, "El fin del populismo mexicano", in Nexos, no.l 13, May, Mexico City 1987, p.31.
18 José Antonio Crespo, "Crisis económica; crisis de legitimidad", in Carlos Bazdresch, et.al. (comps.), 
México: auge, crisis y  ajuste, vol.l, Los tiempos del cambio, 1982-1988, Mexico City, F.C.E., 1992, p.28.
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The new orientation o f the development model -towards a competitive unregulated market 
and the liberalisation of the economy— led to the abandonment of the old schemes of 
corporatist relations that the Mexican regime had been building during the previous 
decades. In this way, the deterioration o f  corporatism is not only explained by a lack of 
resources to continue with re-distributive and traditional exchange policies, but by the 
introduction o f a new economic model -based on efficiency criteria, market competition, 
de-regulation and participation in the external commercial and technological trade—which 
resulted in being inherently incompatible with the traditional corporatist structure at all 
levels. Mexican corporatism acted as a good representation for the vices of the past: 
inefficiency, corruption, bureaucratism, accompanied by a large State networks of 
subsidies, compensations, and diverse social and economic benefits. The new economic 
policies meant in practice precisely the dismantling of such network and, therefore, they 
also meant substantial decreases in social and economic compensations for social groups. 
Since 1984 the net social effects o f the economic stabilisation and liberalisation policies has 
been negative.19 Along with the deterioration of social indicators, according to some 
specialists, from 1984 to 1992 income inequality dramatically polarised: dividing the 
population in ten groups according by their income share, we have that in 1984 the two 
lowest groups o f the population shared respectively 1.60 and 2.89 percent of the total 
income, while the highest ten percent o f the population owned 36.13 percent. By 1992, 
those two poorer groups of the people shared 1.30 and 2.35 respectively of the total income, 
while the upper ten percent concentrated 42.06 percent of the income shares.20 The rise in 
the income share o f the richest tenth percent of the population was not only gained at the 
expense o f the lower strata, but also of the middle class, whose income -if  we sum up the 
4sh, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th tenths of the population—decreased from 39.07 percent in 1984 to 
34.97 percent in 1992.21 At the same time, there began a process of erosion of previous 
social and economic benefits: a serious loss of the purchasing capacity of real minimum
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19 See the detailed account on this topic in Humberto Panuco Laguete and Miguel Szekely, “Income 
distribution and poverty in Mexico” in Victor Bulmer Thomas (ed.). The New Economic Model and its Impact 
on Income Distribution and Poverty, N.Y., San Martin’s Press, 1996.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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wages (which decreased in real terms in 51.7 percent between 1982 and 1988), a weakening 
in the unions capacity to negotiate labour contracts, and a dramatic rise in unemployment.22 23
For its affiliates the benefits of corporatism vanished, but the costs rose instead, since the 
corporatist structure was maintained, but it progressively lost its logic as an exchange 
mechanism, preserving only its logic as a control mechanism. The discipline of the Priista 
corporatist bases was required more than ever in an electoral arena that was becoming more 
competitive and problematic for the regime. Also, the workers and peasant organisations 
affiliated to the PRI were compelled to accept the losses and drawbacks that resulted from 
the liberalisation policies as if they were “great revolutionary gains” -the workers’ and 
peasants’ leadership had no option but to promote them in such terms to the rank-and file, 
losing ever more credibility and support. The affiliated popular sectors, peasants and 
workers, were helpless in facing this new situation, since they had always been dependent 
on the State and lacked -o r were prevented from developing—a capacity to organise 
autonomously. Corporatism was seriously damaged as a demand intermediation 
mechanism.24 It was precisely after these moments of deep crisis, and not during the former 
decades of growth and stability, when the strongest pressures for opening the political 
regime initiated.
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The Emergence o f  Political Pluralism
Covered up by the minimum formalistic -though not substantive—requisites of democracy, 
the Mexican post-revolutionary regime’s legitimacy was founded upon its capacity to 
include the most diverse social sectors into the benefits of economic prosperity and
22 Graciela Bensusan, "Instituciones en crisis: el mundo del trabajo en transformación”, in G. Bensusan and 
Carlos García, Estado y sindicatos, crisis de una relación, Mexico City, Metropolitan Autonomous 
University-Xochimilco and Friederich Ebert Shifting, 1989, p.48.
23 Soledad Loaeza, “Delamadridismo, la segunda modernización”, in Bazdresch, et.al ( 1992), p.65. However 
it must be mentioned that by the end of the 1980s some working groups and unions became very important. 
They were basically the ones that had been growing outside of the traditional corpporatist model inserted 
within the PRI and also the ones that had organised within new industries and highly technological sectors, 
like telecommunications. The best example of this new kind of independent unionism is the Telephone 
Workers Union, whose leader Francisco Hernández Juárez, claimed its independence from the Labour 
Congress (Congreso del Trabajo). which is an organ basically obedient to the Working Sector of the PRI.
24 Lorenzo Meyer, “El corporativismo mexicano en tiempos del neoliberalismo", in Bensusan and García, 
(1989), pgs.27-29.
development, no matter how unequally distributed they were. The crisis questioned 
precisely such capacity, and after the political reforms of the 1970s -especially the Political 
Reform of 1977— that promoted a political liberalisation based upon the strengthening of 
the parties (and, to a lesser extent, upon the emergence of independent unions), there began 
the creation of the mechanisms through which different social sectors could channel their 
political protests against the regime: the electoral arena. It is highly noticeable that the 
discontents against the regime were only very seldom channelled through extra- 
parliamentarian or anti-institutional ways, like the emergence of guerrillas or other 
movements, during the 1980s, the gravest moments of the economic crisis.
The political participation of the population was channelled through the incipient 
opposition parties.25 And this mobilisation, especially that o f the urban middle sectors, 
against the PRI could be seen as a complaint against the failures of a regime that 
jeopardised their expectations of economic improvement and social mobility. At first, more 
than a conscious vote for opposition, the vote of these sectors could be better defined as a 
“punishment vote*’ against the PRI. A vote primarily intended to express unconformity and 
protest against the regime’s performance in the social and economic spheres, more so than 
a conscious vote linked to opposition parties’ loyalties. The PAN was the party that became 
the largest beneficiary of such vote. Its discourse, praising honesty, de-centralisation, 
priority o f local interests, anti-corruption, and local life, became very attractive for urban 
groups for whom the traditional populist and nationalist discourse of the ruling elite had 
ultimately brought about corruption, lack of efficiency, excessive bureaucracy and 
centralisation. The party also became a receptive organisation for an important number of 
small and medium size entrepreneurs -called neopanistas, due to their recent entrance into 
party politics and due to their more pragmatic vision of politics, less attached to the more 
traditional values o f the PAN.
In 1983 in the midst of important citizens’ demonstrations in some Northern cities against 
electoral fraud, important local elections were won by the opposition in such an 
overwhelming manner that the regime felt compelled for the first time to recognise these 
victories. The PAN won in five state capitals, Chihuahua, Durango, San Luis Potosí,
25 Though the PAN was founded in 1939, it never had a true chance to defeat the PRI in elections until the 
early 1980s, when the party became the recipient of the political unconformity against the PRI and its 
governments’ failures.
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Hermosillo and Guanajuato (in coalition with the PDM), and in a major city on the border 
with the USA (Ciudad Juárez). These first victories for the opposition occurred in the 
Northern states -more urban regions, with richer and better educated population.
Though in general terms, as Table 3.2 shows, the presence of opposition parties in 
Congress during the first half of the 1980s remained scarce (the election of 1979 is included 
since it was the first one after the 1977 reform), the unprecedented depth of the 1982 crisis 
and the following drastic economic measures taken by the De la Madrid government 
fuelled electoral opposition and eventually strengthened the traditionally weak opposition 
parties. For instance, the PAN during the 1980s was able to expand its clientele to other 
social sectors outside its traditional voting groups (urban middle classes) and started to 
consolidate wider bases of loyal and constant supporters.26 In this way, gradually during the 
1980s there appeared an important political feature that marked a deep change with the 
past: the electoral processes started to express the political preference o f the population, 
after having been mostly a plebiscitarían mechanism of the ruling PRI for decades.
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Table 3.2
Federal Deputies by Party, 1979*1985
1979 Elections 1982 Elections 1985 Elections
Party Majority
Deputies
PR Deputies Majority
Deputies
PR Deputies Majority
Deputies
PR Deputies
PRI 296 - 299 - 289 . .
PAN 4 38 1 50 6 32
P SUM - -- -- 17 -- 12
PDM -- 10 - 12 -* 12
PPS -- 12 -- 10 -- 11
PST -- 10 -- 11 -- 11
PCM -- 18 -- -- -- -
PSD -- - -- -- - --
PRT - -- -- -- - 6
PARM* — 12 - -- 2 10
26 Soledad Loaeza, “El Partido Acción Nacional: de la oposición leal a la impaciencia electoral”, in Soledad 
Loaeza and Rafael Segovia (comps.), La vida política mexicana en la crisis, 25Ih Anniversary of the Centre of 
International Studies, México City, El Colegio de México, 1987, pgs.77-78.
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PMT - -- -- - - 6
* In 1982 this party lost its legal recognition since it did not reach the minimum 1.5 percentage of votes at a 
national level. In 1984 the party obtained again a conditional registration from the Federal Electoral 
Commission.
Sources: Elaborated with data from the following documents: For PR Deputies to the LI Legislature: Manuel 
González Oropeza, Los diputados de la Nación, volume III, Federal Chamber of Deputies and Secretaría de 
Gobernación. For Majority Deputies to the same Legislature: Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de 
Diputados, Electoral College, LI Legislatura, year I, volume I, no. 1, August 15th 1979, p.8. For PR Deputies 
to the LII Legislature: Directorio de los diputados de la LII Legislatura, 1982-1985, Mexico City, Federal 
Chamber of Deputies, 1985. For Majority Deputies of the same Legislature; Diario de los Debates de la 
Cámara de Diputados, Electoral College, LII Legislatura, year I, volume I, no. 1, August 1988. For PR and 
Majority Deputies to the LIII Legislature: Directorio de los diputados de la Lili Legislatura, 1985-1988, 
Mexico City, Federal Chamber of Deputies, 1988.
Though the government recognised these first victories, it soon realised that the electoral 
arena could rapidly become a real area for disputing power, a challenge that the PRI was 
not willing to tolerate.27 The reaction was to not accept any further important electoral 
defeats, and therefore to manipulate the electoral results if  necessary.28 This attitude 
became commonly known as “the patriotic frauds”. In 1986 the PRI recovered control over 
Chihuahua through very dubious means, since the results did not correspond to the 
demographic composition of that state. With an electoral participation above sixty percent, 
despite the fact that seventy percent of its population was urban, the official party’s victory 
in Chihuahua was based on the rural voting.29
Coincident with the spirit of the “patriotic fraud”, there then passed in Congress the new 
electoral reforms in 1986 and 1987, whose aim was this time to make the PRI more 
competitive by increasing electoral dissidence. Three important reforms were added in 
1986 to Article 54 o f the Constitution, which deals with the electoral system. Firstly, the 
number o f seats in the Chamber o f Deputies was increased from four hundred to five 
hundred deputies. The additional one hundred deputies were to be elected by means of 
proportional representation rule (PR), and in this manner there were to be three hundred 
single majority elected deputies (elected from the same number of districts) and two 
hundred additional deputies elected by PR rule. Within this change, it was established that
27 A famous phrase of Fidel Velazquez, the leader of the Congreso del Trabajo, the largest umbrella workers 
organisation in the PRI, resumes this “spirit”: “We arrived to power by means of guns and bullets and only by 
means of guns and bullets are they going to throw us out” (“Llegamos al poder a punta de balazos y sólo a 
balazos nos sacarán").
28 Juan Molinar, “La asfixia electoral”, Nexos, no. 123, March, Mexico City 1988.
29 For a detailed account on this electoral process see Juan Molinar, "Regreso a Chihuahua", Nexos, no. I l l ,  
March, Mexico City 1987.
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all the parties, including PRI, were allowed to compete for the PR deputy seats (something 
that was previously reserved for opposition parties only by the Reform of 1977). Secondly, 
the minimum national voting percentage for obtaining PR seats in the Lower Chamber was 
fixed at 1.5 percent. Thirdly, it saw the introduction of what was called a “governance 
clause” {cláusula de gobemabilidad), which established two conditions for obtaining the 
absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Firstly, if no party could obtain the absolute 
majority (251 deputy seats), the largest minority party would automatically receive as many 
deputies as required from its PR lists in order to reach such absolute majority. In this way, 
the largest party would always get at least 251 deputies. Secondly, the party that reached 51 
percent or more o f the national voting without obtaining the majority of seats, would 
receive as many deputies as required from its PR list in order to have the absolute majority 
of deputies. As a minor compensation, it was agreed that no party could obtain more than a 
total of 350 deputies, even if that party reached a higher percentage of votes.30 With these 
changes the regime was preparing itself to face the 1988 general elections.
During the early and mid-1980s the political mobilisation was essentially conducted by a 
renewed activism of the middle classes whose challenge -essentially electoral and 
institutional—to the regime was not equalled by any other social group. In the case o f the 
popular sectors, though there were also some popular demonstrations against the economic 
policy, the cost o f life or the defence of social policy, these never turned into a sustained 
challenge for the regime. However, the major electoral challenge was not going to come 
from the PAN in 1988, but from a nationalist coalition gathered around former Priista 
politicians who opposed the abandonment of the “revolutionary” ideology and the old 
economic project. The economic reforms launched by the De la Madrid’s administration 
required a stricter, highly disciplined and quite homogeneous cabinet since at the bottom of 
such policies was the dismantling of the post-revolutionary project and the affecting o f a 
large number of interests.31 The political group gathered around the president, transplanted 
mostly from the financial and economic sectors of the administration, decided to impose 
their particular project without resorting to the traditional elite negotiation processes; this
j0 Secretaría de Gobernación, Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Mexico City, Segob, 
December 1996, p.200.
jl See: Rogelio Hernández Rodríguez, “Los hombres del presidente De la Madrid”, in Foro Internacional, 
vol.28 no.l, July-Septemberl987.
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time “the winners would take everything”, thus violating one o f  the most important internal 
non-written rules of the PRI political cohesion and permanence. Moreover, since the 
success o f such policies depended also on the continuity of power of such a group, for the 
first time in decades, the presidential successor was to be someone from the same particular 
homogeneous political group. The homogeneity and continuity of the new mling elite 
clearly showed the abandonment of the old plural inter-elite coalitions. The concentration 
of political power in the hands o f a relatively single-minded technocratic group also caused 
the subordination of the other political groups without the possibility of obtaining the 
exchanges of the past that were crucial for maintaining the unity, discipline and relative 
coherence o f the “revolutionary family” for decades. This abandonment o f a model of 
State within which diverse interests could be accommodated and find concrete benefits, 
became intolerable for other political groups.
A major rupture among the political elite occurred in 1987 that eventually accelerated the 
progressive transformation of the electoral arena as a space in which the political elite 
started to compete for power: the emergence of an articulate left-wing coalition that based 
its discourse on the nationalist and social justice principles of the Mexican revolution. If in 
1946 and 1952 there were also important divisions among the “revolutionary family” and 
some political groups backed the dissenters, the 1988 elite disagreement was different in 
nature since it proved to be more consistent and outlived the mere electoral moment 
(something the Almazanismo of 1940, the Padillismo o f 1946 and the Henriquismo o f 1952 
never did). The main reasons for this achievement were that, along with to the backup from 
other political groups -as previous rupturing movements also had— , the 1988 coalition was 
successful in generating authentic social support mostly from popular urban sectors.
The general elections of 1988 saw three large organisations in competition: the PRI, the 
PAN and the recently created National Democratic Front (FDN) which was a mix o f PRI 
defectors -renegades o f the nationalist and “revolutionary” sectors of the official party, 
including some notable figures like Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz-Ledo— , 
and various former left-wing organisation militants (including ex-members o f the Mexican 
Communist Party). This coalition became in 1989 the basis of the Democratic 
Revolutionary Party (PRD).
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In many ways, the FDN, with its discourse based on social justice, promised a restoration of 
the old “true” ideals o f the Mexican revolution, becoming thus a sort o f modem replicate o f 
the old PRM -the official party during the times of President Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s. 
Its inclusive social discourse, the prestige of its presidential candidate, Cuauhtémoc 
Cárdenas (the son of the fondly remembered president Cárdenas), and the general 
dissatisfaction with the social and economic situation, which turned many popular 
organisations and unions (including formally Priista ones, like the Oil Workers Union) to 
support the FDN, made of this coalition a formidable challenge for the PRI. Therefore, the 
competition among the parties was by the late 1980s being backed by wide social sectors. 
The elections of 1988 saw much competition, then, but the conditions of such competition 
were highly unequal and excessively unfair, since all the regime’s apparatus backed up the 
official party’s candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari. In spite o f such support, the PRI 
presidential candidate officially obtained for the first time a percentage of votes that 
minimally surpassed 50 percent of the total electoral result (51.7 percent), and actually his 
victory was surrounded by a widespread suspicion of fraud. According to official figures, 
the FDN and the PAN obtained 31 percent and 17 percent respectively.32 
Nevertheless, the 1988 electoral process introduced crucial changes to the national political 
life. For instance, for the first time the widespread popular support for opposition 
candidates was recognised, and electoral races were accepted as being lost in some major 
cities, like Mérida and San Luis Potosí. Also for the first time, though opposition federal 
deputies did not obtain the majority in Congress, negotiations would be needed for passing 
any constitutional reform, which required two thirds of the chamber (Table 3.3). The PRI 
received 265 deputies for the LIV Legislative Period, which the lowest number obtained so 
far. In the Upper Chamber there were found four opposition party’s Senators, who broke
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32 Actually it became impossible to know the exact results of the 1988 electoral process partly because more 
than 24 thousand electoral ballots (which comprised of 45 percent of them) were never checked. The 
Legislative Power, which according to the law was in charge of qualifying the election -and was dominated 
by the PRI—never approved of the opening of those ballots. According to the research of Alberto Aziz Nassif 
and Juan Molinar, even without those ballots one can conclude that in 1988 a massive fraud was orchestrated 
in eight states that are composed by 58 municipalities. And there were even some cases in which the vote for 
the official party was 100 percent of the electorate, like in Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Veracruz, Puebla. 
Yucatán, Nuevo León and Sinaloa (Alberto Aziz Nassif y Juan Molinar Horcasitas, “Los resultados 
electorales”, in Pablo González Casanova (coord.), Segundo informe sobre la democracia. México el 6 de 
julio de 1988, Mexico City, Siglo XXI, 1990, p. 170).
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for the first time the real and complete monopoly that the PRI had enjoyed in that chamber
for 59 years.33
Table 3.3
Composition of the Chamber of Deputies in Congress by Opposition Parties during
the LIV Legislative Period (1988-1 991)
Party Number of 
Deputies
Majority
Deputies
Percentage PR Deputies Percentage
PAN 101 37 36.6 64 63.4
PPS 31 4 12.9 27 87.1
PFCRN* 28 5 17.8 23 82.2
CD** 26 15 ' 57.7 11 42.3
PARM 28 5 17.8 23 82.2
PMS 18 0 0 18 100
Independents 3 0 0 3 100
•Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstrucción Nacional 
••Corriente Democrática (which was to become the core of the PRD) 
Source: Directorio de la LIV Legislatura de la Cámara de Diputados.
The elections of 1988 made clear that the emergence o f political mobilisation in large scale 
was not -and could not be—encompassed and controlled through the traditional corporatist 
means. Moreover, the most permanent trend of 1988 showed that the electoral processes 
were increasingly substituting the corporatist model as a mechanism for channelling 
demands and for political interest intermediation. At the same time, the active support of 
social groups for opposition parties was replacing the old ritualistic plebiscitarian electoral 
mechanism by a process in which the support of the citizens was gaining importance. These 
were crucial changes that were to transform definitively Mexican political life.
The new elected president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), realised this and tried to 
regenerate the image of the regime -and especially his own image, due to the strong 
suspicions of fraud involved in the elections’ results—and strengthen the presidential figure 
against other political groups and figures inside and outside the regime. President Salinas 
crafted a strategy directed at recovering the support of the popular sectors (especially urban
33 During the administration of López Portillo one Senator entered from the Popular Socialist Party to the 
Upper House, but his posting was the result of a negotiation between the PRI and the PPS in which the former 
party maintained all the election charges in the State of Oaxaca (where in some districts the PPS had 
particular importance). In exchange, the PRI offered the president of the PPS, Jorge Cruickshank Garcia, a 
seat in the Senate House.
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popular sectors) and to increasing the back-up that his predecessor received from the 
entrepreneurs. The popularity of the Salinas’ administration needed to increase, but he also 
required the re-establishment of party discipline. This attitude o f Salinas became evident 
through some quite telling incidents: the leader of the Oil Workers Union, Joaquin 
Hernández Galicia -who had supported Cuauhtemoc’s candidacy—was arrested and 
imprisoned under the charge of corruption; shortly afterwards it was the turn o f another 
symbol of the traditional unionism, Jongitud Barrios, the leader of the powerful Teacher’s 
Union, a key organisation within the Popular Sector of the PRI. If such lessons were 
enough to re-establish discipline among the regime’s political groups, Salinas turned then 
to punish a prominent member of the economic elite, the banker Agustín Legorreta, sending 
a clear warning to the entrepreneurial groups. It must be said that these actions, w'hich were 
strongly publicised in the media, proved very popular, since they were promoted by the 
government as concrete measures against corruption and nepotism.
On the economic front, Salinas carried further the liberalisation policies inaugurated by his 
predecessor. The economy was completely oriented towards an export-led model in which 
foreign capital was to play a crucial role as major investor. Economic liberalisation 
strategies were developed and they included extensive privatising policies,34 de-regulation 
of capital markets policies, and the cancellation of most subsidies and aides to the medium 
and small firms (though the policy of fixing the salaries negotiated through a series of 
economic pacts benefited the entrepreneurs). Though corporatism was seriously eroded it 
did not disappear, but in the new economic situation popular organisations lost any 
possibility of negotiating for social and economic benefits from their position within the 
official party -as they traditionally did— , keeping only the relative strength of their 
positions within the wider context o f production.35
To compensate for the social costs of the economic adjustment and for recovering the 
support of previous FDN voters, there a social policy compensation programme was 
introduced, the National Solidarity Programme (Pronasol), and was destined to help
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34 In 1982 there were 1,155 public sector firms, by the end of 1993 there were only 258 (48 of which were to 
be either privatised or closed down). Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público y Secretaria de la Contraloria 
General de la Federación, Desincorporación de entidades paraestatales, Mexico City, F.C.E., 1994, p.57.
35 Graciela Bensusan Areus and Gerardo Zamora Fernández de Lara: "Política laboral y proyecto de 
gobierno", in Manuel Canto Chac and Victor Durand Ponte (coords.), Política y  gobierno en la transición 
mexicana, Mexico City, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 1990, pgs. 83-115.
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alleviate extreme poverty. Almost one tenth of the social budget was allocated to this 
programme, which became extensively announced on radio and television. The continuous 
publicity on Pronasol, plus the fact that it was efficient in channelling resources to certain 
popular sectors who were “politically organisable” increased the popularity o f the 
President. This reflected on the electoral arena with the sound victory of the PRI in the mid­
term elections o f 1991 (Table 3.4) and other electoral processes between 1990 and 1992. 
An example o f the latter was the community of Chaleo, in the State of Mexico, which in 
1988 voted massively for Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas. This community received wide Pronasol 
investments and in the 1990 local elections handed the support back to the PRI.36 
For the Elections o f 1991 new reforms were passed in Congress, but this time with the 
support o f the PAN, since the PRI alone did not have the required number of deputies (2/3 
of the total) to approve by itself a constitutional reform. The aim of the government was 
clear: to strengthen the PRI in Congress in the next intermediate elections of 1991. The 
regime could not take the chance of facing an electoral process in which opposition could 
improve the gains o f 1988. Therefore, it passed a new reform in 1989 that added the 
following conditions that “amended” the “governance clause” as follows: the party that 
obtained the largest number o f simple majority deputies and 35 percent o f the national 
voting, received a sufficient number of deputies in the Chamber in order to reach 251 seats. 
Moreover, to that absolute majority of deputies, that party will receive two more deputies 
from its PR list for each percentage point obtained from the national voting, unless that 
party obtained since the beginning more than 75 percent of the voting.37 In this manner, the 
government wanted to be sure that even in the case of receiving a lower voting than in 
1988, the PRI could still maintain the majority in the Chamber o f Deputies.
In the elections of 1991 the PRI was successful in recovering the control over the Congress 
by obtaining 320 deputies. The electoral recovery of the PRI was, in fact, the outcome of
36 This does not mean that in the rest of the State of Mexico there had not been any irregular and fraudulent 
behaviour. According to the results of that electoral process (held on November 11th 1990), the PRI won with 
58.6 percent, while the PAN decreased by 52 percent from what it had obtained in 1988. The demand was 
made for the cancellation of results in many districts by opposition pames who accused to government of 
previously filling the ballots, of carrying over non-registered voters through diverse districts, to illegally using 
public resources, and the like. However, as Lorenzo Meyer notes, maybe the most important means through 
which the PRI imposed in those elections was the return of the political apathy and lack of participation, since 
abstention raised up to 69 percent of the electorate (Lorenzo Meyer, “El limite neoliberal”, in Nexos, no. 163, 
July, Mexico City 1991).
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the renewed strength o f  the presidency, who served from the State apparatus to support the 
party. In 1991 it was clear that though the corporatist structure was seriously eroded, the 
PRI was still quite an amazing electoral machine capable of channelling popular 
participation.
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Table 3.4
Composition of the Chamber of Deputies by Opposition Parties during the LV 
_______ _____  Legislative Period (1991-1994)_____________________
Party Number of 
Deputies
Majority
Deputies
Percentage PR Deputies Percentage
PAN 89 10 11.2 79 88.8
PRD 41 0 0 41 100
PPS 12 0 0 12 100
PARM 15 0 0 15 100
PFCRN 23 0 0 23 100
Source: Directorio de la LV Legislatura de la Cámara de Diputados.
The positive image o f the president was shared both by large sections of the middle classes 
for whom the project o f Salinas promised a constant improvement in their living-standards 
and a renewed consumption capacity,37 8 and by upper social sectors, since many of them 
were directly profiting from the privatisation policies, the economic liberalisation and the 
optimistic perspectives implied in the possibility of a free trade agreement with the U.S. 
and Canada. In numbers, the macro-economic results o f the Salinas administration were 
promising:39
□ An average growth of around 5.6 percent (compared with the stagnation of the economy 
during the De la Madrid period).
□ An inflation rate o f 7.1 percent in 1994 (as compared to the 80.8 percent in 1983).
□ An extremely low fiscal deficit of 0.3 percent of the GDP in 1994 (as compared to the 
13.6 percent of 1984).
37 Código Federal de Instituciones y  Procedimientos Electorales, in Diario Oficial de la Federación, 
Wednesday, August 15th 1990, p.6.
38 A huge number of American-style shopping malls and American branches of supermarket chains were 
inaugurated during his term, helping to consolidate the “mall and supermarket” culture of consumption among 
the urban middle sectors.
39 Mauricio A. Gonález Gómez, “Crisis and Economic Change in Mexico”, in Susan Kaufman Purcell and 
Luis Rubio (eds.), Mexico under Zedillo, Boulder, CO., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p.42.
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□ A dramatic reduction of import permits and facilities that reduced previous bureaucratic 
processes.
□ A positive current account in 1994 o f USS 19.2 billion, o f which USS 11 billion was 
composed o f productive investments and US$ 8.2 billion o f portfolio investments. This 
contrasted dramatically with the situation in 1987 when foreign bank loans served to 
finance the current account.
□ An increase o f  eleven times in non-oil exports since 1982.
□ An highly optimistic financial situation. In 1983, real interest rates were negative and 
financial savings shrank 17 percent in real terms. In contrast, from 1988 to 1994 rates 
were positive and sufficiently attractive both to retain the savings of Mexican nationals 
and to attract external financial investments.
The general optimistic atmosphere o f the Salinas administration was reflected on the 
particularly high acceptance of his administration40 and, as said before, this helps to explain 
the remarkable electoral recovering of the PRI during the intermediate elections o f 1991. 
During the Salinas’ administration, the situation of the two largest opposition parties was 
the following: In the case of the PAN, its modernisation project was very close to the 
government’s ideological principles that stressed the predominance of private capital over 
public expenditures. Therefore, this party became a more or less a natural ally o f  the 
Salinas’ modernisation project, since most of his economic policy proposals were 
coincident w'ith the economic postulates that party was defending for decades, i.e. 
privatisation, de-regulation, reduction o f public expenditures, and so forth. In Congress, the 
PRI and PAN fractions were passing the economic reforms proposed by the Executive. 
Modifications to Article 27, on the character of public and private property, and to the 
Electoral Law were approved by both party fractions. Salinas recognised some important 
victories of the PAN at both local and state level. In this sense, the PAN was the first 
opposition party in Mexico to which there was awarded an important electoral victory in
40 The Mexican newspaper Reforma published on October 30th 1994 on its front page the results of a survey 
that had been carried on in the main cities of the country in which the people were asked how on a scale from 
one to ten do they judge the administration of President Salinas during his 6 year term. The answers were the 
following: Monterrey, 8.00; Puebla, 7.02; Guadalajara, 7.10; and Mexico City, 6.75. The general average was 
of 7.2. Additionally, the individuals were asked if they did or did not agree with the way Salmas ruled. The
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1989 in the state of Baja California. Other important victories were obtained in the electoral 
races for the governments of Chihuahua and Guanajuato.
All this meant the PAN to be constantly criticised by the Left, especially by the PRD, for 
being a “collaborationist party” and “second official party”. The PAN justified its actions 
by defending the need to pass certain laws whose relevance must be considered beyond 
party divisions. In practice the PAN was accepting a role given by the regime’s rules -those 
o f President Salinas—in exchange for consolidating its electoral position in different states 
and for bargaining with the president for the passing of all laws that were coincident with 
its own agenda. The Panista elite supposed that any direct confrontation, as was the 
strategy of the PRD, would perhaps be useless, and instead they opted for collaborating 
with Salinas in the economic sphere, but always had in return an advance of the party’s 
political interests. With a minimalist strategy, the PAN went about consolidating positions 
in the political landscape: the only opposition governments in the provinces different those 
o f the PRI were its own.
Conversely, the PRD was put under pressure from the beginning of the Salinas’ term. The 
party was led by two former Priista politicians, Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz 
Ledo, whose exit from the party was partly explained by the pre-dominance o f the 
technocratic wing of which Salinas was a prominent member. This fact placed the PRD 
right from the start in a difficult situation o f antagonism with Salinas, whose policy towards 
that party was summed up in his famous phrase “I neither see them, nor listen to them”. 
Nevertheless, the confrontations between the PRD and the government brought with them 
the serious reality of more than two hundred murdered Perredista militants. In the large 
majority of the cases, their deaths were never investigated. The confrontation strategy of 
the party made it difficult for it to reach agreements with the PAN—nominated as 
“collaborationist”—and thus contributed to its isolation. At the time, few practical gains 
were obtained by the party.
The situation of the two largest opposition parties was, thus, quite different during the 
Salinas administration. The PAN was benefiting with slow, but constant advances in the 
political map through pragmatic negotiations and bargaining with the government. The 
PRD was more concentrated on its own survival, and on maintaining the image of the only
answers showed that 20 percent disagreed, 43 percent agreed, and 36 agreed on some issues. In this way we
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true opposition party in Mexico by developing an open confrontation with the regime. The 
then positive image o f the Salinas administration was obscuring the fact that opposition 
parties were transforming and developing. As long as such an image was maintained, the 
political situation seemed to be under the complete control o f the government.
In any case, during the 1988-1994 period both parties movements and actions were 
conditioned by the government’s own attitudes and options, thus creating the impression o f 
a stronger regime that had recuperated almost complete control over the political and 
electoral arenas. In reality these years served for strengthening the opposition parties’ 
identities and for providing them with a political space that had never before been 
accessible to any other opposition party: the PAN acquired a legislative and governmental 
experience in Congress and the states it seldom had in the past; the PRD found ways to 
pressurise on the government and extend its links to other popular organisations and sectors 
which were also opposed to the regime, but whose political capacities to act were reduced. 
Thus, after the 1988 elections, the party system was transformed from being characterised 
by the overwhelming dominance o f an official party over a constellation of weak 
opposition and pseudo-opposition parties, to a system in which there were three political 
organisations in competition, at least in certain urban regions, for power. The period after 
the 1988 elections saw the consolidation o f  a Centre-Right party, the PAN, the emergence 
of a Centre-Left party, the PRD (since 1989), and in the middle a complex organisation, the 
PRI, that, though its traditional revolutionary principles guided it to the left, its actual 
leadership was compromised with economic liberalisation policies that veered it to the 
right.
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can see that, in general terms, his administration enjoyed a good deal of acceptance from the population.
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Chapter Four
Television, the Renewal of Support for the Regime
This chapter discusses the relationship between the political regime and private television 
between the 1970s to the early 1990s, and how it affected the ways of presenting political 
information and material. The political liberalisation process that started in Mexico during 
the 1970s was not reflected on the TV screens. Moreover, it was precisely during those 
years when Televisa (created in 1973) became a virtual ministry of communication that 
presented the official version o f domestic politics. In spite of some circumstantial 
misunderstandings with President Echeverría (1970-76) at the beginning of his term and 
with President López Portillo at the end of the 1970s, the period studied in this chapter 
shows how the information policy of Televisa expressly and decidedly supported the PRI 
regime at the expense of manipulating and underreporting the information related to 
alternative political actors and forces. This is clearly seen during the intense political 
mobilisation in Chihuahua in 1986, the strong electoral challenge to the regime by 
Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas in 1988 and the competed elections of 1994. In exchange for such 
support the regime compensated the network by providing it with all the necessary 
economic and technical facilities for its transformation into the strongest Spanish-content 
media corporation in the world.
Still in the 1970s the government’s discourse was characterised by a populist and 
nationalist rhetoric and an apparently critical attitude towards the entrepreneurial sectors -  
though this was never reflected in concrete adverse policy outcomes. Though many strong 
entrepreneurial groups felt uncomfortable with the populist excesses of President 
Echeverría (that often transformed into the nationalisation of private property), for these 
groups there were not many other real political alternatives to turn to at the time, and most 
of them preferred to give their support to a regime that was still granting them a large 
number of benefits. During the 1980s, when opposition movements began to grow stronger 
and became more important, some small and medium entrepreneurs mostly in the northern 
cities o f Mexico started to sympathise with the centre-right wing PAN. However, in the 
case of the most powerful entrepreneurs and the largest consortiums -among which
Televisa ranked at the top— there was no need to turn into opposition, since President De la 
Madrid (1982-1988) was indeed a strong promoter of their interests. Even the old 
nationalist and populist discourse was replaced by another more akin to entrepreneurial and 
market values. Therefore, despite the fact that the political liberalisation process was 
creating new political alternatives, for the more powerful entrepreneurs there was no need 
to turn towards those alternatives. They decided better to remain on the side o f the 
government and maintain -and increase—their benefits. This was also the case o f private 
TV, for which there was no incentive for openness especially when, with both President De 
la Madrid and President Salinas there was a notable coincidence of interests, as will be seen 
below.
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In 1970 there were 78 television stations in operation of wrhich the most important ones 
were part of the following private TV networks: Telesistema Mexicano (TM), 
concessionaire o f Channels 2 (XEW-TV), Channel 4 (XHTV) and Channel 5 (XHGC-TV), 
Televisión Independiente de México (TIM), concessionaire of Channel 8 (XHTM), 
Corporación Mexicana de Radio y Televisión, concessionaire o f Channel 13 (XHDF), and 
Telecadena Mexicana, with the concession to operate some regional and local TV channels 
in the provinces. This situation contrasted greatly with the one that had prevailed during the 
1950s and almost all o f the 1960s, when TM was practically the only TV network with the 
capacity to broadcast nation-wide. Now, the concessions given to new groups and 
entrepreneurs created the conditions for competition for audiences, ratings and publicity 
among TV networks.
TIM and TM belonged to two o f the most powerful economic groups in the country, and 
therefore they did not hesitate in using the enormous amount o f  resources at their disposal 
to compete. Artists, producers, directors and showmen changed constantly from one 
corporation to the other in response to increasingly higher economic bids.1 The 
corporations even bribed some o f the firms that were in charge o f  measuring the ratings in *
'Zarur Osorio, (1996), pgs.48-49.
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order to appear more attractive before the announcers.2 The contents reflected this 
competition as well and some programmes started to rely more on scandal and vulgarity in 
order to keep the ratings high,3 a situation which provoked the criticism of some sectors 
within the government, including President Echeverría himself.
In December 1972 the merging of the two largest TV networks in Mexico, TM and TIM, 
into a larger consortium called Televisión Via Satélite, S.A. (Televisa) was announced. The 
creation of this new company was a direct consequence o f the strong economic competition 
that both networks had been experiencing over the last years. Competition had been costly 
for both TM and TIM and since July 1972 the concessionaires presented President 
Echeverría with a report on the state o f television underlining the strong economic 
difficulties that that industry was facing. Therefore, the merging of the two most important 
TV networks was not a surprise. Televisa was officially registered in January 8th 1973.4 
TM owned 75 percent of the shares of the new company and TIM kept the other 25 percent. 
Emilio Azcárraga Milmo, the son of the founder of TM who died in September 1972, 
became Televisa’s chairman.5 In a few years Televisa turned into the most important 
television -and multimedia—corporation in the country (and later in the Spanish speaking 
world) since its creation responded both to the needs o f renewing the political alliances 
with the government and to a logic of increasing its economic benefits and diminishing 
competition risks. As seen in Chapter Two, after certain initial disagreements with 
Echeverría, the attitude of the concessionaires -especially those of Televisa—was to 
reinforce their loyalties to the regime and to renew, in closer terms, their compromise with 
the government’s political interests. Their aim was to be secure that there would not be any 
further attempt to alter the private operation of the media. The issuing of the Rulings on the 
Federal Law of Radio and Television (RLFRT) of 1973 made clear the renewed, though 
implicit, compromise between the government and the concessionaires: the government
2 Victor Manuel Bernal Sahagún, Anatomía de la publicidad en México. Monopolios, enajenación y  
desperdicio, Mexico City, Ed. Nuestro Tiempo, 1993, p.164.
3 See: Efrain Pérez Espino, “El monopolio de la televisión comercial en México (el caso de Televisa)“, in 
Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Vol. XLI, no.4, October-December, 1979.
4 See Pérez Espino (1979). This is also confirmed by an interview to the then Vicepresident of the company, 
Alejandro Sada, by Laura Castellot de Ballin. In Castellot de Ballin, Historia de la televisión en México 
narrada por sus protagonistas, Mexico City, Ed. Alpe, 1993.
5 The Executive Vice-President was Miguel Alemán Velasco, the Corporative Vice-President was Rómulo 
O Tamil Naunde and his father, the owner of the newspaper Novedades was the Chairman of the 
Management Board.
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would not affect the economic interests of the concessionaires in return for an 
unconditional collaboration with the promotion of the regime’s positions and interests on 
domestic politics. Just to give one example of the constant support that Televisa gave to the 
regime’s legitimacy one can cite the constant advertising presented on its channels 
whenever there was a national holiday, in which it was always stressed that people in 
Mexico, in subtle contrast with those in other Latin American countries, enjoyed public 
peace, growth and development. These ads emphasising “stability and peace” in Mexico 
were part o f the agreements between the regime and the private television. This also meant 
that spaces for opposition groups were very reduced on the TV screens, and that the modem 
news broadcasts, like the recently created 24 Horas, became true mirrors of the official 
domestic policies and the strongest promoters of the president’s image, which became an 
essential duty in the news broadcasts. At the same time, but on the economic front Televisa 
was founding the pillars of a national multimedia empire through profiting from this closer 
relationship with the government. As one scholar puts it,
[For Televisa this relationship] has meant the expansion of its market, and great gains; for the 
government, the private television has become the most important mechanism for the searching for 
consensus and legitimacy.6
January 1973 saw the issuing o f the new Federal Electoral Law which for the first time 
granted the right of all political parties to have free access to radio and television, though 
only during election times. This new disposition was promoted by the regime as a sign of 
tolerance and an example of the acceptance of political pluralism. In reality, such spaces for 
opposition on TV were restricted, on the one hand, to only ten minutes every two weeks, 
and on the other, to participating in collective programmes by using a few minutes of the 
half hour that Article 59 of the LFRT o f  1960 granted the State per day.
In 1977, the political reform o f  President Lopez Portillo made an important change to the 
electoral prerogatives of the parties in using the media by issuing a new law, the Federal 
Law of Political Organisations and Electoral Procedures, known as LOPPE. In a time when 
the economy was recovering from the crisis of 1975-6, and when it was considered by the 
government that the oil reserves and exports could become the long-desired source for 
sustaining growth and increasing the economic and social re-distribution of benefits,
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President López Portillo promoted a political reform that could secure political spaces for 
“the minority groups” that were not part of the regime’s corporatist networks. Since the 
largest social groups -workers, bureaucrats and peasants—were incorporated into diverse 
organisations affiliated to the official party, the reform only provided spaces for 
institutional channelling of political demands through the electoral arena for those outside 
corporatism.
The reform of 1977 introduced two crucial changes for parties to access the mass media: it 
established as their constitutional right the access to the media, and it disposed that such 
access musí be permanent and not restricted to electoral times (Article 41 of the 
Constitution). These prerogatives were developed in the LOPPE, whose Article 49, section 
A clearly defined the conditions under which the parties would have access to the media:
a) The parties will have at their disposal, monthly and equitably, a part of the State air­
time on radio and television (NB: this time was part of the daily half an hour granted to 
the State by the LFRT of 1960).
b) The programmes of the parties will be preferential within the State air-time (NB: 
though not within the general broadcasting time).
c) The space for the parties in the media will be increased during electoral periods.
d) The parties will freely determine Ihe content of their programmes and the parties will 
decide the format or combination of formats for presenting these programmes.
e) The Commission for Radio Broadcasting (of the Secretariat of Gobernación) will have 
under its charge the technical aspects o f the parties’ programmes and will determine the 
dates and time-tables to broadcast these programmes.
f) These programmes will be transmitted nation-wide.
While at first sight these dispositions seemed to be a great step towards openness, in 
October 1978 important restrictions were enacted through the publication of a series of 
regulations that the parties were obliged to follow for producing and transmitting their 
programmes on the media.7 In these regulations, every party was given only fifteen minutes 
a month for their programmes and the sum of all monthly time for all parties was to 6
6 Zarur Osorio (1996), p. 112.
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oscillate between two and four hours. Moreover, the Commission for Radio Broadcasting 
was to be in charge of the production o f  all parties’ programmes and was given the capacity 
to evaluate and approve “the technical feasibility of their realisation” according to the 
technological possibilities available. In practice, this constituted a legal precept for 
censorship, since by alleging technical reasons some opposition parties* programmes were 
edited or simply not recorded. The Commission for Radio Broadcasting decided to edit 
images or audio clips from some parties’ programmes every time it was considered 
“appropriate” within the Secretariat o f  Gobernación. For instance, a programme of the 
Workers’ Revolutionary Party (PRT) was censored for about five minutes in the parts 
where it denounced the existence of political prisoners.* 8 Mejia Barquera carried on a series 
of interviews to some opposition party’s spokesmen in relation to the censorship on their 
programmes at the end of the 1970s and the beginning o f the 1980s.9 In one case, a 
programme of the Unified Socialist Party o f Mexico (PSUM) was censored when it directly 
accused the president o f the electoral frauds during the intermediate elections of 1983. This 
accusation was not heard in the programme. In another case, the PAN’s spokesman, 
Eugenio Ortiz Walls, recognised at the beginning of the 1980s that their programmes had 
been censored at least twelve times, that the complaint letters they had sent to the Federal 
Electoral Commission and to the Commission for Radio Broadcasting were useless, and 
that censorship became more explicit when criticisms were directed at the army or the 
president.
But if  such regulations enabled the regime to directly censor the “unpleasant” transmissions 
of the parties, the obstacles to freely transmitting were not only on the regime’s side, but 
also on those o f the networks themselves. Further controls on information were practised 
within the TV networks, both public and private. Thus the parties were facing two different 
kinds o f  obstacles to broadcasting their messages, one related to the regime’s legal capacity 
to actually censor their programmes and the other related to the TV’s internal criteria to 
permitting the parties to freely broadcast their messages.
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8 UnomásUno, October M* 1981, p .17.
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The public television network -TCM and Channel 13--10 1*had strict internal controls over 
political information and on the spaces allocated to opposition parties. Since January 1977 
all public media were operated under the direct supervision of a new General Direction of 
Radio, Television and Cinematography (RTC) within the structure of the Secretariat of 
Gobernación. RTC was enabled, according to the Internal Regulation of the Secretariat of 
Gobernación, to supervise that all radio and television broadcasts remained within “the 
limits of respect to private life, public peace and morality” (creating a still deeper confusion 
between all the already existing public facilities related to radio and TV). Article 17 of this 
same regulation stipulates that RTC has the faculty to “co-ordinate, foment, and regulate 
the production, co-production, distribution, exhibition, and transmission of all materials o f 
radio, television and film”.
The first Director General of RTC was Margarita López Portillo, the sister of the president, 
who as soon as she took office declared that her “strongest passion” in that post was “to 
care for the image o f the president”.11 The most important news broadcast of Channel 13, 
Siete Dias,u  though relatively balanced and open on international information, was hardly 
more than just a daily amalgam of official bulletins sent by the different ministries and 
governmental dependencies on domestic matters due to its lack of autonomous 
informational criteria.13 Spaces for opposition and critical opinions were practically non­
existent under such circumstances.
As for private television, it was no less difficult for parties to find spaces there for 
broadcasting their programmes. The regulation of the LOPPE adopted on January 1978 
established that the political parties’ programmes must be transmitted at 19:30 in national 
TV channels. However, since 1980 Televisa decided not to transmit those programmes at 
those times on Channel 2, its most important nation-wide channel, due to a drop in ratings. 
It offered instead some spaces on Channel 5, whose signal could be received in some states 
outside Mexico City, but it was not a “national TV channel”, as the law established. This 
offer was rejected by opposition parties and, as a consequence o f their complaints before
10 In November 1975, eight licenses that belonged to the the private Telecadena Mexicana were revoked and 
re-awarded to the public TV network, Channel 13, which as a consequence of its wider transmission capacity 
increased its audience in the following years. In 1980 Channel 13 had 42 television stations to retransmit its 
programming, and TRM, the other educational public network more than 90.
11 Declaration given to El Nacional, July 15th 1976.
' '  Created in December 20th 1978.
13 Arredondo (1991), p. 144.
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the Federal Electoral Commission and the Commission for Radio Broadcasting, Televisa 
decided in 1982, an electoral year, to transmit again these programmes on Channel 2. 
Nevertheless, the company decided to broadcast those programmes at 14:00 hours instead 
of at 19:30 arguing that according to the agreement reached in 1969, all public 
transmissions should not endanger the economic stability o f the stations.14 This time though 
opposition parties complained before the Commission for Radio Broadcasting, the PRI and 
its minor ally, the PARM, accepted such time-tables offered by Televisa in the Federal 
Electoral Commission.15 In any case, the time-tables proposed by Televisa did not represent 
any loss for the PRI, since that party was already receiving a constant coverage by Televisa 
that outweighed the times strictly conceded by law to that party. Most of the information on 
the PRI was presented as “news” in order not to contravene the legal dispositions that 
restricted each party’s programming time. For the official party, the 15 minute programmes 
constituted only a minimal part of the real time that the broadcasting media devoted to 
covering its agenda.16
Since the 1970s, Televisa consolidated as the most important media network through which 
the government presented its viewpoints on domestic affairs and through which the image 
of the president was promoted. In practice, Televisa became a virtual ministry of 
information and communication of the regime. This was in large part due to the enormous 
penetration o f the private television consortium and its huge economic importance in the 
private world. Televisa was by far the most important TV network in Mexico. For example, 
of all the publicity expenditure invested on television in 1976 only 3.2 percent was 
allocated to Channel 13, and most o f the rest went to Televisa.17 This disproportionate 
importance o f Televisa vis-a-vis the public channels also demonstrates the fact that by the 
early 1980s the public television network was in the middle of a chaotic situation due to the 
irresponsibility of its managers, especially of the sister of the president.18 This condition
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radio and television conceded to the State as fiscal payment.
15 Mejia Barquera (1999), pgs. 38-40.
16 Ibid., p.43.
17 De Noriega and Leach (1979), p.65.
18 If at the end of the Echeverria administration, Channel 13 accumulated a debt of 200 million pesos due to 
the enormous expenditures invested on the premature inauguration of its new installations, thing worsened as 
soon as Margarita Lopez Portillo assumed the control of RTC. In six years the channel had seven different 
directors (Abel Quezada occupied that office for only one day!), a total lack of rational planning, and constant
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brought as a consequence that even the public organs and ministries preferred Televisa’s 
channels than the public one for their advertising. The journalist Francisco Ortiz Pinchetti 
shows that in 1978 of the twenty-two public companies that inserted ads on TV, most of 
them preferred Televisa (72 percent) over public Channel 13 (28 percent).19 20Another 
example is given by the fact that, during the years of their nationalisation (1982-1990), the 
two largest banks in Mexico, Banamex and Bancomer, allocated almost all of their 
advertising in Televisa. And for the government there was no interest in displacing 
Televisa from such a privileged situation.
On the one hand, the Mexican State was still unable to elaborate a consistent public media 
long-term project. On the other, Televisa knew perfectly well how to profit from such a 
situation and reinforced its collaboration with the regime. For instance, the trips of 
President López Portillo to Asia were covered exclusively by Televisa. By the 1980s, the 
importance o f Televisa, its national penetration and its collaboration in promoting a 
positive image of the regime, made it more reliable for the government than its own chaotic 
public TV network.
Therefore, in spite o f eventual misunderstandings, the conflicts between private TV and 
the regime have been essentially circumstantial and restricted to very specific policies. 
Also, in spite of the many declarations that even announced the possibility of the 
nationalisation of the private media during the early years of President Echeverría,21 private 
television maintained itself on the side of the regime and its strategy was not to face the 
government, but to reinforce its support to it. Televisa did not use its ample penetration and 
strength to claim for more open spaces, for political apertura (in which it could even 
legally defend its interests in a more predictable manner), but strengthened its 
collaboration.
It is possible to think that this docile reaction was in part due to both, the still low social 
and political penetration -at a national level, at least—of any alternative political 
organisation22 outside of the official corporatist system, and the weakness of civil society
rivalries within its internal bureaucratic structure, which made improvisation and caprice the distinctive 
feature of the channel's image.
19 In “Televisión rural del Estado al servicio de Televisa”, in Proceso, no.141, July 16th 1979.
20 In Zarur Osorio, (1996), p.l 15.
21 See Chapters One and Two.
22 At the time, the most relevant opposition party, the PAN, was suffering a deep internal crisis in the 1970s 
that even impeded it from presenting a candidate for the presidential elections of 1976.
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organisations. It was then quite difficult to find alternative social forces on which to base 
any solid support for challenging the regime at that time. But the principle explanation lies 
in the fact that for private TV it was extremely convenient to support the regime, since the 
regime never ceased to provide all kind of incentives and benefits to its own development 
and expansion. In October 1972, during the celebration of the Radio Broadcasting Week, 
the Secretary o f Gobernación assured the concessionaires that though the government was 
conscious about its own duties and responsibilities in matters o f radio and television, it was 
going to be extremely careful in order “not to harm any of the legitimate interests of the 
industry” in a clear message not to endanger their economic development.23 
In this sense, the aggressive declarations of the government officials against private 
broadcasting o f  the early 1970s served only to legitimise the direct acquisition o f the State 
of certain radio and TV stations (Channel 13), which in any case, never have constituted an 
alternative to private broadcasting. Actually, the concessionaires were not opposed to the 
direct participation of the State in the media industry, but only to any serious attempt to 
replace the dominant commercial model based on private property with another based on 
the exclusive public control of the media.
In 1976, the Vice-President o f Televisa, Miguel Alemán, defined the existence in Mexico 
of a mixed system of mass media composed by a coexistence of a private commercial 
model with a public model, each with specific functions to accomplish. The functional 
division o f TV in Mexico served not only to legitimise the harmonious coexistence of the 
two models, but to differentiate the task o f private media, entertainment and, secondarily, 
information, from that of the public channels, education and cultural diffusion.
This system became known as the “Mexican formula” of mass media.24 According to 
Aleman, the “Mexican formula” was the expression in the media of the actual mixed 
economic model in which the public and the private coexist and help each other for the 
development o f the country. The aim o f this “Mexican Formula” was to improve the “social 
functions of television” (to entertain, to inform and to educate the population). For these 
purposes each individual television channel had a specific function: “Channel 4 is dedicated 
to raising communication and inter-communication [sic] between the urban popular sectors
23 Declaration of the Secretary Mario Moya Palencia, October 1972. Cited in Arredondo and Sánchez (1987), 
p. 176.
Miguel Alemán Velasco, "El Estado y la televisión”, in Nueva Politica, n.3, July-September, 1976.
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of the Valley of Mexico; Channel 2 was occupied with satisfying the needs and exigencies 
of the middle classes -o f  the traditional values of the Mexican families; Channel 5 keeps a 
global interest in various matters, thus seeking to be a window to the world [sic]; Channel 8 
accomplishes the transcendental task of “feeding back the country from its provinces’ 
richness” [sic -whatever this means: retroalimentar alpais de la riqueza de su provincia]. 
In Channel 8 all the states are presented and provide a positive breath against the 
asphyxiating centralism; Channel 13 defines its functions from a cultural base, satisfying 
the requirements o f the artistic and intellectual sectors; Channel 11 transmits educational 
material...” 25
In spite of this division of functions, the government was not expected to reduce the 
supportive policies towards Televisa. One need only remember that notwithstanding the 
legal obligation that the private consortium had for ceding daily 12.5 percent of its air-time 
to State programming, the annual report elaborated by RTC in 1979 showed that of the total 
870 hours that corresponded to such a percentage. Channel 2, for instance, only transmitted 
121 hours and 57 minutes.26 Moreover, this support for the development of the consortium 
not only remained unaltered, but actually increased. For instance, the National 
Telecommunications Network (RNT) -o f which the system of microwaves network w as 
part—became an instrument for subsidising the private broadcasting activities. According 
to the law, the concessionaires are obliged to use the RNT for conducting their transmission 
within the national territory. The concessionaires must pay for the right to use this service. 
The fees for these rights are established in the Federal Rights Law (Ley de Derechos 
Federales) and they are valid for one year. However, between 1970 and 1976, the 
telecommunications policy of President Echeverría explicitly stated that for such RNT 
services low fees and “promotional tariffs” were required in order to secure television 
signals for all the geographical zones where private television had not reached so far.27 The 
Jow tariffs appear lower still when compared with the income that the concessionaires 
earned for publicity. For instance, in 1985 the cost of using the RNT for sending a two- 
hours programme to Spain was 645,700 Mexican pesos, while the cost of 60 seconds o f
25 Ibid., p.195.
26Reporte general sobre el uso de los Tiempos del Estado y de los Tiempos Fiscales en Radio y  Televisión 
durante 1978, DGRTC, Secretaría de Gobernación, 1979,pgs.56-9.
27 Carlos Núñez Arellano, Las telecomunicaciones en México, P.R.I., Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 
Económicos y Sociales, 1974, p.13.
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publicity in a Football game in Channel 2 was over 3,000,000 Mexican pesos. Moreover, 
if the tariffs for using the RTN were increased every year, the publicity fares of, say 
Televisa, increased every three months. But if this disparity was already noticeable, 
according to a documented research published by the weekly Proceso in January 1989, for 
more than one year in 1988 Televisa did not even pay the corresponding tariff for using the 
RNT, becoming subject o f a fíne according to the Federal Rights Law.28 9 According to the 
same source, President De la Madrid emitted a decree exempting Televisa of paying such 
fine to the Secretariat of Communications and Transports.
Also, as an extension of the RNT, Televisa received the use o f satellite networks, which 
were then developing in Mexico. In 1980 Televisa and the Secretariat of Communications 
and Transports signed a covenant through which they established the basis for increasing 
the number o f satellite terrestrial stations. The private consortium was supposed to invest 
200 million pesos and the government only 70 million pesos, but the former would have 
priority in sending its signals except in cases of emergency. This was the antecedent of a 
complementary project for launching a domestic satellite system in which Televisa has 
played a crucial role and has obtained the possibility of sending its signals to all o f Latin 
America, Western Europe, North Africa and some other Middle East countries.30 
By the 1980s the mutual support between Televisa and the regime were so solidly grounded 
and their relations were on such good terms that, as one scholar observes,
The top directives of Televisa have practically an unlimited disposition of resources to the 
attainment of the corporation goals. According to a top executive, they count on one of the best -or 
possibly the best—information stock system in Latin America, which storage information not only 
on daily matters, but in a wide variety of topics. In consequence, he sustains, Televisa has 
developed narrow co-operation contacts with the Secretariat of Gobernación and the General 
Attorney of the Republic in Mexico, and with the FBI and the CIA in the United States.31 *
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The support that Televisa has given to the regime can be exemplified in the ways that its 
most important news broadcasts, 24 Horas, presented the information on domestic political
28 Femando Mejia Barquera, “Impuestos y tarifas. Los recursos de la nación a bajo precio", in Trejo Delarbre. 
(1988), pgs.199 and 203.
29 Cited in Trejo Delarbre. Ver. pero también leer. México City, Instituto Nacional del Consumidor. 1991. 
p.89.
J(í For a discussion of the initial phases of such project see: Fátima Fernández Christlieb, “Génesis del sistema 
de satélites Morelos”, Información Científica y  Tecnológica, México City, CONACyT, vol.7, no.100, 1985.
31 Miguel Basáñez, La lucha por la hegemonía en México, / 968-1980, México City, Siglo XXI, 1985,
pgs.104-105.
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affairs. As was said in Chapter One this news broadcast became the most prominent 
reference for domestic political life. And Zabludowsky, though strongly criticised in certain 
academic sectors for his biased defence o f the regime, consolidated his position as the most 
influential newscaster in Mexico.32 According to a study on the news content of 24 Horas 
in 1983, the news on domestic political and economic matters constituted only 23 percent 
of the total number of news issues presented and slightly more than 25 percent o f the total 
time of the broadcast.33 This study showed that specifically on the political news, 24 Horas 
privileged information on the speeches and on the daily agenda o f the president and other 
top level governmental officials. Information about anything more than discourses and 
symbolic political acts was almost absent. 24 Horas presented the activities of the president 
and his close collaborators serving more as a governmental communications office than as 
a true news broadcast programme.
This uncritical and biased way of presenting the political information in the news 
broadcasts was not the only way television had for closing the spaces for other opposition 
forces and organisations. Since the 1980s some opposition parties started to explore the 
possibilities o f buying -with their own resources—spaces on TV in which to insert their ads 
and improve their presence in these media. But as a scholar notes, there were two kinds of 
obstacles that the parties had to overcome when inserting their ads.34 On the one hand, 
many stations refused to sell them spaces on which to insert their ads and spots. And, on the 
other, even when the stations agreed to sell them spaces for ads, it often occurred that at the 
very last moment such ads were simply not transmitted disregarding the previously signed 
contracts.
In the 1980s opposition parties strengthened their presence in the political life, especially 
the PAN in northern Mexico.35 The vote against the PRI in the northern state of Chihuahua 
in 1986 reflected both the increasing electoral dissidence o f the urban middle sectors -to  
which a large number o f popular groups were to follow in 1988, but this time gathered
33 24 Horas was the most expensive programme in the Mexican TV on which to insert ads and commercial 
spots. In 1988, according to the Directorate of Publicity Media, the insertion of one minute of commercial 
advertising costed 96,900,000 pesos.
33 Pablo Arredondo Ramirez and Lourdes Zermeno Torres, “La politica informativa de Televisa en los 
Estados Unidos (El caso de 24 Horas)”, in Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, University of California, 
vol.2, no.l, Winter 1986.
34 Mejia Barquera (1999), p.44.
35 See Chapter Three.
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around a centre-left project— and the fraudulent character of the electoral processes in 
Mexico, since in spite of the massive vote for the PAN the PRI “obtained” the victory. On 
national TV channels and news broadcasts these events o f Chihuahua were simply not 
reported, as if  they were inexistent. In June 1996, Televisa’s Vice-President of News, Félix 
Cortés, clearly stated that “the PRI militance of the top executives of this company shapes 
our information policy. Our newscasters comment on the news based on the political 
sympathies o f the company’*.36 In September Miguel Alemán, then Chairman o f Televisa, 
was interviewed by the weekly Proceso and when asked about the underreporting of 
Televisa of the elections of Chihuahua, he answered “I am a Priista. I believe in the PRI.37 38
The words o f “Lolita” Ayala, the newscaster o f the news broadcast Muchas Noticias 
(Channel 4) and for more than fifteen years a close collaborator of Zabludowsky in 24 
Horas, are also quite telling. She said that in relation to politics,
We will inform on all that we consider to be news, even in relation to the PAN or to street 
demonstrations in Mexico City, subjects that were not reported previously. This, however, does not 
mean that we give any importance to them}*
Against this discrimination and manipulation o f information o f Televisa the PAN organised 
a demonstration on July 15th 1986, outside the company’s headquarters in Mexico City. 
What is important to note is that the demonstrators and its sympathisers largely belonged to 
the urban middle classes who formed the most important target audiences for Televisa, but 
who were at the same time receptive to the conservative urban political message of the 
PAN and deceived by the corruption and economic failures o f the PRI. The militant support 
of Televisa to the regime was not new at all, but since the mid-1980s it became increasingly 
incompatible with the preferences o f its most important audiences: the urban middle 
sectors.
Evidently, the behaviour of public television was not different from Televisa’s in relation to 
the spaces given to political opposition. In 1983, President De la Madrid created the Social 
Communication System of the Federal Government for co-ordinating all the public mass 
media. It was composed of three different organisations, the Mexican Institute of Radio
36 In La Jornada, June 10th 1986.
37 Proceso, no.515, September 1986.
38 Words of Lolita Ayala cited in Expansión. November 26th 1986. Italics are mine.
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(IMER), the Mexican Institute of Television (IMEVISION) and the Mexican Institute of 
Cinematography (IMCINE). IMEVISION was composed of Channel 13, the television 
network of TRM with 99 stations that could transmit at a national level, Channel 8 of 
Monterrey and two producing agencies, PRONARTE (which disappeared in 1985) and 
Teleproductora del DF. In 1985 the network of TRM was used for launching a new public 
TV channel, Channel 7, which in 1986 destined more resources to the promotion of 
presidential activities and the president’s image (S 803.1 million Pesos), than to the 
transmission of entertainment programmes ($ 711.3 million Pesos) or its news broadcasts 
(S 46.7 million Pesos).39
The complaints of the opposition parties both in the Chamber o f Deputies and in the 
Federal Electoral Commission against restrictions on television to the transmission of their 
messages, and against the “quite unfair treatment” that they received during TV coverage, 
had minor impacts. The parties wanted more -and better-access to TV. However, such 
petitions were largely ignored by the regime. In December 1987, in Congress, with the PRI 
majority, a new Federal Electoral Code was passed. This code simply repeated the 1978 
formulae by which “the parties can have 15 minutes per month” and that this amount of 
time “should increase during electoral times”.40
The traditional biased ways in which television treated opposition parties, and political 
information in general, was expected to maintain during the 1988 general elections. But this 
time a new ingredient was added to the electoral process: for the first time there was a 
serious external challenge to the PRI candidate. This was not the first time when official 
party candidates were challenged by relatively strong opponents. As in the elections of 
1940, 1946 and 1952, in the elections o f 1988 the official party’s candidate faced rivals of 
certain political leverage, all of them former members of the party’s elite, as Cuauhtemoc 
Cárdenas was himself. The difference was that this time the challenger was not only backed 
up by other political elite groups, but he counted also on the support of important social 
sectors, mainly urban, young, and educated. This feature made the 1988 electoral process a 
truly competitive one, though still unequal and unfair.
In October 4th 1987, the former Secretary of Planning and Budget, Carlos Salinas De 
Gortari, became the official PRI candidate. The announcement was made with great
'?9 IMEVISION Budget, 1996, cited in Zarur Osorio (1996), p.94.
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publicity and nation-wide TV coverage. In contrast, the inauguration o f the campaigns of 
the other two most important candidates, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (FDN) and of Manuel J. 
Clouthier (PAN), were presented on the news broadcasts without much relevance, as minor 
“news”. However, since electoral competition was indeed strong, television finally gave 
some minimal space to opposition candidates. For instance, Clouthier was invited to the 
most important opinion programme in Televisa, Para Gente Grande, hosted by Ricardo 
Rocha, in November 29th 1987. In spite o f this invitation -perhaps more an outcome of the 
initiative o f Rocha than a deliberate policy of Televisa—it was always clear that Televisa, 
and TV in general, was supporting the PRI candidate. Two relevant declarations serve to 
exemplify this point. The first one was made in October 9th 1987 by the President of the 
CIRT in the sense that the Chamber members “as radio broadcasters and as Mexicans” 
were]convinced of the coincidence o f ideals and aims between them and Carlos Salinas, 
and therefore they “supported his candidacy without reserves to occupy the Presidency of 
the Republic” .40 1 The second declaration was made by the Chairman of Televisa in January 
15 1988, Emilio Azcanaga Milmo. He declared that Televisa was a private firm with the 
right to present what it considered to be information, and that in relation to politics there 
should be no doubt: “we are with the PRI, members of the PRI, and we have always been 
with the PRI; we do not believe in any other formula. And as members of that party we will 
do everything possible for making our candidate to win”.42 It is difficult to find an example 
of more clear commitment of the media entrepreneurs to the official candidate.
Opposition candidates complained about the totally supportive role of television in favour 
of the official candidate, and in January 1988 Clouthier requested that his followers and 
sympathisers stop watching 24 Horas and demonstrate outside Televisa’s headquarters 
against its extremely biased method o f informing on the campaigns.
The official answer to Clouthier1 s complaints was given by the secretary general of the 
Industry of Television and Radio Workers Union, the PRI deputy Nezahualcóyotl De la 
Vega, who in May 23rd 1988 published in the newspapers a long letter in which he took 
pains to summarise all the spaces that the broadcasting media have given to Clouthier’s
40 “Código Federal Electoral”, in Diario Oficia! de la Federación, December 12th 1987.
41 Declarations of CIRT President, Julio Velarde, in Excélsior, October 10th 1987, fisrt section.
42 Declarations of Emilio Azcárraga Milmo published in La Jornada, January 16th 1988. This was not the first 
-nor the last—time that the President of Televisa declared his sympathies for the PRI. In 1982, before the 
general elections he also declared himself "a soldier of the PRI" (In Proceso, No. 323, May 17lh 1982, p.23).
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campaign, emphasising that the PAN’s candidate should recognise the impartial behaviour 
o f the media.43 De la Vega underlined that Clouthier not only received the time he was 
entitled by law according to the electoral weight of his party, but also additional time on the 
news broadcasts.44 That same evening, Jacobo Zabludowsky, in the late evening edition of 
24 Horas, read the entire text inserted by De la Vega, and made it clear that the media, 
Televisa in particular, had been absolutely impartial in the campaigns.
Outside Mexico City the story echoed: opposition candidates, Cárdenas and Clouthier, were 
denied spaces on the local broadcast media, and when they obtained some spaces their 
campaigns were simply under-reported, as in the cases of the states of Hidalgo in January, 
Campeche and Yucatan in February, or Chihuahua in March 1988. There were two kinds of 
justification, which the entrepreneurs gave for restricting spaces to the opposition parties. 
One can be labelled the Alemán-Zabludowsky formula (which was also mentioned by De la 
Vega in his press insertion), i.e. to give to each party coverage that corresponds to its 
electoral strength. For some concessionaires it was clear: they would not give even one 
more minute. In this respect, Zabludowsky defined the criteria Televisa foliowxd for 
presenting political information on the campaigns in the following terms,
We studied the procedures in other countries. In Italy, the four most important [television] channels 
have distinct political orientations and function accordingly, favoring their preferred party... In the 
United States, the political parties can buy as much air time as they want. In Televisa we believe 
that the political parties should be assigned air time in the news in proportion to the quantity of 
votes that they received in the last elections.45
The other justification w'as simply a commercial reason, as given by the CIRT46 and by the 
Under-Secretary of Gobernación,47 This justification stated that though the private media 
entrepreneurs had the legal obligation to give to each party the air-times established by law', 
each of them were free to decide according to his/her interests whether or not to sell any 
additional space for the parties to insert their ads or present their points of view. In turn, for 
many entrepreneurs, the convenience in selling or not selling these spaces depended on the
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43 Insertion titled “Miente Clouthier!” in La Jornada, May 23rd 1988.
44 Ibidem.
45 Cited in Ilya Adler, (1993), p.157.
46 Open letter published in La Jornada in February 18* 1988.
47 Declarations of Fernando Pérez Correa published in La Jornada in February 26* 1988.
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parties’ capacities for constantly buying and becoming part o f their regular clientele.48 This 
“commercial approach” served to justify the greater access that the PR1 had within these 
media, since it was, evidently, the richest party o f all and the only one that could afford to 
pay for a constant presence in these media.
In a detailed study by Pablo Arredondo on the ways television news broadcasts, 24 Horas 
(Channel 2) and Dia a Dia (Channel 13), covered the 1988 electoral campaigns and 
reported on the information related to them, interesting data was found.49 Taking a sample 
of 55 days selected at random between September 1987 and August 1988, he found that 
from the total 3,660 news registered, only 435 (11.88 percent) referred to the electoral 
campaigns. Of the total time devoted to the news, i.e. 272,998 seconds, only 17.26 percent 
was devoted to electoral information (Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1
Electoral News Coverage in TV Broadcasts, September 1987-August 1988
News broadcasts Total number of 
news items 
presented
Electoral news 
items presented*
Time of News 
(in seconds)
Time of Electoral 
News *
24 Horas 
Televisa
1,216 141
(11.6%)
75,332 13,043 sec. 
(17.31%)
Dia a Dia 
IMEVISION
2,444 294
(12.03)
197,666 34,069 sec. 
(17.24%)
Total 3,660 435
(11.88%)
272,998 47,112 sec. 
(17.26%)
*The number below refers io the percentages in relation to the total number and time of news on each TV 
broadcast.
Source: Arredondo Ramirez, (1990), pgs.60-61.
With regard to the time devoted to inform on the elections and the number of news issues 
presented on the elections, all news broadcasts greatly favoured the PRI (Table 4.2). Dia a 
Dia news broadcast supported the PRI more openly, since this party received 67 percent of 
the news and almost 90 percent of the time, while 24 Horas devoted it 60 percent o f the 
news and 70 percent of the time. Obviously this difference did not mean that Televisa was 
more open than Channel 13. If it is true that 24 Horas gave slightly more space to the other 
three largest opposition parties (while totally excluding the two smallest opposition parties)
48 Arrdondo Ramírez, “Los medios de comunicación en la lucha político-electoral”, in Arredondo, Fregoso 
and Trejo Delarbre (1991), pgs.71-73.
49 Pablo Arredondo Ramírez, “Los noticieros de televisión y la sucesión presidencial de 1988”, in Seminar on 
Medios, democracia y  fines, México City, UNAM, Frederich Naumann Stifitung, Notimex, 1990.
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than public television, the information that was presented on them was far from being 
impartial. An example o f this was the programme 60 Minutos hosted by the journalist Juan 
Ruiz Healy, who just three days before the election day, presented a special issue on the 
candidates profiles and careers on which those of the opposition parties were derided and 
their projects disapproved.
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Table 4.2
Electoral Coverage Time (in seconds) on TV News Broadcasts by Parties, September 
______________________________ 1987-August 1988____________________________
News
Broadcasts
Duration of 
News
PRI PAN FDN PMS PRT PDM
24 Horas 
Televisa
13,043 sec. 9,081 sec. 
(69.62%)
705 sec. 
(5.41%)
595 sec. 
(4.56%)
573sec.
(4.39%)
0 0
Dia a Dia 34,069 sec. 30,089 sec. 778 sec. 169 sec. 345 sec. 171 sec. 204 sec.
Imevision (88.32 %) (2.28%) (0.50%) (1.01%) (0.50%) (0.60%)
Total 47,112 sec 39,170 sec. 
(83.14%)
1,483 sec. 
(3.14%)
764 sec. 
(1.62%)
918 sec. 
(1.94%)
171 sec. 
(0.36%)
204 sec. 
(0.43%)
Source: Calculated with the data provided by Arredondo Ramirez (1990), pgs.61, 67, 71 and 72.
The evening of the election day, July 6th, a general “breakdown o f the computing system” 
impeded the preliminary results from being shown. This failure o f the computing network 
was minimised by the media, but it generated the suspicion that a large-scale fraud had 
been committed, as was alleged by both Cárdenas and Clouthier. The fraud was never 
proved and the television news broadcastings immediately presented information 
supporting the victory o f Carlos Salinas. In the following days, programmes were devoted 
to interviewing the most important PRI political figures who evidently advocated the 
victory of their party. No space was given to opposition or even to any critical opinion 
against the regime.50 On the transmission o f July 19th Zabludowsky devoted a great part of 
his programme to reading the reviews on the elections in México, from some of the most 
prestigious international newspapers (the list included The Washington Post, The Wail 
Street Journal and El Pais): all o f which acknowledged the victory of the PRI-and 
therefore helped to legitimise it.
50 Ibid., pgs. 163-165.
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Though the PRI obtained the victory in the presidential election, opposition parties obtained 
the largest ever number of seats in Congress.51 The opposition parties, with their 235 
Federal Deputies, decidedly pressed for better terms in the electoral competition and for 
more equitable conditions in the electronic mass media.52 In September 24th 1990 the 
Official Daily published the new Federal Code for Electoral Institutions and Procedures 
(COFIPE). The Federal Electoral Commission was substituted by a Federal Electoral 
Institute (IFE). Though the Secretary o f Gobernación was still the president of that 
organisation, more balanced space was given to the parties’ representatives through the 
removal of former Executive representatives. In matters o f transmissions, the IFE was 
supposed to receive the tariffs and costs for ads from the concessionaires-and the prices 
were not to be any higher than the equivalent commercial prices—and presented them to 
the parties allowing them to buy spaces according to their interests and convenience. This 
was a great advancement for the parties.
However, there were also other dispositions that kept some advantages for the PRI. For 
instance, though the 1990 Law maintained the 15 minutes monthly access to broadcasting, 
Article 44, section II stated that the increase in time that each party would receive during 
electoral processes would be proportional to its electoral strength, (instead of the previous 
egalitarian distribution of this additional elections’ time). This disposition stated that during 
campaigns, the PRI would maintain a more privileged position. As was expected, 
opposition parties immediately raised objections, though at the end the PRI passed the law 
with the approval of the PAN. The 1991 mid-term elections were held under such 
provisions and the PRI obtained important victories that helped it to recover the control 
over the federal congress.53
However, important changes were about to transform Mexican television in the mid-terms: 
In September 14th 1990 it was announced in the Secretariat o f Gobernación that the nation­
wide Channel 7, the Mexico City Channel 22 and the Monterrey Channel 8 were going to 
be privatised. In April 1992, the government added to that original “public media offer” 
Channel 13, the newspaper El Nacional and COTSA, a theatres manager company. The 
State was, in the words of President Salinas, redefining its role in the communications
5] See Chapter Three.
52 Raúl Trejo Delarbre. La sociedad ausente. Comunicación, democracia y  modernidad, Mexico City, Cal y
Arena, 1992, p.43.
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policy, since it was to cease to be the direct owner of mass media, though it would keep its 
role in “regulating the concessions, granting freedom of expression, protecting the rights of 
the communicators, and creating the conditions for their development”.53 4 The sale o f 
IMEVISION responded to the privatising atmosphere that characterised the administration 
o f Salinas. His economic programme was amply supported by the private business world -  
to which Salinas provided many facilities to flourish—since a total coincidence of interests 
and aims was recognised in it after years o f populism and revolutionary discourses in the 
1970s. As one scholar notices,
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The decision to privatise public television was not difficult since Televisa was transmitting the 
governmental message, and demonstrated its effectiveness and compromise with the modernising 
project launched by Miguel De la Madrid and Carlos Salinas... The Salinas’ government and the 
entrepreneur Emilio Azcarraga understood each other and recognised their interests’ affinities.55
The good terms in the relations between Televisa and the Salinas government was well 
exemplified when, in November 28th 1993, the consortium, through its company 
Radiotelevisora de México Norte, S.A. de C.V., obtained sixty-two new television 
frequencies, for developing the nation-wide transmission capacity o f its Channel 9 (former 
Channel 8).56 In this way Televisa was reu'arded for its loyalty and support. This loyalty 
was also expected from Radio Televisora del Centro, the group that finally acquired 
Channels 13, 7 and 8, since the way the privatisation process was carried out was not free 
from suspicions and unclear actions even led opposition parties in the Chamber of Deputies 
to request for a revision of such processes. The revision was presided over by PRI deputies 
who, as one may expect, did not find any major irregularity in the privatisation process.57 In
53 See Chapter Three.
54 La Jornada, April 10,h 1992.
55 Zarur Osorio (1996), p.106.
56 Alejandro Olmos, “Algunos protagonistas de la televisión”, in Sánchez de Armas and Maria del Pilar 
Ramírez (1999), p.292. It is important to note that those 62 concessions that Televisa obtained were part of 
the 152 television stations of Channel 13. When this channel was privatised in July 1993, it only counted on 
90 stations in the country, since the rest were reserved to be given to Televisa in November that year. In this 
way, at the end of 1993 Televisa had a total o f208 television stations.
57 On April 1“ 1993 the Official Daily published the names of the private groups interested in buying the 
public TV Channels: Geo Multimedia (of Raymundo Gómez Flores), Radio y Televisión del Centro (of 
Ricardo Salinas Pliego and Francisco Aguirre), Corporación de Medios de Comunicación (of Adrián Saba, 
Joaquín Vargas and Clemente Sema), and Cosmovisión (of Javier Sánchez Campuzano, William Karab and 
Javier Pérez de Anda). The most experienced group was Corporación de Medios de Comunicación, since 
Vargas was the President of another important media group, Multivision, and Clemente Sema was the main 
shareholder of Radio Red. The weakest group seemed to be Radio y Televisión del Centro, especially after
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this manner, in July 1993, the second largest private television network in the country, 
under the name of Television Azteca, S.A (TV Azteca) came into operation. The 
consolidation o f this new network was to prove to be decisive for changing the status quo 
in which television had developed -as  will be seen in further chapters—, since it brought a 
serious competitor to a landscape in which traditionally Televisa used to hold sway, and 
this situation, in turn, would have consequences on the role o f television in politics.58 
However, during the first year o f existence, TV Azteca was not a serious threat to Televisa 
and it did not seem to be interested in offering any true alternative to Televisa’s 
programming. This was not surprising i f  one takes into account the words o f its chairman, 
Ricardo Salinas Pliego, who declared in an interview that for him, television was 
essentially an entertainment means that should play down the ideological and political 
contents, and even its news broadcastings.59 This was the context in which the campaigns 
of 1994 started.
In September1993 reforms to the COFIPE introduced some changes that favoured greater 
equity and transparency in the ways the electronic media reported the political campaigns. 
Though some articles and dispositions were still a matter o f debate and disagreement 
among the parties, like Article 48,60 in general terms more equitable conditions were 
granted for electoral competition. The IFE was given the legal faculty for meeting with the 
CIRT in order to suggest a series o f measurable criteria for transmitting the information
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Francisco Aguirre -son of the founder of Grupo Radio Centro and the one with experience in the mass media 
in that group—refused to increase the capital o f the enteiprise and instead decided to join Cosmovisión along 
with Sánchez Campirano in May 1993. Under such controversial circumstances it was never clear at the end 
where Ricardo Salinas Pliego had obtained the USS 645 million with which he finally became the strongest 
bidder as announced in July 18th. Three years later, in June 1996, there appeared in the Miami Herald, some 
versions published by the journalist Andrés Oppenheimer stating that the brother of the ex-President Carlos 
Salinas, Raúl Salinas, had loaned a large sum of money (US$ 29 million) to Ricardo Salinas Pliego to 
purchase the channels. A few weeks afterwards there were some rumours that even mentioned Raúl Salinas as 
an important shareholder in that TV network, (Televisión Azteca, S.A.). These irregularities caused some 
opposition deputies to ask for a revision of the whole privatisation process. In December of that year, the 
High Contability o f the Treasure Commission o f the Chamber of Deputies, the one that was in charge of 
investigating the case, determined that those accusations could not be proved and that the privatisation 
process had been legal.
58 The consequences of a new private terrestrial TV market is analysed in Chapter Seven.
59 El Financiero, April 22nd 1993, p.12.
60 Article 48 established that when two or more parties were interested in buying air-time in one station at the 
same time, the IFE would be permitted to solve the conflict through the following mechanism. The desired 
time would be divided into two parts, in which the first one, would be allocated to each party on equal terms, 
and the second one would be distributed to each party according to the electoral voting proportion obtained in 
the previous majority election. This meant that in any dispute over the same time tables, the PRI would be 
benefited.
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related to the campaigns in impartial ways. In February 28th that year, the IFE made public 
a document entitled “Lincamientos generales aplicables en los noticiarios de radio y  
televisión respecto de la información y difusión e actividades de campaña de los partidos 
políticos” This document contained a series of recommendations that the electoral institute 
addressed to the television and radio concessionaires and managers in order to provide the 
audiences with balanced and fair information on the campaigns. The main criteria were:
□ To maintain an equitable transmission time for all the parties (as controlled through the 
following indicators: total time for each party, voice and images devoted to each party, 
importance of the news on each party, number of news reported on each party).
□ To present information with impartiality (as measured by the following indicators: 
kinds of comments on the news, type of judgements and interviews, and number of non- 
reported relevant facts).
□ To present the images and sounds of the candidates and their campaigns with uniformed 
technical quality (as measured through the kind and number of shots taken of the 
candidates, o f their meetings and other events and the quality of the sound presented).
Other criteria were also added, such as the right to reply, the presentation of the electoral 
campaigns in a special section of the news broadcasts, the need for the newscasters to 
specify whenever they were transmitting a paid information, the respect for the candidates’ 
private life, and so forth. Though the CIRT members were not legally compelled to follow- 
such suggestions, it became a matter of preserving their credibility in the media business, 
since the IFE, through the Commission for Broadcasting, was responsible for monitoring 
the most important news broadcasts on radio and TV in order to track the fulfilment of 
those criteria and the results were to be published. The important thing to note is that for the 
first time in Mexico the ways in which the media presented political information were to be 
induced under “impartial and objective” criteria. At least on paper, this represented the 
greatest “leap forward” for the emergence of open and independent electronic mass media. 
In the end, despite important advances, the outcome did not live up to such enthusiastic 
expectations.
On the positive side, it has to be mentioned that both Televisa and TV Azteca decided to 
open some spaces to political debate and to opposition parties. On July 7Ih 1994 Televisa
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invited the then nine presidential candidates to present their political manifestos on a fifteen 
minutes programme for each one. Televisa also offered to broadcast the programme on its 
four channels at different times, so that they could be seen by larger audiences. The 
candidates accepted the invitation.
In turn, TV Azteca invited them on August 8th, two weeks before the day o f the elections, 
on August 21st. TV Azteca offered a ten minute programme to each candidate. But maybe 
the most remarkable fact of the 1994 electoral campaigns on the media was the organisation 
on May 12th o f a live political debate by the CIRT-in a somewhat similar fashion to the 
U.S. debates between the Republican and the Democrat candidates—between the PRI, PAN 
and PRD presidential candidates. The day before, the debate between the candidates of the 
other six smaller parties had been transmitted. It must be acknowledged that for the first 
time, the closing o f the campaigns o f each o f the three largest parties’ candidates were also 
transmitted.
However, the way in which the political information was presented on the television during 
the 1994 campaigns remained strongly biased in favour of the PRI. Some important and 
pioneer studies will be cited next. The first study was elaborated by the Commission of 
Radio Broadcasting of the IFE between June 22nd and August 16:h 1994 as part o f its 
monitoring responsibilities and faculties. The outcomes may seen in Table 4.3 and Figure 
4 A  below.
As one notices, the time devoted to the official party was superior by far to the time 
dedicated to any other party. This figure becomes more shocking if ones takes into account 
the individual TV news broadcasts, as in Figure 4.A. The TV news broadcasts monitored 
were Televisa Channel 2: Al Despertar (7:00-10:00), 24 Horas (14:00-15:00), 24 Horas 
(22:30-23:30); Televisa Channel 9: Muchas Noticias (20:00-21:00); Televisa Channel 5: 
Punto por Punto (00:30-01:30) ; TV Azteca Channel 13: A Primera Hora (7:00-10:00), 
Hechos (21:30-22:30); Channel 11: Enlace (20:30-21:00); and Multivision MMD System61 
transmitting in Channel “AS” or NBC Para Usted (21:00-22:30).
61 In 1984 the entrepreneur Joaquin Vargas -owner of some radio stations and restaurants—received a 
concession to operate television using the Multipoint Directional System (MMDS) via microwaves. The 
pressure of Televisa -through its cable TV branch Cablevision—delayed the beginning of the operations of 
Varga’s project until September 1989. In 1993 his TV system had more than 250 thousand subscribers in the 
country, and by 1997 the figure rose up to 450 thousand. That year he received two more concessions to 
operate a MMD system in Guadalajara and Monterrey. He later obtained two more concession in 
Villahermosa and Merida. Between 1992 and 1995 he established important partnerships with United
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Table 4.3
Total Coverage of the Electoral Campaigns on TV News Broadcasts, June 22nd- 
______  _______  August 16'" 1994
PRI PRD PAN PT PVEM PDM PPS PFCRN PARM
Time for llh  34’ 7h 20’ 6h 7” 3h 6’ 3h2’ Ih 55’ lh 28’ lh 26’ lh i r
news 24” 43” 38” 55” 56” 55” 31” 50” 37”
Average 30.8% 19.5% 16.3% 9% 8.3% 5.1% 3.9% 3.9% f  3.2%
Source: IFE, Informe global sobre el monitoreo de noticiarios de radio y  televisión de ¡os lincamientos 
sugeridos por ¡a Comisión de Radiodifusión a la Camara Nacional de Radio y  Televisión. Wednesday 22nd of 
June to Tuesday 16* of August 1994.
Figure 4.A
Total Coverage Time of the Five Most important Parties’ Campaigns on TV News 
Broadcasts, June 22nd-August 16th 1994
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Source: IFE, Informe global sobre el monitoreo de noticiarios de radio y televisión de ¡os lincamientos 
sugeridos por la Comisión de Radiodifusión a la Camara Nacional de Radio y Televisión. Wednesday 22nd of 
June to Tuesday 16th of August 1994.
Also taking as its reference framework, the criteria presented by the IFE in February 1994, 
the Mexican Academy for Human Rights along with the NGO Civic Alliance decided to 
carry out the monitoring of ten relevant moments of the campaigns on Televisa’s 24 Hours 
(Channel 2, from 22:30 to 23:30) and TV Azteca’s Hechos (Channel 13 from 21:30 to
International Picture, Cablecinema of Venezuela, the Argentinian Cable Society, NBC, Spelling 
Entertainment, World Vision, Hughes Communications and TV Abril of Brazil. In 1996 he obtained 
permission to operate the satellite TV system known as Direct To Home Television or DTH. His main rivals 
are Cablevision -now with a large percentage of shares in the hands of the powerful Grupo Carso—and 
Televisa’s SKY, its alternative of DTH.
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22:30), their most important news broadcasts.62 In this study, from the time devoted to each 
party in the broadcasts, the PRI received 13 hours and 53 seconds, whereas the PAN 
received 5 hours and 32 minutes, and the PRD 5 hours and 29 minutes.
PRI candidate Zedillo also appeared the most on the screens directly explaining his ideas 
(45 percent of the time controlled for “Voice and image”), and his closest follower was 
PAN candidate Fernández de Cevallos with only 27 percent o f the time. As for the number 
of news items on the candidates, Zedillo was mentioned in 63 notes, Fernández de Cevallos 
in 37 and PRD candidate Cárdenas in 43. In 24 Hours Zedillo also received 12 positive 
opinion judgements, compared to one for Cárdenas and two for Fernández de Cevallos. The 
conclusions that Aguayo and Acosta derive from their study are the following,
In their covering of the presidential elections of 1994, the main news broadcasts of the Mexican 
television (Televisa’s 24 Horas and TV Azteca’s Hechos) completely ignored the recommendations 
made by the Federal Electoral Institute. Both with sophisticated and rough methods they favoured 
the candidates of the Revolutionary Institutional Party and undermined the image of their 
opponents, especially those of the PAN and the PRD (using also for such purposes a upgraded 
image of the candidates of the PVEM and the PT) The trend is so clear and consistent that it is 
hardly coincidental; it is, insfact, the outcome of a deliberate decision.63
A further study was carried out by the AMDH and Civic Alliance, this time focusing on an 
evaluation o f the content of the news presented on all the most relevant news broadcasts of 
the Mexican television.64 These broadcasts were: Televisa’s 24 Horas (Channel 2, from 
22:30 to 23:30), Al Despertar (Channel 2 from 7:00 to 10:00), and Muchas Noticias 
(Channel 9, from 20:00 to 21:00), TV Azteca’s Hechos (Channel 13 from 21:30 to 22:30), 
Channel 11 ’s Enlace (20:30 to 21:00) and Multivision’s Para listed (Channel “AS” or
62 These selected moments were: the nomination of Ernesto Zedillo as the PRI candidate (29th March), the 
debate between the three candidates (12th May), the meeting between Cárdenas and the Sub-Comandante 
Marcos ( 16th May), the visit of Zedillo to the National University, UNAM (24th May), the presentation of the 
economic project of Zedillo (6th June), the visit of Cárdenas to UNAM (8th June), the visit of Diego 
Fernández, the PAN’s candidate, to UNAM (15th June), the presentation of the economic project of Cárdenas 
(24th June), the meetings of the three candidates with the intellectuals that formed the San Angel Group (29,h 
June with the PAN, 14th July with the PRD, and 18th July with the PRI), and the closing day of the campaigns 
of each of the three candidates. In Sergio Aguayo Quezada and Miguel Acosta, Urnas y  pantallas. La batalla 
porla información, Mexico City, Ed. Océano/Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos, 1997, pgs.43-44.
63 Ibid., p.75.
64 “Análisis de contenido electoral de seis noticiarios de televisión. (18 de julio al 19 de agosto)”, in Miguel 
Acosta Vaiverde, Manuel Martínez Torres and Luz Paula Parra R. (coords.), Las elecciones de ¡994 en 
México vistas por los medios de comunicación. (¡8 de julio al 2 i de agosto), Mexico City, AMDH/Alianza 
Civica-Observación 94, 1995.
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NBC, from 21:00 to 22:30). The period studied was between July 18th to August 19th 
1994.65
Here I will only cite three relevant variables (out of the seven considered in the study) to 
show the bias in favour o f the PRL The first one is the share of the TV time each of the 
candidates received on the six news broadcasts out of a total time of 25 hours, 25 minutes 
and 57 seconds. On average, the time that the six broadcasts gave to the candidates was as 
follows: to the PRI candidate, Ernesto Zedillo, 29,2 percent; to the PAN’s candidate, Diego 
Fernández de Cevallos, 14,4 percent; to the PRD’s candidate, Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas, 19,7 
percent; to the PVEM’s candidate, Jorge González, 10,4 percent and to the rest of the 
parties 26 percent. As can be seen these averages are also highly coincident with the IFE 
monitoring between June 22nd and August 16th 1994, whose outcomes were cited above on 
Table 4.3. Figure 4.B shows the time devoted by each broadcast to the candidates as found 
by this study of the AMDH and Civic Alliance.
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Figure 4.B
Percentage of Time for Candidates on News Broadcasts, July 18lh-August 19th
□  Ernesto Zedillo 
B Diego Fernandez
□  Cuauhtemoc Cardenas 
□Jorge Gonzalez
B Other Candidates
Source: Elaborated with information provided by Valverde, Martinez Torres and Parra Rosales (1995), pes 
16-17.
All the news broadcasts gave Ernesto Zedillo more time than the rest of the candidates, and 
only in Televisa’s 24 Horas and Al Despertar the accumulated number of time given to the 
five smaller parties’ candidates surpassed the time given to Zedillo. However, there is one 
quite interesting factor to underline: the study of the AMDH and Civ ic Alliance reveals that
65 The news broadcasts Al Despertar and Muchas Noticias started to be studied since July 25* 1994.
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when taken into account the time devoted to each party, the one that obtained more time 
was the PRD, not the PRI, which means that though throughout the campaign the official 
party was the most favoured one in time (as Table 4.3 above shows), during the last month 
of the campaign more time was devoted to the PRD. Time averages for parties in the last 
month were as following: PRD, 34 percent; PRI, 19 percent; PAN, 12 percent; PVEM, 7 
percent, and the rest of the parties obtained 28 percent of the total time. Nevertheless, as 
will be shown below, this information presented on the PRD was usually qualified by 
negative judgements and tendencies. The other two variables that are shown here from the 
study AMDH and Civic Alliance are the “judgements given by newscasters and reporters”, 
and the “tendency in the treatment of the news”.
The judgements refer to the qualifying remarks given by newscasters and reporters while 
presenting the news (see Tables 4.4 and 4.5 below). The tendency in the treatment of news 
refers to the general position o f each news broadcast with respect to the candidates and 
parties as controlled by the number and kind o f images presented on each candidate/party 
and the adjectives used when referring to them (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7 below).
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Table 4.4
Percentage of Negative and Positive Judgements for Candidates on the News
Broadcasts
All Six News 
Broadcasts
Ernesto
Zedillo
Diego
Fernández
Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas
Jorge
González
Other
Candidates
Total
Percentages
Positive
Judgements
53,7% 12,1% 10,6% 5,3% 9,3% 100%
Negative
Judgements
5% 35% 30% 25% 5% 100%
Source: Elaborated with information from Valverde, Martinez Torres and Parra Rosales (1995), pgs.36.
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Table 4.5
Percentage of Negative and Positive Judgements for Parties on the News Broadcasts
All Six News 
Broadcasts
PRI PAN PRD PVEM Other Parties Total
Percentages
Positive
Judgements
35,2% 29,4% 35,2% 0% 0% 100%
Negative
Judgements
11,1% 11,1% 66,6% 11.1% 0% 100° «i
Source: Elaborated with information from Valverde, Martinez Torres and Parra Rosales (1995). p.57
Table 4.6
Percentage of Negative and Positive Tendencies for Candidates on the New s
Broadcasts
All Six News 
Broadcasts
Ernesto
Zedillo
Diego
Fernández
Cuauhtemoc
Cárdenas
Jorge
González
Other
Candidates
Total
Percentages
Positive
Tendency
66% 10% 9% 3% 12% 100%
Negative
Tendency
0% 29% .  56% 10% 5% . 100%
Source: Elaborated with information from Valvcrde, Martinez Torres and Parra Rosales (1995), p.38.
Table 4.7
Percentage of Negative and Positive Tendencies for Candidates on the New s
Broadcasts
All Six News 
Broadcasts
PRI PAN PRD PVEM Other Pames Total
Percentages
Positive
Tendency
48% 8% 16% 4% 24% 100%
Negative
Tendency
4,1% 25% 70,8% 0% 0% 100%
Source: Elaborated with information from Vaiverde, Martínez Torres and Parra Rosales (1995), p.39.
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As for the information presented on the main television channels on the day of the 
elections, August 21st 1994, the outcomes were as following:66
A) Channel 2 o f  Televisa: Focused on the “peaceful and ordered attendance to the ballots”. 
Also, the speeches of Ernesto Zedillo and Diego Fernández de Cevallos were 
transmitted in whole, but that of Cárdenas was edited and narrated by a reporter.
B) Channel 13 o f TV Azteca: Though it presented a special report on the nine candidates, 
the only speech they presented completely was that o f Zedillo. Cardenas’ and 
Fernández's were constantly interrupted.
C) Channel AS o f  Multivision: Announced the victory o f Zedillo, even before knowing the 
official results. The main anchorman o f this transmission, Pedro Ferriz de Con, 
discredited the PRD and its national leader, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo on several occasions.
D) Channel 11 (public channel): Commented on the atmosphere of peace that prevailed 
throughout the election day. Also stressed the high participation of the voters. It was the 
most professional coverage, since it tried to maintain a balanced treatment of events and 
did not present any conclusion until the official results were confirmed.
As may be seen, until 1994, in spite o f  the changes that had been taking place in the 
political arena, TV networks were not offering more adequate spaces for the expression of 
political pluralism. Was the regime's pressure over television the main obstacle to them 
becoming more open, or may one think that it was in the interest o f television to remain 
closed to alternative political expressions? By 1994, both the political conditions and the 
specific circumstances of television proved to be more supportive o f the second 
explanation. It is true that the legislation on radio and television (the LFRT of 1960 and the 
RLFRT of 1973), still remained quite ambiguous and there remains some legal precepts 
that the regime could interpret in its favour in order to control the media -like the 
cancellation o f  the concessions, or the closing of a station with any kind of technical 
pretext.67 It is also true that the regime still exercised certain forms of control especially on 
television programmes through the Secretariat of Gobernación, (in this sense, the role of 
the Director General of RTC during the Salinas administration, Manuel Villa, became
66 “Los medios y la jomada electoral (21 de agosto de 1994)’’, in Valverde, Martinez Torres and Parra Rosales 
(1995), pgs. 154-159.
6' See Chapter Two for an analysis of the LFRT of 1960 and the RLFRT of 1973.
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notorious due to his constant interfering with the concessionaires news broadcast policies, 
mainly on radio stations). However, by 1994 many things were already transforming the 
political and economic landscape in Mexico.
The years of largesse that were the basis of the coiporatist system wrere over with the crisis 
o f  the 1980s and more so with the Neo-Liberal policies o f the Salinas period. In this 
respect, public advertising, one of the essential indirect forms of support for the media, was 
reduced -except of course during electoral times. Though there are no figures to establish a 
comparison between what the government used to spend during electoral campaigns, a 
study on the cost of the political advertising during the 1994 electoral campaigns reveals 
that the PRI was, by far, the party that spent more and whose ads were transmitted at the 
highest rating time.68 Between July 11th and July 17th they only transmitted the ads of 
Ernesto Zedillo, who appeared exclusively at prime time and on other special programmes 
with the highest viewer ratings. A calculation of the cost of the PRI candidate’s ads 
comes to a sum of around $6,686,000.00 Mexican Pesos (around US$ 1,300,000.00). 
Between August 1st and August 11th two other parties appeared along with the PRI, the 
PAN and the Workers Party (PT). From the total number of ads, 187, the PRI inserted 141 
(75,4%), the PAN inserted 37 (19,8%) and the PT inserted 9 (4,8%). The total costs were 
the following: the PRI spent $16,874,000.00 Mexican Pesos, the PAN spent $4,374,000.00 
Mexican Pesos and the PT spent $961,000.00 Mexican Pesos. It is important to note that 
other organisations, like Televisa’s workers union, SITATyR, inserted extra ads in favour 
o f the PRI candidate whose cost was calculated to be $4,410,000.00 Mexican Pesos.69 
The cost for television expenditures during the 1994 electoral campaign, though high for 
the PRI, are not completely representative of the total amount of expenditure on publicity 
that the government was spending during the last years. In spite o f the lack of reliable 
figures on this topic, it is not absurd to think that the total investment in governmental 
publicity was reduced during the 1980s due to the crisis, but perhaps even more so because 
o f the privatisation of a large number of public enterprises that used to spend large sums of 
money on publicity. If in 1979 the State was the main client o f private television due to the
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68 “El costo de la propaganda política en los canales 2 de Televisa y 13 de Televisión Azteca (11 de julio al 11 
de agosto de 1994)”, in Valverde, Martínez Torres and Parra Rosales (1995), pgs.145-149.
69 lbid..% p. 148.
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publicity expenditures made by a huge public bureaucratic apparatus,70 by 1994 the entire 
governmental expenditure on publicity within the electronic media was still 47 percent, but 
this lowered to 40 percent in 1995.71 72
At the same time that the relative importance of State publicity decreased, the total 
investment of publicity on television rose. This means that the private sector allocated to 
this area larger sums of money that compensated the decrease of public investment in that 
area. In this way, the total share of publicity that was aimed at television, raised from 62 
percent in 1976 to 64 percent in 1990, to 66 percent in 1993 and to 74 percent in 1995.7: 
This means that television was relatively more independent from the government, in 
economic terms, so that the maintenance of strong loyalty to it was not due to its 
expenditure on advertising and publicity.
At the same time, the political opposition parties and some other civil organisations were 
pressing at different levels for the suppress o f  the constitutional freedoms of speech and of 
the press within the electronic media. Within such a situation o f the economic dismantling 
of the old corporatist system and political effervescence, many of the unwritten rules on 
which the regime was based, became more and more diffuse. Finally, it must be taken into 
account the fact that the main opposition parties, the PAN and the PRD, had been 
increasingly supported by the same social groups who formed the most important television 
audiences: the middle sectors. If all this is true, why then did television continue to remain 
supportive of the PRI against all apparent logic?
Careful observation would lead one to note that during the 1990s there was a subtle, but 
crucial change in the attitudes of the media entrepreneurs. Television was no longer 
supporting the regime as it had in the past, but was focusing its support more on the 
president. This was a subtle, but very important change. This attitude reached its climax 
with Carlos Salinas. The economic project o f  Salinas, based on a total support for private 
business and capital, was incompatible with the old structures on which the regime was 
based. With Salinas, the old nationalist and populist discourse and the corporatist logic of 
the policies were replaced by a decided emphasis on globalisation, economic
70 Thirty public enterprises led the list of the largest advertisers on private television (Bohmann, (1997), 
P-190).
71 “Inversión publicitaria en 1995", in El universo de la radio, México City, Vol.l, n.2, Summer 1995, p.69.
72 Table of publicity expenditures in Mexico elaborated by the Asociación Mexicana de Agendas de 
Publicidad.
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competitiveness, efficiency, integration and the like by the late 1980s. Even the PRI, with 
its corporatist structure, resulted more as “a barrier to modernisation” than a true aid 
(except for the fact that the technocracy still required that party pass reforms in Congress 
and act as an electoral tool to organise popular sectors).
The premise of the new model was simple: a small, but highly efficient government that 
could set the conditions for the private world to flourish and maintain economic growth. 
These attitudes were in accordance with the kind of social and economic expectations 
shared not only by a large number of urban middle sectors, but obviously also by the 
entrepreneurs. The backing of these sectors to the Salinas’ project o f modernisation became 
evident in the mid-term elections of 1991 in which the PRI recovered from the relative loss 
it suffered in 1988.
Nevertheless it must be emphasised that it was not support to the PRI and to what it 
traditionally symbolised (corporatism, pork-barrel politics, expanded bureaucracy, and, as a 
result, inefficiency), but to President Salinas and his new policies. The urban and modem 
social sector’s sympathies were directed more to the president -since it was clear that he 
was still the key figure in the political structure—, and less and less to the old corporatist 
regime. The high level of popularity of Salinas, 72 percent, is shown on the survey that the 
newspaper Reforma carried out in the main urban centres o f Mexico and published in 
October 30th 1994.
After years of populism and of “anti-entrepreneurial” discourses, the new ruling elite was 
openly and plainly supportive of the interests of the private businesses and capital. 
Therefore, if during previous decades there were few other real political alternatives to 
which to turn to for the big entrepreneurial groups, now that opposition was growing, it 
became unnecessary since the old regime apparatus was now led by a technocracy 
convinced of the benefits of economic liberalisation, of entrepreneurial values, and of the 
importance of private capital as the main locus for development. There was no need to 
change the formula by looking at opposition forces and parties. An example of this support 
to the Salinas’ project (and to the continuation of that project as represented by his 
successor, Ernesto Zedillo) were the declarations of the Asociación Mexicana de Bancos, 
(one o f the top entrepreneurial organisations) one week before the 1994 elections who
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stated that, “if  Zedillo does not win the elections, instability would reign in the country”.73 
More than a declaration, this was a clear warning from the bankers.
Television entrepreneurs were not alien to this sentiment and, therefore, though there had 
been changes in the political arena, television remained still loyal to the presidential figure 
-and only secondarily and indirectly to the PRI—who was still the most important factor in 
Mexican political life, the one who could still decide to whom the benefits and favours 
could be granted. An excellent example o f this was Salinas decision to give what would be 
the last “big” TV concession to Televisa in 1994 (Radiotelevisora de México Norte) for S 
295, 198,777 Mexican Pesos (equivalent to USD S 80 million at that time).74 In turn, the 
chairman of Televisa, made it very clear that his support lay with President Salinas (“I’m a 
Soldier of the President”), instead o f declaring his support to the PRI as in previous 
occasions.75
Therefore, the political liberalisation process that started in Mexico in the late 1970s was 
not reflected on television screens in 1994. Moreover, in spite of the creation of a nation­
wide public television network, these decades saw the transformation of Televisa as a 
virtual communications office o f the government on domestic political affairs and as a quite 
impressive public relations agency for the promotion of the presidential image. This was 
the outcome o f  the mutual support that Televisa had exchanged with the regime since the 
1970s and the joint interests that had started to appear more explicitly by the end of the 
1980s - a  time when opposition parties began to grow and strengthen in Mexico. However, 
there was no space for these alternative political voices on the television screens. The 
political liberalisation process that was being experienced in Mexico, and the growth of 
opposition parties, had thus only created the necessary conditions, but it was not sufficient 
for generating more plural and open television, as can be seen during the 1994 electoral 
process. Other forms of change -o f  an economic and financial nature—within the specific 
context o f television were required to launch television into openness.
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7-> La Jornada, August 13* 1994, front page.
74 This payment was based upon Article 110 of the Law of General Communication that enables the federal 
government to participate in the income of all communication enterprises when using the concessions 
received. This prerogative of the government had not been used before.
75 In Reforma, May 15th 1995.
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Chapter Five
The Initial Transition of Radio in Mexico, 1980s-1994
During the late 1980s some stations began to adapt new formats on radio programming, 
especially talk-radio news broadcasts where journalists were hired as newscasters and 
began to editorialise the news. Slowly, and at times still erratically, these changes in format 
gave way to more important changes in the contents of the news broadcasts in the early 
1990s. A slight openness could be found on the radio in the presentation of news, especially 
at election time. The presentation of the news on those programmes moved at times 
towards the boundary o f the regime’s tolerance of what could be presented in the media, 
and censorship measures were not infrequent when such boundaries were considered to be 
trespassed. Censorship ranged from “friendly” recommendations to modify the formats to 
more explicit demands for removing critical newscasters and journalists from the 
programmes.
Though such changes were still rare, it was possible to note already a process of openness 
on the radio that was unthinkable on television in those years. What are the motives that 
moved the radio towards a more independent and open presentation of political 
information? This chapter shows that those first steps towards independence and openness 
that could already be noted by the early 1990s on the radio and had their roots in two 
important changes that occurred during the previous decade: on the one hand, the wider 
adoption of innovative forms of broadcasting based on talk-radio formats (including the 
positive reaction that the people developed towards those programmes). These new changes 
in the formats were introduced at first by AM stations at a time when audiences began to 
prefer FM stations for music broadcastings. On the other hand, those initial changes in the 
formats slowly began to give wfay to changes -still rare and erratic—in the contents as well. 
Though the “discovery” that the concessionaires made of the need of the people for having 
some space in which they could participate and from which they could get some alternative 
information, (at a time when television was totally closed ) is important for further 
openness. Here I sustain that a better explanation is found on the competition among a 
growing number of stations within a stagnant publicity market, in a situation of continuous
economic instability and frequent crises (1982-1994). Before discussing these hypotheses, I 
would like to present a brief sketch o f the situation o f the radio in Mexico before the 1980s, 
noting some o f its main characteristics.
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In 1970 there were 603 radio stations in Mexico, of which 579 were classified as 
commercial radio stations and the other 24 as cultural or public stations. By 1994 there 
were 1,214 radio stations, of which 1,068 were commercial and 146 were classified as 
cultural or public.1 Contrary to television, where the limits o f ‘ V hat and how” to say things 
were defined for many years by one dominant private corporation through a decisively 
supportive policy towards the government, the limits on radio became more diffuse, since 
there were too many stations in quite different financial, regional and political situations in 
relation to the centre of power, symbolised by Mexico City.2 But what was the usual 
content of the radio transmissions?
During the 1920s and 1930s the programmes transmitted on the radio were direct and 
broadcast live. However, the high costs o f  production plus the technological advances made 
it more profitable for small stations to replace such programming with recorded 
programmes from Mexico City’s larger stations, such as the XEW and the XEQ. Recorded 
programmes acquired from Mexico City’s stations were also the only way for small 
provincial stations to have the opportunity to present some elaborate programmes or special 
shows hosted by well known presenters who invited famous singers and artists. Thus at the 
end of the 1950s, the production of live programmes was a business in which only the 
largest stations could profitably compete. Recorded programming became the dominant
1 The figures are taken from the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes, Dirección de Normas y 
Sistemas de Difusión, Informe de labores, 1989-1994, and from the reports of the CIRT. In many cases, the 
figures of the Secretariat of Communications do not coincide with the ones provided and published by the 
Chamber.
'  Though the heterogeneity of the radio in Mexico is quite notorious, since many important regions developed 
important radio groups that at times not only opposed to the radio policies elaborated by the large radio 
entrepreneurs from Mexico City, but also to certain governmental policies, this chapter only concentrates on 
the largest national radio groups that for practical purposes dictated and shaped the “radio policies" to be 
followed by most of the other small local radio concessionaires. For an interesting account on the position of 
some local radio broadcasters in relation to the "central radio power” as represented by Mexico City, see 
Fernandez Christlieb. (1997).
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format on radio broadcasts in the country during the following decades and the production 
of live original material became exceptional.3
But not all the recorded programmes came from the larger stations. Many stations reduced 
their operations costs even further by replacing the recorded programmes bought from 
larger stations with recorded music bought in the market. Soon the large majority o f radio 
stations -both large and small—opted to base their programming on recorded music 
broadcastings, thus reducing their personnel and their expenditures to the minimum. This 
sort of broadcasting was called “the California System”, where the broadcasters function 
was purely to present the melodies and songs followed by commercial breaks. With such an 
arrangement, many of the owners o f these small stations limited themselves to collecting 
their revenue without doing much more. However, since the best quality music programmes 
were still those transmitted from Mexico City’s stations, many small entrepreneurs with 
one or two stations found it lucrative to merge with radio networks -also dominated by 
Mexico City’s stations—that could provide them with both complete programming and 
advertising.
The merging of stations into networks homogenised the programming and concentrated the 
operation of the stations -though not the possession of the federal concessions—in very 
few hands. Groups such as RUMS A of Manuel Guillemont, Radio Programas de México of 
Clemente Sema, Radiodifusoras Associadas, S.A. of José Laris Iturbe, Grupo ACIR of 
Francisco Ibarra, or Radio Cadena Nacional of Rafael Cutberto Navarro controlled more 
than 60 percent of the radio stations. Thus, by the 1970s the large majority of radio stations 
were part of larger networks and the programming they transmitted was based essentially 
on recorded musical broadcasts.
This does not mean that the presentation of information was alien to Mexican radio. In fact 
news broadcasts have been transmitted on the radio since the late 1920s. The traditional 
formats of these news broadcasts consisted of reading some news from the printed press 
without any further comment or editing. More than being programmes, these news 
broadcasts were brief reports of no longer than fifteen minutes. Nevertheless, it was 1959 
when the first important “revolution” within radio news broadcasts took place. The XEOY- 
Radio Mil station made a new style o f radio presentation popular when it inaugurated the
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fifteen-minutes news programme “Radio Mil-Carta Blanca”, (later known as “Primera 
Plana”), in December o f that year. It was transmitted twice daily, at 7:30 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. 
from Monday to Friday (and at 8:30 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. on Saturday, Sunday and 
holidays’). Though the information presented on that broadcast was still taken from the 
newspapers -as  was the norm during those years— it added four innovative changes: it 
hired its own reporters to gather information, it adapted a brief format for presenting news 
resumes that could be repeated all day, it also opened, when required, a section to present 
special transmissions, like the President’s speech before Congress every September, and 
finally, it arranged agreements with important international press agencies in order to 
receive bulletins on foreign affairs.4
Nevertheless, it was the first and second innovation that gave Radio Mil greater prestige 
among other radio stations and groups: for the first time reporters were sent to different 
parts of the city “to report the news on the spot”. Radio Mil also assigned a permanent 
reporter to cover information directly related to the presidency, and moreover, it eventually 
sent journalists to cover important international events like the Vietnam War. This provided 
Radio Mil’s news broadcast a quick response to events and news.
In 1967 the already constituted Nucleo Radio Mil, as the corporate group was registered, 
decided to create the internal News Division of which “Primera Plana” remained as the 
pillar programme. The frequency of news reports was increased in all the stations of the 
group. These fifteen-minute transmissions started at 6:45 and were repeated every hour 
during the day until 24:45 in all the stations of the group (XEBS, XEOY, XEUR, XECO 
and XEPH).5 The main characteristics o f this news format were:
□ The importance given to the quantitative aspect of news presented, i.e. the number of 
news items as a synonym of quality of information.
□ The diversity o f news transmitted, which tended to be presented in very brief slots, 
information regarding both domestic and international events originating in politics, 
economics, and the social or cultural spheres.
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4 The international press agencies that provided the Mexican radio stations with news were: United Press 
International (UPI), Associated Press (AP), Agence France Press (AFP) and Latin Reuters. There were also 
two Mexican press agencies, INFORMEX and the public NOTIMEX.
s Gabriel Sosa Plata and Alberto Esquivel, Las mil y  una radios, Una historia, un análisis actual de la 
radiodifusión mexicana, Mexico City, McGraw-Hill, 1997, p.237.
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□ The presentation o f  information without any proper explanation o f the context and 
circumstances in which it originated. In this sense, the news broadcasts were only 
accounts and collections of “noticeable” facts without context.
This innovative model o f Núcleo Radio Mil -the quick, plain and brief reading of new s 
repeated every hour during the day—consolidated between 1970 and 1985 as the pattern to 
be followed by other radio news broadcasts, like those of Grupo ACIR, Organización Radio 
Centro and RPM. Almost three out of four stations inaugurated a new's broadcast shaped 
along those lines. In spite of this, the time devoted to news broadcasting still remained low 
in comparison to that dedicated to entertainment programmes. According to a 1984 study of 
574 radio stations on the AM band in all the 32 states of Mexico, three quarters of them 
transmitted on average eight news broadcasts per day, with an average time of transmission 
of 7.5 minutes each.6 This means that the stations devoted 58 minutes and 40 seconds a day 
to the transmission of news broadcasts, which is very low if one compares it with the time 
devoted to musical programmes (7.5 hours a day) or quiz shows (2.5 hours a day).7 In this 
way, by the beginning o f the 1980s radio broadcast time in Mexico was devoted far more to 
music programmes, and the transmission of information, on the other hand w as presented 
through brief, plain and heterogeneous collection of news reports, repeated throughout the 
day.
However, after the mid-1980s these ways of producing radio shows in Mexico were 
modified yet again. The reasons were, on the one hand, the wider adoption of innovative 
forms of broadcasting based on talk-radio formats, and also the positive reaction of the 
people to those programmes. These new changes in the formats were introduced at first by 
AM stations at a time when audiences began to prefer FM stations for music broadcastings. 
On the other hand, those initial changes in the formats slowly began to give way to changes 
in the contents as well. This change has to do not only with the “discovery” that the
6 Serafina Llano and Óscar Morales, La radiodifusión en México, Mexico City, Comunicación. Tecnología e 
Investigación, S.C., 1984, p. 151.
7 Ibid., p. 154. According to the same study, three quarters of the stations in 1984 did not transmit any 
programme of debates or comments on public matters, and those who did transmit them devoted on average 
48 minutes a day to such programmes. Nevertheless, the transmission of news broadcasts was economically 
profitable since the insertion of ads during their transmission had usually an additional cost of thirty percent 
on the regular price (Alma Rosa Alva de la Selva. Radio e ideología. Third edition. Mexico City. Ed. El
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concessionaires made of the need o f  the people to have some spaces in which to be heard 
and from which they could get some alternative information, (at a time when television was 
totally closed ), but most importantly to the competition among a growing number o f  
stations in a decreasing publicity market.
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A change in the formats
The displacement o f AM stations by FM stations caused by the preferences of the 
audiences for music broadcastings, is crucial for understanding the adoption of talk-radio 
formats on the AM band stations. Until the late 1960s the development o f  FM radio was 
still very poor and not very popular, since very few radios had the capacity to receive its 
frequency, and the ones that could were much more expensive.8 The slow growth in the 
number of FM stations contrasted with the rapid growth of AM stations in those same years 
(Table 5.1). Consequently, the announcers were not very interested in investing money 
therein.9 This was problematic for the FM radio concessionaires, who then decided to 
launch a strong campaign to promote that frequency.
Caballito, 1986, p.88). This was all the more profitable if one takes into account that almost the same news 
report was presented on air again and again throughout the day.
8 At the beginning of the 1950s the FM frequency band was inaugurated for commercial purposes. This band 
transmits today between 88 and 108 Megahertz (AM band was located between 535 and 1605 Kilohertz, but 
at the end of the 1980s it was expanded up to the 1705 Kilohertz). Though the quality of the sound 
transmission is much better than that of the AM band, for many years the FM band was not very popular. In 
May 1952 the first FM radio station in Mexico City, XHFM Radio Joya, began operations. Shortly 
afterwards, there appeared some other FM stations such as XEOY-FM, o f Radio Mil (1957), XET FM in 
Monterrey (1957), XEQ-FM of Mr. Azcárraga (1957), XERPM-FM, of RPM (1959) and XEHMLS-FM in 
Matamoros (1960).
9 Femando Mejia Barquera, La industria de la radio y  ¡a televisión y  la política del Estado mexicano, Thesis, 
FCPyS, UNAM, Mexico City, 1982, p.701.
161
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero. .Chapter Five
Table 5.1
Growth of AM and FM Commercial Radio Stations, 1960-1969
Year AM Band FM Band Total*
1960 352 10 369
1961 370 10 398
1962 389 14 424
1963 401 19 442
1964 441 25 488
1965 450 27 501
1966 458 31 513
1967 476 35 535
1968 486 41 551
1969 505 49 579
* This figure considers also short wave commercial stations
Source; Secretariat of Communications and Transports, General Direction o f Concessions and Permissions, 
Department of Statistics, Yearbook, 1970.
In May 1970 the Association of FM Radio Broadcasters was created out of the initiative of 
Joaquin Vargas (owner of Stereo Rey), Francisco Sánchez Campuzano (owner of Estereo 
Mi!) and Salvador Arreguin (owner of Radio Imagen), amongst others. The aim o f the 
Association was to convince the announcers to advertise on these stations in order to 
popularise the frequency. They argued that the FM band permitted clearer sound quality 
transmissions, which was better for music and concerts. At the same time, they negotiated a 
reduction on the prices of AM-FM radios with the retailers.
These efforts finally developed into positive outcomes, since between 1969 and 1982 the 
number of FM stations increased from 49 to 176, but the total number of commercial 
adverts transmitted on this frequency almost matched the number of adverts on AM, in 
spite of having more than three times the number of stations (624). Moreover, despite the 
fact that in 1980 Mexico City audiences preferred AM stations by a ratio of almost 4:1 (77 
percent against 23percent) over FM stations, by 1985, only five years later, these 
preferences had almost reversed: 35.1% still preferred AM, while 64.9% went for FM.10
10 Data taken from the monthly reports elaborated by the International Research de México, S. A. on audiences 
on broadcasting media. The data of 1980 correspond to the average audiences of FM and AM stations 
reported in: Mediometro Radio. Ciudad de México, INRA, January to December 1980. And the data of 1985
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As said before, the dominant programming on Mexican radio was (and still is today) music 
broadcastings. A reason for the rapid growth in the popularity of the FM was that the 
audiences, (and the announcers, o f  course) soon noted the higher quality of the 
stereophonic sound -simultaneous transmission on two channels—which was more suitable 
for music programming at a time when technology in radio devices not only reduced the 
costs of the sets equipped with FM band, but also created a new generation of radio gadgets 
like the “Walkman”, and more sophisticated home and car stereos.
In brief, technological advances reduced the prices and made the acquisition of FM and 
double band radio sets more accessible, which created a better quality of audio for similar 
prices to AM radio sets. The 1980s witnessed the explosive growth of FM radio stations 
which concentrated their programming on music (Table 5.2).
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Table 5.2
Growth of AM and FM Commercial Stations, 1984-1994
Year AM Band FM Band Total*
1984 634 183 837
1985 636 185 839
1986 645 189 852
1987 653 195 866
1988 654 197 869
1989 673 214 898
1990 690 249 950
1991 700 267 974
1992 705 294 1006
1993 717 314 1037
1994 729 334 1068
* This figure includes commercial short wave stations.
Source: Secretariat of Communications and Transports, General Direction of Norms and Communications 
Control, Office o f Statistics and Information, Yearbook 1995.
correspond also to the average audiences reported on FM and AM stations in Mexico City in: Mediometro 
Radio. Ciudad de México, INRA, January to December 1985. These data were provided by Luis Mereader. 
General Director of INRA de Mexico, S. A. de C.V.
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The preferences of the audiences and, obviously, of the announcers and publicity agencies 
for FM, at least in the urban centres, seriously challenged the AM stations. They could not 
maintain the same programming offer as FM radio stations since it became evident that at 
equal prices people would prefer to have quality sound to enjoy musical transmissions. The 
audiences’ preference for FM was followed by that of the announcers’. Therefore, some 
stations started to innovate the formats o f their programming and the kind of transmissions 
they presented. If they could not compete with music, they could certainly explore the 
possibility of presenting attractive transmissions that did not require high audio quality. 
One option that proved to be successful was talk-radio.
Many AM stations started to adapt different kinds of live transmissions that already existed 
on the radio, but that were still marginal. The contents of such programmes ranged from 
housekeeping to football, and many o f them opened their phone lines to audience 
participation. People started to react positively to these changes in formats, since they were 
eager to have spaces where in they could feel they were being listened to and in which they 
too could have a voice. For instance, an individual who called up a programme in which the 
discussion dealt with education, might very well end up complaining about government 
corruption and inefficiency.11 In a country with a very low level o f readership (see Chapter 
One) and at a time when television was completely closed to any alternative voice and for 
any form of audience participation, these few spaces on the radio were very important, and 
the people responded with enthusiasm. These forms of transmissions became so popular 
that by 1990 AM band stations had recovered 44,5 percent of the audiences in Mexico 
C ity.’2
O f course, most of these programmes dealt with aspects of daily life and topics that could 
not be easily linked to broader discussions on politics or public life. However, there were a 
few other programmes whose subjects could be turned into more political issues. Many of 
these kinds of programmes, with their growing popularity, found it more and more difficult 
to remain on air. This was the case, for instance, with the programmes hosted and 
conducted by the journalists Francisco Huerta, who has had experience on these kind of 12
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11 Interview with Roberto Ordorica, February 2001, State of Mexico.
12 .Mediometro Radio. Ciudad de México, INRA, January to December 1990.
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talk-radio programmes since the late 1970s with a programme called “Public Opinion” -a  
programme that was finally banned in 1982.13
After the closedown of “Public Opinion” he returned to the radio at the beginning of the 
administration of President De la Madrid. The new programme was called “Public Voice” 
(Voz pública) and kept the talk radio format. However, the condition that XEX Radio (of 
Televisa) put to Huerta for broadcasting was to previously record the programmes -in order 
to have a better control over its content—and to avoid live broadcasting. Even this much 
more controlled format resulted to be “excessive for the President’s taste” and it was 
censored as well. Huerta’s final work on radio began in 1984 with the programme “Guilty
13 In September 1976 he launched a quite innovative radio programme called “Public Opinion” (Opinión 
pública) on ABC Radio property of the entrepreneur Carlos FeiTáez. His original idea was to make a 
programme which could offer a space for the people to call and discuss matters related to market consumption 
of diverse goods and services, so the consumers could express their opinion about the quality, the price, the 
advantages or disadvantages about different items. However, the people staned to call to complain about the 
government and to show their irritation against President Echeverría due to the recent devaluation of the 
currency (August 30th 1976) after more than two decades of exchange rate stability.
The first pressure to cancel the programme came from the Radio and Television Industry Workers Union 
(STIRT). Its Secretary General, Nezahualcóyotl De la Vega (who shortly after became a PRI federal deputy) 
started to complain about Huerta’s conduction of the programme and argued that the journalist was not a 
member of the union and, therefore, he needed a “permission letter” to continue with his work before the 
microphones. Naturally, the letter depended on De la Vega’s good will. After some time Huerta finally 
obtained it due to the intervention of Ferráez, who as all concessionaires had to offer certain benefits to the 
union -like regular monetary contributions or*working posts to individuals who, independently of their 
ability, were “recommended” from its leaders— in order to avoid problems with it. Besides, Huerta had to 
regularly pay to the union a fee “for occupying the post that should be given to a union member”.
The programme’s popularity grew and also the pressures over it, but Ferráez decided to maintain it due to the 
financial difficulties of the station, which had gone into bankruptcy. Between 1977 and 1978, Mexico City’s 
Major, Carlos Hank González, was implementing a huge urban project in order to open wider streets and 
avenues in the city. This project was carried out with little consideration for the neighbourhoods’ urban 
characteristics and without the possibility for their inhabitants to do anything about it. “Public Opinion” 
became a sort of forum for complaints and the government’s pressure increased to prevent any further airing 
of the spaces for citizens’ opinions. Huerta recalls one occasion when “a certain guy named Riva Palacio, who 
was a collaborator of Hank González”, called to the station and said to the manager: “Tell that bastard.
Huerta, to stop it, because he cannot keep on doing this to the Professor” -as Hank González was known 
(Francisco Huerta, Crónica del periodismo civil. La voz del ciudadano, Mexico City, Grijalbo, 1997, pi 13). 
The threats continued and at the beginning of 1982 a new Chief of Social Communication of the Presidency 
entered office, Francisco Galindo Ochoa, a person known by his intolerance towards the media and famous in 
the journalistic circles for "having the money on one hand and a gun on the other” (Ibid., p.128).
Galindo Ochoa exercised more pressure over the programme than anyone else, and in a concerted effort with 
De la Vega decided to close down the programme definitively in August 1982. On the IQ1* of that month two 
union bodyguards prevented Huerta from entering the station. Soon afterwards the station was sold to Mario 
Vázquez Raña, a close friend of Echeverría and the president of the Mexican Olympic Committee for more 
than twenty years. Huerta visited him in order to see if his programme could be restored and the answer was 
clear: “You will not return to the radio, Mr. Huerta; your programme was highly unpleasant for Mr. President 
and he told me so. So, you’d better stop thinking of coming back” (Ibid, p. 131).
The complete narration of the story can be consulted in Francisco Huerta, Mordaza a la opinión pública, 
Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1986; along with his interview by Leticia Singer in her book Mordaza de papel, 
Mexico City, Ed. El Caballito, 1993.
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or Innocent?” that discussed the state of justice in Mexico, the condition of the prisoners, 
the practice o f torture by the police, and the various irregularities that usually accompanied 
the implementation o f legal procedures. Threats and warnings started immediately, but the 
programme survived for some years. In 1990, when “the programme was having important 
audience figures and the station started to receive telephone calls from Human Rights 
NGOs, Francisco Huerta was definitively vetoed from the Mexican radio”.14 
Experiences such as this made the radio in the 1980s a relatively more dynamic and 
innovative electronic media than TV, though not necessarily because the radio wanted to 
become a space for political freedom, but because these few spaces had never existed 
before on radio. The existence of these spaces was not the conscious outcome of the 
concessionaires convictions, but only the timid and cautious attempts of some entrepreneurs 
who wanted to raise the ratings and who hoped that the large number of radio stations 
would help them to be less vulnerable to censorship than other forms of media.
The adoption of talk-radio formats was later extended to the news broadcasts. Actually, a 
successful pioneer in these kind of transmissions was the news transmission of Radio 
Programas de Mexico (RPM), Monitor, conducted by the journalist José Gutiérrez Vivó. 
The Monitor news project started in 1973 initiated by a group of people among w hich there 
was Roberto Ordorica, who became the General Manager of the station XERED that later 
transmitted the news broadcast.15 According to Ordorica two important things must be 
taken into account for explaining the increasing importance of Monitor during the 1970s
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14 Singer (1993), p.128.
15 In 1973 RPM acquired some radio stations from Radio Cadena Nacional (RCN) belonging to Rafael 
Cutberto Navarro, among which there was XERCN, a station located in Mexico City, and shortly afterwards 
renamed XERED. The idea of Ordorica, who became the manager of the station, and of its collaborators was 
to develop a talk radio similar to the one of Radio VIP, a station with a permission to transmit in English. 
However, XERED was to transmit in Spanish and its transmissions wtre to be re-transmined in other stations 
in the provinces. The news broadcasts was called Monitor. It started its transmissions in 1974. Jose Gutierrez 
Vivo -who had worked in Radio VIP—replaced Mario Ivan Martinez as newscaster. Monitor was transmitted 
three times a day with a duration of between I ’/i-2 hours.
By the end of the 1970s Radio VIP was moved from the AM band to the FM band in order to activate a 
concession given by the government on the 88.1 MHz. In the 1980s Radio VIP changed its name into 
XHRED-FM and transmitted Monitor on FM. At that time Gutierrez Vivo adopted another innovation on the 
news broadcast: he started to travel with some other journalists and reporters to present his programme live 
from different countries. While broadcasting Monitor he would also tell the audiences about the costumes, the 
art, the ways of life of other countries and peoples. This feature offered Monitor's audiences a surplus of 
information that other news broadcasts did not have (Interview with Roberto Ordorica. actual owner and 
Director General of the radio station “La ‘I’ de Ixtapan" [14000 khz] of Ixtapan de la Sal. State of Mexico, on 
February 2001).
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and 1980s: Firstly, the high professional standards attained by the broadcast’s personnel.16 *
Key to this was the policy of its newscaster to always refuse to use those spaces for 
supporting politicians and to never accepting any sort o f “gifts and other compensations” 
from them. Though Gutierrez Vivo was never radical, he nevertheless maintained a honest 
attitude to his work by not entering into dealings with interests alien to journalism, which 
made criticisms o f the government appear to be founded on purely professional grounds. 
On the other hand, the fact that it was the first radio station to invest a huge amount of 
money in its facilities, news services and buildings, served also to give prestige to the 
station and make it attractive for politicians and important business people to accept the 
invitations to the studios.57
But if Monitor was the most successful model on talk-radio formats for news broadcasts, a 
further incentive for the adoption of such a model was provided by the dramatic situation 
caused by the September 1985 Earthquake in Mexico City. At 7:20 on the morning of 
September 19th 1985 an earthquake reaching 8.1 degrees on the Richter Scale shook 
Mexico City, causing one of the most devastating tragedies in the history of the country.18 
Though in general terms the media were basically under-prepared both in resources and in 
technology to face such an event, the radio reacted quickly, opening its spaces for the 
transmission o f information about the situation in the city and organising the collection of 
aid, resources, clothes, medicines, and food. The radio helped to keep a constant 
communication with the rest o f the country.19 Radio stations kept their airwaves open for
16 The managers and news personnel of Monitor were constantly travelling to American and Canadian cities 
to leam and adopt the latest developments on talk-radio broadcasting.
1 ' The original studios of XERED were located in the Plaza de la República in Mexico City. Then they were 
moved to Reforma Avenue along with the headquarters of Radio VIP. However, the small space that ¿íe two 
stations shared was considered to be at odds with the development of a modem radio station* Therefore in 
1980-1 there were inaugurated the new studio of XERED in the southern neighbourhood of San Jerónimo. 
There was the explicit intention of making of the facilities of the San Jerónimo studios the most impressive 
and modem ones that any radio station had {from satellite communications and helicopters pons to powerful 
electric transmitters). These facilities contrasted greatly with the usual “small cabin concept” of the radio in 
Mexico. With such facilities, the news broadcast started to extend invitations to top level entrepreneurs and 
politicians, including the president, for being interviewed live on the studios, something that they very seldom 
accepted. All this made of Monitor the most important news broadcast by the mid-1980s, and its long 
transmission live format became the model of many other news broadcasts on the radio.
18 The earthquake had a duration of 120 seconds and its effects caused more than 10 thousand casualties,
5,500 disappeared persons, 7,000 wounded persons, serious damages in 6,000 buildings and houses, 137 
schools, 11 hospitals and 97 theatres. More than 35 thousand people could not return to their houses and flats, 
around 100 thousand persons lost their employment and more than 6 million inhabitants could not be 
provided with water and 4 million with electricity. The damage was calculated in US $ 5,000 million.
19 Sosa Plata and Esquivel (1997), p.244.
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those citizens who wanted to communicate with their relatives, for the authorities to give 
messages related to public security and health measures, and for channelling various aid 
efforts to the places where they were required. Many stations, like those of Nucleo Radio 
Mil, the XEW of Televisa, and Radio Red of RPM maintained an almost continued social 
service transmission throughout the 19Ih and 20th of September. As one scholar notices,
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From those moments on [the earthquake], the sumring media... reacted and radically altered, for 
some days, their tendencies and the logic of production of the traditional mass culture of Mexico 
City's Valley. There was no time for waiting for international aid, nor to carefully design a 
meditated project of information transmission, and therefore, under such radical circumstances the 
mass media improvised a disordered and, at times contradictory, but useful programme of social 
help... A social project abruptly emerged on the media and drastically buried the other cultural 
logic [based on capital accumulation, consciousness atomisation and reality dissimulation] that only 
half an hour before they were promoting. The media recovered the only sense through which they 
can be justified in the country: their high social character,20
The impact of the earthquake on the radio was shocking and it helped to give a very 
important impulse for adopting the Monitor model for other newfs broadcasts, since it was 
discovered that long live transmissions could be attractive if the adequate format was 
adopted. Longer news broadcasts were definitively included on radio. Some radio 
organisations, like Radio Mil and ACIR started to produce news broadcasts of half an hour. 
The old readership o f news was complemented with special reports on specific topics, 
interviews with public figures and editorial comments on news, w'hich became a highly 
important part of the broadcasts.21 All these changes are condensed in the words of two 
experts,
For many, radio was “re-discovered" from those moments. It realised that, contrary to television, it 
could provide a more efficient service during these kind of events and it could offer a more 
complete information coverage. But these changes were not for free, since the concessionaires knew' 
that only with a change of this nature they would have larger audiences and would face the 
competition of other information technologies that had been rapidly grow ing in the last years. To 
take advantage of such situation was the disjunctive, and they did it.
The long duration news broadcasts started then to emerge in Mexico City’s radio stations and 
competition between them took place. The amount of resources invested and spent was enormous: 
cell phones, cars and motorbikes, helicopters, computers and the use of satellite communications
20 Javier Esteinou Madrid, “Los medios de comunicación y los terremotos de 1985”, in Revista Mexicana de 
Comunicación, no.8, November-December 1989, p.34.
21 Though these formats were firstly introduced by the news broadcast Monitor in Radio Red, part of Radio 
Programas de México (which belongs to Clemente Sema), since the mid-1970s, their popularisation only 
began after the second half of the 1980s.
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technology. At the same time, many well-known television journalists and anchormen were hired, 
who were supported by larger of editors, reporters and domestic and foreign press correspondents.22
The adoption o f long talk-radio formats on the news broadcasts proved successful as 
reflected in the increasing advertising tariffs in these programmes. For instance, in 1988 
Radio Mil charged an additional 40 percent more than the regular tariffs for inserting ads 
just “before, after or during news broadcasts or other special events” and ACIR charged an 
additional 30 percent for ads during news broadcast time.23 RPM charged a substantial 
amount for ads in Monitor. The regular tariff for a 10 second advert transmitted for five 
days in regular programming cost $28,000 Mexican Pesos, but the equivalent 10 second 
spot in Monitor was raised to S 92,000 Mexican Pesos time.24
However, one should not confuse these profitable and attractive changes in the formats with 
the more open contents of the news broadcasts. These innovations in the way of presenting 
the news did not necessarily mean that such information was more complete, unbiased and 
relatively objective on domestic political affairs. In October 1986 José Luis Gutiérrez 
Espindola and María P. Lobato carried out a content study on the six most important news 
broadcasts in Mexico City, all o f which were produced by some of the largest national radio 
networks and were transmitted beyond the capital city.25 The period studied was between 
October 13th and 17th, 1986, and the news broadcasts selected were:
□ Notisistema, from 20:00 to 20:16 hours. A news service transmitted in different 
stations in Mexico City.
□ Noticentro o f  Organización Radio Centro, from 21:00 to 21:14 hours.
□ Nucleonoticias o f Núcleo Radio Mil, from 21:00 to 21:30 hours.
□ Radiocomunicación Humana of Grupo ACIR, from 21:30 to 22:00 hours.
□ Monitor o f Radio Red, which was part o f Radio Programas de México, from 18:00 to 
19:30 hours.
□ Radio Educación, from 21:30 to 22:00 hours. This is a public radio station operated by 
the IMER and transmitted through more than 10 universities’ radio stations nationwide.
22 Sosa Plata and Esquivel (1997), p.245.
23 Medios Audio-Yisuales, No. 118-2. Mexico City: Medios Publicitarios Mexicanos, S.A. de C.V.. June 
1988, pgs77 and 80-84.
24 Ibid., p.80.
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The following Table 5.3 shows the time and average length of notes transmitted in the six 
news broadcasts considered in the study.
Table 5.3
Time and Average Duration of News Transmitted on Six News Broadcasts, October
13th-October 17th 1986
News broadcasts Total duration of 
news broadcasts
Average of notes 
presented at the 
initial resume
Average of news 
presented by 
edition
Average of time 
per note presented
Radio
Comunicación 
Humana ACIR
30 minutes 8 36 50 seconds
Nucleonoticias
NRM
30 minutes 8 24 74 seconds
Radio Educación 30 minutes 7 30 60 seconds
Noticentro 14 minutes 4 25 34 seconds
Notisistema 16 minutes 5 17 57 seconds
Monitor 90 minutes 6 21 257 seconds
Source: Espindola and Lobato (1989), p.159.
The news broadcast that devoted more time to each note was Monitor. Four other news 
broadcasts had specific editorial sections, ACIR, NRM, Radio Educación and Noticentro. 
In each of them the average time of the editorials is between one and a half and two 
minutes, and the topics of these comments are usually quite general ranging from domestic 
to international politics and economics. As for the subjects treated in these broadcasts, the 
study divides them into four categories: news from Mexico City, news from the states of 
Mexico, worldwide news that affects Mexico, and other international news (Table 5.4). 
Radio Educación present most of its information on political and economic issues, both 
domestic and international. On international issues it devotes more coverage to news 
originating in other Latin American countries and the overall tone, of this news, is 
decisively anti-imperialist and sympathises with Left-wing approaches. Notisistema gives 
preference to sports news, which comprises 40 percent of its information material, followed 
by news from Mexico City and international news. Noticentro, ACIR and NRM gives 
importance to news from Mexico City and to international information, though the sport 25
25 J.L. Gutiérrez Espindola and M.P. Lobato, “Información radiofónica: el mundo en tres minutos”, in María 
Antonieta Rebeil Corella, Alma Rosa Alva de la Selva and Ignacio Rodríguez Zárate (coords.). Perfiles del
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section is quite relevant in these transmissions. Monitor is one station that places more 
importance than the other stations on Mexico City news, disproportionately followed by 
international information.
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Table 5.4
News Topics on Each News Broadcast
News broadcasts News from 
Mexico City
News from 
other states
Foreign news 
with impact on 
Mexico
International
news
Average of 
notes by edition
Radio
Comunicación 
Humana ACIR
17 2 2 9 36
Nucleonoticias
NRM
13 2 1 4 24
Radio Educación 10 3 3 14 30
Noticentro 10 1 2 5 25
Notisistema 6 1 1 3 17
Monitor 14 1 1 3 21
Source: Espindola and Lobato (1989), p.159.
The content of the news presented in these broadcasts was characterised, according to the 
study, by the following aspects. Discontinuity, since the information broadcasted did not 
present the tracking of processes, but only limited itself to giving “an account o f actual 
noticeable facts”. Dispersion, since even the information presented resulted as being 
fragmentary and partial about the facts. Excessive centralisation, since most of the news 
transmitted originated in Mexico City. In this sense, it is important to notice the almost total 
absence o f news from the rest of the country. And finally, the information provided on 
domestic political and economic matters, tended to be highly supportive o f  governmental 
official positions and, paradoxically, (except for Radio Educación), political opposition 
organisations were practically excluded, which showed a low level of pluralism in these 
news broadcasts.26
In this way, while in the 1980s there began an important change in radio broadcasting 
formats, which at times opened spaces for audience participation and began to present 
information in newer and more innovative forms, the contents of the majority o f these
cuadrante. Experiencias de la radio, Mexico City, Ed. Trillas, 1989.
26 Ibid.y p.162.
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programmes -especially the news broadcasts’—remained nonetheless behind the 
informational needs o f a modem society. Although, the formats were highly innovative, the 
contents of many news broadcasts were still restricted on certain matters. One reason for 
this, as will be shown below, was that whenever these programmes dared to trespass the 
“accepted levels” o f criticism, the response of the regime was to censor their contents or to 
veto certain newscasters. However, censorship would not be a sufficient obstacle to prevent 
a gradual openness with regard to contents, when strong economic motives of competition 
emerged, which were similar, though more critical, than those that had originally motivated 
the adoption of new formats.
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The first steps towards content changes on the radio
In a country historically characterised for an extremely low level o f  readership, it was clear 
that the printed press was not going to become the place where the population would seek 
information. In Mexico City, perhaps the largest city in the world, there only around 400 
thousand newspaper issues are sold per day.27 Though it is very difficult to calculate the 
actual number of readers, since the newspapers very seldom declare their true circulation, it 
is possible to come to the conclusion that it must be very low in relation to the total 
population (see footnote 61 in Chapter One). The importance of the printed press lies in the 
fact that it has been the political and economic elite and the upper and educated middle 
classes who compose its regular readership; quantitatively low in number, but qualitatively 
a crucial population. This is why the printed press in Mexico, more than being a channel of 
transmission of news, has been a channel for mediating information and interests among 
important political and economic groups. This elitist character o f the printed press leaves 
radio as the only popular and widespread media where people could find information.
In 1985, in Mexico City there were only 6 million radio sets in homes plus 2,7 million in 
cars.28 It is calculated that radio’s actual penetration reaches almost 90 percent of the
27 Raúl Trejo Delarbre, Ver, pero también leer, México City, Instituto Nacional del Consumidor, 1991, p.28.
28 Estudio de hábitos, sintonía de radio y  consumo en el Distrito Federal, Asociación de Radiodifusores del 
Distrito Federal, México City, May 1985.
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population in Mexico.29 The audience of the news broadcasts reflects a plural social 
composition, since 35 percent o f it is composed o f what is called A/B Audience, i.e. upper 
and middle-upper classes; 29 percent is composed o f C Audience, i.e. middle classes; and 
36 percent is composed of D Audience, i.e. lower classes.30 Under these circumstances it 
was not difficult to see why radio was the most popular form of media and the information 
that it transmitted was, if not necessarily more widely heard, at least more accessible to the 
majority of the population than that printed in the press.
As noted, some radio concessionaires discovered that talk-radio programmes could be a 
quite profitable business, but there were still many others who preferred a more cautious 
approach and kept themselves on good terms with the government officials in charge o f 
supervising radio and TV transmissions. However, in contrast to television the radio offered 
certain spaces where some alternative information could be found. Though these spaces 
were evidently not in the majority on radio, the information presented on the 1988 electoral 
process shows more openness than the TV screens.
One o f  the extremely few studies on the role o f  the radio during the 1988 electoral 
campaigns is the one that the one time Centro Internacional de Investigación Política y  
Desarrollo, A.C. carried out between October 1987 and May 1988.31 A content analysis 
was made of the information provided by the most important news broadcasts in Mexico 
City: Radio Comunicación Humana o f Grupo A CIR, Monitor of Radio Red-RPM, 
Noticentro o f Organización Radio Centro, Nucleonoticias o f Núcleo Radio Mil and the 
news broadcast of Radio Educación. Basically the same news broadcasts which served as 
the basis of the work of Gutiérrez Espindola and Lobato Pérez, above mentioned. Although 
as mentioned, the radio concessionaires gave their support to Carlos Salinas, the spaces for 
opposition were greater and more accessible than on television (Figure 5.A ).
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29 In 1995, there were calculated in México 15,218,821 homes with radios, which meant an audience of 
76,687,163 inhabitants. In “La Radio Mexicana en Cifras”, El univeno de la radio, Vol.l, n.3. Fall. Mexico 
City. 1995, pgs.102-103.
30 “Los pûblicos de la radio”, in El universo de la radio, vol.3, n.4,Winter-Spring, Mexico City 1997, pgs.24- 
25, as reported by information provided by Nielsen, Co.
31 This work is cited by Sosa Plata and Esquivel (1997), pgs. 250-253.
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Figure 5. A
Time for Candidates and Parties on Radio and TV News Broadcasts during the 1988
Electoral Campaign
□Television
Broadcasts
B  Radio Broadcasts
Source: For TV calculated with the data provided by Arredondo Ramirez (1990), pgs.61,67, 71 and 72. And 
for radio, calculated with the data provided by the CIIPDAC.
According to the information presented on Chapter Four, the time that the TV news 
broadcasts 24 Horas o f Televisa and Dia a Dia of IMEVISION devoted to the PRI and its 
candidate during the electoral campaign was 83.14 percent of the total time that these 
broadcasts devoted to the presentation o f information on the campaigns. In contrast, they 
only gave opposition parties 7.49 percent o f this time, and with the remaining 9.37 percent 
they presented other information related to the campaigns, but not directly linked to the 
parties. There was no doubt about the complete support and promotion that television gave 
to the official party’s candidate Carlos Salinas.
In one notorious contrast, the spaces devoted on radio broadcasts to information about the 
parties and their candidates in the 1988 electoral process were as follows: 57.72 percent for 
the PRI and its candidate, 27 percent for opposition parties and candidates and 15.28 
percent for other electoral information not directly related to parties. There were more 
spaces available for opposition parties on the radio. Figure 5.B below shows the 
distribution o f time given to the PRI and to other parties by each individual radio station.
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Figure 5.B
Time for Candidates and Parties on Radio News Broadcast during the 1988 Electoral
Campaign
Source: Data provided by the CIIPDAC.
It is noticeable that XEEP Radio Educación, a public radio station, devoted more time than 
the rest to information on opposition candidates and parties. This paradox is explained by 
the fact that this station in particular has been always linked to the National University, the 
UN AM and to other public universities of the states. Its audiences are mainly the students 
and academics o f these universities, and its programming is mainly composed o f cultural 
and educational material. Even XEEP’s personnel is usually recruited from these 
universities and tends to sympathise with more progressive political positions. An example 
of this can be seen in the content of its news broadcasts, which in the study of Gutierrez 
Espindola and Lobato Pérez proved to be not only the one which gave more spaces to 
opposition groups, but was also the one which devoted more time to presenting news from 
Latin America and to assuming “anti-imperialists positions”.32
For the journalist Jorge Meléndez, the 1988 elections showed that there were some radio 
concessionaires who were pressed by the regime, others were simply afraid to open up their 
microphones to alternative voices, and there were still others who, through collusion with
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interests alien to journalism, decided to close all spaces to the opposition in their stations.32 3 
However, there was one good practical reason for supporting the official party candidate, 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari: in 1989 more than 421 radio concessions expired and their actual 
holders wanted to renew their concession without major problems (Table 5.5).
Table 5.5
Number of Concessions that Expired in 1989 by State in Mexico
State Number of Concessions 
that Expire
State Number of Concessions 
that Expire
l:
Aguascalientes 4 Morelos 2
Baja California 23 Nayarit 6 ;
Baja California Sur 2 Nuevo León 20 1
Campeche 5 Oaxaca 11 i1
Colima 5 Puebla 11 1
Coahuila 27 Querétaro 3 1
Chiapas 14 Quintana Roo 1 :
Chihuahua 27 San Luis Potosí 8
Distrito Federal (Mexico 
City)
38 Sinaloa 12
Durango 8 Sonora 27
i
Guanajuato 19 Tabasco 8 i
■i
Guerrero 10 Tamaulipas 29
Hidalgo 3 Tlaxcala 0 .
Jalisco 29 Veracruz 33
State of México 5 Yucatán 7 .
Michoacán 20 Zacatecas 4
Source: Enrique Velasco Ugalde, “Las concesiones que se vencen en 1989”, in Revista Mexicana de 
Comunicación, n.4, Maich-April 1989.
¡'
32 Gutiérrez Espíndola and Pérez Lobato (1989), pgs.152-155.
53 Jorge Meléndez, “No habrá democracia sin apertura de medios”, in the Simposium on Medios, democracia 
y  fines, Mexico City, UNAM/Friederich Nauman Stiftung/Notimex, 1989, p.302.
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In a country without clear and regular criteria for renewing the concessions,34 since this 
depended basically on political criteria, most of the concessionaires did not take the risk of 
having their licenses revoked and openly supported the PRI candidate, especially in such a 
complex electoral situation as that of 1988. However, in spite o f the general support to the 
PRI, some stations, like Radio Mil, still granted certain spaces for the two most important 
opposition candidates, Cárdenas and Clouthier, notwithstanding the pressure of the 
Secretariat o f Gobernación and the Office of the Presidency.35
It was precisely during the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s when the conditions in 
which radio was developing experienced a further change and generated incentives for 
adopting new programming formulae: an important growth in the number of stations not 
only within a context in which the radio’s share o f the advertising market has remained 
stagnant for almost ten years (in 12-13 percent), but in which the general economy has 
performed quite poorly due to frequent instability and crisis. Such situation affected the 
radio stations in their programming.
Specifically in the case of the news broadcasts, radio stations facing stronger competition 
for relatively poorer resources, decided to try more aggressive and open formulae which led 
them eventually to trespass the limits o f tolerance o f the regime. What is noticeable is that, 
though censorship became common during this period, many stations tried -a t times 
erratically and timidly—to sustain their news broadcasts on the air. When the pressure was 
stronger the common attitude o f the stations was to dismiss the newscaster. By 1994 it was 
already evident that some important stations had consolidated more open and independent 
spaces on the radio, though this was not still the rule with the news broadcasts, but just the 
initial step.
As Table 5.6 shows between 1973 and 1981, saw' a period o f an average economic growth 
of 6.7% per year36 and, except for 1975-6, of political and economic stability, the annual 
average share o f the radio o f the national advertising market wras higher than fifteen
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iA See Chapter Two for a discussion on the law concerning radio and television.
iS Both candidates were invited for a half-an-hour programme where they could present their points of view,
though an explicit warning was made to the Vice-President of the Núcleo Radio Mil, Guillermo Salas, against 
those invitations by the Director General of Radio and Television of the Secretariat of Gobernación and the 
Office of the Presidency. Interview with Guillermo Salas, August 2000. 
j6 Taking as a basis 1980 prices.
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percent, but with a constantly growing advertising investment. In this situation of growth 
the number of commercial stations grew from 554 to 800, i.e. a growth of 44.4 percent.
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Table 5.6
Advertising Investment on Radio and TV, 1973-1981
Type of Media 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
TV 50% 55% 60% 62% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65%
Radio 20% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Newspapers
and
Magazines
15% 15% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Cinema 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Others 10% 10% 8% 6% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Total (in 
Thousands of 
Pesos)
4,500 5,000 5,500 6,000 7,500 8,000 8,500 9,750 13,500
Source: Asociación Mexicana de Agencias de Publicidad, AMAP, Tabala de Datos Historíeos, i973~¡985, 
AMAP, México City.
Similarly, in the period between 1982-1994 the number of radio stations (and of 
concessions given to operate such radio stations) grew from 800 to 1,068, i.e. a growth of 
33.5 percent. There are two important things to notice here. Firstly, the 1982-1994 growth 
in the number of stations operating occurred at a time of enormous economic instability and 
very low economic growth. Though the annual GDP growth average for the period is o f 
1.58 percent a year, the economy oscillated between^.2 percent o f the GDP in 1983 to 4.4 
percent of the GDP in 1990 (see Table 5.7 for the years between 1985 and 1994).
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero. Chapter Five
Table 5.7
Nominal and Real GDP Growth Between 1985-1994
Based on 1993 Prices Based on 1980 Prices
Real Real
Year
Nominal 
Million Pesos 
Per Year
Million Pesos 
of 1993
(%)
Growth
Nominal 
Million Pesos 
Per Year
Million Pesos 
of 1980
(%)
Growth
1985 n.a. 1043818 2.2 47392 4920 2.6
1986 n.a. 1011278 -3.1 79191 4736 -3.8
1987 n.a. 1028846 1.7 193312 4818 1.7
1988 416305 1042066 1.3 390451 4876 1.2
1989 548858 1085815 4.2 507618 5047 3.5
1990 738898 1140848 5.1 686406 5272 4.4
1991 949148 1189017 4.2 865166 5463 3.6
1992 1125334 1232162 3.6 1019156 5620 2.9
1993 1256334 1256196 2.0 1145382 5659 0.7
1994 1420159 1312200 4.5 1272799 5857 3.5
n.a. Non Available ^
Source: Elaborated with data from INEGI’s Cuentas Nacionales (various years) by the Social and Economic 
Studies Division (División de Estudios Económicos y Sociales) of Banamex, México Social ¡996-1998. 
Estadísticas Seleccionadas, México, Grupo Financiero Banamex-Accival, Mexico City, 1998, pp.390-391.
Secondly, the growth in the number of stations occurred also at a time when the average 
share of radio in the advertising market decreased from an average of 15 to 13.3 percent, 
remaining more or less constant during the whole period 1982-1994 (Tables 5.8a and 
5.8b). The difficult situation for the radio (and other media) becomes clear when ones 
notices that the relative lack of growth in the ad-investments on radio also occurred in a 
time o f high annual inflation rates. For instance, between 1985 and 1994, annual average 
inflation rates were the following: 1985, 56%; 1986, 75%; 1987, 120%; 1988,150%; 1989, 
24%, 1990, 29.9%; 1991, 18.8%; 1992, 11.9%; 1993, 8%; and 1994, 7.1%.
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Table 5.8a
Percentage of Advertising on the Media, 1990-1994
Type of 
Media
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Television 68% 68% 67% 50% 67% 65% 68% 64%
Radio 13% 13% 15.8% 21% 13% 12% 13% 12%
Printed 
Press and 
Magazines
10% 10% 9.5% 15% 14% 16% 14% 17%
Others 9% 9% 7.7% 13.3% 6% 8% 5% 7%
Source: Asociación Mexicana de Agencias de Publicidad, AMAP, Tabala de Datos Historíeos. 1973-1985y 
AMAP, México City; Información Estadística de la Publicidad en México, Inversión Publicitaria de la 
Iniciativa Privada, 1990-2000, AMAP, 2001.
Table 5.8b
Percentage of Private Advertising on the Media, 1990-1994
Type of Media 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Television 64% 64% 62% 66% 65%
Radio 12% 13% 12% 12% 12%
Printed Press 13% 13% 10% 10% 10%
Magazines 7% 7% 6% 6% 6%
Others 4% 3% 10% 5% 7%
Source: Información Estadística de la Publicidad en México, Inversion Publicitaria de la Iniciativa Privada, 
1990-2000, AMAP, 2001. Table elaborated with selected years.
As a result, a large number o f stations and radio groups decided to make certain 
adjustments in their programming in order to make it more attractive and raise the ratings.37 
For instance, many FM stations radically changed the programming in order to raise their 
rating points. Some stations replaced their transmissions of classic music with the more 
commercial popular music (for instance, XEOY-FM 89.7) or changed from romantic- 
instrumental music to rock pop (for instance XHDL 98.5 FM) or from jazz music to 
popular music (for instance XEDF 104.1 FM). However, the most remarkable change with
37 Another important strategy developed by the radio concessionaires by the early and mid-1990s was to 
establish strategic alliances among them in order to improve ratings, and offer better options of advertising to 
their clientele. Though it is at the close of the period under consideration in this chapter that such strategies 
were developed, a more detailed discussion on them will be given in Chapter Eight.
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regard to this study was the consolidation of live new s broadcasts on FM, a band that had 
up until then been dedicated almost exclusively to music broadcastings.
Since the late 1980s some networks that provided for the programming of AM and FM 
stations decided to introduce to the latter, some of the news broadcasts that had been 
successfully transmitted on AM. Between 1988 and 1994 FM stations began to transmit 
longer live news broadcasts, adopting in a way the model inaugurated by Monitor. In 1994 
there were already twenty five news broadcasts transmitting from Mexico City’s FM 
stations every day (some o f them three times a day) and re-transmitted in different states. 
The normal duration o f these programmes was between two and three hours and they 
counted on two or three daily editions. The most important morning radio news broadcasts 
in 1994 were Monitor (XERED-AM and FM) with 3.2 rating points;38 Buenos Dias 
(XEDF-FM 104.1) with 1.05 rating points;39 Ensalada de Lechuga (XEDF-FM) with .95 
rating points;40 El Mañanero (XHSH-FM) with .78 rating points;41 Informativo Panorama 
(XEL-ACIR and XHM-Azul 89-FM) with .75 rating points;42 and Cúpula Empresarial 
(XERPM-FM) with .45 rating points.43 Also, in 1993 the first station dedicated exclusively 
to the transmission of news, XECMQ-AM Formato 21, o f Grupo Radio Centro, was 
inaugurated. Many of these news broadcasts were constantly being reformed in their 
formats, in their names, and in their newscasters.
Competition led to the eventual trespassing of the regime’s “limits of tolerance”. And 
whenever this happened, censorship raised its head. The normal warning for stations 
comprised of phone calls from different governmental offices in protest against certain 
comments or opinions expressed on the air by newscasters, journalists or their guests. Of 
course every call implied a threat that might even go as far as to cancel the concession. The 
Director o f Radio, Television and Cinematography of the Secretariat o f Gobernación 
during most o f the Salinas’ administration, Manuel Villa Aguilera, w'as very well known 
for his short-sighted intolerance to any criticism against the government and for being a 
hard-liner in respect to the defence o f the regime’s image. Evidently, every space that the
38 Presented by José Gutiérrez Vivó.
j9 Presented initially by Guillermo Ochoa and then replaced by Eduardo Ruiz Healy.
40 Presented by Héctor Lechuga and Mauricio Hernández.
41 Presented by Victor Trujillo.
42 Presented by José Cárdenas, who substituted Guillermo Ochoa.
43 Presented by Oscar Mario Beteta
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero________ _ ____________________________________Chapter Five
181
news programmes gave to opposition groups was immediately registered and used against 
the station as a means of applying pressure.
The reaction of the radio concessionaires to those threats was usually the removal of the 
newscasters. Journalists like José Cárdenas were censored and had to leave the news 
programme Enfoque in Stereo Cien in 1993; René Delgado and Miguel Basañez left the 
news broadcast Para Empezar o f MVS Radio; Catalina Noriega was replaced on Radio 
Fórmula by Carlos Ramos Padilla; and the very prestigious journalist Miguel Ángel 
Granados Chapa was removed from NRM because, among other things, he decided to 
interview Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in September 1993. But this created a certain dynamic 
horizontal labour market for journalists on the radio, since many of them moved frequently 
from one station to another, also because many concessionaires were conscious that having 
a critical and independent journalist was important for the credibility of their news 
broadcasts and their ratings.
There were many other cases o f censorship. For instance, Manuel Villa explicitly 
prohibited the concessionaires from inviting certain personae non grate to the news 
broadcasts in their stations. In this “Black List” there were included the names o f Adolfo 
Aguilar Zinzer (removed from Cúpula Empresarial and replaced by Oscar Mario Beteta), 
Lorenzo Meyer, Jorge Castaneda, and Demetrio Sodi to name just a few. In October 1993 
the government announced that Villa was going to be replaced by Jorge Montano, who was 
until that moment, the Director General of the IMER. Nevertheless, this change did not 
alter the previous censorship trend and in 1994 there were more cases of journalists 
censored on the radio. For example, Enrique Quintana o f Enfoque was fired in 22 August 
for interviewing a former collaborator of the Federal Prosecutor Office, Eduardo Valle, 
who gave information about the links between top government officials and drug cartel 
bosses.
Censorship was strengthened in the difficult year of 1994 not only because of the general 
elections that were to take place in August, but also because of the Zapatista uprising on 
January Is' and because of a series of political upheavals and general instability that 
included the murder of the PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in March, 
Further problems were caused by the sudden resignment of the Secretary of Gobernación,
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero_____________________________________________Chapter Five
Jorge Carpizo, the assassination of the Secretary General of the PRI, José Francisco Ruiz 
Massieu, and the economic collapse o f December. The government wanted to have absolute 
control over the information that appeared on the news and therefore the surveillance over 
news broadcasts was careful. For instance, in the case o f  the Zapatistas, the government 
prohibited the news broadcasts from referring to them by their actual name -Ejército 
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional or EZLN—or from using the words “insurgents”, 
“guerrilla”, or any other vindicating name. More acceptable were the words “armed group”, 
“law transgressors”, or “delinquents”.44
Of course, during the electoral campaign government pressure became stronger, though one 
should also note that the pressures on the concessionaires did not come only from the 
government. The attitude of the CIRT made clear its support for the PRI candidates. The 
CIRT negotiated with the Secretariat o f Gobernación for certain agreements through which 
the media were not authorised to suspend their normal transmissions during the election 
day on August 21st 1994, for informing on the developments of the process. The only way 
to present any information on the election day before the closing of the ballots was through 
brief and general “information flashes”,45 This measure was unwillingly accepted by certain 
radio stations, like XERED and XHRED-FM who were already prepared to transmit an all­
day live coverage o f the electoral process.
Also, the CIRT hired the services o f Mitofsky-Hanis-Bimsa, a famous pollster firm, in 
order to carry out an exit poll whose outcome was to be transmitted exclusively on the radio 
and television channels without the possibility for the stations to hire any other polling 
services or present results o f their own. Finally, on 21st August 1994, the Chamber 
distributed a circular letter among its members in which it clearly recommended that they 
should not transmit any news on which the general outcome o f the election was put into 
question by opposition parties or in which there was any mention of the possibility of 
fraud.46 In brief, the microphones were to be closed to opposition parties. Consequently, the 
meeting of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in Mexico City central square on 22 August was not 
covered by any radio station or TV channel.47
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44 El Financiero, January 12* 1994.
43 La Jornada, August 19th 1994.
46 Sosa Plata and Esquivel (1996), p.270.
47 La Jornada, August 23rd 1994.
183
In spite of that, there were some stations that tried to keep some spaces open for alternative 
political opinions, and such an attitude found support on a document published in February 
28th by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) on the criteria that were expected to guide the 
presentation of information related to the political campaigns on radio and television: 
objectivity, uniform quality in news management, possibility of replication, respect to the 
candidates’ private life, specification of all paid-up information, and insertion of a specific 
section in the news broadcasts to inform on the developments o f the campaigns.48 These 
criteria were “moral suggestions” and lacked legal obligation.
However, in June 1994 the IFE decided to carry out a careful monitoring of the ways in 
which the information on the campaigns and the candidates was being presented by the 
main radio and television stations (Figure 5.C).49 Table 5.9 shows the total time and 
average time dedicated to each party on radio news broadcasts.
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Table 5.9
Coverage Time of the Parties’ Campaigns on Radio News Broadcasts, June 22nd- 
____________________________ August 16th 1994____________________________
PRI PRD PAN PT PVEM PDM PFCRN PPS PARM
Time 21h41’ 16hl9’ I3h34’ 4hl8’ 2h8’ lh59’ I h 15 * 45* 42’
33” 3” 4” 47” 13” 8” 19” 56” 11”
Average 35% 26.1% 21.7% 6.9% 3.4% 2.4% 2% 1.2% 1.1%
Source: Elaborated with data from Instituto Federal Electoral, Informe global sobre el moniioreo de 
noticiarios de radio y  televisión de los lincamientos sugeridos por la comisión de radiodifusión a la Cámara 
Nacional de la Industria de Radio y Televisión. Miércoles 22 de junio al martes 16 de agosto de 1994, 
México City, IFE, Comisión de Radiodifusión, 1994.
48 For a detailed account on the content of the document published by the IFE “Lincamientos generales 
aplicables en los noticiarios de radio y  televisión respecto de la información y  difusión e actividades de 
campaña de los partidos políticos”, see Chapter Four.
49 Instituto Federal Electoral, informe global sobre el monitoreo de noticiarios de radio y  televisión de ¡os 
lincamientos sugeridos por la comisión de radiodifusión a la Cámara Nocional de la Industria de Radio y
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Figure 5.C
Average Time for the Five Largest Parties on Radio News Broadcasts on a 15 Days 
Study Basis, June 22nd -August 16th 1994
□ J u n e  22nd-July 5th  
E lJu ly  6th-July 19th  
□ J u ly  20th-A ugust 2nd 
□ A u g u s t 3rd-A ugust 16th
Source: Elaborated with data from Instituto Federal Electoral, Informe global sobre el monitoreo de 
noticiarios de radio >■ televisión de los lineamientos sugeridos por la comisión de radiodifusión a la Cámara 
Nacional de la Industria de Radio y  Televisión. Miércoles 22 de junio al martes 16 de agosto de ¡994, México 
City, IFE, Comisión de Radiodifusión, 1994.
As one can see, during the first fifteen days o f the monitoring there was a strong bias in 
favour o f the PRI in the percentage o f time devoted to information on its campaign. This 
outcome, however, became more balanced amongst the three largest parties in the 
following six weeks, even favouring the PAN and PRD during a second monitoring carried 
out between the 17lh and the 19lh of August 1994 (Figure 5.D).
Televisión. Miércoles 22 de junio al martes 16 de agosto de 1994, México City, IFE, Comisión de 
Radiodifusión, 1994.
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Figure 5.D
Average Time for the Parties on all Radio News Broadcasts, August 17th-19,h 1994
Source: IFE, Comisión de Radiodifusión, Addenda del informe global del monitoreo en noticiarios de radio y  
televisión de los lincamientos sugeridos por la comisión de radiodifusión a la Cámara Nacional de la 
Industria de Radio y Televisión. Miércoles ¡7 al viernes 19 de agosto de 1994, México City, IFE, Comisión 
de Radiodifusión, 1994.
Though the total average of time devoted by the radio news broadcasts to information on 
the campaigns favoured the PRI, it is interesting to note that not all the stations behaved in 
the same way all the time (Figure 5.E) and, when observed individually, some news 
broadcasts even presented more information on the opposition candidates than on the 
official PRI candidate. A case in point was the news broadcast Enfoque, whose newscaster, 
Enrique Quintana, was fired one day after the elections.
The data on Figure 5.E shows that, though in general, the radio was still aligned with the 
regime’s positions, not all the stations behaved in the same way, and some even decided to 
apply their own independent journalistic criteria, which at times coincided with the IFE 
requirements. It is true that, not all the radio stations were open before that time, but there 
was an increasing movement, led by some important stations, towards generating more 
spaces in which other voices could be heard.
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Figure 5.E
Average Time for the Parties on Different Radio News Broadcasts, June 22nd -A ugust
16th 1994
50 y
Source: Elaborated with data from Instituto Federal Electoral, Informe global sobre el monitoreo de 
noticiarios de radio y televisión de los lincamientos sugeridos por la comisión de radiodifusión a la Cámara 
Nacional de la Industria de Radio y  Televisión. Miércoles 22 de junio al martes 16 de agosto de 1994, 
México City, IFE, Comisión de Radiodifusión, 1994.
The competition for resources, clientele and publicity induced some radio concessionaires 
to test more interesting programming formats and ways o f presenting information in an 
attempt to raise the ratings. In other words, economic competition created the incentives for 
some stations to explore the new terrain opened to them by the growing political plurality, 
and the need of the people to receive more reliable information. A survey carried out by 
Enrique Leon Martinez shows precisely that the level of credibility of the radio news 
broadcasts is higher in relation to that o f  TV broadcasts.50 Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that by the end of the period studied in this chapter audiences were completely confident of 
what was presented on the radio. In November 1993 a survey conducted by the Opinion 
Study Cabinet (Gabinete de Estudios de Opinion, S.C.) and published on the weekly 
Etcétera shows that 28 percent o f the individuals interviewed believed that the information 
presented on the radio was “highly censored”, 39 percent believed that such information
50 Enrique León Martínez, Los medios de comunicación en el proceso político de México, México City, IPN. 
1998, pgs.49-52 and 134-137.
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was “more or less” censored, 20 percent that it was “not very” censored, and only 4 percent 
believed that it was “not censored at all”.51
This outcome is relatively coincident with the uneven ways in which political information 
was transmitted during the 1994 electoral campaign on radio, when some stations did 
present the information more independently while the majority decided to conform to the 
established dispositions. However, the first steps towards more independent radio were 
made during this period as an unintended consequence o f the need for survival of radio 
stations, a stronger competition for resources, and the profitable uses that the 
concessionaires found for to the need of the people to find spaces within the media in which 
they could participate and voice their opinions.
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51 Etcetera, November 18th 1993.
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Part III
The Electoral Reform of 1996 and thè Openness 
on thè Broadcast Media

Chapter Six
The Political ContextII, 1994-2000
Between 1995 and 2000 a transition occurred in Mexico which can be described as the 
accelerated “de-consolidation” process o f  the post-revolutionary regime, since many o f 
the rules that sustained it ceased to be valid, but without new ones to legitimately replace 
them. Corporatism and the PRI monopoly of power were in a irreversible process of 
erosion. Unending discussions took place upon new rules and a substantial agreement 
was reached on one crucial point: the widening of the electoral arena as the space where 
political conflicts should be channelled and its definitive openness as the space in which 
different political forces could legitimately and truly compete for power.
This favoured the emergence of a truly autonomous, fair and competitive electoral arena. 
Thus, during this period when the long political liberalisation process -which granted the 
regime the ultimate control over politics and characterised the Mexican protracted 
transition—finally reached its end by completely opening the electoral arena to true 
competition among the parties in which the outcomes were not determined from the 
outset. This was the end of the party system that had been consolidating in Mexico since 
the 1988 electoral process dominated by three main political organisations, the PRI, the 
PAN and the PRD.
This period was marked by the approval o f a new electoral reform in 1996, which granted 
the independence of the electoral institute in charge o f organising the process -the 
Instituto Federal Electoral, IFE—and established clearer conditions for party 
competition. All this seen in a wider context could very well be viewed as the highly 
successful outcome of a protracted transition whose major advances had always been 
concentrated at the electoral level and of the party system since the Reform of 1977. The 
present chapter is divided into three parts. The first one refers to the political instability 
and the economic collapse that followed in 1994-95 and that in many ways created the 
conditions for an accelerated passage from a situation of political liberalisation to another 
in which the regime lost its main control over the access to political power. The second 
discusses the Political Reform of 1996 that granted the final openness of the electoral
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arena and strengthened the party system. The last one briefly comments on the elections 
of 1997 and 2000.
Political and Economic Instability, 1994-95
Still during his last year in office, and despite all the apparent success of the economic 
strategies o f President Salinas, economic growth was not evenly reflected either in the 
regions or in the various social sectors. As one author states,
The positive results o f  these reforms raised the expectations amongst Mexicans that the country 
was on the brink o f becoming an advanced industrialized nation -an  expectation that proved 
short-lived. Even with the evident improvement, economic growth was insufficient to generate 
much needed employment o f  about 1.2 million jobs a year or make a dent in widespread 
underemployment [...] which in 1994 represented 17 percent o f  the labour force. Insufficient 
growth made it impossible to improve income distribution and began to raise doubts about the 
viability o f  exclusive reliance upon free markets and private ownership as a long-term economic 
development strategy.1
The continuity o f the fiction of buoyancy created by the regime between 1990 and 1993 
greatly depended on the confidence o f the investors -especially the foreign ones— and on 
the maintenance of the internal political stability -something the PRI had been doing for 
a long time. Any difficulty in those areas would endanger the basis of the economic 
model, and the modernisation project o f Salinas. The first signs of decay in the economy 
appeared in 1993, a year in which the government had to use public expenditure to raise 
the Aggregate Demand. At first, this was thought to be only a temporary measure. 
However, public life was abruptly shaken, paradoxically the day when the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force, i.e. January 1st 1994.
On New Year’s eve a small but relatively well organised military group took control of 
some municipalities and towns in the southern state of Chiapas. The Zapatista guerrilla 
uprising was manned by Indians from different villages in the mountains of that state, 
who soon gained the sympathy -and  support—o f a large number of NGOs and other 
groups of civil society, both domestic and foreign, which traditionally had traditionally 
fought for human and minority rights. The revolt o f these poor Indian peasantry created a
1 González Gómez, (1988), p.42.
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“shock of consciousness” in urban Mexico, which had been fantasising, due to the 
widespread publicity o f the so-called immediate benefits that the NAFTA would bring to 
the country, and an accelerated insertion into a level o f development that could finally 
assure a sustained improvement in living standards. Instead, January 1994 was the start of 
a dramatic year that not only made evident the social costs of the neo-liberal policies and 
the absolute decrease in social expenditures, but also the degree of decay of the Mexican 
ruling elite and the strong conflicts within it.
In a conference held at El Colegio de Mexico at the end of 1993, the Secretary of 
Commerce, Jaime Serra, proudly declared that the country had accumulated foreign 
currency reserves above USD $ 30 billion. Even after the Zapatista uprising, in February 
1994, the foreign reserves were still around USD S 29 billion, however the continuous 
political instability along with continuos political scandals within the PRI elite generated 
a volatile economic atmosphere with huge capital outflows that weighted heavily on the 
exchange rate. In March, the official party’s candidate, Luis D. Colosio, was murdered 
during his campaign whilst visiting Tijuana, city bordering the U.S., creating turmoil 
among the PRI groups. Between May and July there remained still around USDS 17 
billion in foreign reserves, but the unexpected resignation of the Secretary o f 
Gobernación caused a further capital loss of USDS 3 billion. In September the General 
Secretary o f the PRI was assassinated and few weeks afterwards the Special 
Commissioner for investigating the case (who was the brother of the murdered 
politician)1 2 decided to quit his charge. The overall result was a deep political uncertainty 
combined with heavy pressure over economic stability and financial confidence, which 
stopped foreign capital inflows, depleted foreign exchange reserves, and led finally to a 
strong devaluation o f the currency which started the infamous “Tequila effect” in the 
international financial markets.3
1 One year afterwards he was arrested in the U.S. while he was trying to enter that country with U.S.S 10
million undeclared. In 1997 he committed suicide in a prison in the state of New Jersey.
3 For M.A. González, even before the political turmoil of 1994 there were strong signs that may have 
forcast the economic crisis o f 1994. There were essentially three factors that brought about the crisis: the 
way monetary policy was implemented (liquidity, interest rate and exchange rate policy); the size of the 
current account deficit (which was reflecting a huge gap between imports and exports before 1994); and the 
way in which trade liberalisation took place in the early 1990s. The current account deficit was financed 
through external credit and foreign investment, but after the events of 1994 foreign capital inflows ceased 
to enter the country and the foreign currency reserves started to diminish because of pressure on the peso 
and the ways in which monetary policy was handed (which increased credit from the central bank to the
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In the midst of this scenario, the general elections of August 21st 1994 became a matter of 
serious preoccupation for the government. In 1993, during the height of the Salinas’ 
administration, a new electoral reform was passed by the PRI alone, counting on the fact 
that the outcomes of the 1991 elections gave that party 320 deputies, only ten deputies 
less than the 2/3 required for making constitutional reforms. These ten missing deputies 
were easily found, since the pseudo-opposition parties PPS, PARM and PFCRN had 12, 
15 and 23 deputies respectively. The most important modification introduced by the 
Reform of 1993 was to establish a maximum of 300 deputies for any majority party 
obtaining between 50 percent plus one and 60 percent of the national voting. However, in 
the event that that party obtained more than 60 percent o f the voting, it was to receive a 
number of deputies from its PR list up to 315. This was seen as a “generous” concession 
from an apparently all-powerful regime to the opposition parties. However, in the middle 
of 1994, the opposition parties’ pressure made the government’s party approve important 
modifications to the electoral system. Though the political instability forced the 
government and the PRI to negotiate a reform, the PRD left the negotiating talks since the 
regime were still unwilling to cede its ultimate control over the electoral authority. The 
PRI and the PAN continued the talks and the latter gave its support to the reforms as long 
as three conditions were granted.
Firstly, though the government maintained control over the organisation and the electoral 
process (the Secretary of Gobernación was still the President of the Federal Electoral 
Commission, now renamed Federal Electoral Institute), all the parties were to be more 
equitably represented on the electoral boards. Secondly, a Federal Electoral Tribunal was 
created, which depended on the Judicial Power (which though controlled by the 
president, it implied the possibility o f  a further relative independence), whose function 
was to decide on all electoral disputes. Thirdly, a Citizen Electoral Board was created 
composed of independent well-known citizens accepted by all parties, with moral the 
power to oversee the electoral process and with a voice, though no vote, within the IFE.
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rest o f the economy at a rate higher than that consistent with economic stabilisation and which was intended 
to avert a liquidity crisis). These short term measures did control the interest rates for a while but after the 
murder of the Secretary General of the PRI in September even more foreign capital inflows decreased, it 
was not possible to maintain the same strategy. A devaluation was necessary, but the conditions of 
credibility in the economy were lost by the end of the year. Abruptly the value of the peso moved from 3.75 
to the US dollar to more than 5.00 pesos to the dollar in December. See Ibid., pgs.45-54.
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In spite of these improvements, the government started a strong campaign for placing its 
candidate as the best choice in times o f uncertainty. The Zapatista uprising and the 
murder of the PRI presidential candidate were used by the regime to manipulate the 
electoral advertising. The government’s electoral ads emphasised the need to vote for 
stability and peace, which ironically meant to vote for the PRI candidates.4 With a 
decisive electoral marketing campaign and the support of television,5 the government was 
able to polarise the electoral options within an already exhausted society between a vote 
for stability, i.e. the PRI, and a vote for inexperience and chaos, especially the PRD. 
Confronted with such a dramatic year, people awaited the call to the polls -showing a 
preference for institutional solutions for political problems—and the vote tum-out on the 
day reached around 77 percent.
The victory went to the PRI presidential candidate, Ernesto Zedillo (who replaced 
Colosio after his assassination), with 17 million 181 651 votes that represented 50.1 
percent of the total votes. An explanation of the high participation rate in the electoral 
process and of the victory of the PRI lies in what has been called “the vote of fear”; fear 
o f increasing political and social instability, and, of course, fear of further violence and 
disorder.6
The PRI obtained the majority of the seats in Congress (Table 6.1) and the most 
important victories in local governments.7 Once again the regime’s apparatus -and 
private television, as will be seen in the following chapter—supported the official 
candidate, Emesto Zedillo, making the electoral process a highly unequal and unfair one, 
as recognised by the new president himself.8 The victory of Zedillo was to be the last
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4 Actually the two most important messages that the PRJ used for its electoral publicity were “I vote for 
peace” (Yo voto por la paz) and “For the well being of the family” (Bienestar para la familia). The first one 
referred to the possible political instability that a defeat of the PRI may bring to the country. The second
one referred to the stability required for economic growth. These ads were accepted by various important 
groups, like the Mexican Banking Association, whose leader, Roberto Hernández, declared one week 
before the elections that “any electoral outcome negative to the PRI may bring financial instability”. 
s See Chapter Four.
6 See the interview of Juan Villoro in La Jornada on August 21“ 1994 and the article of Héctor Aguilar 
Camín, “Compuerta”, in Nexos, no.201, September, Mexico City 1994.
7 The only relevant victory for opposition was in the race for the government of Guanajuato, where the 
PAN’s candidate Vicente Fox easily defeated the PRI and the PRD.
8 In 1995, Zedillo declared that though his election has been legal according to the rules of the time, it has 
been unequal in the conditions of competition among the parties, and there was therefore the need to 
negotiate a new electoral reform.
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uninterrupted victory of an “official PRI candidate” in gaining the presidential seat since 
1929.
Table 6.1
Composition of the Chamber of Deputies during the LVI Legislative Period (1994-
1997)
Party Number o f 
Deputies
Majority
Deputies
Percentage PR Deputies Percentage
PRI 302 273 91 29 9
PAN 118 20 16.9 98 83.1
PRD 70 7 10 63 90
PT 10 0 0 10 100
Source: Directorio de la LVI Legislatura de la Cámara de Diputados.
The fragile victory of the PRI -inspired more by fear than conviction—was immediately 
shaken in September when the Secretary General of the PRI, Jose Francisco Ruiz 
Massieu, was brutally assassinated on the street making o f the brother o f the still 
President Salinas one of the principal suspects o f this atrocity. This new political scandal 
among the Priista groups was swiftly followed by further tension and disagreements 
between the government and the Zapatistas that led this group to break the military truce 
in December. All this pressure contributed to the economic collapse that followed the 
announcement of a devaluation of the Peso in December 19th 1994. The impact of the 
economic breakdown on the GNP can be seen in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2
GNP in Mexico, 1994-1997 
Annual Variation Average for Three Months-Periods
1994 1995 1996 1997
Jan-Mar 2.3 - 4  ! .1 4.6
Apr-Jun 4.0 -4.9 3.2 6.5
Jul-Sept 4.2 -5.9 4.4 6.8
Oct-Dec 4.5 -6.2 5.1 6.8
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI), Sistema de cuentas nacionales 
de México. Web site address: www.inegi.gob.mx
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The international financial aid promised by the U.S. government and the IMF (USDS 50 
billion from which USDS 26,253 billions were used during 1995) were delayed, and by 
February 1995 the peso was still devaluating until it reached an exchange rate of 6.20 to 
the US Dollar, almost double what it had been in December 1994. The social 
consequences of the crisis were devastating. According to a study carried out by the 
specialist Julio Boltvinik, based on data from the National Urban Employment Survey 
(ENEU), between 1994 and 1999 the number of poor and extremely poor people 
dramatically rose from 11.04 to 13.26 millions and from 8.26 to 16.68 million 
respectively.9 According to the Annual Economic Report o f the Bank of Mexico 
industrial production decreased in real terms by 29.1 percent only in 1995.10 1The effect of 
the crisis on the GDP caused an overall decrease of -5.3 percent that was larger than the 
previous dramatic decrease after the 1982 crisis, which was a decrease of -4.5 percent of 
the GDP in 1983."
This situation put a lot o f pressure on the political group that entered office with President 
Zedillo in December 1994. Since the economic solutions to the crisis implied further 
doses of restrictive economic policies, tight control over public finances and a strategy 
centred around the control of inflation and a strict monetary policy, President Zedillo 
seemed to understand that after more than fifteen years of administering the same 
economic “receipts”, a good way to channel social and political pressure was through the 
further openness of the political arena, i.e. to generate more favourable conditions for 
party competition. This solution has been used by the regime since the Reform of 1977. 
However, the magnitude of this new crisis in a situation dominated by recession and low 
growth rates for more than fifteen years made it very difficult to maintain the ultimate 
control over a political liberalisation process. Under such conditions a further openness of 
the electoral arena could very well mean the loss of its historical capacity to monopolise 
the upper echelons o f the political power pyramid.
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9 See Julio Boltvinik, “Economía Moral. Fábrica de pobres”, in la  Jomada, July 14* 2000.
10 Informe Anual del Banco de México, B.de M., México City, 1996, p.89.
11 Arturo Huerta G., Carteras vencidas. Inestabilidad financiera, México City, Diana, 1997, p.19.
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The 1996 Reform and the End o f  Political Liberalisation
The 1994-95 economic crisis proved to be catastrophic for the Mexican post­
revolutionary regime. The promise o f a sustained economic improvement that the Salinas 
administration had created, suddenly evaporated, leaving the regime’s structure even 
weaker than in 1982 because the old corporatist networks and the social penetration of 
the official party had been slowly eroding for almost fifteen years. The revolutionary 
origins o f the regime, the inclusive official party, the mixed economy, and the old 
developmental formula that combined growth with stability, which were all the pillars of 
both corporatism and the social acceptance of the PRI, were definitively in decline. The 
basic unit o f the traditional post-revolutionary regime, corporatism, was very quickly 
ceding its place to more individual forms o f representation that were increasingly 
strengthening other forms o f political participation. In brief, though the PRI had won the 
elections of 1994 in the following years, the regime was in a deep and irreversible crisis 
since the 1995 economic collapse destroyed the confidence and the support that the 
regime had certainly regained during the Salinas administration, therefore impeding the 
possibility for the regime to maintain a claim on its legitimacy, based on a relatively 
efficient economic and administrative performance, (as had been the case during some 
parts of the 1988-1994 period).
The dramatic combination o f political shocks combined with those new economic failures 
and financial difficulties created a very volatile atmosphere in which unrest and 
dissatisfaction were dominant. The new president, Ernesto Zedillo, seemed to realise this 
and instead o f pulling the strings and resorting to the re-creation of the deteriorated image 
of the presidency (still the most important institution in the Mexican political system) 
through the use o f a wide variety o f meta-constitutional powers and faculties, he decided 
to implement further political reform -again at the electoral level—to cope with the by- 
then-unavoidable political pluralism, to improve the administrative functioning of the 
Judicial Power and to amend the relationship between the presidency and the official 
party by what he termed a “healthy distance”.
The alternative that Zedillo seemed to have found at the beginning of his term in the 
context of crisis was either to use the political power o f the presidency to rebuild the
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Ipolitical networks and to revive the (remnants of the) corporatist structures, therefore 
using the PRI as the privileged arena for negotiation and exchange. But all this was to 
come at the cost o f reducing the pace and the rhythm of the economic liberalisation 
measures, or concentrating on the economic and financial policies even at the cost of 
seriously damaging the party’s popularity.
Ernesto Zedillo was part of the financial technocratic sector of the public administration, 
where he made his career. With no previous links to the PRI -as was the case of many of 
the closest collaborators of the Salinas administration—the majority of his cabinet 
members shared a similar profile. All of them were convinced o f the need to continue 
with the economic liberalisation policies, and to use the party in Congress to approve the 
required economic reforms and measures no matter how costly they could result for the 
PRTs popularity.12
Moreover, as early as September 1994 he announced that his policy towards the official 
party was going to be characterised by what he called “a healthy distance”. Though no 
further explanation was officially given on the way in which that statement was to be 
interpreted, the dominant opinion was that for the first time the president was not 
assuming the leadership within the official party and that increasing independence was to 
be expected within the party internal structures (at least as long as such “independence” 
o f the party would not endanger the President’s economic strategy). The Party was 
basically used as an instrument for passing the economic reforms by a political group that 
had no real links with it.
In light of this situation, some voices started to rise within the party claiming for a return 
o f the PRI to its popular and nationalist principles and policies, and criticising the 
“technocratic way o f rule” that the party had experienced for the last decade, which 
alienated it from its “true” principles and compromises with the popular sectors. Many 
old top ranks of the party that had been excluded by the technocracy that had taken over 
the party during the De la Madrid administration, were eager to return to the forefront of
12 In this sense, one of the most remarkable laws that w'ere passed in Congress which happened to be 
extremely unpopular and politically costly to the PRI was the reform on taxation policy that increased the 
VAT from 10 to 15 percent in 1996. Paradoxically, the PAN also supported the passing of this reform 
(since it basically shared the economic project of the Zedillo administration), but the cost seemed to remain 
mostly on the side of the official party, as the electoral outcome of the 1997 elections showed.
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the politics o f the party and replace the technocrats. Moreover, during the XVIII National 
Assembly o f the PRI, celebrated in 1996, its National Executive Committee added to the 
party’s basic principles that all future Priista presidential candidates must posses the 
following requirements: the candidate must have a proven party membership o f at least 
10 years; he/she must have previously occupied an elected office; and, he/she must have 
held an official post within the party.
These requirements automatically eliminated a large number of would-be candidates 
from the President’s cabinet, and this tied the President’s hands -or better, they tried to 
cut “the finger” (el dedo) o f the President—to select and decide who his successor must 
be, a privilege the presidents have enjoyed almost from the start. At that point it became 
evident that the independence of the PRI was going further than the President wanted, 
and such attitudes were finally disapproved by President Zedillo since they also hid the 
seeds of a possible setback in his economic measures and projects. The president decided 
to re-gain control over the party. A new party chairman and a new party secretary general 
were immediately appointed showing the true limits of “the healthy distance” between 
the PRI and the President. Discipline returned to a party that had no experience of 
autonomous behaviour, and the party congressmen finally passed the economic reforms 
proposed by the President.
But if  the reform inside the PRI was finally stagnant, President Zedillo at the begining of 
his term decided to launch what he called a National Political Agreement on Electoral 
Reform, which was signed with the leaders o f the Parliamentary party fractions in 
January 17th 1995.13 President Zedillo’s intention was to create a “definitive electoral 
law” that could consolidate the electoral and party systems in Mexico, and thus 
“contribute to the perfection of the existent democracy”. Inside the PRI, some critics 
emerged, since it was considered that there was no need to “give more concessions to the 
opposition”, especially at a time when not only the PRI had the majority in Congress but 
the President himself had been elected by a true majority o f votes, giving him democratic
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lj At that moment there were eight national parties represented in the Federal Congress, the PRI, the PAN, 
the PRD, the Labour Party (Partido del Trabajo, PT) the Green Party (Partido Verde Ecologista de México, 
PVEM), the Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstrucción Nacional (PFCRN), the Popular Socialist 
Party (PPS), and the Democratic Mexican Party (Partido Demócrata Mexicano, PDM).
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legitimacy, (the highest of all PRI presidents ever).14 For many PRI members there was 
no need to negotiate with the opposition for further reforms.
It is only when one takes into account the situation of economic crisis and the 
government decision to carry on with a Neo-liberal economic programme that the 
decision of President Zedillo to implement another electoral reform makes sense. Under 
such circumstances, it was considered by the promoters of the electoral reform that a 
viable way to avoid the further emergence of anti-institutional protests (of the kind of the 
Zapatistas and other groups), was to finally grant the autonomy of the electoral arena, 
especially after six years of confrontations between the regime and the centre-leftist PRD. 
To maintain the restrictions to open, free and fair participation and competition, and to 
keep the PRD at the margins, (as had been the strategy of Salinas), was considered to be 
explosive under the conditions of economic crisis, especially if stricter economic reforms 
were to be applied, as the President wanted. The further opening o f the electoral arena 
would result in the virtual end of the long process of political liberalisation put into 
practice by the regime since the political reform of 1977, a process in which all 
“concessions” to opposition had been made without endangering the regime’s ultimate 
control over political life. However, a new reform could end such control and pave the 
way for truly fair and competitive electoral processes.
The Electoral Reform of 1996 was, in general terms, the outcome of the compromise 
between all the political parties and the Executive Power for establishing acceptable and 
equitable conditions for electoral competition. In July 1996, after almost eighteen months 
of negotiations, the Reform was approved by the consensus of all the parties in the 
Chamber of Deputies. Paradoxically, at the end, only the PRI deputies approved of the 
law (along with few scattered votes from opposition), since a great disagreement 
followed when the issue related to party financing was discussed, in wrhich opposition 
party members considered that the amounts of money granted for their finance were 
extremely high. Though it was agreed by all parties that the bulk of party financing would 
come from public sources (limiting the size of individual contributions to 0.5 percent of 
public financing), the PRI wanted to set public financing at an unprecedented level of
14 Though no open criticism was made against the President’s initiative, the press registers a series of 
comments given by notable PRI members in which they are not convinced of the need to further reform the 
electoral law.
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USDS 278 million for all parties, with 30 percent being allocated equally among all 
parties and 70 percent according to their share of the vote in the previous election.
In spite of the disagreement with the parties, the majority o f PRI congressmen approved 
the law. However, these resources would prove crucial for providing the parties with 
more equitable and fair conditions within the electoral processes as far as electoral 
advertising in the mass media was concemed-especially radio but, most o f all, on 
television.15 As for the Electoral Reform of 1996, its most important innovations were the 
following:
• It reduced to 300 the total number o f deputies that any single political party could get 
either by majority vote or PR formulae. This established a maximum limit of 60 
percent o f the total number o f deputies to be assigned to any majority party in the 
Chamber o f Deputies.
• It added 32 Senate seats to be distributed according to PR rule. Though this reform 
opened the Senate House to more party representation, it definitively altered the 
original representational character of the Upper Chamber, i.e. territorial 
representation. Before 1996, only 96 Senators were elected, three from each state of 
the Federation. Two of them were elected through simple majority rule, and the third 
was adjudicated to the party that obtained the second largest voting in each state. 
Therefore, the territorial representation principle was maintained until the 1996 
Reform, since a fourth senator is chosen from PR lists.
• It made more flexible the criteria for parties to register. In the 1996 Law the number 
o f national affiliates required to obtain the register was reduced from 65 thousand to 
30 thousand, which can be presented in two modalities. Either, each party must prove 
to have 3 thousand affiliates in at least 10 of the 32 Federal States, or it must prove to 
have 300 affiliates in at least 100 of the 300 Electoral Districts of the country.
• It raised the minimum percentage of national voting required for parties to keep their 
national register from 1.5 to 2 percent of voting turn-out. This 2 percent serves also as 
a minimum basis with which the parties are able to obtain PR deputies from their 
lists.
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• It recognised the possibility of organising and register National Political Associations 
(NPA) as different from political parties. NPA must prove to have 7 thousand 
affiliates in the country and national delegations in at least 10 Federal Sutes.
• At electoral times, parties must have more access to the broadcasting media. During 
general elections national parties are entitled to obtain up to 250 hours on radio and 
200 hours on television. These figures are reduced by 50 percent during mid-term 
elections. At the same time, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) is given the faculty 
o f monitoring the mass media transmissions of information on politics (news 
broadcasts and programmes on political debates) during campaigns, in order to 
control that such information respects the time assigned to each party and is not 
intentionally biased.16 The law also prohibits any group or organisation that is not a 
party from acquiring TV or radio adverts to promote or attack a candidate or a party. 
Only the parties can buy spaces in the media for their advertising. At the same time, 
the 1996 Law grants the right of candidates and parties to rectify any inaccurate 
information presented on them by the media.
• Total independence was granted to the Federal Electoral Institute from the Executive 
Power, i.e. the President. Before this reform, the President of the General Board of the 
IFE was the Secretary of Gobernación, This post was replaced by a Presidential 
Advisor (Consejero Presidente) chosen by the consensus of all parties and approved 
by a two-thirds majority within the Chamber of Deputies. Also proposed by the 
parties were another eight Electoral Advisors {Consejeros Electorales), who along 
with the Presidential Advisor make up the Federal Electoral Board (Consejo Electoral 
Federal). All of them are selected from amongst electoral specialists and academics, 
(party members and politicians are disqualified), to serve for six-year terms with the 
opportunity of being re-elected once. These Board members are the only ones w ith a 
voice and vote in electoral matters, since the party and congress representatives that 
assist to the Board meetings can only have voice without vote. The internal 
organisation of the IFE was divided into specialised commissions in charge of 
administrative, organisational, electoral, fiscal and media-surveillance tasks. The IFE
16 A more detailed discussion on this point is found in Chapters 7 and 8.
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became therefore in a highly professional and independent institution, which came to 
be key for the organisation of the 1997 and 2000 elections.
• At a constitutional level the prevalence o f the public funding was established over all 
sorts of private financing for the parties. Public funding is assigned in the following 
way: 30 percent is divided equally amongst the parties and the other 70 percent is 
assigned according to the voting percentage each party obtained in the previous 
elections. New parties do not receive funding until after their first electoral 
competition. Private funding cannot be greater than ten percent o f the public funding 
destined to any party.
• Another important change that the 1996 Reform introduced was the establishment of 
the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of the electoral results. The Federal Electoral 
Tribunal was made part of the Supreme Court and its staff is now composed by 
judges appointed by the chief justice with the approval o f two-thirds of the Chamber 
o f Senators (previously they were appointed by two-thirds o f the Chamber of 
Deputies at the President’s suggestion).
• The Federal Electoral Tribunal was given the faculty to qualify the elections and 
have the last word on the results.
• Finally, the parties were given the faculty of promoting, whenever they considered fit, 
a case o f unconstitutionality before the Supreme Court o f Justice to revise the legality 
of the acts and resolutions of the electoral legislation, both local and federal.
The Reform of 1996 altered the nature in which transition had been developing in 
Mexico. Since the Reform of 1977 the transition took the shape of a process of political 
liberalisation in which the regime decided the rhythms and the topics that could be 
negotiated. As discussed in Chapter Three, liberalisation is a process that makes effective 
certain rights that protect both individuals and groups from power arbitrariness.17 
However, the process was initiated “from above”, from the regime itself, in the belief that 
by opening up certain spaces for individual and group action, the regime “can relieve 
various pressures and obtain necessary information and support without altering the 
structure of authority, that is, without becoming accountable to the citizens for their
17 O’Donnell and Schmitter, (1986), p.7.
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actions or subjecting their claim to rule fair and competitive elections;... in our 
discussion, we refer to such cases as ‘liberalized authoritarianism’ (known also by their 
Spanish name o f dictablandas)"
In Mexico, the economic growth o f the 1940s-1970s generated little pressure for 
démocratisation and political abertura. At the same time, the weakness of the parties, 
(other than the PRI), made it rational for the regime to channel into the electoral arena the 
political demands of sectors that during those decades grew outside the corporatist 
structures and networks, essentially the middle classes. It was the deep economic crisis of 
the 1980s which launched some of these sectors against the regime, and they found in the 
electoral arena the mechanisms and means of pressure adequate for their protests. 
However, these pressures “from below” that characterised other transitions,18 9 were 
relatively absent in Mexico and circumscribed to some urban middle sectors in the north 
o f  the country. By opening further the electoral arena the protests o f such sectors were 
successfully channelled therein.
The major opponent was not a mobilised civil society, but political parties that were 
increasingly structuring themselves and redefining their identities.20 All this permitted the 
regime to maintain in all the previous electoral reforms the ultimate control over the 
political arena, while at the same time negotiating with the parties for relatively better 
conditions in which to enter into the Federal Congress. These features are precisely the 
ones which characterised the Mexican protracted transition.21
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19 See for instance the analysis of Timothy Garton Ash on the popular movements and the unions activities 
in Poland and Hungary that gave a strong element of popular pressure “from below” to the transitions in 
those countries. Timothy Garton Ash, We the People. The Revolution o f 89, Cambridge, Granta Books, 
1990.
20 Maybe the only two moments when there was visibly a popular civil society element, completely 
autonomous from parties, during the aftermath of the 1986 earthquake that destroyed a large number of 
neighbourhoods in Mexico City. People protested spontaneously before a quite inoperative government that 
was caught by surprise. The other moment was during the 1988 elections. Cardenas, the candidate of the 
then FDN, was able to mobilise and gather a large number of groups that took the squares and the streets in 
his support, though without having received any resources from the Cardenas coalition.
21 See Chapter Three. Todd Eisenstadt has remarked that in such forms of transitions “it appears that 
democratization is a ‘war of attrition’ of the authoritarian incumbents and the opposition parties over the 
micro-institutional foundations of the transition. The locus of change, rather than being a fissure between 
hard-liners and soft-liners within the authoritarian coalition prior to authoritarian breakdown and the 
signing of a society-wide pact, seems rather to take the form of continuous and prolonged struggles over the 
formal institutional playing field" (Eisenstadt, [2000], p.4).
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The Reform of 1996 altered those conditions and at the same time it brought to a close 
the political liberalisation process, since the regime negotiated and passed a law that 
secured the conditions for free, fair and competitive elections organised by a truly 
autonomous and independent electoral authority. The Reform of 1996 recognises that any 
artificial maintenance of the PRI in power would be politically volatile (the emergence of 
the Zapatistas and other guerrilla groups were clear signs of it), and that opposition 
parties were mature enough to dispute the regime’s access to power. However, other short 
term considerations must be explained.
Firstly, the economic crisis of 1994-5 destroyed the confidence that remained in the 
adequate economic performance o f  PRI governments. This confidence had been the last 
element for maintaining a minimum o f  legitimacy, since by then the old corporatist 
structure was seriously eroded and the revolutionary discourse (which emphasised social 
development) was useless.22 Thus, any attempt to seek legitimacy under the principles of 
social justice and developmental nationalism was unthinkable. Secondly, if during the 
Salinas administration people believed that the economy started to function relatively 
well and that solid bases were sustaining it, as the propaganda emphasised, giving the 
president a high level of support (72 percent according to the newspaper Reforma1 s 
survey in October 1994),23 the 1994-5 collapse, plus the further scandals that implicated 
his family in murders and other illicit activities, finally drove the whole Priista political 
class into discredit and chaos. Under such circumstances, the President’s closest circle 
seemed to have decided that the best alternative was to opt for a complete electoral 
openness through which political unrest could be channelled.
By means o f  the conditions set up by the Reform of 1996, competition became more 
equitable and fair, and it also provided the possibility for using, in systematic and regular 
ways, political marketing techniques in the campaigns by all parties involved. The 
electoral landscape seemed to have completely transformed into a modem arena of 
competition. For the first time in Mexican history, the electoral process seemed to contain
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22 The depth o f the crisis had serious consequences until the end of the period studied here. Still in the year 
2000, as a study of the newspaper La Jornada expressed, real wages in Mexico have decreased 41% since
1988 {La Jornada, May 22 2000).
2* See Chapter 3.
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the three essential ingredients for a contested competition: the process was open, 
relatively fair and truly competitive.
The 1997 and 2000 Elections
After the 1996 Reform, the electoral processes created a new arena in which the 
political leadership increasingly owed their position more to the approval and support of 
the bases and voters and less to the approval and support from the centre, i.e. the 
Executive Power. Political accountability was finally emerging since competition 
amongst the parties was real. Moreover, the political figures that began to compete for 
their positions became increasingly more representative of the demands of their 
supporters. Even Priista's newly elected officials seemed to be willing to replace their 
traditional roles as controllers of political demands and docile servants of the central 
Executive for a more active role in favour o f the local interests of their constituencies.24 
The new conditions for competition took place within the context o f economic disrupt 
and political scandals involving PRI members. Moreover, to the already precarious 
situation of the PRI was added the fact that in 1996 the party approved of the raising of 
VAT from 10 to 15 percent, a measure that was obviously highly unpopular. This was the 
situation under which the race for the government of Mexico City started. For the first 
time in history, Mexico City’s citizens were able to freely choose their governor and this 
gave to such an electoral process a more complex dimension and generated more 
expectations than most normal mid-term election. Along with the government of Mexico 
City, the Federal Congress was to be partially renewed and local congresses, 
municipalities and some governors were going to be elected also.
It is possible to say that the Elections of 1997 were the first ones o f the post-liberalisation 
period and the first ones in which the presence of the three largest parties was relatively 
equal, at least in Mexico City. In spite of certain minor incidents, the role played by the 
broadcasting media became crucial for making the conditions of elections quite balanced 
at least in the case of the Mexico City race for government, and for convoking the
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The case of Chihuahua in 1998 is perhaps the best example.
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population to vote and participate.25 The overall participation reached almost 60 percent 
of the 52 million 200 thousand registered citizens (Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5). At the 
national level, the PRI was the party that obtained more votes, since it was “the rival to be 
defeated” by opposition parties, and was still important with strong support, especially in 
rural areas. However, it lost the majority in the Chamber o f Deputies and in Mexico City 
it experienced a bitter defeat.
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Table 6.3
National Voting for Parties to the Federal Congress in 1997
Party Million Votes Percentage
PRI 10.050 38.86%
PAN 6.980 26.99%
PRD 6.620 25.59%
PVEM 0.998 3.86%
PT 0.663 2.56%
PFCRN 0.292 1.13%
PDM 0.173 0.67%
PPS 0.088 0.34%
Source: IFE: www.ife.ore.mx Resultados Electorales 1997.
Table 6.4
Composition of the Chamber of Deputies for the LVII Legislative Period, 1997-
2000*
Party Total Number of Seats Majority Deputies PR Deputies
PRI 239 164 75
PRD 125 70 55
PAN 122 65 57
PVEM 8 0 8
PT 6 1 5
* The PPS, PFCRN, and the PDM lost their registry as national political parties, surviving only as local 
parties.
Source: Elaborated with data collected from Directorio de la LVII Legislatura de la Cámara de Diputados 
and IFE’s internet webpage: www.ife.org.mx
35 See Chapters Seven and Eight.
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Table 6.5
Composition of the Senate for the LVII Legislative Period, 1997-2000*
Party Total Number of Senators | PR Senators
PRI 77 12
PAN 32 9
PRD 13 8
PVEM 1 1
PT 1 1 1
INDEPENDENTS 3 1 1*
* Former member of the PVEM.
Source: Elaborated with data from Directorio de la LVlll Legislatura de la Cámara de Diputados and 
IFE’s internet webpage: www.ife.org.mx
The PRI obtained the lowest total number of votes in its history and lost the simple 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time in history (in 1988 it obtained 265 
Deputies, equivalent to 53 percent), though it was still the largest minority party. To pass 
regulations that required a simple majority vote in Congress, negotiations with the 
opposition were mandatory. The only advantage that the PRI retained was that it could 
still block opposition law initiatives considered to be disadvantageous for the regime with 
its majority in the Senate, though the 1997 electoral defeat of the PRI was magnified 
because it lost the first electoral race for the Government of Mexico City. The twice 
nominated presidential candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas of the PRD won that crucial 
election with more than 47 percent of the votes, followed very far behind by the PRI 
candidate, Alfredo Del Mazo, with only 25 percent. The PRD also won in all of 40 
Mexico City’s electoral districts, and obtained a total of 44.5 percent o f the votes to the 
Local Legislative Assembly.
Immediately after the elections the results were accepted by all major political figures. 
President Zedillo declared on July 7th 1997, one day after the elections, that from then on 
no one could contend that in Mexico there was still an official regime’s party,26 a 
statement that was still quite arguable. Nevertheless, a great deal of important changes 
slowly altered the political landscape in Mexico. To start with and to put it simply: while 
in 1982 the PRI controlled 91 percent of all popular election charges in the country, after
26 La Jornada, July 7th 1997, front page.
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1997 that party only controlled 54 percent o f them.27 However, the electoral results 
showed a quite heterogeneous country where regional disparities, in terms o f  electoral 
competition testified that democracy was more a northern than southern phenomenon as 
well as being a more urban than rural characteristic of late twentieth century Mexico. The 
unanimity that prevailed during the PRI hegemony was thus replaced by a political life 
that developed at different speeds and that showed the dramatic challenges that the 
opposition parties were to over come in order to consolidate a stronger tri-partite system, 
since the PRI was still the only party with true national presence in all comers of the 
country. Political competition at local and regional levels involved generally only one o f 
the two opposition parties that was strong enough to challenge the PRI. In Northern states 
political competition occurred usually between the PRI and the PAN, whereas in some 
Southern states -an  exception being Yucatan, due to its particular history—the 
competition took place mostly between PRI and PRD. An exception was Mexico City. 
Further elections maintained that regional electoral map, even the 2000 elections, when at 
the end the most significant confrontation occurred between the PRI’s and the PAN’s 
candidates.
The 2000 electoral process can be considered as the end of the transition. In general 
terms, the norms regulating competition amongst the parties and political figures, were to 
be tested in a general electoral process. Since the 1996 Electoral Reform the last controls 
over the electoral arena were removed from the regime’s hands and more equitable 
conditions were secured for competition amongst the parties. However, the essential 
consequence of political accountability, (the peaceful replacement of one government for 
another at the will of the majority), was to be tested at the federal level for the very first 
time. The 2000 election was not a “ founding election” in the same way as the electoral 
processes in, say, Brazil or Argentina in the mid-1980s, since by that time opposition was 
already controlling the government o f many states, but it offered the possibilities for 
ousting the PRI from the presidential office.
The combination of these factors along with the emergence of stronger competition 
amongst the parties during the process and the acceptance of the electoral results by all
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poder político en México”, in Nexos, No. 247, July, México City 1998, p.42.
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the political figures involved, made the elections of July 2nd 2000 a formal finishing point 
for the long protracted transition process in Mexico. The clarity of the rules and the 
fairness of the conditions for competition in 2000 generated the strongest expectations 
ever for an electoral process. The parties invested large amounts of resources in 
advertising and in promoting their candidates through various means.28 Moreover, the 
PRI organised an internal primary process to select its candidate from amongst four 
notable politicians (out o f which, it must be said, only two had any real chances of 
winning). Though, at the end, the candidate who was closest to President Zedillo was 
nominated, he was selected by the votes of more than seven million individuals in an 
open election for all citizens. In spite of some minor irregularities in the PRI internal 
selection process, its victorious candidate, Francisco Labastida, gained a certain air of 
legitimacy that no previous PRI candidate had ever gained before.
The impact o f  the PRI internal election made the two largest opposition parties attempt 
the creation o f  a common electoral front to challenge the PRI. At the time when the PRI 
was in the middle of an internal competition among its pre-election candidates, the 
opposition parties initiated talks about the possibility of creating such national coalition 
to present, at least at the presidential level, a single candidate. However, at the end the 
divergent interests of the leading PAN and PRD politicians destroyed all possibilities for 
such coalition by early September 1999.29 Nevertheless, the PAN and the PRD separately 
negotiated alliances with other minor parties. The PAN coalesced with the Greens 
(PVEM) in what was denominated the Alliance for Change (AC), while the PRD created 
an Alliance for Mexico (AM) with the Partido del Trabajo, PT, and the recently created 
Convergencia Democratica, CD, Sociedad Nacionalista, PSN, and Alianza Social, PAS. 
In the elections, there also competed -and lost their register, since they could not obtain 
at least 2 percent of the voting—the Partido del Centro Democratico, PCD, Partido 
Democracia Social, PDS, and the old PARM.
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29 See for instance the decision of the PRD to nominate Cardenas as his candidate for the presidency in 
September 8th 1999, and the reactions that the PAN’s strongest candidate Vicente Fox had against the 
creation of an alliance that same day. See La Jornada, September 9th 1999.
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On the election day the voting participation reached 65 percent o f all registered voters.30 
The votes received by each party on the three federal elections -for President, for the 
Senate and for the Chamber—are shown on Table 6.5 below. As one can see, the real 
competition occurred between the PRI and the AC in all three processes. Table 6.6 shows 
the composition of the Chamber of Deputies after the 2000 elections. The PRI obtained 
42 percent of the seats, the Alliance for Change 44.8 percent and the Alliance for Mexico 
13.2 percent.
Table 6.5
Total Voting and Percentage for Presidential and Federal Congress Elections in July
2000
Political Party/Coalition
AC* PRI** AM*** PCD PARM PDS
President
15,988,544 13,576,189 6,259,018 208,527 157,119 592,072
42.52% 36.10% 16.64% 0.55% 0.42% 1.57%
Majority
Senators
14,203,588 13,692,186 7,024,999 521,086 274,766 669,650
38.11% 36.74% 18.85% 1.40% 0.74% 1.80%
Majority
Deputies
14,212,476 13,720,453 6,948,204 428,577 272,425 698,683
38.23% 36.91% 18.69% 1.15% 0.73% 1.88%
AC Candidate: Vicente Fox Quesada; ** PRI Candidate: Francisco Labastida Ochoa; ***AM Candidate: 
Cuauhtemoc CardenasS.
Source: Instituto Federal Electoral, México.
Table 6.6
Composition of the Chamber of Deputies for the LVIII Legislative Period, 2000-
2003
Party/Coalition Majority Deputies PR Deputies Total Number of 
Deputies
PRI 131 79 210
Alliance for Change (PAN- 
PVEM)
143 81 224
Alliance for Mexico (PRD- 
PT-PSN-PAS-CD)
26 40 66
T otal 300 200 500
Source: Instituto Federal Electoral, Mexico.
j0 At a local level, the race for the governments of Guanajuato and Morelos were won by the PAN, while in 
Mexico City the PRD repeated its 1997 victory
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In the Senate the PRI obtained 45.31 percent of the seats, while the Alliance for Change 
received 41.40 percent and the Alliance for Mexico the rest 13.28 percent. These results 
correspond to the following number o f senators per party/coalition:
Table 6.7
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Composition o: the Senate for the LVIII Legislative Period, 2000-2003
Party/Coalition Majority
Senators
PR Senators Total Number o f 
Senators
PRI 45 13 58
Alliance for Change 
(PAN-PVEM)
40 13 53
Alliance for Mexico
(PRD-PT-PSN-PAS-
CD)
11 6 17
Total 96 32 128
Source: Instituto Federal Electoral, Mexico.
In the presidential race, voters supported the alliance led by the PAN candidate Vicente 
Fox, who emerged as a charismatic and popular politician as he was representative of 
precisely the opposite of the traditional PRI candidates: his vernacular style made him 
appear more as the common-man rather than the more stereotypical stiff politician. The 
vote for the PAN can be explained not only because of the strength and the coherence of 
its ideology, but most of all for the fact that Fox was the candidate that, according to the 
polls, was more successful in promoting the anti-PRI sentiments along with the desire for 
change. During most of his campaign, Fox insisted that he was the candidate o f change, 
and even his coalition with other parties took that name.
At the same time, the situation for the PRI’s candidate was very difficult not only because 
the political and economic unrest and instability that has been already mentioned in this 
chapter, but also because this candidate was not able to break with the past. Historically 
one o f the actions that helped to restore the claims for legitimacy within a regime that did 
not allow true party competition for decades, was that even though the president in turn 
had the ultimate say in nominating the candidate, as soon as the nomination was made, 
the nominee immediately started to ground his (it was never a female) political project 
upon the denouncement o f  the past and the mistakes committed by the actual
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government. This attitude which was common to all PRI candidates was fundamental in 
giving hope to the population that “this time, things would improve”. One must also bear 
in mind that traditionally the official candidate was very seldom a close member of the 
president’s political group. The candidate was chosen among the secretaries of the 
cabinet, but the selection was also made amongst members of other groups of the 
“revolutionary family”, as this was crucial for unity. Also this process facilitated 
criticisms against the recent past during the campaigns, and allowed that such criticisms 
were not merely part of a formal protocol, but part of more substantial differences in the 
forms of perceiving politics among different groups. All this w'as possible because there 
was no true electoral competition, so the competition for power took place inside the 
party. Thus, in spite of being part of the same party as the president (and of having been 
members of his cabinet), the candidates wanted to make clear that they had the will to 
mend their predecessor’s failures and mistakes with new and different programmes. It 
was precisely this break with the past among Priistas that candidates could no longer 
practice once the electoral arena became a true ground for competition. It was to the 
opposition to play such role, not to the PRI’s candidate. Thus, it w'as opposition who was 
already criticising the government and preventing the PRI candidate from taking any 
credible critical position (especially since he himself had been Secretary of Gobernación 
in the cabinet). Moreover, opposition candidates, but especially Fox, were able to 
position Francisco Labastida as the “candidate of continuity”, being able thus to polarise 
the elections between two clear options: continuity or change. Watching the electoral 
results in which the vote for Fox amounted to 43.43 percent, it was not difficult to see 
what the electors wanted. For Labastida it became impossible to make a break with the 
past especially after all the support received from President during the PRI primary. 
Whatever the reasons that moved the voters to support opposition to the PRI, what is 
important to note is that the Elections o f 2000 finally consolidated the electoral arena as 
the place in which political demands could be peacefully and institutionally channelled, 
and as a space for disputing and competing for power. The scholar Héctor Aguilar Camin 
characterised these changes in 1997 in the following way,
Maybe all the epoch changes that Mexico is living could be seen as a long good-bye to the 
Mexican Revolution, a long good-bye to one o f the most successful and stable moments in the
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country’s history, a time of deep political agreement, high economic performance, and powerful 
institutionalisation; an epoch that, by reiteratively using the formulae of its past successes before 
actually new situations, transformed its virtuous circles into vicious circles, its public savings into 
debt, its clientelistic consensus into authoritarian corruption, its political leadership into excessive 
governmental controls, its balance into unsteadiness, and the expectations of its citizens into 
public unrest.31
However, at that very same time, the outcome of the Elections of 2000 posed enormous 
challenges to the parties since the nature of the traditional tri-partite system was altered. 
The PRI, once ousted from office, were to face the challenge to create a true centre of 
power in order to elaborate and present a coherent political project and to maintain 
discipline among its numerous federal deputies and senators, its state controlled 
congresses and local governments. The president used to play the cohesive (and 
controlling) role, and now it is the party -its top cadres—who will have to gain the 
strength and the ability to do so. The PAN now has to define its new relations with both 
its parliamentary group and the federal executive, which is not a simple task given the 
fact that inside the party many believe that President Fox (a PAN newcomer) “imposed 
himself’ on the traditional cadres, and such resentment can bear a high price to a 
government when seeking support from its party in congress. The PRD, who came third 
in the electoral outcomes, must re-define its ideological discourse based upon a reality 
very much inspired by the 1968 student movement ideas (anti-imperialism, Althusserian 
socialist views, ideological discourse based upon values that impede them to negotiate 
with any other political organisation -since negotiation is regarded for many inside the 
PRD as treason), and lacking in real political and economic alternatives for a quickly 
changing society.
What is clear is that finally in México, political differences seemed to be agreed upon 
through the electoral arena, (as one o f  the most important channels), in which the parties 
are given the main responsibility for articulating demands. The setting is thus agreed 
upon, now only time will prove its adequacy, since what is still missing is the 
negotiations on the content o f new rules for political life.
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Chapter Seven
Mexican TV in the Late 1990s: An Accelerated Openness
In spite o f the constant growth of political opposition in Mexico throughout the 1980s, this 
was certainly not reflected on the TV screens. Even during the competed elections of 1994, 
television presented only partial coverage that explicitly favoured the official party. 
However, in sharp contrast with what has been its traditionally closed handling of political 
information, after 1996 private television started to play a crucial role as a more 
independent source of political information. These changes were noticeable both during the 
campaigns o f 1997 and the electoral race o f 2000, when the information presented on the 
TV screens was not biased in favour o f the PRI and its candidates, but instead was quite 
impartial.
The explanation for such openness has to do with the emergence o f a competition scheme 
that seriously altered the conditions of the quasi-monopoly in which Mexican private TV 
had been developing for decades. Though a new private terrestrial TV network appeared in 
1992 out o f the privatisation of the public TV network Imevision, it was not until 1995- 
1996 that true competition between the two largest private consortiums -Televisa and TV 
Azteca—developed its most fierce aspects. Competition forced both networks to invest 
more, to implement new investment and publicity policies, and to seek new alliances to 
strengthen their positions and raise the ratings.
Additionally, in 1996 a new electoral reform was passed that granted the political parties 
the largest amount of resources ever for investing in political advertising. This proved to be 
highly favourable for fostering the openness of television, since the networks started 
disputing those large sums of money granted to the parties by the IFE. The issuing of a new 
electoral reform in 1996 not only reiterated the recommendations of 1994 on the ways in 
which they media should present information on the campaigns and implemented new 
mechanisms for monitoring that information, but most decisively the Reform of 1996 
provided the political parties with more air-time on television and the largest amount of 
resources ever to be spent on commercial adverts and publicity. This situation coincided
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with the increasing importance o f political marketing tools as a means o f developing 
political campaigns.
Increasing competition in the TV market and the Reform o f  1996
As was discussed in Chapter Four, though there existed in Mexico other terrestrial TV 
options, including a public channel, their audiences were so low that for all practical 
matters the creation of Televisa in 1973 consolidated a quasi-monopolistic television 
service in the country, operating with enormous profits, protection and advantages. 
Moreover, during the following twenty years Televisa experienced spectacular growth 
allowing it to successfully expand its satellite coverage over almost all the national 
territory1 -Televisa was already transmitting through satellite in the U.S. by the end of the 
1970s1 2— and many other countries worldwide.3 By the beginning of the 1990s Televisa 
inaugurated its Direct To Home TV or DTH in order to cover the Latin American market.4
1 Since 1985 Televisa profited from the Mexican satellite system (first the Morelos I and II and later of the 
Solidaridad I and II) to cover the Mexican territory with its signals. In November 1993 Televisa received the 
concessions to operate 62 television stations that were part of the IMEVISION system.
2 In May 1980 the firm signed up a contract with the Secretariat of Communications and Transport through 
with an agreement was reached to install 80 land stations for satellite services, of which Televisa would 
finance the building of 46. The agreement established that Televisa would give those stations to the 
government in exchange for priority of transmission when only one channel could be sent through those 
means and for a discount on the tariffs charged by the Secretariat for the transmission of television signals. At 
the end, Televisa only installed 32 stations. (Mejia Barquera, “Del Canal 4 a Televisa”, in Miguel Angel 
Sánchez de Armas (coord.), Apuntes para una historia de la televisión mexicana, Mexico City. Revista 
Mexicana de Comunicación and Televisa, 1998, pgs.52-53).
J In the 1980s Televisa also expanded and consolidated important positions in the U.S., Latin America and 
Europe. By 1986, after the decree of a U.S. Judicial Power that obliged Azcárraga to sell his partnership in the 
Spanish International Communication Corporation, his businesses in the United States were re-allocated to 
UNI VIS A, a corporation that controlled the following firms: ECO, Spanish International Network, 
FONOVISA, GALAVISION, PROTELE, Grupo Industrial UNIVISA, VIDEOVISA and Univisa Satellite 
Corporation. By the beginning of the 1990s Televisa continued its expansion. In December 1991 Televisa 
announced the acquisition of 49 percent of the shares of the Chilean TV network Megavisión. In January 
1993 it acquired 50 percent of the shares of the Pan American Satellite Co. In June that year, it bought 25 
percent of the shares of the National Bolivia ATB-Network. In February 1988, UNIVISION was sold to the 
firm Hallmark Cards, Inc., but in 1992, Televisa, associated with Venivision of Venezuela and with the 
American entrepreneur Jerrold Perenchio bought the UNIVISION network of Miami with 581 stations in the 
country. Though at first Televisa owned 25 o f the shares, after a public share bid ini 996, the consortium kept 
only 19.8 percent of it. (Ibid., pgs56-57; Grupo Televisa, Informe Anual ¡996, Mexico City, Bolsa Mexicana 
de Valores, 1997, p.23).
4 For the provision of DTH services Televisa associated with the Medcom enterprise of Clemente Sema, the 
old partner of Emilio Azcárraga Milmo in Radio Programas de México. In Mexico, two DTH TV systems 
started to operate at the end of 1996. The competitor with Televisa’s SKY -as its DTH service was named—is
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In November 1995 Televisa announced the launching of its DTH service, called SKY 
Entertainment Services in association with Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation and the 
gigantic Brazilian O ’Globo network, each contributing 30 percent of the shares. The 
remaining 10 percent was invested by Tele Communications International, Inc. SKY who 
started operating by the end of 1996. Televisa also explored the European DTH markets 
and by November that year it announced a project-Plataforma de Televisión Digital—in 
which Televisa became a partner o f Telefónica de España, the largest investor (35%), 
Radio y TV Española (17%), Antena 3 (17%), Televisión de Catalunya (6%), Telemadrid 
(4%), Canal 9 (2%), Televisión de Galicia (1%) and Unidad Editorial (l% ).* 5 This 
expansion to new communication technologies brought Televisa to the level of a true 
multimedia corporation.
However, in the Mexican terrestrial TV system the main competitor for Televisa appeared 
after the privatising in 1992 of the public network Imevision, which consisted of Channel 7 
and Channel 13. The network was renamed Television Azteca, TV Azteca, and it 
immediately sought to position itself in the TV market with a very similar programming 
offer as Televisa’s. Moreover, its CEO, Ricardo Salinas Pliego, explicitly announced his 
wish to dispute Televisa’s position. TV Azteca invested more than 20 million USD in 
expanding the coverage capacity of his Channel 13 by 65 percent and of his Channel 7 by 
40 percent.6 Between 1993 and 1997, TV Azteca increased the number of stations for 
Channel 13 from 90 to 128 and for Channel 7 from 78 to 120.7 The main policies of the 
network were directed towards increasing its audiences and to eventually producing their 
own programmes at top rating times (between 19:30 and 22:30) which by 1994 was only 24
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Multivision, owned by Joaquin Vargas, who allied with Hughes Electronics in order to introduce its 
alternative DTH service called DirecTV. However, by 1997 they still did not have a very large clientele 
(estimated in 450 thousand, according to...). One important reason might have been be the prices for 
subscription. For instance, Televisa’s SKY hiring cost in 1997 was of US $ 370, while Multivision’s DirecTV 
cost w'as of US $ 319. In both cases, the subscriber has to pay a monthly rent that in 1998 was around US$ 25 
that for a vast majority of the population it means a sum of money that they cannot afford paying. See 
Alejandro Olmos, “La TV en 1996: nexos políticos, pugnas y sensacionalismo", in Revista Mexicana de 
Comunicación, no.47, February-March. Mexico City, Fundación Manuel Buendia, 1997.
5 By the end of that year. Antena 3 decided to separate from the group, and both Televisa and RTVE increased 
their shares to 25,5 percent, See Mejia Barquera (1998), p.60.
6 Alejandro Olmos, “Del Canal 13 a TV Azteca”, in Miguel Ángel Sánchez de Armas (coord.), Apuntes para 
una historia de la televisión mexicana, Mexico City, Revista Mexicana de Comunicación and Televisa, 1998, 
p.130.
' Mejía Barquera, La Crónica de Hoy, August 25th 1997, p,22.
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percent. They were successful, since three years later they were already producing 83 
percent of its programming at top rating times.8
In 1994 TV Azteca incorporated local programming in the states of Nuevo León, Jalisco, 
Baja California and Guerrero in order to have a better anchor at a regional level. Three 
years later TV Azteca had stations operating with local programming in Tijuana, Ciudad 
Juárez, Chihuahua, La Paz, Torreón, Monterrey, San Luis Potosí, León, Guadalajara, 
Toluca, Mexico City, Mérida, Veracruz, Cancún, Cuernavaca, Puebla, Tabasco and 
Acapulco, which represented an increase of 64 percent with respect to 1996.9 In the same 
fashion as Televisa, TV Azteca started its expansion to the US,10 1Latin America,11 and into 
other communication technologies.12 The value o f the network increased from US $ 645 
million, the amount paid by Salinas Pliego in 1992, to US S 2.4 billion in 1997. Also in the 
case o f the news broadcast programmes, TV Azteca decided to create a specific division in 
charge o f co-ordinating all its information and research programmes.13 In June 24th 1996, 
this new division, called Fuerza Informativa Azteca, was formed under the co-ordination of 
the journalists Sergio Sarmiento (who was also the Vice-President of News) and Maribel 
Diaz (Director of News in TV Azteca). At the same time a new programme dedicated 
entirely to information and entertainment, ¡Hola México! was launched.
The rapid expansion of TV Azteca eventually came to represent a serious competition for 
Televisa, even in areas where the latter traditionally dominated like the soap-operas, and 
eventually led both networks to transmit sensationalist programmes in order to maintain 
higher ratings than its counterpart.14 By mid-1996 the competition was transformed in what
8 Sabás Huesca Rebolledo, “La noticia por televisión", in Miguel Ángel Sánchez de Armas and María del 
Pilar Ramírez (coords.), Apuntes para una historia de la televisión mexicana, Mexico City, Revista Mexicana 
de Comunicación and Televisa, 1999, p.85.
9 Azteca Avances, information publication of TV Azteca, no.24, February 1997, pgs.4-5.
10 In 1996 it associated with the US firm Telemundo, rival of UNIVISION, in order to produce programmes 
and series.
11 Up until 1998, TV A2teca bought shares in Channel 35 of Guatemala (60%), Channel 12 of El Salvador 
(75%), and Channel 13 of Dominican Republic (50%). However, the expansion to these countries was not 
limited only to television, but also to those o f radio communication services and department stores. El 
Universal, Espectáculos, April 27th 1997, p.5. In January 1998 it acquired 75 percent of the shares of Channel 
4 of Chile, known as La Red (La Jornada, January 9th 1998). That year in April it also bought 35 percent of 
the shares of Channel 4 of Costa Rica {La Jornada, April 1 Ith 1998).
12 It also launched its records producer Azteca Music, S.A.
b El Universal, Espectáculos, June 22nd 1996, p.l 1.
14 An example of this crude competition occurred in 1996, when TV Azteca launched a televised version of 
the most sensationalist tabloids, Expediente 13, 22:30, shortly followed by Ciudad Desnuda, dedicated to
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was called by the press “the war of the TV”.15 It was noticeable that during this conflict, 
both networks published long insertions in the newspapers on which both cited different 
institutions dedicated to measuring ratings and public opinion, like the famous Brazilian
IBOPE or Nielsen International, in which each alleged their victory with regard to viewer 
preferences. Each one also declared the inaccuracy of their competitor’s statistics. 
However, an independent study revealed that by mid-1996 TV Azteca’s news broadcast, 
Hechos, had a 23 percent higher viewer rating than Televisa’s 24 Horas,16
Of course, the increasing competition among the networks, as reflected in their 
programming, their mutual attacks and their fierce fights for clientele wras also reflected in
f l  I-I L
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the publicity market by 1996 and 1997. From 1994 to 1996 TV Azteca had raised the 
number of its clientele from 52 to 265,17 and this naturally affected the shares of Televisa in 
the publicity market. For instance, in 1995 TV Azteca signed a contract with Unilever, one
showing bloody accidents, crimes, arrests and the like, with such success that the latter was transmitted twice 
a day (leaving for the evening transmission the coldest scenes). Televisa counter-attacked and produced 
Cerezo Rojo, A sangre fría and A través del video. By July 1996 the networks were dedicating more than 24 
hours per week to such programmes (See Olmos [1997], p.7). The competition was leading the networks to 
present more brutal stories with more explicit scenes in order to increase their audiences. This attirude 
provoked President Zedillo himself to declare several occasions that such programmes should not be 
transmitted on TV due to their high degree of explicit violence. Though this statement was supported by 
religious and families’ organisations, it became controversial at a time when many other groups were 
defending the freedom of the press. In June 7th 1996, the Day of the Freedom of the Press, President Zedillo 
delivered a speech in which he underlined the need for establishing ethic codes to normalise the contents of 
the programming, though he insisted on the fact that such codes should be designed by the media themselves 
(See La Jornada, June 8th 1996). The idea was immediately supported by PRI, PAN and PRD Senators, 
entrepreneurial leaders and other civil society organisations, such as the A favor de Lo Mejor en Los Medios. 
Moreover, these arguments were reiterated by both Zedillo and his Secretary of Gobernación, Emilio 
Chuayffet, during the Week of Radio Broadcasting in October (See their declarations in Reforma, October
15th 1996 and El Financiero, October 16th 1996). Though the networks did not cancel the transmissions of 
these programmes, they modified their content and became relatively more careful about the stories they 
presented.
15 This episode started during the first two weeks of July 1996 due to some declarations that the imprisoned 
brother of former President Carlos Salinas, Raúl, made to the Swiss Prosecutors who wanted to know the 
origin of the money he had in Swiss bank accounts. Raul Salinas confessed to having made some business 
with Ricardo Salinas Pliego, the president of TV Azteca. This issue was used by Televisa to present a series 
of transmissions, most of them in its opinion programme Detrás de la Noticia, hosted by Ricardo Rocha, in 
w hich the goal was to show the irregularity of the credits with which Salinas Pliego made his businesses. TV 
Azteca replied with long programmes in which Sergio Sarmiento, the then Director of Broadcasts of that same 
network, interviewed Salinas Pliego with the clear intention of praising his honesty. Eventually, both 
networks resorted even to open insults and to the elaboration of negative propaganda, like the TV Azteca‘s 
programme Este Enterado, which entitled its transmission of July 8lh "The cowardliness of Ricardo Rocha". 
The mutual attacks continued for the next months. Finally, by mid-October the reiterated interventions of the 
Secretary of Gobernación seemed to have helped to end the conflict (See Reforma, November 4th 1996).
16 The study cited was conducted by MORI de Mexico, and was published by Este Pais in its edition of 
February 14th 1996.
17 Alberto Aguilar, “Nombres, nombres”, in Reforma, September 10,h 1996.
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of the most prestigious publicity agencies,18 that represents such well known brands as 
Pond’s, Angel Face, Brut, Zwan Food Products, and Clemente Jacques. For the first time, 
this company decided not to sign an exclusive contract with Televisa. Another example was 
the dispute over the transmission of football games. Formerly transmitted almost in 
exclusivity by Televisa (who also owned some football teams), in 1997 TV Azteca bought 
the rights to broadcast the matches from the stadiums of Cruz Azul, Neza, Santos, Celaya, 
Leon, besides owning 80 percent o f  the shares of Morelia and Veracruz football teams 
(which it sold in January 1999).19
One must remark that since 1994 TV Azteca began to offer its clientele an attractive 
publicity package known as the “Mexican Plan”, an alternative to the “French Plan” offered 
by Televisa since 1981. The advantage of the former’s plan was that the customer was to 
pay in relation to the real rating points of each programme. This meant that if a firm 
originally bought some spaces in a programme classified with 15 rating points, but after a 
transmission it did not reach that rating level, TV Azteca would compensate the difference 
with extra air-time. The outcome o f this situation was that during 1997 Televisa’s share of 
commercial publicity, whose total in 1996 was calculated in US $ 1,250 million,20 
diminished by 14.9 percent, while that of TV Azteca raised by 18.5 percent.21 All this 
affected the economic performance of Televisa.22 A change in the business strategy of 
Televisa was necessary.
The company decided to concentrate on the production market and on financial 
efficiency.23 Televisa announced the selling of its shares to some companies. It sold 37
ts According to the Fortune magazine, this firm is ranked number 38 among the 500 more influential world 
corporations. Reforma, October 1st 1996.
19 By the end of 1996, nine teams had signed with TV Azteca and the other nine remained with Televisa.
20 La Jornada, October 30th 1996.
Alva de la Selva, “La televisión en 1997: expansión y lucha de poder”, in Revista Mexicana de 
Comunicación, no.52, January-February, Mexico City, Fundación Manuel Buendía, 1998, p.7.
22 In December 1996 the total sells of Televisa were of $11.5 billion pesos, while its debts raised to $ 20 
billion pesos (see El Universal, April 17th 1998).
23 In October 1996 Manuel Rubiralta, who had been the president of Pepsi Cola Company in Mexico, was 
hired as the new director of the commercialisation area. At the same rime, it hired well known actors and 
media personnel with proven experience in order to strengthen professionalism and secure higher ratings. In 
this way, for example, Guillermo Ochoa, an experienced communicator who had been fired in 1993 due to an 
interview he had with the leader of the oil workers that deeply infuriated President Salinas, was rehabilitated. 
Also two extremely popular Mexican artists, the pop singer Gloria Trevi and the composer and singer Juan 
Gabriel, were also hired again by Televisa after a ban of some years.
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percent o f its shares of the street publicity company Vendor by mid-1996,24 and another 44 
percent in June 1998.25 Shortly afterwards, Televisa sold 51 percent of its shares to the 
private radio communications company Skytel.26 The TV network decided to retain only 
the 28.8 percent o f the shares of the world-wide satellite company PanAmSat and to sell the 
rest to Hughes Electronics Corporation.27 Also, Televisa decided to capitalise on its cable 
TV company, Cablevision, by selling 49 percent of its shares to the strong Grupo Carso, 
owner of the telephone company Telmex.28
In May 1997 the new Televisa President, Emilio Azcarraga Jean, announced what was 
called the “Televisa 2000 Strategic Plan” which w'as meant to reduce the operation costs of 
the company by USD S 270 million, to raise its audience, and to develop the DTH TV 
system.29 With the application o f this plan they expected annual savings of USD S 90 
million for the period 1998-2000. Among other policies, Televisa’s strategy emphasised a 
reduction in the salaries of its top executives, of over-time payments, and of travel 
expenses, as well as the re-negotiation of the conditions for renting buildings and other 
facilities, the better use of the spaces within the company, a decrease in the publicity 
expenditures of its music division, and the disappearance o f some low circulation 
magazines.30 By the beginning of 1999 Televisa was also designing policies to reduce its 
debts and to get fresh investments. Televisa reached further agreements with the Carso 
Group through which the later was supposed to invest more than USD S 160 million for the 
following four years in Televisa’s projects.31
In the case of TV Azteca, though it was the main profiteer from the loses of Televisa,32 the 
strong competition brought some setbacks as well. The re-structuring of the firm during the 
1995-1998 period was characterised by austerity. During the first semester of 1998 TV 
Azteca announced a 12 percent employee lay-off (400 labour posts disappeared).33 Later
u  Reforma, July 27* 1996.
25 La Jornada, June 9* 1998.
26 El National May 20th 1996.
27 La Jornada, July 18* 1996, p.42.
28 Reforma, October 9* 1996.
29 Reforma, Negocios, May 22nd 1997.
20 La Jornada, May 22"d 1997.
Jl La Jornada, Februrary 2,lJ 1999.
32 For instance, during the transmission of the World Cup in France during the Summer ofl998, TV Azteca 
obtained USD S 57 million in advertising, while Televisa "only” USD $ 50 million {Reforma. July 31“ 1998).
JJ El Financiero, March 3 1st 1998.
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that year, in September, it was confirmed that the total expenditures of the company would 
be cut down to a minimum.34 As a consequence it cancelled the formation of a merging 
firm which would manage all the businesses of Salinas Pliego; it reduced by 10 percent the 
salaries o f its executives; it cut by 20 percent its administration and selling expenditures; it 
postponed the expansion o f the firm to other Latin American countries other than the ones 
in which it had already invested; and the total amount o f the company’s investment was to 
be trimmed down from S US 35 to S US 25 million.35
One must note that it was within this general situation o f strong competition and economic 
re-structuring of the TV networks that the CEO of Televisa, Emilio Azcárraga Milmo, died 
(April 16th 1997) at the age of sixty-six.36 His son, Emilio Azcárraga Jean, who entered in 
the company in 1991,37 was already general director of the Grupo Televisa since March 4th 
of that year, a charge given to him by his father, who also hired Guillermo Cañedo White as 
chairman o f the board of administration. However, after his father’s death, Azcárraga Jean 
started to take complete control o f the company.38 Firstly, he took over the post of Cañedo 
White on the board of administration. The pressure Azcárraga Jean put on Cañedo White 
obliged he and his brother (who also worked in Televisa) to sell his family shares to 
Azcárraga Jean and leave the company.39 Then, the young CEO created an Executive 
Committee in order to “strengthen the direction of the corporation through a more 
professional and specialised style, instead of the previous relying on the individual
34 Alejandro Olmos, “Algunos protagonistas de la televisión”, in Miguel Ángel Sánchez de Armas and María 
Del Pilar Sevilla (coords.), Apuntes para una historia de la televisión mexicana ¡l, Mexico City, Revista 
Mexicana de Comunicación and Televisa, 1999, p.314.
35 It should be noticed, however, that there are other businesses in which Salinas Pliego participates, like 
Gmpo Elektra (a retailing department store), Tiendas Hecali (low-cost clothing stores), Biper (private radio 
communication services), Radioed (mobile phone systems) and Unefon (radio communication services for 
enterprises).
’ft A biography on the life and the ways in which Emilio Azcarraga Milmo built Televisa: Claudia Fernandez, 
El Tigre: Emilio Azcarraga y su imperio Televisa, Mexico City, Grijalbo, 1999.
3' That year he entered the management board of the company due to a cession of shares (10 percent) that his 
father had made on his behalf. Afterwards he became Vice-president of the North Western Division of 
Televisa, Vice-president of Programming and in 1996 Chief o f  Operations of Televisa.
38 Several changes in the composition of the board took place and, of course, in the ownership of the 
shareholdings. At the moment of the death of Azcárraga Milmo in April 1997 the shares of Televisa were 
distributed as follows: Azcárraga Milmo, 41.4 percent; Alejandro Burillo Azcárraga, 14 percent; Miguel 
Alemán Velasco and his son, 14.4 percent; Emilio Azcárraga Jean, 10 percent; Paula Cussi Presa Matute, 10 
percent; José Antonio Cañedo White, 5.1 percent; and Guillermo Cañedo White, 5.1 percent (see Proceso, 
n. 1081, July 20,h 1997, p.7).
39 By July that year the shareholders had changed as following: Azcárraga Jean, 52 percent; Miguel Alemán 
and son 14.4 percent; Alejandro Burillo, 14 percent; and other shareholders the rest of the shares.
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leadership [that characterised the age of Azcárraga Milmo]”.40 In May 1997, Azcárraga 
Jean announced a strategy to reduce expenditure by around S US 200 million and in the 
operation costs by 35 percent by the year 2000.41
Along with this change towards more efficiency in the economic and financial performance 
of the company, the new executives in Televisa decided to change the image of the 
company, (the traditional logo of the company was even replaced by a new more colourful 
one). In May 1997 the area of news broadcasts was totally re-structured and the new vice- 
president o f the news division, Miguel Alemán Velasco, promised drastic changes to come 
in that area. Moreover, on Sunday November 9th 1997, The Miami Herald published an 
interview given by Azcárraga Jean in which he emphasised that,
Now there is an openness in the Mexican political system that requires an openness in the news 
broadcasts system as well. There will be a new form of conducing the news, a new' rhythm, and a 
new format. It will be as if we had started all over again.42
Shortly afterwards in July 25th, Emilio Azcarraga Jean transmitted a message within the 
closed-circuit system of the company to its more than 30 thousand employees in which he 
presented the new criteria that would-guide the functions and the performance of Televisa. 
On that occasion he also answered some questions related to the traditional support of 
Televisa for the PRI. He expressly emphasised the freedom of the employees to vote for the
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party that they preferred, and that the attitude of the company in relation to all o f the parties 
would be balanced.43 As for the news broadcasts, the changes were quickly noticed. In 
January 19th 1998, after 27 years of being the most important and permanent news 
broadcast on the Mexican television -but also one that was highly identified with the PRI 
regime— 24 Horas transmitted its last programme.44 An episode in the development of
40 Alvade la Selva(1998), p.5.
41 Azcárraga Jean also announced the sale of 14 percent of Televisa's shares in Univision and the closing of 
the Contemporary Art Cultural Centre, a museum and art gallery that Televisa inaugurated in 1986. Olmos 
(1999), p.302.
42 The Miami Herald, November 9:h 1997.
43 Reforma, July 26th 1997.
44 An opinion survey conducted by the newspaper Reforma and published in January 18,h 1998 reported that 
still in those days the large majority of the individuals interviewed considered 24 Horas to have had either 
some or much influence on the political life of the country. Enrique Sánchez Ruiz, “Fin del antiguo régimen 
televisivo”, in Reforma, January 18th 1998.
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Mexican TV came to an end and Jacobo Zabludowsky, the anchorman o f 24 Horas, 
commented in relation to his imminent substitution that,
The news broadcasts reflect the situation that the country experiences, and today it is a moment 
when the lack of credibility affects the institutions, all broadcasts included, not only those of 
Televisa... In Mexico, today there is an apertura previously unknown and in this context there also 
emerges a new competitor, who we welcome... The news broadcasts were at many times influenced 
by the circumstances of the times. If we suffered from a loss of credibility, it may have happened as 
a consequence of such an influence.45
Apparently, everyone inside the corporation wanted to emphasise that new policies should 
be implemented in order for it to become more competitive, and in many respects these new 
policies implied a rupture with the old compromises that the corporation had with the 
regime, which were based on the exclusion of alternative voices -and incomes— from the 
political arena. In relation to this point, Azcârraga Jean made a public declaration in March 
20th 1998 in which he emphasised that the new policies o f Televisa were to be completely 
different from those of the past, characterised by strong links to the PRI. He said that,
The relation between the government and the media has been long over... The old relation obeyed 
to a previous governmental structure... but today there is opposition and competition in the TV, 
whose outcome is a weaker and weaker manipulation of the information.46
If such declarations were not enough to make the new policies of the company clear in 
relation to politics and to the ways political information was to be presented in the news 
broadcasts, in August 1998 Azcârraga Jean remarked again that,
I am not a politician, moreover, I do not understand much about it... I do not believe that having
links with politicians would be beneficial for us in matters of our substantial concern. I believe in 
4?ratings.
What lies underneath of all these declarations is the recognition that economic competition 
was the most important concern for the company, and that to remain alien to the voices of 
other political alternatives was equivalent to losing competitiveness for the publicity market
45 Interview of Daniel Moreno to Zabludowsky in the weekly supplément “Enfoque”, Reforma, November 
16* 1997.
46 Reforma, March 2 lth 1998.
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as a whole, especially, as will be shown below, since the Electoral Reform of 1996 
provided the parties with the largest amount of resources ever to spend on advertising (of 
which a substantial part was invested on TV). Thus, these young executives were 
characterised by a higher concern with the running o f their businesses than with politics 
and, therefore, it became increasingly clear to them that a more open political arena would 
mean larger sums o f money for parties to spend on ads. For these entrepreneurs the 
Electoral Reform of 1996 translated democracy into a highly profitable business.
The Electoral Reform of 1996 established new legal dispositions to grant equity in the 
access of the parties to the broadcasting media. The Reform o f 1996 authorised the IFE 
through its Commission of Radio Broadcast to carry out a constant monitoring of the way 
the media presented information on the political campaigns. On December 13th 1996 the 
IFE made public a series of fairness criteria to be followed by the broadcasting media in 
relation to the political information. Through these criteria, the IFE expected the National 
Chamber of the Industries of Radio and Television (CIRT) to induce its members to present 
information related to the campaigns in a more equilibrated manner. These criteria were the 
same as those that the IFE established in February 1994 for the elections that year.47 8
As in 1994, the IFE was to monitor the adherence to the criteria and to make public its 
findings. But these recommendations alone had already proved in 1994 that they were not 
enough to push the TV companies towards political impartiality. What changed things this 
time was the crude competition that started to take place between the corporations and, 
under such circumstances, the immense opportunity for doing business with the vast 
resources that the IFE was to provide for the campaigns advertised in the media. According 
to the 1996 Law, there are three modalities for spending on media advertising. Firstly, 
additionally to the regular fifteen minutes monthly that each party can have in the electronic 
media (Article 44), the 1996 Reform established that during electoral times the parties 
could enjoy up to 200 hours on TV and 250 on radio when a general election takes place, 
and up to 100 hours on TV and 125 on radio when a mid-term election takes place (Article
47 Reforma, August 17th 1998.
48 Again, the criteria were: objectivity; uniform quality in the handling of information; right of the candidates 
and parties to clarify information; a special section for informing on the campaigns within the news 
broadcasts; similar air-time for all parties without discrimination; specification of all pre-paid information;
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47, paragraph I-a and I-b). With this time, the parties can produce programmes o f 5, 7 and 
10 minutes. Secondly, Article 47 paragraph I-c, establishes that during electoral periods the 
IFE will buy and distribute to the parties each month up to ten thousand adverts on radio 
and four hundred on TV. The duration o f each of these ads will be of twenty seconds and 
will be aimed at advertising only. Both modalities of time -that allocated for programmes 
and that for advertising ads—are distributed amongst the parties as following: 4 percent 
goes to parties without representation in Congress (Article 47, paragraph 2), while the 
others are allocated 30 percent with equal terms for all parties and 70 percent according to 
their share o f votes in the previous electoral process (Article 47, paragraph 3). O f course, 
the stations were to be paid for all this ad space.
Thirdly, these types of media spaces, bought and distributed to the parties by the IFE, does 
not exclude the possibility for the parties to buy additional advertising time in the media, as 
Article 48 states. For instance, for the 1997 elections the Congress authorised the IFE the 
distribution o f US S 278 million to the parties, five times more than in 1994. These funds 
were allocated amongst the parties as follows: 30 percent on equal terms for all parties and 
70 percent according to their share of the votes in the previous election. In this way, the 
PRI obtained US $111.5 million, the PAN US $ 66 million, the PRD US $ 49 million, and 
the rest went to the other parties. O f this money, the parties utilised large sums to buy ads.49
In this way, the Reform of 1996 became a definitive incentive for the TV networks to 
compete for the parties’ advertising, thus contributing indirectly, to the openness o f the 
political arena by trying to maintain balanced, relatively fair, and impartial information in 
their news broadcasts. The constant monitoring of the IFE provided the parties with the 
information required on the eventual “dis-information” or partiality of the TV channels -
respect for candidates’ private life; and this time they included the obligation for the IFE itself to make public 
the results of the periodic monitoring. For the 1994 criteria see Chapter Four.
49 According to a study conducted by Miguel Acosta, Miguel A. Garcia and Nestor Vargas, the PRD was the 
party that bought the largest number of TV ads with 271 (21.7 percent), followed by the PRI with 265 (21.2 
percent) and by the PAN with 251 (20.1 percent). This same study revealed that the PAN and the PRD 
preferred to buy spaces in Channel 2 (Televisa), while, in general terms, PRI, PVEM and PT preferred 
Channel 13 (TV Azteca). It was noticeable that at the highest rating times (AAA Time), Televisa’s Channel 2 
charged US $ 60 thousand for a 30 seconds advert, while TV Azteca’s Channel 13 (Premium Time) charged 
US $ 900 for equivalent time, (see Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos, Observación de gastos de 
camapaña para Jefe de Gobierno del Distrito Federal, Mexico City, AMDH, 1997). The AAA Time in 
Televisa’s Channel 2 runs from 17:00 to 24:00 p.m. hours from Monday to Friday (for the rest of Televisa’s 
channels this time starts at 19:00 p.m.); TV Azteca’s Premium Time runs from 19:00 to 24:00 p.m. from 
Monday to Friday.
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which was very low, as has been seen—and thus became a mechanism for them to judge a 
channel as a possible means for allocating its advertising. This was, thus, a clientele that the 
TV networks could not risk rejecting. O f a publicity market that in 1997 was calculated in 
US S 1.7 billion, the parties contributed 6.5 percent of it, making it obvious the great 
business that it represented for the TV networks, especially when competition had turned 
into a sort of zero-sum game for them.50
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero_________________________________________ Chapter Seven
Electoral processes o f  ¡997 and 2000
If the coverage o f the 1994 electoral campaigns on TV was still marked by unfairness and 
an overt promotion of the official party’s positions, the 1997 and 2000 campaigns were 
conversely covered in an unusually open and balanced way. The mid-term electoral process 
of 1997 took place in a moment characterised by the deep economic shock of 1995 (-6.9 
decrease in GDP), whose effects were felt strongly by the population. As in the past, 
economic instability fuelled the opposition vote, but this time, after more than a decade o f 
recurrent economic crises and with stronger opposition parties, the possibilities for them to 
inflict a serious defeat to the PR1 were higher than at any other time. Special attention was 
paid to the race for Mexico City’s government, for the first time subjected to popular vote, 
and to the possible composition of the Congress, the key for passing laws. Journalists, 
specialists and academics spoke about a crucial stage in the Mexican transition process. In 
any case, the strong competition that marked the electoral process -mainly in Mexico 
City—created the idea that a major defeat for the PRI was not only possible, but imminent.
In order to avoid any possible fraud, measures were taken to secure the credibility o f the 
process. The IFE decided then to take specific actions for granting the transparency and the 
fairness o f the electoral process. For instance, some members o f different opposition parties 
claimed that the Federal Electoral Registry (RFE), which included the names and 
identification of all voters, could be misused to favour the PRI. The IFE then spent more 
than USS 3 million in verifying the data contained on the RFE and providing the parties 
with a copy of all the information about the organisation and the costs of the elections.
50 Adcebra, no.68, October 1997.
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Another problem that opposition parties raised referred to the traditional partiality of 
television as seen during the 1994 elections.
The IFE announced that its Commission for Broadcasting was to conduct a careful 
monitoring o f the ways in which the media presented information on the campaigns and the 
candidates- The monitoring o f the IFE covered from April 16lh to July 3rd 1997. The total 
time for the campaigns on television -taking into account local TV stations and channels— 
was 258 hours, 13 minutes and 43 seconds, which were divided among the different parties 
as shown in Table 7.1. The time on this table refers to the time TV channels devoted to 
information on the campaigns on their news broadcasts, i.e. unpaid and, hopefully, neutral 
time, and not to the ad time bought by the parties or by the IFE.
Table 7.1
Coverage Time for Parties on TV News Broadcasts (including local TV channels),
April 13th -July 3rd 1997
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PR] PRD PAN PT PVEM PDM PPS PFCRN
Time 106h 41' 45h 44' 53h 51” 26h 46’ 5h 53’ 5h 12’ 4h 55’ 9h 7’
32” 35” 15” 53” 47” 15” 54” 32”
Average 41.32% 17.71% 20.86% 10.37% 2.28% 2.02% 1.91% 3.53%
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Informe que presenta la Comisión de Radiodifusión al Consejo 
General del ¡FE, en relación a los monitoreos muéstrales realizados sobre tiempos de transmisión de las 
campañas de los partidos politicos en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación. April 13lh to 
July 3rd 1997.
As can be seen, when one takes into account the time devoted to each party by television 
stations in all the 32 states o f Mexico, the result clearly benefits the PRI. This outcome may 
reflect the fact that in many states, local TV channels -particularly the public ones—were 
still strongly linked to PRI politicians (or controlled by the local executive powers, who 
appoint the directors of these channels). However, a more careful evaluation of the 
information provided by the monitoring shows that this may not always be the case, since 
when taken individually, the information coming from each mainly reflects the strong 
competition between the PRI and usually only one o f the largest opposition parties, be it the 
PAN or the PRD. Except for some very rare cases, as with Mexico City, in the large
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majority of states there is no competition amongst more than two parties. Also one must 
take into account that in 1997 the party with the strongest national presence was the PRI, 
and opposition parties usually organised their campaigns usually in order to compete 
against it. For instance, in some Southern states, like Oaxaca and Guerrero the sole 
opposition to the PRI came from the PRD, since the PAN was very weak there; conversely, 
in states like Nuevo Leon and Chihuahua -in  the North—competition occurred between the 
PRI and the PAN, leaving the PRD or any other party in third place. In 1997 the stronger 
presence of the PRI in Mexico’s TV channels did not necessarily mean that in all cases the 
information provided was biased.
When one takes into account the objectivity of the information provided by all local and 
national TV channels considered in the monitoring -defined by the IFE as the non­
existence of any additional comment, opinion or qualification by the newscaster on the 
news presented—, the conclusion is the following: of all the news presented 98.46 percent 
of them were free from comments and qualifications. Moreover, from the total number of 
qualified (or non-objective) news, 131 notes, the four largest parties received 124, divided 
into positive and negative qualified news. From the total number of positive notes: the PRI 
received 20 notes, the PAN 17, the PRD 15 and the PT 4; and from the total number of 
negative notes: the PRI received 21, the PAN 26, the PRD 13 and the PT 8. The PT 
received twice the amount of negative comments than positive ones. The only party that 
received more positive than negative notes was the PRD.
However, the openness of television during this process -in  clear contrast to what had 
happened during the 1994 elections—can be better assessed when evaluating the 
information provided by the monitoring on the national TV networks, i.e. the ones located 
in Mexico City, where competition was fierce among the three largest parties. The process 
in Mexico City comprised not only o f the elections for federal deputies and senators, but 
also of the election of local deputies and, for the first time, also of its governor. The 
monitoring in Mexico City’s (national) TV news broadcasts was carried out between March 
16th and July 3rd 1997. In these months television news broadcasts devoted 62 hours, 42 
minutes and 14 seconds to the different campaigns, and this time was distributed among the 
parties as shown by Table 7.2.
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Table 7.2
Coverage Time for Parties on National TV News Broadcasts (only TV networks from
Mexico City), March 16th -July 3rd 1997
PRI PRD PAN PT PVEM PDM PPS PFCRN
Time 15h 6’ I5h34* 15h 00’ 3h 32’ 4h 47’ 3h IT 2hl5* 3h 14’
2” 14” 31” 18" 39” 1” 40” 49”
Average 24.08% 24.83% 16.3% 5.64% 7.65% 5.08% 3.61% 5.18%
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, informe que presenta la Comisión de Radiodifusión a! Consejo 
General del IFE. en relación a los monitoreos muéstrales realizados sobre tiempos de transmisión de las 
campañas de los partidos politicos en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación, March 16Ih to 
July 3td 1997.
As for the number of notes, 3,904 were presented on national television news broadcasts 
during the months examined in the monitoring. This number of notes were divided amongst 
the parties as shown by Table 7.3.
Table 7.3
Number of Notes on the Parties on National TV News Broadcasts (only TV networks 
from Mexico City), March 16th-JuIy 3rd 1997
PRI PRD PAN PT PVEM PDM PPS PFCRN
Notes 855 874 811 266 405 271 157 265
Average 22% 22.41% 20.75% 6.81% 10.37% 6.94% 4.02% 6.79%
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Informe que presenta la Comisión de Radiodifusión al Consejo 
General del IFE, en relación a los monitoreos muéstrales realizados sobre tiempos de transmisión de las 
campañas de los partidos políticos en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación, March 16th to 
July 3rd 1997.
The outcomes shown in tables 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate the attempts of national television to be 
substantially more equilibrated and careful with the presentation of information related to 
the campaigns than it ever had been in past electoral processes. This balance in the 
information provided was not only reflected on the air-time dedicated to the parties -a t least 
to the three largest—, but also, and most importantly, on the “objectivity” o f the notes
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presented, as defined by the IFE. Of the 3,904 notes on the campaign presented on national 
television (TV channels transmitting from Mexico City only), 96.29 percent were not 
subjected to any qualification, opinion or editorial comment by the newscaster. Of the 145 
notes that were not free from comments and other qualifications, 43 (29.66 percent) were 
considered to be positive for the parties and 102 (70.34 percent) negative. Table 7.4 shows 
the number and the percentage of objective and non-objective news presented on each 
party. Table 7.5 shows the number and percentage of non-objective positive and negative 
comments on the news presented on each party.
Table 7.4
Objective and Non-objective Notes Presented on the Parties on National News
Broadcasts
Party Total number 
of objective 
notes
Percentage Total number of
non-objective
notes
Percentage Total number of 
notes
Percentage
PAN 765 19.60% 46 1.18% 811 20.78%
PRI 829 21.23% 26 0.67% 855 21.90%
PRD 835 21.39% 39 1.00% 874 22.39%
PFCR 259 6.63% 6 0.15% 265 6.78%
PT 258 6.61% 8 0.20% 266 6.81%
PVEM 394 10.09% 11 0.28% 405 10.37%
PPS 152 3.89% 5 0.13% 157 4.02%
PDM 267 6.84% 4 0.10% 271 6,94%
Total 3759 96.29% 145 3.71% 3.904 100%
y  L l l  I W U V i  U I L U  »» l l> i i  t i  v m  t t  i  r *j  l / í  í f f ^  t y n v  ƒ / '  V J  v  r . . » -  —' — ’ "  — —  -   -
General del ¡FE, en relación a los monitoreos muéstrales realizados sobre tiempos de transmisión (¿eJ as 
campañas de los partidos políticos en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación. March 16 to 
July 3rd 1997.
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Table 7.5
Non-objective (Positive and Negative) Notes on the Parties Presented on National
News Broadcasts
Party Total number 
of positive 
notes
Percentage Total number of 
negative notes
Percentage Total number of
non-objective
notes
Percentage
PAN 10 6.90% 36 24.83% 46 31.73%
PRI 10 6.90% 16 11.03% 26 17.93%
PRD 11 7.59% 28 19.31% 39 20.90%
PFCR 4 2.76% 2 1.38% 6 4.14%
PT 1 0.69% 7 4.83% 8 5.52%
PVEM 3 2.07% 8 5.52% 11 7.59%
PPS 2 1.38% 3 2.07% 5 3.45%
PDM 2 1.38% 2 1.38% 4 2.76%
Total 43 29.66% 102 70.34% 145 100%
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Informe que presenta la Comisión de Radiodifusión al Consejo 
General del ¡FE, en relación a los monitoreos muéstrales realizados sobre tiempos de transmisión de las 
campañas de los partidos politicos en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación. March 16* to 
July 3rd 1997.
As can be seen from these tables, the three largest parties received similar treatment with 
regard to the information presented on national TV news broadcasts. Actually, it was the 
PRD who received the largest total number of positive and negative remarks on the news 
broadcasts. It must be remarked, though, that both the PRI and the PAN received far more 
negative comments than positive ones. Nevertheless, a very interesting feature comes to 
light when one considers the objectivity o f the news on each of the different news 
broadcasts (Table 7.6). In the monitoring the following national news broadcasts were 
considered: 24 Horas Evening Edition; 24 Horas Late Evening Edition; Al Despertar; 
Detras de la Noticia; Muchas Noticias (all of these transmitted on Televisa’s channels); 
Enlace (transmitted on the public Channel 11); En Blanco y  Negro; Para Usted 
(transmitted on Multivision); Hechos Late Evening Edition; Hechos Evening Edition;
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Hechos Weekend Edition; Primera edición; Hola México!; La Realidad Hoy (all of these 
transmitted on TV Azteca’s channels).
Table 7.6
Objective and Non-objective Notes Presented on the Different News Transmissions
News
Broadcast
Total number 
of objective 
notes
Percentage Total number 
of non­
objective 
notes
Percentage Total
number of 
notes
Percentage
24 Horas 
L.E.
226 5.79% 0 0% 226 5.79%
24 Horas E. 143 3.66% 0 0% 143 3.66%
Al Despertar 468 11.99% 0 0% 468 11.99%
Detras de la 
Noticia
195 4.99% 0 0% 195 4.99%
Muchas
Noticias
199 5.10% 2 0.05% 201 5.15%
Enlace 394 10.09% 0 0% 394 10.09%
En Blanco y 
Negro
128 3.28% 11 0.28% 139 3.56%
Para Usted 376 9.63% 38 0.97% 414 10.60%
Hechos L.E. 294 7.53% 9 0.23% 303 7.76%
Hechos E. 128 3.28% 26 0.67% 154 3.94%
Hechos W. 116 2.97% I 0.03% 117 3.00%
Hola
Mexico!
564 14.45% 47 1.20% 611 15.65%
La realidad 
hoy
1 0.03% 0 0% 1 0.03%
Preparen,
apunten,
voten
57 1.46% 0 0% 57 1.46%
Primera
edición
0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Punto por 
punto
470 12.04% 11 0.28% 481 12.32%
Total 3,759 96.29% 145 3.71% 3,904 100%
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Informe que presenta la Comisión de Radiodifusión al Consejo 
General del ¡FE, en relación con los moniioreos muéstrales realizados sobre tiempos de transmisión dejas 
campañas de los partidos políticos en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación, March 16 to 
July 3rd 1997.
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It becomes immediately evident that Televisa’s news broadcasts, and those o f the public 
Channel 11, were the most balanced and avoided editorialising the information presented. 
The handling o f information by Televisa on the 1997 campaigns markedly contrated with 
its own performance on previous campaigns, when a strong bias in favour o f the PRI was 
evident. In the case of the other two networks, Multi vision tended to comment on less than 
ten percent o f the news presented, and TV Azteca’s news broadcasts proved to be the ones 
that included more additional comments and opinions. Though the monitoring o f the IFE in 
1997 does not inform on this aspect, it is possible to sustain that while Televisa and 
Channel 11 tried to maintain a balanced presentation of news, Multivision, when 
commenting on the news, did slightly criticise the PRI and the PAN, and TV Azteca tried at 
the same time to favour the PRI and undermine the image of the PRD. For instance, the late 
evening edition o f the news broadcast Hechos (Channel 13 of TV Azteca), everyday during 
the campaigns devoted a special section on the parties that presented cartoons with the title 
of “The Capital’s Handicap” that represented the electoral competition for the government 
of Mexico City as if it was a race between three horses, the PAN’s, the PRD’s and the 
PRI’s. The horse that represented the PRI candidate, Alfredo Del Mazo, was presented as 
being strong, young and fast, while the one representing Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (again the 
PRD candidate) was pictured as old, stubborn and tired. Another way in which TV Azteca 
mocked and presented negative propaganda against Cárdenas was carried out with the 
transmission o f brief political parodies using puppets, known as Los Peiuches, in which, 
again, that candidate was represented as being basically incompetent and obsessed with 
power.
These attitudes were also registered by a news content study carried out by the Mexican 
Academy o f Human Rights (AMDH) between March 17th and July 2nd 1997.51 This study 
analyzed the content of 3,608 news transmissions of which only 182 (5 percent) of them 
contained any comment or remark (Table 7.7). The news broadcasts studied were 
Televisa’s 24 Horas (evening edition), TV Azteca’s Hechos (evening edition), 
Multi vision’s Para Usted, and Canal 1 l ’s Enlace, In general terms, the news broadcasts
51 Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos, Las elecciones federales de 1997 en cuatro noticiarios de 
televisión, Mexico Cit>, AMDH, 1997.
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were extremely careful in remaining unbiased. Impartiality was more evident in Enlace, 24 
Horas and Para Usted. Hechos proved itself to be the news transmission that broadcast the 
most comments, most of them unfavourable towards the PRD and its candidate. In this 
regard, while Hechos resulted in being decidedly anti-PRD, Para Usted's negative 
observations were directed mainly against PAN’s candidate Carlos Castillo and PRTs 
candidate Alfredo Del Mazo. 24 Horas and Enlace tried to maintain neutrality and 
impartiality in their notes.52
Table 7.7
Positive and Negative Comments on the Candidates for Mexico City Government on 
the Main National News Broadcasts, March 17,h-July 2nd 1997
Candidate/
News
Broadcast
24 Horas Hechos Para Usted Enlace Total
Alfredo Del 
Mazo (PR1)
1/0 10/4 0/7 0/0 11/11
Carlos Castillo 
(PAN)
0/2 2/9 0/9 0/0 2/20
Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas
(PRD)
0/1 2/12 3/3 2/0 7/16
Guadalupe 
González (PT)
0/0 0/0 0/1 0/1 0/2
Jorge
González
(PVEM)
0/0 0/1 3/1 0/0 3/2
Pedro Ferriz 
(PFCRN)
o/o 0/0 2/0 0/0 2/0
Fernández 
Flores (PPS)
0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 1/0
Valadez
Montoya
(PDM)
0/0 o/o 1/0 0/0 1/0
Total 1/3 14/26 10/21 2/1 27/51
NB: The number that appears on the left of the dash indicates the positive remarks and the number on the 
right indicates the negative remarks.
Source: Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos, Las elecciones federales de ¡997 en cuatro noticiarios 
de televisión, México City, AMDH, 1997.
S2 Paradoxically, the most impartial, objective, neutral and most complete information on the campaigns was 
delivered by Enlace, the news broadcasts of Channel 11, a public channel.
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In spite o f the relatively adverse attitude towards the opposition parties -especially the 
PRD—that TV Azteca displayed during the campaign o f 1997, both the monitoring of the 
IFE and the study of the AMDH agree that there was a positive advance in the television 
coverage o f the campaigns, which was characterised by an equilibrium in the information 
presented on the three most important parties.53 In the case of the election for Mexico 
City’s Government, Cárdenas was the candidate who received more time, more notes and 
more complete coverage, though he was also the most openly criticised in one news 
broadcast -Hechos.5* Also remarkable was the behaviour o f Jacobo Zabludowsky, the 
anchorman o f  24 Horas, who tried to maintain impartiality and neutrality in his comments, 
and even declared in his transmission of April 21st 1997 that he expected that Televisa 
would rank at the top in the criteria of objectivity in the next partial results on the 
monitoring to be published by the IFE in the following days.
Another positive change should to be highlighted: for the first time, information concerning 
the electoral campaigns was presented in special sections within the news broadcasts. Both 
the monitoring o f the AMDH and the IFE showed highly equilibrated news releases and a 
quite balanced presentation of information on the three largest parties and their candidates 
in these news broadcasts. But perhaps one of the most important advances was the 
recognition o f all the candidates and the parties for the general impartiality and openness of 
television. The day of the election, July 6th 1997 at 8:00 p.m., TV channels were reporting 
on the victory o f the PRD in Mexico City. With it, the strong mistrust against a TV system 
that had favoured the PRI for decades was sensibly reduced. In this sense, Cuauhtémoc 
Cárdenas, the candidate who was most critical o f the traditionally biased political role of 
television, affirmed that “one important difference with the past that has had an influence 
on the actual [electoral] final outcome were the media”.55 This general openness of 
television during the 1997 campaign was acknowledged also by the delegation sent by the 
Carter Center, in whose report it established that,
53 AMDH (1997), pgs. 18-19 and IFE (1997), pgs. 30-31.
i4 A long list of examples of the various forms in which Hechos tried to undermine the candidacy of Cárdenas 
can be revised in Miguel Acosta Valverde, “Las elecciones federales de 1997 según TV Azteca y Televisa”, 
in Revista Mexicana de Comunicación, no.49, June-July, Mexico City, Fundación Manuel Buendía, 1997.
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The problem of electronic media bias in Mexico has ameliorated considerably. In 1997, both 
Televisa and TV Azteca provided somewhat balanced coverage of all political parties and 
candidates. A televised debate between Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Alfredo Del Mazo for the 
governor’s race in Mexico City signaled the electronic media’s growing openness. Escalating 
competition and more discerning viewers have encouraged the electronic media to become more 
objective in their coverage.5 6
The presence of different parties on TV convinced many people that competition for power 
was true and helped to generate the necessary confidence in the electoral process and its 
organisation. This does not mean that television suddenly became a producer of critical and 
analytical programmes on politics, but compared with the recent past, the openness showed 
during the electoral process had not been seen before. Some negative aspects did remain 
however. If it was true that during the campaigns the information was presented in a highly 
impartial way, after the electoral process these attitudes did not remain the same in all 
television broadcasts. For instance, TV Azteca then started a campaign against the PRD and 
its government in Mexico City. An example of this could be clearly seen in June 7‘h 1999 
when a famous TV presenter, Francisco Stanley, was murdered outside a restaurant in 
Mexico City. That same evening, TV Azteca, the network for which the presenter worked, 
decided to cancel its normal programming and devoted an all-day transmission to 
denouncing “the irresponsibility” of the government of Mexico City for their poor 
investigation of the case of for the general lack of crime prevention policies. Also on that 
day Ricardo Salinas Pliego, TV Azteca’s CEO, on a nation-wide transmission insisted on 
the removal of all of Mexico City’s top ranking government officials, including the 
Secretary of Justice {Procurador) and the governor himself. This attitude remained and the 
confrontations between TV Azteca and the Cárdenas administration became evident for all 
to see.
In this way, though the general attitude o f television after the electoral process of 1997 
started to be more open, this did not mean that all parties were treated in the same fashion. 
While Televisa and the public Channel 11 remained relatively impartial, TV Azteca 
became openly critical of some opposition alternatives such as the PRD. These ambiguities
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55 Cited in Alma Rosa Alva de la Selva, “La pista de los comicios federales en la TV”, in Revista Mexicana de 
Comunicación, no.50, August-September, Mexico City, Fundación Manuel Buendía, 1997, p.5.
56 The Carter Center Delegation to Observe the July 6th, 1997 Elections in Mexico, Report, Latin American 
and Caribbean Program, The Carter Center, Atlanta, 1997, p.18.
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of television were maintained still until the beginning of the 2000 electoral process, where 
certain voices who warned about the possible recession o f TV openness in a situation in 
which what was to be decided there was the control of the federal political positions -both 
at the Executive and the Legislative levels. Thus the 2000 elections were not only a test for 
the Mexican political system, but also for the TV openness.
The electoral process of 2000 brought with it the possibility for voting the PRI out from the 
presidency for the first time in seventy-one years. Competition amongst the three largest 
parties was also the strongest ever. Since 1998 some intellectuals and opposition politicians 
had been making intense efforts for the creation of a common front against the PRI by 
presenting a single presidential candidate in order to have greater chances o f victory. 
During 1999 this approach was also contemplated by the most important pre-election 
candidates o f the PAN and PRD, Vicente Fox and Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas respectively. 
Several meetings among party officials and intellectuals took place between August and 
September 1999 to elaborate a common platform and an acceptable procedure for selecting 
the single candidacy. The problem was that both the PAN and the PRD wanted their 
candidates to run for the coalition. In spite of the efforts to reach a substantial agreement 
thereupon, the project was definitively abandoned in October of that year when the PAN 
most conservative members and PRD politicians decided to run their presidential 
candidates separately. However, the idea of the coalition was not abandoned, and both the 
PAN and the PRD decided then to lead their own coalition separately. Two opposition 
coalitions were thus registered before the IFE, the Alianza por el Cambio (leaded by the 
PAN) and the Alianza por Mexico (leaded by the PRD).
The rise and fall of the single opposition front project coincided with a primary process 
within the PRI for selecting its own presidential candidate. In the PRI primaries President 
Zedillo’s former Secretary o f Gobernación turned out to be the pre-candidate winner, the 
process in general was a successful one. And this contrasted markedly with the failure of 
opposition parties to create a meaningful agreement on an electoral common front. The 
final selection of the PRI candidate was to be carried out, picking one of the four pre­
candidates on Sunday, November 7th 1999, through an open vote in which all those citizens 
with voting card could participate. The PRI success made things complicated for the 
opposition, since the official candidate, Francisco Labastida, was undoubtedly shrouded
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with a certain aura o f legitimacy (though the rules of the competition were constantly called 
into question by the other three pre-candidates).57
What is important to note here is how the television news broadcasts reported on these pre- 
electoral campaigns. Between August 17th and November 7th 1999, that is between the 
moments in which the creation of an opposition alliance seemed feasible, and the election 
day of the PRI presidential candidate, the journal Reforma decided to monitor the time 
given by Televisa (Channel 2) and TV Azteca (Channel 13) -and eight nation-wide radio 
stations—to each of the most important pre-candidates of all the parties.58 Reformats 
monitoring focused on two things: the quantity of time devoted to each candidate on the 
news broadcasts and also on the quantity of ad-time bought by each of them in which to 
insert their adverts in this media. In the case of television, the amount of time devoted to 
each candidate on the news broadcasts without considering any paid advertising spot is 
shown on Table 7.8.
There are some important things to notice. Firstly, it was actually Vicente Fox, PAN’s main 
candidate, who received more attention (in time devoted) from television in general, though 
it was actually Televisa who gave him more time for coverage. TV Azteca slightly 
favoured Labastida, though in general terms it is possible to say that both networks 
presented quite a balanced coverage in the time devoted to each (with the exception of 
Televisa’s coverage for Bartlett).
In the case of the internal PRI competition, Francisco Labastida was strongly criticised, 
even by his fellow PRI competitors, for being “President Zedillo’s candidate” and, thus, 
receiving all sorts of explicit and implicit support from the PRI machinery, but also from 
the media. Roberto Madrazo, who openly defied President Zedillo, claimed several times 
that “the whole apparatus” was against him and that the media were purposely giving more 
spaces to Labastida. However, as can be seen, in general terms it was Fox who received the 
largest coverage time of all the pre-candidates.
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î7 See Chapter Seven.
iS Running for the PRI there were: Francisco Labastida, Roberto Madrazo, Humberto R. Villanueva and 
Manuel Bratlett. In the PRD, though Cuahutemoc Cardenas was by far the most likely candidate, Porfirio 
Munoz-Ledo declared his intentions for running for the candidacy. In the PAN, Vicente Fox -then governor 
of Guabajuato—was already the strongest candidate.
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Table 7.8
Time in Seconds for the Pre-Candidates on Different TV News Broadcasts, August
17",-November3,d 1999
Pre-candidates Time on TV News Broadcasts by Channel
Channel 2 Channel 13 Total TV Percentage
(Televisa) (TV Azteca) Time
Bartlett (PRI) 3,161 6,110 9,271 8.68%
Labastida (PRI) 10,908 11,002 21,910 20.51%
Madrazo (PRI) 7,180 8,934 16,114 15.08%
Villanueva (PRI) 6,032 5,824 11,856 11.10%
Cardenas (PRD) 8,014 7,885 15,899 14.88%
M. Ledo (PRD) 4,239 4,128 8,367 7.83%
Fox (PAN) 12,763 10,628 23,391 21.90%
Total 52,297 54,511 106,808 100%
Source: Elaborated with information published by Reforma between Tuesday, August 17th and Monday, 
November 9th 1999.
Nevertheless, when compared with the PRI candidates’ time, Labastida appears as the most 
favoured one. Table 7.9 shows the contrast between the quantity of time each of the four 
PRI pre-candidates received on Channel 2’s and Channel 13’s news broadcasts and the 
quantity of time each of them explicitly bought on those same channels.
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Table 7.9
Ad-Time versus Regular News Broadcast Coverage of the PRI Pre-candidates on TV,
August 17th-November 3rd 1999
Pre-candidate Time on News Broadcast Advertising Time
F. Labastida 6 hours 08 minutes 1 hour 16 minutes
M. Bartlett 2 hours 57 minutes 2 hours 16 minutes
R. Madrazo 4 hours 46 minutes 3 hours 26 minutes
H.R. Villanueva 3 hours 29 minutes 17 minutes
Source: Reforma, November 6th 1999.
Though Madrazo was the pre-candidate who bought more ad-time on the screens, Labastida 
was the one who received more time on the news broadcasts. To this apparent preference o f 
television for Labastida other incidents occurred that put television openness at stake and 
generated suspicions on the impartiality of this medium and the renewal of its support for 
the PRI. An important incident occurred when transmitting the Government’s Annual 
Report {Informe de Gobierno) presented by President Zedillo in September 1st 1999. Every 
year, the official reply to that report is given by the Chairman of the Legislative 
Commission of Governance and Constitution. In 1999, the chairman was a member o f the 
PAN, Carlos Medina, who replied with some severe criticisms to the president’s arguments. 
Though both the president’s Report and Medina’s reply were broadcast live, later in the 
evening on the TV news broadcasts, the reply was either under-reported or strongly 
criticised. In the case of El Noticiario (Channel 2), its newscaster Guillermo Ortega 
prsented a brief account of the issues and topics presented by the president during his 
speech and then, without transmitting any part of the reply o f Mr. Medina, he directly 
qualified it as “shameful for the Mexican people”, and as a “lack of respect” for the 
president. In turn, the newscaster of Channel 13 Hechos, Javier Alatorre, after commenting 
on the president’s speech, and without presenting a single line of Mr. Medina’s reply, 
introduced an editorial comment in which the director of news broadcasts of the network, 
Sergio Sarmiento, described the reply as “an incendiary discourse” charged with
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“intolerance”.59 This and other incidents generated the suspicions about the impartiality of 
television and meant that by the beginning of November PAN’s pre-candidate Vicente Fox 
warned against what he called the usual challenges for opposition parties in electoral times: 
on the one hand, the whole support o f the state machinery in favour o f the official party 
candidate, and on the other, the unbalanced treatment and coverage o f the mass media in 
favour of the PRI.60
The parties and alliances in competition for the 2000 general election were: Alianza por el 
Cambio (PAN and Partido Verde), Alianza por Mexico (PRD, PT and three other newly 
created parties),61 PRI, Partido del Centro Democratico, PARM, and Partido Democracia 
Social. Under such competitive process and in order to present an image o f impartiality, 
Joaquin Vargas, President o f the CIRT, declared (one day after Fox’s warning) in a meeting 
with top officials of the IFE that all members o f the Chamber were to assume the 
responsibility of presenting information on the elections o f 2000 in balanced and impartial 
ways.62 The parties unanimously agreed that the media -especially radio and TV—should 
concentrate on the presentation o f information on issues, proposals and debates, not on 
incidents and personal anecdotes of the candidates.
Thus, by the end of 1999, the situation regarding the presentation of information on TV 
screens was still ambiguous. On the one hand, the experience o f 1997 showed that openness 
was under wray, but on the other, the last six months of 1999 were showing that old trends 
were difficult to overcome. Episodes that illustrated such ambiguous paths o f TV openness 
continued into early in 2000. Some o f them were simply incidental,63 and others were more 
significant.64 But it is difficult to imagine that the process could have been otherwise. After
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59 Reforma, September 2nd 1999.
60 La Jornada, November 3rd 1999.
61 Partido Sociedad Nacionalista, Partido Convergencia Democrática, Partido
62 El Universal, November 4th 1999.
63 For instance, the suspension for one week of Guillermo Ortega, the newscaster of El Noticiero (Channel 2), 
after PRI top officials complained -in private— for the presentation in February during an evening edition of a 
mock election result in a school in which the PAN’s candidate, Fox, obtained the victory.
64 For instance, the protests of the IFE from the end of February to the beginning of May 2000 against the 
cancellation of its spots (inviting the citizens to vote and to refuse bribery) on eight radio stations in 
Campeche, 5 in Guanajuato and a radio group in Baja California. The suspension was supposedly caused by a 
letter sent by the CIRT (Letter 3236, of February 23rd) to its members instructing them to stop transmitting the 
adverts of the IFE. Though it was never clear if that letter really existed, the IFE complained before RTC, the 
responsible authority within the Secretariat o f Gobernación, and for months the attitude of this agency was to
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all, the decisions to transmit alternative information on politics were the consequences of 
transformations within the television networks and their markets, more than the outcome of 
constant pressures from the parties or the “democratic convictions” on the part of the TV 
executives or licensees. Thus, at times it was not clear that after decades in which the 
identification of interests between television and the PRI regime was taken for granted, a 
definitive opening for political alternatives was to take place on the screens. The past was 
still a heavy legacy, but the trend towards openness was undoubtedly on its way.
Once the electoral campaigns officially started in January 2000, and in spite of eventual 
claims form some opposition parties on minor irregularities, television was able in general 
to present the political information of the whole electoral process in quite impartial way. 
The monitoring of the IFE, carried out between January 19th and June 29lh 2000, reveals 
this clearly when evaluating the information provided by the national TV channels -though 
o f course, some local TV channels still remained partial and tendentious. This was no 
surprise since in some states the influence of the governors and other political groups linked 
to the PRI over local stations is strong -there is some evidence that this happened with 
cases such as Tabasco. This unbalanced presentation of information on local TV channels 
can be clearly seen on table 7.10 below, which shows the total average of news presented 
on each party (or party alliance) on all of the local television channels. One should not 
forget that by 2000 the PRI still ruled in 21 states. But strong control over stations by PRI 
politicians is only part of the explanation; the rest lies in the fact that in all states this party 
was the “enemy to defeat” by opposition parties. As was said before, in most states, the 
electoral race was to take place essentially between the PRI candidate and one of the other 
twro largest opposition coalitions’ candidates.
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refuse to take any serious step for obliging these media to re-transmit the spots. Finally, in May due to the 
constant pressure of the IFE, the stations decided to re-transmit the spots.
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Table 7.10
Average Number of Notes on the Parties on TV News Broadcasts in Different States,
Jan.l9lh-June 26th 2000
STATE AC PRI AM PCD PARM DS Total
Aguascaiientes 30.5% 26.1% 20.1% 6.8% 8.9% 7.6% 100.0%
Baja California 29.1% 39.0% [ 20.2% 2.7% 4.0% 4.9% 100.0%
Baja California Sur 23.9% 33.3% 33.1% 5.6% 3.1% 1.0% 100.0%
Campeche 17.0% 41.3% 16.2% 5.6% 12.4% 7.5% 100.0%
Coahuila 26.8% 50.5% 13.8% 2.2% 4.4% 2.3% 100.0%
Colima 23.6% 44.4% 18.8% 8.6% .3% 4.2% 100.0%
Chiapas 24.9% 31.4% r  23.9% 5.2% 5.2% 9.4% 100.0%
Chihuahua 31.5% 43.5% r 16.6% 3.3% 1.9% 3.2% 100.0%
Distrito Federal 
(Mexico City) 28.7% 26.1% 23.6% 6.5% 9.2% 5.7% 100.0%
Durango 20.1% 54.3% 22.3% .3% 1.2% 1.8% 100.0%
Guanajuato 41.7% 22.1% 17.6% 3.8% 9.5% 5.2% 100.0%
Guerrero 25.4% 44.0% 26.8% 2.1% .4% 1.4% 100.0%
Hidalgo 21.1% 37.6% 22.5% 8.7% 4.8% 5.3% 100.0%
Jalisco 30.1% 36.1% 15.2% 7.0% 6.9% 4.7% 100.0%
México 21.3% 25.6% 20.2% 9.9% 14.0% 9.0% 100.0%
Michoacán 15.5% 40.3% 24.1% 4.6% 9.9% 5.6% 100.0%
Morelos 17.1% 42.0% 27.6% 4.0% 5.5% 3.8% 100.0%
Nayarit 22.4% 32.9% 29.8% 7.0% 5.7% 2.2% 100.0%
Nuevo León 29.7% 35.0% 19.0% 6.1% 7.0% 3.1% 100.0%
Oaxaca 26.7% 36.8% 21.4% 3.5% 7.3% 4.3% 100.0%
Puebla 28.7% 35.0% 22.3% 3.8% 5.1% 5.1% 100.0%
Querétaro 29.7% 33.7% 16.2% 7.9% 7.4% 5.2% 100.0%
Quintana Roo 28.4% 36.1% 20.0% 5.1% 6.3% 4.2% 100.0%
| S a i Luis Potosí 31.1% 40.0% 15.5% 4.2% 5.4% 3.8% 100.0%
| Sinaloa 22.5% 42.8% 25.5% 2.2% 3.7% 3.3% 100.0%
Sonora 34.4% 31.6% 19.6% 4.3% 6.3% 3.8% 100.0%
Tabasco 14.2% 59.9% 10.9% 4.5% 6.4% 4.0% 100.0%
Tamaulipas 27.9% 36.7% 23.9% 2.0% 4.4% 5.2% 100.0%
Tlaxcala 19.3% 14.8% 26.4% 16.9% 11,3% 11.3% 100.0%
Veracruz 26.0% 34.9% 25.4% 4.3% 5.4% 4.0% 100.0%
Yucatán 18.1% 40.3% 16.4% 7.0% 9.6% 8.6% 100.0%
Zacatecas 19.8% 38.9% 28.8% 4.5% 4.2% 3.8% 100.0%
Total 27.1% 34.0% 21.2% 5.6% 7.2% 4.9% 100.0%
¿•i! urce: Elaborated with data from IFE, Monitoreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
políticas en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana. January I9lh-June 29th 2000, IFE, Mexico City, CD-Rom.
One may note that the average o f news in general favours the PRI, though in most states the 
figures for the two opposition alliances are not very far from those of the PRI. However, the
2 4 4
presence o f opposition parties on the screens is clearly larger in urban and Northern states 
than in more rural and Southern states. There were states under strong PRI bosses, like 
Tabasco, Campeche or Yucatan, where the number of news on this party more than doubled 
that of its closest rival.
When summing up the total average o f the news of all states it is again the PRI who 
received more notes on the screens, 34 percent against 27.1 percent of the alliance 
supportive o f Fox, and 21.2 percent of that which supported Cardenas. This dominance of 
the PRI in the number of notes presented is also reflected in the time devoted to this party 
by TV stations all over the country (Table 7.11).
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Table 7.11
Total Time for Parties on the TV News Broadcasts in all the Country, Jan. 19th-June
26th 2000
AC PRI AM PCD PARM 1 DS Total
Total 145:04:12 219:36:34 111:25:25 29:32:02 30:22:50 1 23:14:18 559:15:23
Average 25.9% 39.3% 19.9% 5.3% 5.4% 1 4.2% 100.0%
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Monitoreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
políticas en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana, January I&h-June 2 f h 2000, IFE, México City, CD-Rom
Nevertheless, an interesting may be noted contrast when evaluating the information given 
by local TV stations against the information presented by national TV networks, which are 
the ones with the largest audiences. When considering the results of the monitoring of the 
national TV channels, Televisa's and TV Azteca's, a more balanced transmission o f the 
campaign becomes evident. Tables 7.12 to 7.15 show the time, the average of time, the 
number o f notes and the average of notes devoted to each party and coalition on these 
national TV news broadcasts transmitting from Mexico City. In the tables, the second 
column indicates the TV channel number.
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Table 7.12
Time for Parties on National TV News Broadcasts (Mexico City), Jan.l9,h-June 26,h
2000
I News Broadcasts AC PR1 AM PCD PARM DS Total
I
TV
.Channels
2
Noticiero (14:30-15:00) ■ 0:58:42 0:48:10 0:38:02 0:10:57 0:21:48 0:18:13 3:15:54
Noticiero (22:30- 23:30) 4:08:57 3:44:45 3:22:58 0:57:32 1:14:12 1:12:41 14:41:08
Primero Noticias (6:00- 
09:00) 6:24:25 5:37:57 5:03:06 1:16:37 2:12:51 1:47:19 22:22:19 j
7 Hechos del 7 (21:00-21:30) 0:39:48 0:12:51 0:13:25 0:01:19 0:18:32 0:00:40 1:26:39
9 Noticiero (20:30 —21:00) 0:42:19 0:42:24 0:28:31 0:12:50 0:22:35 0:12:35 2:41:15
11
Enlace (21:30- 22:00) 0:31:22 0:32:31 0:31:26 0:02:32 0:08:37 0:02:30 1:49:00
Noticias con Sergio Uzeta 
(21:30- 22:00) 1:42:02 1:55:09 1:28:47 0:08:44 0:31:16 0:09:49 5:55:50
13
Hechos (6:00- 9:00) 8:04:21 7:54:06 6:04:09 2:57:21 2:40:12 1:50:12 29:30:23
Hechos (15:00- 16:00) 0:43:13 0:38:15 0:31:19 0:17:22 0:17:44 0:09:08 2:37:03
Hechos (22:30- 23:30)* 5:01:37 4:40:01 3:27:10 0:30:17 0:55:34 0:36:07 15:10:49
40 CNI Noticias (22:00-23:00) 7:24:20 6:02:19 4:50:21 0:39:55 1:00:00 0:19:20 20:16:17
Total 36:21:12 32:48:33 26:39:21 7:15:30 10:03:26 6:38:39 119:46:42
Except for Hechos, which transmits from Monday to Sunday, all the rest of the news broadcasts are 
transmitted from Monday to Friday at the scheduled time in parenthesis.
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Monitoreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
políticas en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana, January l^-Ju n e  29h 2000, IFE, Mexico City, CD-Rom.
Table 7.13
Average Time for Parties on National TV News Broadcasts (Mexico City), Jan.l9,h-
June 26th 2000
>ews Broadcasts AC PR1 AM PCD PARM DS Total
Noticiero (14:30-15:00) 2.7% 2.4% 2.4% 2.5% 3.6% 4.6% 2.7%
Noticiero (22:30- 23:30) 11.4% 11.4% 12.7% 13.2% 12.3% 18.2% 12.3%
Primero Noticias (6:00- 
99:00) 17.6% 17.2% 19.0% 17.6% 22.0% 26.9%
18.7%
Hechos del 7 (21:00- 21:30) 1.8% 0.7% 0.8% 0.3% 3.1% 0.2% 1.2%
Noticiero (20:30 -21:00) 1.9% 2.2% 1.8% 2.9% 3.7% 3.2% 2.2%
Enlace (21:30- 22:00) 1.4% 1.7% 2.0% 0.6% 1.4% 0.6% 1.5%
Noticias con Sergio Uzeta 
21:30-22:00) 4.7% 5.9% 5.6% 2.0% 5.2% 2.5%
5.0%
lechos (6:00- 9:00) 22.2% 24.1% 22.8% 40.7% 26.5% 27.6% 24.6%
lechos (15:00-16:00) 2.0% 1.9% 2.0% 4.0% 2.9% 2.3% 2.2%
lechos (22:30- 23:30)* 13.8% 14.2% 13.0% 7.0% 9.2% 9.1% 12.7%
NI Noticias (22:00-23:00) 20.4% 18.4& 18.2% 9.3% 9.9% 4.9% 16.9%
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Except for Hechos, which transmits from Monday to Sunday, all the rest of the news broadcasts are 
transmitted from Monday to Friday at the scheduled time in parenthesis.
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Monitoreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
políticas en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana, January l^ -J u n e  29*h 2000, IFE, Mexico City, CD-Rom.
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Table 7.14
Number of Notes on Parties on National TV News Broadcasts (Mexico City), Jan.l9th-
June 26th 2000
News Broadcasts AC PRI AM 1PCD PARM DS Total
¡Noticiero (14:30 -15:00) 98 78 j " 66 1" 30 46 i 30 348
2 Noticiero (22:30-23:30) 370 306 319 j 110 i 145 125 1375
¡ Primero Noticias (6:00- 09:00) 1 5 3 Í 516 J 474 1 134 j 183 I 126 1 1966
7 Hechos del 7 (21:00-21:30) 52 37 1 41 1 8 | 27 6¡ 171
TV
Channels
9 Noticiero (20:30-21:00) 102 95 68 r 29 45 1 26 365
I I ¡Enlace (21:30-22:00) 431 42 42 I 4 | 13 4 1481 1 ¡Noticias con Sergio Uzeta (21:30- 22:00) ¡ 107 105 1 90 r 18 36 20 1 376
¡Hechos (6:00- 9:00) 1 599" 543 499 1 1301 195 88 2054
13 lHechos (15:00- 16:00) 125 121 103 72 1 66 ( 60 1 547
¡Hechos (22:30- 23:30)* 396 364 I 301 j 53 102 1 52 1 126S
40 CNI Noticias (22:00-23:00) 441 401 354 61 64 j 36 1 1357
Total [ 2Í66 2608 2357 649 922 573 9975
Except for Hechos, which transmits from Monday to Sunday, all the rest of the news broadcasts are 
transmitted from Monday to Friday at the scheduled time in parenthesis,
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Monitoreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
políticas en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana, January I (/ !-June 2911' 2000, IFE, Mexico City, CD-Rom.
Table 7.15
Average of Notes on Parties on National TV News Broadcasts (Mexico City), Jan.l9,h-
June 26th 2000
Except for Hechos, which transmits from Monday to Sunday, all the rest of the news broadcasts are 
transmitted from Monday to Friday at the scheduled time in parenthesis.
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Monitoreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
políticas en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana, January l^-June 2$h 2000, IFE, Mexico City, CD-Rom.
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As can be seen in both by the time devoted to each party and the number of notes presented 
on each of them by all the national news broadcasts, competition between the three largest 
parties was indeed reflected with great accuracy. In the case of broadcasting time for 
parties, on seven news broadcasts it was the coalition supportive of candidate Vicente Fox, 
who obtained the longest coverage. The total time devoted for each of the three largest 
parties was 36 hours 21 minutes and 12 seconds for AC, followed by 32 hours 48 minutes 
and 33 seconds for PRI and 26 hours 39 minutes and 21 seconds for AM. The main 
competition thus was between AC and PRI and this was also reflected by the total number 
of notes presented on the parties: 2,866 for AC against 2,608 for the PRI (and 2,357 for 
AM). Now, if  the amount o f time and notes were similar, what was the content o f the news 
provided on the parties by the news broadcasts?
As for the way in which information was presented in the notes, the IFE this time decided 
to replace the word “objectivity” by the less controversial one of “neutrality”, always 
referring to the absence of comments or editorial remarks in the notes on the parties and/or 
candidates, be they positive or negative. Table 7.16, below, shows the total number of notes 
on each party or coalition divided by positive, negative and neutral notes all presented by 
TV news broadcasts, both local and national. Table 7.17 does the same, but it focuses only 
on the national TV news broadcasts.
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero___________________________________________Chapter Seven
Table 7.16
Positive, Negative and Neutral Notes on the Parties Presented on Local and National 
TV News Broadcasts, Jan. 19th-June 26th 2000
AC PRI 1 AM PCD PARM DS Total
Negative 404 3 1 0 161 55 1 57 16 1003
TOTAL NATIONAL Neutral
1 8 2 5 9 10591 1 6669 1775 r 2261 r 1532 31087
Positive 1 2 Ö 2 T 233 1 121 1 «1 391 54  1 657
Total "1 8 8 6 5  ] 111 3 4  j 6951  1 1838 1 2357 1602  r 32747
Source: Elaborated with data firom IFE, Monitoreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
políticas en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana, January JSfh-June 29lh 2000, IFE, México City, CD-Rom.
248
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero. .C hap ter S even
Table 7.17
Positive, Negative and Neutral Notes on the Parties Presented on National TV News
Broadcasts, Jan.l9,h-June 26th 2000
1 News Broadcast AC PRI AM PCD PARM DS Total
Negative 1 0 i l 0 1 o T 3
Noticiero (14:30-15:00) Neutral 97 78 65 30 45 30 345
Total 98 78 66 30 46 1 30 348
Negative 19 11 7 2 31 2 44
Noticiero (22:30- 23:30) Neutral
j 3441 292 306 108 j 14211201 1312
2 Positive 1 7 3 6 | o | 0¡ 31 19
Total 1 370 306 1 3191 HO 1 145 j 1251 1375
Negative 1 4 3 7 3 3 1 i | 18
Primero Noticias (6:00- Neutra) 7 527] 513 469 131 180)125 1945
09:00) Positive 2 0 >1 o| oprr 3
Total 7 533 516 474 134 1 183 11261 1966
Negative 1 2 i o | o | 0 o| 3
Hechos del 7 (21:00-21:30)
Neutral 1 49 36 41 «I 27 n r 1677
Positive 7 H o o¡ 0 0 r ~ ó r 1
Total 1 52 ( 3 7 1 41 j 8 | 27 PíT 171
Negative 1 1 l l 1 o | 0| oT 3
Noticiero (20:30-21:00)
Neutral 1 99 j 94 1 67 j 29 j 45 J 261 3609
Positive 1 21 7*1 0 o| 0 ¡ o| 2
Total 7 102 95 j 68 1 29 45 j 26 1 365
TV Channels
Enlace (21:30-22:00)
Neutral 7 43 42 42 1 4 U  P3T 148
Total 43 42 42) 4 | 13 P T " 148
11
Noticias con Sergio Uzeta 
(21:30-22:00)
Negative 1 0 0 o\ 0póT 1
Neutral 106 105 90 j 18 36 20 T 375
Total 107 105 90 181 3 6 j 20 J 376
Negative 7 7 4 | 3 0 1 22
Hechos de la Mañana (6:00- Neutral 1 585 535 495 j 127 195 861 2023
9:00) Positive 7 1 0 0 o| iT 9
í Total 1 599 543 499 j 130 195 1 881 2054
Negative T 1 il o | o | oPóT 2
13 Hechos (15:00-16:00) Neutral 1 124 120 j 103 l l \ ~ 66 601 545
Total 1 125 121 103 j 72 1 66 J 601 547
í Negative 1 13 4 6 | °! oPo| 23
Neutral 1 382 359 295 53 1 102 J 5 2 j 1243Hechos (22:30-23:30)* Positive 1 1 1 0 0 opór 2
r Total 396 364 301 ¡ 53 102 52 1268
-------------------------------------- r Negative 1 16 20 13 5 ! 0 j 0
54
40 Neutral
1 411 379 329 i 56 64 36 P 1275CNI Noticias (22:00-23:00) Positive 14 2 1 12 o | 0| o|- 28
Total 1 441 401 354 61 64 j 36 1 1357
Except for Hechos, which transmits from Monday to Sunday, all the rest of the news broadcasts are 
transmitted from Monday to Friday at the scheduled time in parenthesis.
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Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Monitoreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
políticas en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana, January J&^-June 29lh 2000, IFE, México City, CD-Rom.
For all the parties the notes delivered were mostly neutral, and that further information was 
seldom presented. As for the three largest parties, one can even see that the PRI obtained 
the worse ratio between positive and negative news, getting 6.8 more negative comments 
than positive ones. For the other two largest coalitions, the figures are quite similar since 
each obtained more negative notes than positive ones at a ratio of 1.89-1.90.
As for the kind of notes presented by the news broadcasts, it is again the impartiality that 
becomes evident. In the case o f Televisa’s news broadcasts, they all presented a total o f  
4,054 notes on the campaign o f which only 68 notes were negative and 25 positive on the 
parties. Out of these latter figures, the PRI received 15 negative comments and only 3 
positive remarks, while AC obtained 25 negative for 11 positive notes, and AM got 13 
negative and 7 positive statements. In the case o f TV Azteca’s news broadcasts in all they 
presented a total of 4,040 notes on the campaign of which 50 of them were negative and 12 
positive. O f those notes that were accounted for the PRI obtained 13 negative and 2 positive 
remarks, the AC received 23 negative and 9 positive comments and the AM only 10 
negative and no positive notes.
As for the number of notes presented on the three largest parties, both private networks 
produced highly balanced results: Televisa presented 995 notes on the PRI, 1,013 on AC 
and 861 on AM, while TV Azteca presented 1,065 notes on the PRI, 1,025 on AC and 944 
on AM. This balance in the provision of information became even clearer in the case of the 
public TV Channel 11, where only one single note out of 524 presented during the 
campaign was accounted for (being negative for the AC).
Thus, if  for many decades TV channels never did show any alternative version of domestic 
politics to the official one presented, by 1997 and 2000 television became essential for 
presenting and transmitting the most relevant positions involved in these electoral races.65 
Until the 1990s the political liberalisation process had had little impact on television -
6i See Manuel Alejandro Guerrero, (2000) www.pulso.org/Espanol/Archivo/
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though the increasingly complex political arena might have forced television to maintain a 
minimum of consideration for the opposition parties, which were gaining strength. This 
does not mean that television remained unchanged during the period under consideration in 
this chapter. Actually, after the crisis of 1982, but especially during the presidency of 
Salinas de Gortari, television moved its loyalties from a general support to the regime to a 
more focused support to the presidential figure, as discussed in Chapter Four. The political 
competition among new forces and the economic upheavals, which eroded the old 
corporatist structures, made it rational for television to strengthen its relationship with the 
president in order to maintain the benefits. Especially with President Salinas the benefits 
allocated to different sectors came less and less through the old corporatist mechanisms, 
and more from a direct intervention from the Executive -o r the president himself (an 
example being the social programme for poverty alleviation, Solidaridad). This picture was 
finally altered by the coincidence of two important factors. On the one hand, a new scenario 
of economic competition that radically altered the quasi-monopolistic conditions in which 
private television in Mexico had been developing for decades. On the other, a political 
reform that amended the electoral law and granted the political parties the largest amount of 
resources ever for investing in political advertising, a business from which the largest 
networks hoped to obtain large profits.
Under these new circumstances, political openness became a better option for a new 
generation of young entrepreneurs more concerned with doing profitable business than on 
preserving old political loyalties; especially if under the new economic circumstances those 
political loyalties could not secure per se the traditional benefits that they had in past 
decades. In this general context, it became wiser to turn the political campaigns into a 
highly profitable economic enterprises and to turn democracy into a successful economic 
business.
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Chapter Eight
Consolidating the Trend: Radio and Political Openness, 1994-2000
As was seen in Chapter Five, since the late 1980s there had been a sustained growth in the 
number of concessions for operating new commercial radio stations in a time of general 
economic depression, in which the publicity market share o f the radio had been kept at an 
average level of 12 percent a year. While such a situation gave way to the development of 
new strategies, such as creating corporate alliances among radio networks, and asking for 
formal support from the Secretariat of Transports and Communications for AM stations, in 
the specific case of the news broadcasts some stations decided to try attractive 
combinations between innovative formats (a feature that some news broadcasts were 
adopting since the late 1980s) with more open contents. Without becoming the rule among 
all the radio stations, these were the firsts steps of the radio towards openness and plurality 
in the way in which information was presented on the news broadcasts. The present chapter 
deals precisely with the consolidation o f these trends.
There are basically two key reasons that explain the consolidation of the apertura on the 
Mexican radio stations; on the one hand, a further and stronger economic crisis that caused 
radio’s share in the publicity market to drop from an already low 12 percent during the 
early 1990s to a dramatic 9.6 percent between 1995 and 2000. Radio networks not only 
decided to carry further their corporate alliances policy, but they also tried new formulae in 
their transmissions that comprised o f constant modifications, not only of the programming, 
but of the whole orientation of the stations. At the same time, the largest radio networks 
diversified their investments towards other areas of communication technologies, especially 
towards cable and satellite transmissions. On the other hand, as in the case of TV, the 
Electoral Reform of 1996 that granted the largest amount of money ever for campaign 
advertising on the media, became a crucial incentive towards consolidating the political 
openness on radio, since being the media with the widest penetration throughout the 
country -and cheaper than TV for ad insertion—all parties were eager to buy radio time for 
their spots. The outcome wras that the strong competition for resources led to an extremely
balanced, impartial and open transmission of the political campaigns on the radio both in 
1997 and 2000.
Further Crisis on the Radio
An important study on the composition and consumption patterns of the radio audiences in 
Mexico was carried out in February 1996 by Indemerc-Louis Harris, one o f the most 
famous public opinion poll companies.* 1 The outcome of the research, which took into 
account both rural and urban population segments, showed that radio was listened to in 97 
percent of the households in the country, independently of the social conditions, and that 
the highest rating time is between 8:00 and 18:00 hours, except on weekends. There is 
actually an average of 2.6 radio sets per household, (though in rural areas this average 
lowers to 1.33 sets), and people listen to the radio around 4.5 days per week. Each day, 
fifty-six percent of men listen to the radio for an average of 2.3 hours, while fifty-nine 
percent o f women do so for an average of 2.8 hours.2 Radio is by far the media with the 
strongest penetration in the country, though at the same time, since radio programming is 
less centralised than that of the TV channels in general there is no single radio programme 
that enjoys the national ratings of a TV soap-opera or a TV news broadcast. Radio has a 
more local or regional character that makes it “closer” to the individual than the nation­
wide TV stations located in Mexico City. However, in this chapter I deal mostly with 
Mexico City radio networks, not because they have been the only ones to be on the 
vanguard o f political openness (local radio stations have fought important “battles” against 
local power, as in Yucatan or Baja California Norte), but because it has been in Mexico 
City where the headquarters of the most important networks of the country have been 
located. Even when not having the majority of their stations there, by 1996 all major radio 
networks had at least one station in operation in the capital, making Mexico City a major 
field o f competition for the largest radio groups.
Since the late 1980s the advertising expenditure for radio in Mexico has remained stagnant 
at an annual average of 12 percent. As discussed in Chapter Five, this situation has already
1 Indermec-Louis Harris, Estudio de Hábitos y  Consumo de los Radioescuchas de la República Mexicana, 
Mexico City, 1996.
1 Ibid.
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created pressure amongst radio entrepreneurs since more stations entered into operation 
during those same years, in a situation in which also the general performance o f the 
economy was quite unstable and precarious. If between 1991 and 1993, during the most 
successful years o f the Salinas administration, the economy seemed to be slowly recovering 
from a decade o f instability and frequent crises, the political upheavals that shook Mexico 
during 1994 eroded the still fragile economic advances and unleashed the deepest crisis in 
decades (Table 8.1).
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Table 8.1
Real GDP Growth, Inflation and Exchange Rates, 1994-1999
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
GDP Growth 4.5 -6.2 5.1 6.8 4.8 3.7
Inflation 7.1 56.9 26.44 15.7 18.7 12.32
Exchange
Rate
(Mex. Pesos per 
USDS 1)
$3.37 $6.40 $7.59 $7.92 $9.96 $9.51
Source: Elaborated with data from INEGI, Banco de Información Económica, Sistema de cuentas nacionales. 
Producción, inflación y  Precios al Consumidor, Mexico City (www.inegi.org.mx) and Banco de Mexico, 
Mexico City (www.banxico.org.mx).
The immense recession of the Mexican economy during the years after the 1995 crisis had 
a direct impact on all areas of economic life and affected the already fragile landscape of 
the radio industry (Table 8.2). The radio’s share of the advertising market was drastically 
reduced from 12 percent to only 9.6 percent between 1995 and 2000. Moreover, the 
investments in the whole media advertising market were reduced in real terms, since such a 
figure amounted to USD SI.935 Billion in 1994 and fell to only USD S 1.118 Billion in 
1995, thus making of an already low nine percent an even smaller proportion of a reduced 
advertising national market. The mass media advertising market only started to recover in 
2000 the pre-1995 levels of investment, though in the case o f the radio that is still not the 
case. In 1994 this type of media was allocated USD S 232.194 Million of advertising 
investment (equivalent to its 12 percent share o f this market), while in 2000 such 
investments amounted to USD S 226.100 Million (equivalent to a 10 percent share).
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The magnitude of this crisis pushed the radio industry to further develop the strategies they 
had already been practising for attracting ratings, improving their financial performance 
and adapting to adverse conditions o f competition. If before the crisis of 1995 the stations 
were already establishing strategic alliances and modifying the contents of their 
programming to make them more attractive (with the implication of exploring the limits o f  
tolerance o f the regime in relation to the ways o f transmitting and presenting information 
on their news broadcasts), as a result of the crisis the entrepreneurs decided not only to 
carry such strategies even further, but they also decided to diversify their investments either 
in other countries or in other areas o f mass media (mostly Cable TV, satellite TV and other 
forms o f Direct Broadcasting System transmissions -DBS). In the short term, however, 
many were constrained to dismiss a large number o f their employees, especially in their 
AM stations.3
Table 8.2
Private Investments on Media Advertising
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]'ot£.l ill 
USDS 
Billion
N.A.= Not availa j.le.
(e) Estimated values.
Source: AMAP, Información estadística de la publicidad en México, inversion publicitaria de la iniciativa 
privada, / 990-2000, Mexico City, AMAP, 2000.
1997 1998 1999 (e) 2000 (e)
74% 75% 75% 74%
10% 10% 10% 10%
7% 6% 6% 6%
4% 4% 4% 4%
5% 5% 4% 4%
N.A. N.A. 1% 2%
1.634 1.534 1.879 2.261
3 Although no exact data exists on the number o f dismissed employees in the area of radio due to the crisis, all 
eight radio entrepreneurs interviewed accepted that a common measure taken by them was to reduce their 
number of collaborators in the stations. They did provide the author with the number of employees that were 
fired from their stations, but at times, I must say, such figures did not coincide with the eventual published 
numbers on the printed press.
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Even before 1995, AM stations were facing difficult times. Paradoxically, the number of 
AM stations had been growing while their ratings had been constantly falling since the 
early 1990s.4 As discussed in Chapter Five, FM stations had been displacing AM stations in 
audience preferences since 1985. The strategy of the latter for recovering audiences and 
surviving during the late 1980s was essentially to reduce music broadcasting and adopt 
more talk-radio formats in their programming. The strategy worked well for some years and 
they recovered some rating points. However, since the early 1990s FM stations also started 
to adopt talk-radio formats, especially in their news broadcasts, and were thus once again 
transmitting very similar programming to the disadvantage o f course of AM stations. 
Therefore, the generally difficult economic situation of the radio industry was aggravated 
for the AM stations since it combined with the already continuous fall in their ratings. In 
January 1995 the rating points of the AM stations amounted to 5.16, while those for FM 
stations reached 12.91 rating points.5 6 Before the crisis, the concessionaires had also started 
to apply to the Secretariat of Communications and Transports to obtain the technical and 
administrative support to make sure that those stations that were located within the AM 
band could also transmit on the FM band (depending, o f course, on the availability of 
frequencies on each market), and in this way many programmes which were successful on 
certain stations within one band could also be heard on the other.
In October 1994 the Secretariat of Communications and Transports announced that 
technical facilities and support would be given to the stations for transmitting on both bands 
and in this way “respond to the crisis of the AM band stations”.'* Nevertheless, after the 
1995 economic crisis the concessionaires, through the then chairman of the CIRT, Emilio 
Nassar, openly asked for stronger measures from the Secretariat of Communications and 
Transports and to avoid causing the stations to go into bankruptcy and to avoid job losses.7
4 According to some of the entrepreneurs interviewed, such "irrational growth in the number of AM stations” 
when it was “evident for any true entrepreneur" that these stations were losing audiences, responds to the fact 
that many AM concessions were given to politicians with no experience on radio or to close friends of theirs 
at the local level (Interview w'ith Guillermo Salas, August 2000, and Share-holder of MVS TV, August 2000). 
Though I could not find definitive proof of this, some hints in favour of this argument are discussed by Fatima 
Fernandez (see note 10 below).
5 “Los publicos de la radio”, in El universo de la radio, vol.2, no.2, Summer, Mexico City 1996, p.30.
6 “Lineamientos generales de apoyo tecnico a las estaciones de radio locali2adas en la banda de amplitud
modulada", Diario Oficial de la Federacion, October 2nd 1994.
7 Bole tin Radiofonico-TV, No. 422, August, Mexico City: CIRT, 1995, p. 10.
2 5 6
However, the critical situation o f the radio forced many stations to dismiss a considerable 
number o f their employees.8 For instance, by mid-1995 Grupo Radio Centro -o f  Francisco 
Aguirre— dismissed two hundred employees; Radiópolis, the radio division of Televisa, 
dismissed forty employees; Grupo Agentes de Radio y Televisión -ARTSA of Diaz 
Romo— fired more than one hundred and fifty employees; Organización Radio Fórmula - o f  
Rogerio Azcarraga—dismissed thirty employees; Núcleo Radio Mil -o f  the Salas family—  
fired more than one hundred and fifty employees; and, Radiodifusión Red, the network 
transmitting Monitor, fired fifty employees in order to reduce expenditure. These radio 
groups were, of course, not the only ones to reduce their personnel, since more dramatic 
situations were registered in some local radio stations in provinces like Oaxaca, Chiapas, 
San Luis Potosí or Michoacan,9 however, since these groups represent some o f the strongest 
radio organisations in Mexico, these examples are illustrative of the general situation that 
was being experienced in radio during 1995.
It is interesting to note that in spite o f such a situation, the federal government continued to 
award concessions for operating more commercial radio stations.10 In 1995, the worst 
moment o f the crisis, there were given sixty-seven concessions for operating radio stations, 
while, for instance in 1990 and 1991, years that registered a GDP growth of 4.4 percent and 
3.6 (and with a share o f 12 percent o f the advertising market), fifty-two and twenty-four 
concessions respectively were awarded.
Thus between 1994 and 1995 the total sum of commercial concessions grew from 1,068 to 
1,135 in a moment when the radio’s advertising market was at a very low level both in 
relative (decreasing from 12 to 9 percent) and in absolute terms, falling from a total share 
of USD $ 232.194 Million to only USD $ 100.620 Million in those years (Table 8.3).
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8 For a careful account on the loss of jobs on different kinds of media see Alejandro Olmos, “La marea de la 
crisis econo mica arras tra a los medios mexicanos”, in Revista Mexicana de Comunicación, n.40, May-July, 
Mexico City: Fundación Manuel Buendia. 1995.
9 See Gabriel Sosa Plata, “Focos de emergencia para la radio mexicana”, in Revista Mexicana de 
Comunicación, no.43, February-April, Mexico City: Fundación Manuel Buendia 1996.
iü A constant criticism found during the interviews of the radio licensees is that the government not only 
continued to award concessions in highly discretionary ways without regarding the “market structure”, but 
also that a good number of those concessions had been awarded to politicians, and not to experienced radio 
entrepreneurs. The researcher Fatima Fernandez has also pointed out this fact in the case of the Grupo 
Radiorama, a network founded in 1974 that now controls 161 stations. According to her findings, a large 
number of the concessions for operating those stations have been awarded to politicians that collaborated in 
the Echeverria and Lopez Portillo administrations. See Fatima Fernandez Christlieb (1991), pgs. 174-175.
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Table 8.3
Number of Radio Concessions in Operation and Investment on Radio, 1994-2000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Number of 
New Radio 
Stations
1,068 1,135 1,145 1,137 1,143 1,146
Radio's 
Share of 
Advertising 
Investment
12% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10%
Advertising 
Investment 
on Radio in 
Absolute 
Terms (USD 
$ Millions)
232,194.6 100,620 113,691.33 163,431.3 153,349.9 187,909.1
Source: Elaborated with data from AMAP, Información estadística de la publicidad en México, Inversion 
publicitaria de la iniciativa privada, 1990-2000, Mexico City, AMAP, 2000, and data from Secretaria de 
Comunicaciones y Transpones, Estadísticas,^Estaciones de radio y  television, concesionadas, permisionadas 
y complementarias en operación, Mexico City (www.sct.gob.mx).
Under such circumstances, the position of the concessionaires was made very clear in the 
words o f one o f its most well known members, the vice-chairman of MVS Radio, Adrian 
Vargas Guajardo, who was at that time also the president of the Mexico City Radio 
Broadcasters Association (ARDF),
The market [for radio) is now saturated and there are cities where it becomes impossible to establish one more 
station... If I was in a position in government, I would not award any more concessions, since I believe that 
the actual number of stations is adequate, and all attempts to increase it will decrease the profitability 
transforming the radio from a healthy business that provides good service to the community, into an industry
with more problems.11
11 El Financiero, November 15l!1 1996. !
!I
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Another important dilemma for the radio stations is that they cannot compete for audiences 
against television. Even as an information source, television is preferred to radio. 
According to the study earned out in 1996 by the IFE and the Instituto Nacional de 
Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM, when individuals were asked what their usual 
sources o f  information on politics were, 59 percent answered TV as opposed to only 17 
percent who answered that it was radio.12 Obviously this trend was reflected also in the 
allocation o f investments. During the 1980s the share of investments on advertising for 
television remained constant at 65 percent, while that of the radio stayed at 12 percent. 
However, after the 1995 crisis, there was a drastic change in the advertising market 
structure in the media. As Table 8.2 above shows, while the share o f radio has fallen and 
remained low for the period 1995-2000, that for TV has raised from 65 percent in 1994 to 
an average of 74.5 percent between 1995 and 2000. This trend does not seem to be 
reversible and has, thus, placed greater pressure on the radio licensees for trying more 
innovative strategies and more daring programming, including, of course, news broadcasts. 
Let us now tum to the analysis o f the responses of the radio organisations to these 
challenges and difficulties.
A common response was to accentuate some o f the courses of action that were already 
being practised by the concessionaires since the early 1990s in order to become more 
competitive and reduce costs. One such practice was the formation of alliances amongst 
different radio organisations. The aim of such alliances was to capture a larger clientele by 
offering more attractive publicity plans or “publicity packages” to the announcers for 
buying air-time and transmitting their commercials in more stations and, therefore, into 
wider areas. Most of these alliances were temporal and they did not include a fusion of 
capital or the merging of shares. Another strategy was to diversify the investments in other 
areas of the media industry, especially Cable TV and other new radio technologies and 
satellite communication services, like DBS transmissions.
Some o f the first alliances were, for instance, that of the network Crystal with the Grupo 
Cima in 1992 in order to have control over 80 stations in 21 states; in March 1993 Crystal- 
Cima allied with Grupo Sociedad Mexicana de Radio (Somer) and together they operated
12 IFE and IIJ-UNAM, Reporte sobre consumo de medios en México, UNAM, 1996; and Omar Raúl Martínez 
, “Datos duros sobre monitoreos de coberturas electorales”, in Revista Mexicana de Comunicación, vol.63, 
May-June. Mexico City: Fundación Manuel Buendía 2000.
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113 stations. However, in May 1995 Crystal decided to separate from the alliance, leaving 
only the Cima-Somer network. In 1994 Radio Mil established an alliance with ARTSA in 
order to offer the announcer the possibility of transmitting their advertising in ten stations 
in Mexico City (three of NRM and three of ARTSA). However, the alliance did not work 
out as expected and ARTSA decided to rent its three stations in Mexico City to the network 
ACIR,13 which then controlled 150 radio stations nationwide. ACIR, whose main 
shareholder was Francisco Ibarra, then decided to re-structure its corporation and create 
three divisions: ACIR Radio, TV Integral (composed of twelve cable systems, five UHF 
systems and two terrestrial local channels), and Multicom (various communication systems 
for companies). In 1996 ACIR sold 49.5 percent of its shares to Carlos Slim Helu, the main 
shareholder o f Telmex, through his corporation Grupo Financiero Inbursa. The aim o f such 
capitalisation was to get fresh resources for the launching o f a DTH TV project o f Radio 
ACIR and compete with Televisa, Multivision, Medcom and Ultrasenial.14 *
After the separation of Grupo ACIR, Núcleo Radio Mil decided to sell two of its stations in 
Mexico City, XECO-AM and XEUR-AM to Radiorama (of Javier Pereda and Javier Perez 
de Anda) in 1994 and to establish in 1995 an alliance with Estéreo Cien, a station belonging 
to the Somer Group. The main shareholder of the latter, Edilberto Huesca Perrotin, became 
Joint Director General of the NRM. In April 1995, Radiorama established the 
Comercializadora Multimedia de Comunicación with Grupo Siete (of Javier Sanchez 
Campuzano, major shareholder also of Grupo Crystal) in order to offer the announcers 
seven radio stations located in seven different cities, spaces on four newspapers (including 
the San Diego Hoy edited in Spanish in San Diego, CA), two monthly publications, and two 
frontier-city channels, Channel 33 of Tijuana and Channel 2 o f Reynosa-Matamoros.13 
Grupo Radio Centro, which operates three large radio networks, (one of them being 
Organización Impulsora de Radio), comprised one hundred and five stations nationwide, 
owns thirteen stations in Mexico City, three of which it acquired from Medcom
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)J Reforma. November 2nd 1995. 
u Reforma, March 2T‘ 1996.
13 It is interesting to note that Radiorama had already allied with Grupo Siete and Grupo Radio Centro to
create Proyecto Cosmovision in 1992 to bid for the public “media package" that included I.MEVISION 
(Channels 13,and 7, and Channel 2 of Chihuahua), die Theatre Company COTSA and the newspaper El 
Nacional.
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Corporation.16 In 1995 Medcom sold three stations in Mexico City and one in Guadalajara 
which also comprised of Radiodifusion Red. This network transmitted Monitor. Initially 
GRC paid USD $ 33 Million for 33 percent o f the shares o f  Radiodifusion Red in May 
1995, and paid US $ 42.4 Million (due to the devaluation o f prices) for the other 67 percent 
of the shares in January 1996. Radiodifusion Red disappeared and a new division was 
created within GRC called INFORED. During this situation o f change Jose Gutierrez Vivo 
(the newscaster o f Monitor) assumed 27 percent o f the total shares o f GRC. Moreover, 
INFORED is supposed to provide information services to more than one hundred radio 
stations who have been affiliated to the group for ten years and, such services extend to the 
remaining stations of Medcom Corporation. For its part, Medcom used the resources to 
invest in its DTH TV project with satellite services. After the acquisition of INFORED, 
GRC re-structured its corporation as following: Organización Impulsora de Radio (with 
105 affiliated and personally owned stations in the country), Organización Radio Centro 
(which controls nine stations in Mexico City), and INFORED (with three stations in 
Mexico City and repeaters in Monterrey and Guadalajara). GRC created another company, 
Ameritel, in 1998 to compete for the further opening o f the local telephone services, 
investing therein more than US $ 70 Million.17
For JV Corporación, (of which MVS Radio is part along with forty-two radio stations), the 
option was to expand its TV division, Multivision. In September 1994 it obtained the 
concession to operate satellite TV services, and in March 1995 Mutivision announced its 
association with Televisao Abril do Brasil, Organización Cisneros o f Venezuela, and 
Hughes Communications to create the Galaxy Consortium Latin America in order to 
provide the whole region with DTH TV, called DirecTV Latin America, through the 
Galaxy III-R Satellite (of Hughes Comm,).18 In 1996 MVS Radio allied with Grupo Imagen 
(owned by Jose Luis Fernandez Herrera) to offer a larger audience to the announcers. In 
April 1997 MVS Radio and the NRM decided to create a commercial alliance to offer the
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16 The old radio network, Radio Programas de Mexico, of Clemente Sema, was merged with others of his 
businesses -Radiodifusion Red, Super Red, Teleprogramas de Mexico and Corporación Telepatía de TV—to 
create Medcom Corporation in March 1993.
17 La Jornada, June 4th 1998.
18 Taken from Mejia Barquera, “Disputa por la TV restringida via satélite”, in El Nacional, November 13th
1995.
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announcers eleven radio stations in Mexico City.19 The alliance resulted so convenient that 
in July 1999, MVS bought 25 percent o f the shares of NRM. In November 1997, MVS and 
Grupo Imagen decided to merge their shares,20 though in 1999 the venture was ruptured. 
Finally, another interesting alliance during this period occurred between Televisa’s 
Radiopolis and Radiodifusoras Asociadas (Rasa) in October 1996. According to the terms 
of the alliance, the programmes produced by Radiopolis could be transmitted on more than 
seventy radio stations belonging to Rasa in the country.21 During the end o f 1998, 
Radiopolis decided to study a new strategy, that of selling franchises of its stations to local 
radio stations. This was put into practice in June 1999.
Many radio corporations decided not only to join with others to form alliances for 
advertising or for investing in other communication technologies, but a third strategy led by 
some of the strongest groups was the exploration o f foreign radio markets, be it either by 
selling their programmes to radio stations in other countries, or by investing directly in the 
acquisition o f shares from foreign radio organisations. Televisa’s radio division, 
Radiopolis, signed important contracts with Radio East Shanghai in 1996 through which 
the Mexican network recorded and sold programmes especially designed for Chinese 
audiences.22 Besides the Chinese radio market, Radiopolis increased the distribution of its 
programmes in Spain, Guatemala, Costa Rica and El Salvador.23 Organización Radio 
Formula also decided to expand into the U.S.A. in 1994 by acquiring and affiliating thirty- 
five radio stations mainly, but not uniquely, along the border, and providing them with 
programming elaborated in Mexico City.
A fourth important strategy applied by the radio organisations was to modify the content of 
their programming and, in many cases, this implied deep structural changes within the 
stations. These changes took place mostly between 1995 and 1996. For instance, in 1995 
two of Radiopolis’ stations, XEQ-AM and XEX-AM, transformed from broadcasting 
modem music in Spanish and talk-radio programmes into talk-radio and Mexican music
19 El Financiero, April 5th 1997. The stations are Stereo Rey, Globo 105, Pulsar FM, Radio Activo and XELA 
of MYrS Radio, and Sabrosita 590, Radio Mil, Radio Sinfonola, Morena, Stereo Cien and Codigo 100.9 of 
NRM.
20 El Financiero, November 24th 1997.
21 El Financiero, October 12th 1996.
22 El Financiero, October 15th 1996.
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respectively. However, in 1996 XEX-AM changed its programming again to modem pop 
music in Spanish. Grupo Acir also changed the programming of two stations, XHSH-FM 
and XEVOZ-AM from broadcasting modem music in Spanish and group-Latin music, to 
popular northern-style music and Mexican folk music. RASA also changed the 
programming o f its XEN-AM station from modem English pop to talk-radio broadcasting. 
Grupo Siete replaced the transmission of group-Latin music with talk-radio programming 
on its XEUR-AM station. Organización Radio Formula also transformed the programming 
of its XESM-AM station from modem pop -both in English and Spanish—into Mexican 
and international ballads. However, maybe the most notorious change was that of Núcleo 
Radio Mil’s XHSON-FM a station called “Rock 101” (since it was located at 100.9 FM). 
This station was one of the pioneers in broadcasting less commercial and modem rock 
music and attracted the kind of audience that seldom found other alternatives on the radio. 
However, since the station had constantly been losing announcers, the executives of the 
NRM decided to transform it into a more “general pop music broadcaster”. In August 1996 
a group o f three hundred youngsters organised a rock concert outside the facilities of the 
NRM in order to protest at the closure of the station.23 4 However, “Rock 101” was replaced 
by “Codigo 100.9”, and later to “ 100 Punto Nueva Era”. That same year, another five 
stations decided to change their programming and formats as well. Along 1997 these 
changes continued.
As for the changes in the news broadcasts, many stations were also trying out innovative 
adaptations in the formats and hiring well known professional journalists as newscasters. In 
Mexico City, new programmes appeared on current affairs debates, some news broadcasts 
decided to expand their transmissions time, and journalists and well known and provocative 
newscasters were constantly moving from one station to another. For instance, between 
1996 and 2000 Jose Cardenas transferred from Grupo Acir’s Informativo Panorama to 
Radiopolis’ Detrás de la Noticia and later to Radio 13’s Al Momento, and finally, at the end 
of the period studied here, to Radio Formula’s Jose Cardenas Informa. Enrique Quintana, 
director o f the economic section o f the newspaper Reforma, was hired by Grupo Radio
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23 For the name of the stations in these countries see Gabriel Sosa Plata, “Panorama estable para la radio 
mexicana en 1996”, Revista Mexicana de Comunicación, no.47, February-March, Mexico City: Fundación 
Manue 1B uendí a, 1997.
24 Reforma, August 16th 1996.
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Centro (GRC) as director o f News and Information Projects in February 1997. This was 
part of a whole new project of transformation within GRC in its news broadcastings, in 
which the key element was the acquisition of the Radiodifusion Red Network -the one that 
produced the news broadcast Monitor—from Clemente Sema at the beginning of 1995. 
Radiodifusion Red was composed of XERED-AM, XERED-FM, XEDKR-AM in 
Guadalajara, and afterwards it was renamed Infored, under the direction of the journalist 
Jose Gutierrez Vivo.25 In 1997, Infored was transmitting its Monitor news broadcast in the 
42 most important cities of México, covering almost 80 percent o f the market.26 Moreover, 
the transmission o f its evening edition was lengthened from 18:00 to 21:00 hours to 17:00 
to 21:00 hours daily.
Televisa’s Radiopolis also decided to hire important journalists to direct and edit its news 
broadcasts. Its major news broadcast Detrás de la Noticia hired figures such as Carlos 
Monsivais and Carlos Fuentes, and in order to appeal to the youth, the news broadcast 
started to be transmitted also in the Pop Rock station WFM since November 1997. 
However, in 1999 the journalist Ricardo Rocha-Vice-President of Radiopolis, who showed 
on Televisa’s Channel 2 the videos that implicated the federal police in the murder of 
peasants in the southern state o f Guerrero—decided to leave the corporation after 27 years 
of collaboration. He moved to Grupo Acir, where he conducted the major news broadcast, 
called Detrás de la Noticia, since he had the rights over the name of the news broadcast of 
Televisa, and under the same name he founded an information agency.
The MVS Group also became more aggressive in its competition for audiences in its news 
broadcasts, and along with the already popular Para Empezar (simultaneously transmitted 
on MVS TV Channel AS), the network decided to present information capsules from CNN 
live every hour. In December 1999, with the break up between Grupo Imagen and MVS, 
the group of journalists that had conducted the three editions of the MVS news broadcast 
Para Empezar -Pedro Ferriz, Javier Solorzano and Carmen Aristegui—joined Grupo 
Imagen in the creation of Imagen Informativo, its news editions. Other networks decided to 
hire already famous figures who, even when not directing news broadcasts, were famous 
enough to attract audiences. Such was the case of Hector Martinez Serrano, the anchorman
25 See Chapter Five.
26 Gabriel Sosa Plata, “Se vitamina el cuadrante radiofónico mexicano", in Revista Mexicana de 
Comunicación, No.52, January-February, Mexico City: Fundación Manuel Buendía, 1998.
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of the famous music programme Reloj Musical of Televisa’s XEW, who left the station in 
1997 in order to conduct the information and entertainment programme Buenos Dias o f 
Organización Radio Formula, the network that was able to hire most of the big names that, 
for one reason or another, had left Televisa’s Radiopolis.
To sum up, these were the different forms in which the Mexican radio corporations were 
responding to the difficulties, (some of which were already present since the late 1980s, 
like the stagnation of its publicity market’s share in a situation of the continuos growth in 
the number o f stations and of general economic instability), that consolidated after the 1995 
economic crisis. The radio organisations not only continued with strategies already in 
practice since the early 1990s -the formation of alliances for advertising and the change o f  
programming—but they also tried to diversify their investments into other areas of the 
communications industry and into other radio markets abroad. In the short term, many 
stations were also constrained to dismiss a number of their employees.
A further aspect that will be discussed in the following part, is that which deals with the 
pressure that the radio stations suffered from the regime due to the further openness that 
was brought about by the already discussed competition amongst the stations. This will be 
discussed within the context of the electoral campaigns o f 1997 and 2000.
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The Campaigns on Radio
The Electoral Reform of 1996 established new legal dispositions to secure equity in the 
access of the parties to the broadcasting media. The Reform of 1996 authorised the IFE 
through its Commission o f Broadcasting to carry out a constant monitoring of the way the 
media presented information on the political campaigns. In December 1996 in order to 
secure balanced transmissions the IFE made public a series of fairness criteria to be 
followed by the media in relation to the political information. Through these criteria, the 
IFE expected the CIRT to induce its members to present information related to the 
campaigns in relatively neutral and balanced ways.27
27 See Chapter Four.
265
As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, during the 1994 campaigns, the monitoring o f the 
IFE was not enough to induce more balanced and impartial transmissions. However, this 
time it was different since the IFE also authorised a large amount of resources for the 
parties, to be spent on broadcasting ads. According to the 1996 Law, there are three 
modalities for spending on media advertising. Firstly, to the regular fifteen minutes 
advertising that each party can have monthly in the electronic media (Article 44), the 1996 
Reform established that during electoral periods the parties could avail of up to 200 hours 
on TV and 250 on radio when a general election takes place, and up to 100 hours on TV 
and 125 on radio when a mid-term election is under way (Article 47, paragraph I-a and I-b). 
With this time, the parties can produce programmes of 5, 7 and 10 minutes. Secondly, 
Article 47 paragraph I-c, establishes that during electoral periods the IFE will buy, and 
distribute to the parties each month up to ten thousand ads on radio and four hundred on 
TV. The duration o f each of these spots will be of twenty seconds and are to be destined for 
advertising only. Both modalities of time -that allocated for programmes and that for 
advertising ads— should be distributed amongst the parties as follows: 4 percent to parties 
without representation in Congress (Article 47, paragraph 2), 30 percent on equal terms for 
all the parties and 70 percent according to their share of votes in the previous electoral 
process (Article 47, paragraph 3). Of course, all this time must be paid to the stations. 
Thirdly, these types of media spaces, bought and distributed to the parties by the IFE, does 
not exclude the possibility for the parties to buy additional advertising time on the media, as 
stated by Article 48. For instance, for the 1997 elections the Congress authorised the IFE to 
distribute US S 278 million to the parties, five times more than in 1994. These funds were 
allocated among the parties as follows: 30 percent on equal terms for all parties and 70 
percent according to their share of the votes in the previous electoral process. In this way, 
the PRI obtained US $111.5 million, the PAN US $ 66 million, the PRD US S 49 million, 
and the rest went to the other parties. O f this money, the parties used large sums to buy ads. 
If in 1994, the parties spent 25 percent o f their funds for broadcasting media ads, in 1997 
they spent 55 percent.28 In the case of the radio, the three largest sources of income during 
1997 were the advertising of the long distance telephone service companies -a  sendee that 
for the first time ceased to be a monopoly of the recently privatised Teléfonos de México—
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amounting to 12.5 percent of the total, the advertising of the banks for obtaining the 
recently created retirement funds for workers, amounting to 8.5 percent of the total, and the 
electoral advertising amounting to 6.7 percent of the total.28 9
As seen in the previous section, the radio stations were making majors adjustments in their 
news broadcasting formats and teams and in other information programmes. One of their 
principal aims was that o f attracting the highest ratings possible during the campaigns. 
Once the IFE had granted a large amount of resources to be spent by the media for the 
campaign o f 1997, the radio stations started to compete for those resources. A general 
course o f action was announced by the president of the Radio Broadcasters Association o f  
the Valley o f Mexico (Asociación de Radiodifusores del Valle de México, ARVM), Adrian 
Vargas Guajardo. This course of action was based on four strategies: the modernisation o f 
radio services, the promotion of the advantages o f advertising on radio, the organisation for 
awarding recognition for the best commercials on the radio, and the development of three 
opinion studies in relation to voting tendencies in the 1997 race for the government o f 
Mexico City.30 Moreover, in co-ordination with the CIRT, the ARDV announced its public 
compromise to present the outcomes o f the exit poll of the elections in Mexico City on the 
evening o f July 6th, between 21:30 and 22:00 hours.31
All these efforts of the radio to capture more audience attention and more resources from 
the parties and from other announcers, reflected on a relatively balanced presentation o f 
information on the radio news broadcasts. Nevertheless, at a local level, some radio stations 
were still openly in favour of the PRI. If one takes into consideration the form in which the 
elections o f 1997 were reported in all the country’s radio stations, a clear bias in favour o f 
the PRI becomes immediately noticeable (Tables 8.5 and 8,6).
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28 Information provided by Margarita Moreno Lopez, Deputy-Director of Radio Broadcasting at the Dirección 
Ejecutiva de Prerrogativas y Partidos Politicos of the IFE.
29 Adcebra, no.56, October 1996, pgs 5-8.
30 La Jornada, February 24th 1997.
Jl Ibidem
267
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero. .Chapter Eight
Table 8.5
Coverage Time for Parties on Radio News Broadcasts in all the Country, April 13th -  
________________________________ July 3rd 1997__
PRI PRD PAN PT PVEM PDM PPS PFCRN
Time 263h 51’ 136h 08’ 139h 41’ 33h46’ 15h 05’ 8h34’ 8h55’ 10h47’
17” 59” 26” 18” 51” 21” 07” 37”
Average 42.67% 22.07% 22.65% 5.47% 2.45% 1.39% 1.45% 1.75%
Source: IFE, Informe que presenta la Comisión de Radiodifusión al Consejo General del IFE, en relación a 
los moniloreos muéstrales realizados sobre tiempos de transmisión de las campañas de los partidos políticos 
en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación. April 13^ to July 3rd 1997.
Table 8.6
Number of Notes on the Parties on Radio Broadcasts in all the Country, April 13Ih - 
_____________________________ July 3rd 1997_______________________
PRI PRD PAN PT PVEM PDM PPS PFCRN Total
Notes 5,280 3,318 3,012 822 435 294 259 381 13,801
Average 38.2% 24% 21.8% 5.9% 3.1% 2.2% 1.9% 2.7% 100%
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Informe que presenta la Comisión de Radiodifusión al Consejo 
General del IFE, en relación a los monitoreos muéstrales realizados sobre tiempos de transmisión de las 
campañas de los partidos políticos en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación, April 13th to 
July 3rd 1997.
This aspect o f radio made it the broadcasting medium that in certain areas was 
courageously presenting controversial material and direct criticisms against the regime -as 
in the case of the stations located in major cities or on the frontier—, but also an openly 
supportive medium for the PRI candidates. In certain provinces, radio stations were either 
under strong pressure from the governors or were closely linked to the local PRI interests, 
(stations directly owned by Priistas).
However, when considering the forms in which the information was presented on the news 
broadcasts that were transmitted from major cities, the trends towards openness on the 
radio, already present since 1994, were clearly reinforced. The 1997 electoral campaign 
involved for the first time a dispute for the government of Mexico City, making the election 
develop into a sort of “minor presidential race”, and therefore a carefully monitored one. As 
in 1994, the Radio Broadcast Commission of the IFE carried out monitoring on the ways in 
which the radio and TV news broadcasts were presenting the information related to the 
electoral campaigns. In general terms, the information presented on the radio news
26S
broadcasts anchored in the capital was relatively balanced for the largest political 
competitors. As Tables 8.7 and 8.8 show, when comparing both the time and the number o f  
notes devoted by Mexico City’s news broadcasts to each of the three largest parties, it 
becomes apparent that there was a quite balanced reporting on them.
Table 8.7
Coverage Time for Parties on Radio News Broadcasts in Mexico City, March 16th-  
_____________________________ July 3rd 1997
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PRI PRD PAN PT PVEM PDM PPS PFCRN
Time 9 4 h 4 5 ’ SSh 4 6 ’ 85h 5 1 ’ 1 4 h 0 r 15h 0 7 ’ 06h 46’ 03h 59’ 1 lh  54’
37” 0 9 ” 08” 20” 20” 15” 20 ” 22”
Average 29.50% 27.64% 26.73% 4.37% 4.71% 2.11% 1.24% 3.71%
Source: IFE, Informe que presenta la Comisión de Radiodifusión al Consejo General del IFE, en relación a 
los monitoreos muéstrales realizados sobre tiempos de transmisión de las campañas de los partidos políticos 
en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación, March 16th to July 3rd 1997.
Table 8.8
Number of Notes on the Parties on Radio News Broadcasts in Mexico City, March 
_____________________________ 16lh-July 3rd 1997_____________________
PRI PRD PAN PT PVEM PDM PPS PFCRN
Notes 1,450 1,380 1,363 349 525 263 180 338
Average 24.79% 23.60% 23.31% 5.97% 8.98% 4.50% 3.08% 5.78%
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Informe que presenta la Comisión de Radiodifusión al Consejo 
General del IFE, en relación a los monitoreos muéstrales realizados sobre tiempos de transmisión de las 
campañas de los partidos políticos en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación, March 16th to 
July 3ri 1997.
In the monitoring of the IFE, one very important criteria to be controlled was the 
“objectivity” of the information released on the news broadcasts, (as may be seen below, 
for the elections of 2000 the label “objectivity” was replaced by the less controversial term 
“neutrality” to control the same criterion). By “objectivity”, the IFE meant the non­
existence o f additional remarks or comments by the reporter, the journalist or the 
newscaster when presenting the news.
This did not imply any restriction on editing the information presented by the news 
broadcasts, but only implied a more careful presentation of the news. If the newscaster or 
the reporter added any comment to “facts” presented on the news, then such a remark was 
considered as being non-objective, be it either positive -when supporting— or negative -
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when deriding the party or candidate. Table 8.9 below presents the total number of 
objective and non-objective notes in relation to the total number of notes presented on the 
parties by the radio news broadcasts transmitted from Mexico City.
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Table 8.9
Total Objective and Non-objective Notes Presented on Parties on the Radio News 
___________Broadcasts in Mexico City, March 16th-July 3rd 1997___________
Party Number of 
objective 
notes
Percentage Number of 
non-objective 
notes
Percentage Total number 
of notes
Percentage
PAN 1,245 21.29% 118 2.02% 1,363 23.31%
PRI 1,366 23.36% 84 1.44% 1,450 24.80%
PRD 1,291 22.08% 89 1.52% 1,380 23.60%
PFCR 331 5.66% 7 0.12% 338 5.78%
PT 342 5.85% 7 0.12% 349 5.97%
PVEM 493 8.43% 32 0.55% 525 8.98%
PPS 180 3.08% 0 0% 180 3.08%
PDM 258 4.41% 5 0.09% 263 4.50%
Total 5,506 94.15% 342 5.85% 5,848 100%
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Informe que presenta la Comisión de Radiodifusión al Consejo 
General del ¿FE. en relación a los monitoreos muéstrales realizados sobre tiempos de transmisión de las 
campañas de ¡os partidos politicos en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación. March 16th to 
July 3rd 1997.
The number o f non-objective notes represents only a very small percentage of the total 
amount of notes reported on the parties. The total number of non-objective notes 
represented only 5.85 percent of the total o f notes, however, when analysed separately one 
may notice that, as Table 8.10 shows, the number o f negative non-objective notes far 
exceeded the number of positive non-objective notes on the parties.
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Table 8.10
Non-objective (Positive and Negative) Notes on Parties Presented on Radio News 
_  _______ Broadcasts in Mexico City, M arch 16th-July 3rd 1997
Party Positive notes Percentage Negative notes Percentage Non-objective 
notes (total)
Percentage
PAN 15 4.39% 103 30.12% 118 34.51%
PRI 16 4.68% 68 19.88% 84 24.56%
PRD 7 2.05% 82 23.98% 89 26.03%
PFCR 4 1.17% 3 0.88% 7 2.05%
PT 1 0.29% 6 1.75% 7 2.05%
PVEM 1 0.29% 31 9.06% 32 9.35%
PPS 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
PDM 1 0.29% 4 1.17% 5 1.46%
Total 45 13.16% 297 86.84% 342 100%
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Informe que presenta la Comisión de Radiodifusión al Consejo 
General del IFE, en relación a los moni to reos muéstrales realizados sobre tiempos de transmisión de las 
campañas de los partidos políticos en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación, March 16th to 
July 3rd 1997.
From these tables above, it is possible to see that the PRI was the most favoured party, 
though only by a slight percentage. The number o f positive notes favours the PRI by one 
note more than the PAN, and the number of negative notes again favours the PRI from 
amongst the three largest organisations in competition. From their total number of non­
objective notes the PAN received 87 percent o f negative remarks, the PRD 92 percent, and 
the PRI 80 percent. When one considers the number of negative notes in relation to the total 
number o f notes, the results still favour the PRI, since this party received 4.6 percent, the 
PRD 5.9 percent and the PAN 7.5 percent of negative notes out of their total number of 
notes. Also, when regarding the presentation of news on the radio broadcasts, the disparity 
among them regarding “objectivity” is really strinking (Table 8.11).
i •
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Table 8.11
Objective and Non-objective Notes Presented on Radio News Broadcasts in Mexico 
__________________ City March l^ -J u ly  3rd 1997
News
Broadcast
Objective
notes
Percentage Non-objective
notes
Percentage Total of 
notes
Percentage
Al Momento 605 10.35% 29 0.50% 634 10.84%
Antena
Radio
289 4.94% 3 0.05% 292 4.99%
Decision 97 264 4.51% 0 0% 264 4.51%
Detras de la 
Noticia
271 4.63% 2 0.03% 273 4.67%
En Contacto 105 1.80% 97 1.66% 202 3.45%
Enfoque 423 7.23% 12 0.12% 435 7.44%
Ensalada de 
Lechuga
197 3.37% 70 1.20% 267 4.57%
Formato 21 119 2.03% 2 0.03% 121 2.07%
Hechos de 
la Noche
289 4.94% 8 0.14% 297 5.08%
1 Hora 7 631 10.79% 17 0.29% 648 11.08%
Indice
Politico
91 1.56% 6 0.10% 97 1.66%
Las Buenas
Noticias
2 0.03% 0 0% 2 0.03%
Linea
Directa
248 4.24% 10 0.17% 258 4.41%
Lopez
Doriga
169 2.89% 14 0.24% 183 3.13%
Monitor de 
la Manana
413 7.06% 24 0.41% 437 7.47%
Monitor de 
la Tarde
224 3.83% 0 0% 224 383%
Niño Canun 274 4.69% 0 0% 274 4.69%
Informativo
Panorama
279 4.77% 28 0.48% 307 5.25%
Para
Empezar
469 8.02% 10 0.17% 479 8.19%
Perfil de la 
Noticia
144 2.46% 10 0.17% 154 2.63%
Total 5,506 94.15% 342 5.85% 5,848 100%
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Informe que presenta la Comisión de Radiodifusión al Consejo 
General del ¡FE, en relación a los monitoreos muéstrales realizados sobre tiempos de transmisión de las 
campañas de los partidos políticos en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación. March 16 to 
July 3rú 1997.
The news broadcasts that presented the largest number of non-objective notes were En 
contacto (48%) and Ensalada de lechuga (26.2%). As for the rest, there were only another 
five news broadcasts that presented more than five percent of non-objective notes:
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Panorama (9.1%), Perfil de la noticia (6.4%), Indice politico (6.1%), Monitor de la 
manana (5.4%), and Lopez Doriga (5.4%). As may be seen, only two news broadcasts 
presented more than ten percent o f  non-objective notes out of the total number of notes 
reported. Moreover, in general, some o f the news broadcasts transmitting from Mexico City 
also made innovative additions by opening special sections to report on the campaigns, 
such as “Agenda Decision 97” within the Decision 97 news broadcast or “En campana 
hacia la democracia” within the news broadcast Para empezar. The day o f the election -  
July 6th—the news broadcast Monitor was transmitting live all day on its internet site on 
which its star newscaster, Jose Gutierrez Vivo, remained running on air for twenty-seven 
hours. That same day, the station Cambio 14.40 transmitted live for more than thirty-three 
hours a programme named Primer maratón radiofónico por la democracia on the 
developments and issues o f that electoral journey. Thus, in general, though the information 
slightly favoured the PRI it was considered by the IFE to be quite a fair and balanced 
presentation o f information. However, such conclusions hide one very important aspect: the 
pressures that the radio stations received from some regime’s officials during the campaign. 
The pressure by the government on the stations, though it was reduced during the 
presidency of Zedillo, it did not disappear. Cases o f harassment against newscasters, 
stations and journalists continued. For instance, the journalist José Cárdenas was forced to 
leave Radio ACIR after he announced the existence o f a new guerrilla group, the Ejército 
Popular Revolucionario, in July 1996. There are many other cases of the pressure of regime 
officials on the radio stations, most of which are documented by the Fundación Manuel 
Buendia on its Actos de Represión contra Periodistas, which is available also on that 
Foundation’s internet site.32 Maybe one of the most telling examples is the case of Monitor. 
The morning edition of this news broadcast inaugurated a section for discussions on the 
electoral process and political choices. This was called “Mesas de debate vespertinas” or 
“Morning debate round-tables”. In February 1997, President Zedillo presided a meeting at 
the PRI headquarters, aimed at making the official presentation of the party’s candidates. 
President Zedillo intervened with a supportive speech for the party’s candidates, which was 
criticised the following morning on many stations, one of which was Monitor's round­
tables. According to the information provided by a top collaborator o f the station, a phone
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call was received from the Office o f the Presidency strongly complaining about such 
criticism. The outcome was the cancellation of the morning debates.33 The critics o f the 
President’s speech at the PRI were not left “unsanctioned” by the governmental officials in 
other news broadcasts. For instance, the academic Lorenzo Meyer was dismissed from his 
weekly collaboration with the news broadcast Para Empezar after critically commenting on 
President Zedillo’s intervention.34 According to Meyer, the same day that he made his 
comment -a  Wednesday morning in March 1997—he was told by the anchorman o f the 
news broadcast, Pedro Ferriz de Con, that since they had just received “a phone call from 
‘the top’ [referring to the Office of the Presidency]” demanding his dismissal, the station 
had no other alternative but to do so.35
In spite of this pressure, a large number o f the news broadcasts kept their microphones open 
to critics and pluralism. After the elections pressure diminished in general, though there 
were still some cases reported of regime strong men pressurising the stations. Such was the 
case of the newscaster Nino Canun, who conducted the news programme ¿Y usted qué 
opina? on a station of the Organización Radio Centro. In the edition of March 17th 1998, 
Nino Canun criticised the open manipulation of the information on the Southern state of 
Chiapas by the journalist Lolita De la Vega in her weekly programme on TV Azteca’s 
Channel 7. Since De la Vega is the wife of the General Secretary of the Sindicato de 
Trabajadores de la Industria de Radio y  Televisión (STIRT), Netzahualcóyotl De la Vega, 
member and former federal deputy o f the PRI, and since the employees and workers of 
most radio stations are affiliated to that union, he had strong influence over many stations. 
Two days after Canun criticised De la Vega, he was fired from his programme without any 
formal explanation.36
Thus, the attitude of the concessionaires towards the government was still ambiguous. On 
the one hand, a good number of them were strongly supporting their freedom within their 
news broadcasts in order to maintain their credibility and gain larger audiences. This, in 
turn, translated into higher profits since the news broadcasts are the programmes with the 
highest advertising tariff rates. Table 8.12 compares normal tariff rates with news
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broadcasts tariff rates on six important Mexico City’s stations: Radio Formula presents 
Lopez Doriga; Azul 89 presents Informativo Panorama ; Stereo Rey presents Para 
Empezar (renamed in 1999 Informativo MVS)\ Radio Red presents Monitor, Stereo Cien 
transmits Enfoque; and Radio 13 hired in 2000 Abraham Zabludowsky as newscaster of 
Noticiario Abraham Zabludowsky.
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Table 8.12
Tariff Rates for Advertising on Radio*
Radio Station Regular Tariff for 60 a Seconds 
Spot
Tariff for a 60 seconds Spot in 
News Broadcasts
1997 2002 1997 2002
Radio 13 $ 1,350.00 S 15,000.00 $ 2,700.00 $41,000.00
Radio Formula 
103.3 FM
$ 9,500.00 $ 36,000.00 $ 15,000.00 $ 81,000.00
Azul 89 $ 2,520.00 $ 11,942.00 $ 10,530.00 $ 69,000.00
Radio Red $ 9,000.00 $21,000.00 $ 36,000.00 $ 78,000.00
Stereo Rey 5 2,100.00 S 8,400.00 $ 13,500.00 S 60,000.00
Stereo Cien 5 3,000.00 S 13,800.00 $ 9,000.00 $ 36,300.00
*Six radio stations from Mexico City with important news broadcasts were selected. The prices are shown in 
Mexican Pesos of March 1997 (USS 1=7.92 Pesos) and March 2002 (US$ 1= 9.20 Pesos).
Source: Medios Audio Visuales, no. 153-1, March 1997 and no. 173-1, March 2002. Mexico City: Medios 
Publicitarios Mexicanos S.A. de C.V.
On the other hand, the “official” position of the concessionaires -through the CIRT—was 
to subtley remain on the best possible terms with the president. For instance, at the 
beginning o f 1999, the CIRT sent an official invitation to the president to conduct a weekly 
programme every Saturday morning, Pláticas del Presidente, in which he could talk about 
political, social or economic affairs directly to the audiences.37 The transmission started on 
Saturday February 20th 1999 at 10:00 a.m.
However, what was clear is that the majority o f the concessionaires opposed the constant 
pressure from the government, especially at a time when radio had not recovered from the
j7 La Jornada, February 19lh 1999.
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1995 crisis and all the stations were preparing to compete for ratings and advertising in the 
next electoral campaigns of 2000. In this way, in August 1998, during the closing o f the 
conferences on Freedom of Expression and Social Responsibility ("Libertad de Expresión y 
Responsabilidad Social"), organised by the CIRT, the Chamber concluded that in order to 
secure freedom of expression during the 2000 elections, and due to the enormous 
importance of such a process for democracy in Mexico, it would be a good idea to renew, 
in anticipation, at least half of the 1,480 concessions of radio and television that were to 
expire during the elections year.3® The idea behind this petition was, of course, to avoid 
governmental pressure on the media with possible threats o f holding onto the concessions. 
The protest was not attended by the government.
At the same time, the electoral race for the presidency was already starting that year with 
the declarations by the PAN’s governor of Guanajuato, Vicente Fox, that he was 
determined to get the candidacy of his party to run for the presidency. In the case o f the 
PRD, it was clear that Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, actual governor o f Mexico City was to 
become the party’s candidate, though the second “on-board the PRD”, Porfirio Munoz 
Ledo immediately started an independent pre-campaign for the candidacy. Finally, within 
the PRI the situation was more complicated, since the tension between President Zedillo 
and a large number of old-guard members made it difficult to openly impose on them a 
candidate through the traditional finger-point process (Dedazo). Therefore, by the 
beginning of 1999 a primary election was announced amongst all the candidates willing to 
run for the party’s presidential candidacy. Four candidates appeared, Francisco Labastida, 
Manuel Bartlett, Roberto Madrazo and Humberto Roque Villanueva. In this way by mid- 
1999 there was already a vivid electoral atmosphere with four PRI pre-candidates, two PRD 
pre-candidates, and one PAN virtual candidate. All o f them were running a pre-candidacy 
primary race for which, since no such process was contemplated within the electoral law, 
the parties did not receive funds from the IFE. However, the pre-candidates spent large 
amounts o f money on advertising in the media.
It is interesting to note how the media reported on such primary campaigns, since the IFE 
criteria for evaluating the ways in which they presented information were not yet applicable 
due to the fact that the formal campaigns for the 2000 elections were to start in January 3
33 Excelsior, August 12th 1998 and La Crónica de hoy, August 12Ih 1998.
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2000. The IFE’s media monitoring was only authorised to start at the official beginning o f  
the campaigns, and no primary election was contemplated therein. Nevertheless, the 
newspaper Reforma elaborated the monitoring on the ways in which the broadcasting media 
reported on the parties’ internal candidate selection processes. The monitoring covered the 
final moments of the pre-campaigns of the different pre-candidates from August 16th to 
November 7th 1999, the day when the PRI presidential candidate was finally selected.39 
On the radio, the monitoring covered two kinds o f information presented by the media on 
each pre-candidate: advertising spots bought by the candidates and regular coverage of the 
pre-candidate’s activities on the radio news broadcasts. The radio stations included in the 
monitoring were: Azul 89, Inolvidable, Radio Formula, Radio Red, 1500 AM, Stereo Rey, 
and XEW, all of which are transmitted nation-wide. Additionally, two Mexico City radio 
stations were controlled, Formato 21 and Radio 13. Table 8.13 shows a comparison 
between the percentage of time devoted to the candidates by the radio news broadcasts and 
the percentage of time they bought on radio and TV, (since the figure for radio alone was 
not available), for an almost four week period. This comparison highlights two factors: On 
the one hand the pre-candidates who bought more time for transmitting their ads were not 
necessarily always the same as those who received more time on the news broadcasts. On 
the other, it becomes apparent that the real competition within the PRI was between 
Francisco Labastida and Roberto Madrazo. Labastida, who had been the Secretary o f  
Gobernacion in Zedillo’s cabinet was considered to be the President’s candidate, while 
Madrazo -form er governor o f Tabasco—was on very bad terms with the president.
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Table 8.13
Advertising Time and Regular News Broadcast Coverage on the Parties' Presidential 
______  Pre-Candidates, August 16th-November 7th 1999_________
August ^-Septem ber 9* September 10*- October 7th October 8* -November 7*
Candidate
Time on 
RNB*
Ad-Time on 
Radio and 
TV
Time on 
RNB*
Ad-Time on 
Radio and TV
Time on 
RNB*
Ad-Time on 
Radio and 
TV
M. Bartlett 9.66% 14.42% 10.24% 21.6% 13.0% 23.59%
F. Labastida 26.36% 10.63% 19.53% 23.0% 31.76% 24.83%
R. Mardrazo 16.90% 14.95% 14.12% 26.1% 20.77% 30.47%
H. Roque 12.94% 0% 7.15% 0% 12.06% 6.42%
C. Cardenas 15.23% 60% 20.24% 21.3% 9.73% 0.66%
V. Fox 11.77% 0% 24.06% 5.0% 14.40% 3.11%
P.M. Ledo 8.81% 0% 4.43% 0% 1.78% 0%
J. G. Torres 0% 0% 0.19% 3% 0.31% 10.88%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
* Radio News Broadcasts regular coverage.
Source: Elaborated with data from Reforma, from August 16th to November 8th 1999.
The relation between the time devoted by the news broadcasts on the pre-candidates and the 
time they bought on media advertising do not necessarily have any correlation. The Priista 
Madrazo was the pre-candidate who in general bought more ads in the media, but he never 
received the largest coverage on the news broadcasts. Another similar case was that of his 
fellow party member Manuel Bartlett, who never received as much coverage as the time he 
bought in the media for his ads, and of PRD pre-candidate Cardenas, who during the first 
term of the monitoring bought 60 percent o f the ad-time, but only received 15.23 percent of 
the news broadcast coverage. Conversely, pre-candidate Labastida always received more 
regular news coverage time than the time he bought for advertising. However, the two pre- 
candidates who, almost without buying time for advertising during the whole period, 
received a great deal of coverage from the news broadcasts were the Priista Humberto 
Roque and the Panista Vicente Fox. What becomes clear is that in spite o f a seeming 
favouritism for Labastida, who in two of the terms appears to have more regular coverage
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time on the news broadcasts, it was actually Vicente Fox who got more time in relation to 
the ad-time he bought from the media.40
Since, in general terms, the ways in which the media were presenting the information 
related to the pre-campaigns was relatively impartial, the same behaviour was expected by 
the parties for the rest of the electoral process. Once becoming the invested candidates of 
the PAN and the PRD, Vicente Fox and Cuauhetemoc Cardenas at different times, 
expressed their wish that the media maintain a truly impartial role during the electoral 
process.41
As in the previous elections, the Commission of Radio Broadcasting of the IFE organised 
the monitoring -based upon the already mentioned criteria—on the ways all the 
broadcasting media reported on the campaigns. When controlling the number of notes 
devoted to the parties on all the radio news broadcasts o f  the country between the 4th and 
the 29th of June 2000, the outcome favours the PRI with 34 percent of all notes on the 
parties, while those for the Alliance for Change (AC) that supported Fox received 29.4 
percent and the Alliance for México (AM) that supported Cardenas obtained 20.8 percent 
of them (Table 8.14).
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero_____________________________________________ Chapter Eight
40 According to three interviewed media executives in August 2000 (Roberto Ordorica; a Top Executive of 
Monitor; and Raul Trejo Delarbre), freedom of the media was not censored and the media could freely print 
or present whatever kind of information they wanted in relation to the pre-campaigns. However, from the 
information provided by them it is possible to infer that there were two main criteria followed by the 
broadcasting media for presenting information relating to the pre-campaigns. On the one hand, though none of 
the interviewed media executives, (neither these three nor anyone else), referred to any explicit pressure form 
the government, they all acknowledged that “since Labastida was the President’s true pre-candidate, some 
special attention must be paid to his activities”. Conversely, since both Madrazo and Bartlett represented 
openly critical and opposed positions to the President from the PRI, their pre-campaigns could be “not so 
enthusiastically” covered. On the other hand, and this shows somehow the autonomy of the media in deciding 
on the news, the preferences of the media entrepreneurs played an important role. Cuauhtemoc Cardenas was 
highly disliked by the entrepreneurial community, and thus, in spite of paying good money for ad-time, he 
never received as much coverage time on the news broadcasts. Fox, instead, was the pre-candidate who, in 
more or less subtle ways, became the preferred pre-candidate for the entrepreneurs, explaining his wide 
coverage on the RNB, in spite of buying very little ad-time. What is interesting to note here is that, if it is true 
that no pressure was exercised in the media in favour of the RNB coverage of Labastida and to “uncover” 
Madrazo, the media were still working through an old inertia. It is important to note as well that, whenever 
the IFE was not monitoring during these pre-campaigns, the broadcast media were also able to set their own 
agenda, favouring Fox and disfavouring Cardenas.
41 La Jornada, January 22th, 2000 and Reforma, March 6th, 2000.
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Table 8.14
Percentage of notes on the Parties on Radio News Broadcasts in the Different States,
June 4,h -June 29,h 2000
State AC PRI AM PCD PARM j DS Total
Aguascalientes 32.4% 1 33.3% j 18.2% j 4.7% 6.3% j 5.1% 1 100%
Baja California 1 32.4% J 33.6% 1 19.2% 1 4.1% 5.9% j 4.8% 100%
Baja California Sur 22.9% 27.8% 1 32.9% ] 6.8% 6.1% j 3.4% j 100%
Campeche 29.0% 1 36.2% 1 17.9% j 4.4% 7.5%T" 5.0% 1 100%
Coahuila 32.0% 1 39.6% ( 16.8% 1 3.3% 5.2% I 2.9% 1 100%
Colima 22.9% 1 36.3% 1 25.1% 7.6% 2.4% 5.7% 100%
Chiapas 16.0% 46.5% 20.2% 4.4% 6.0% j 6.7% 100%
Chihuahua 34.6% 34.3% 16.7% 4.3% 5.6% 4.4% 100%
Distrito Federal 30.3% 28.5% 22.4% 5.7% 7.5% j 5.5% 100%
Durango 22.1% 52.2% 16.7% 1.8% 4.5% 2.7% 100%
Guanajuato 40.3% 31.1% 15.7% 3.6% 6.5% 1 2.8% 100%
Guerrero 23.6% 1 40.8% 23.2% 3.6% 5.3% j 3.5% 100%
Hidalgo 25.8% 37.8% 19.4% 5.3% 5.4% 6.4% 100%
Jalisco 31.0% 33.7% 17.1% 5.6% 6.8% j 5.7% 100%
México 24.3% 36.9% 18.4% 6.1% 9.4% 4.9% 100%
Michoacán 28.6% 1 30.8% 24.6% 4.7% 7.3% 4.0% 100%
Morelos 29.8% 30.9% 24.7% 3.2% 7.3% 4.1% 100%
Nayarit 28.4% 1 35.2% 25.5% 4.4% 3.9% I 2.6% 100%
Nuevo León 41.2% 29.6% 15.0% 4.9% 5.9% j 3.4% 100%
Oaxaca 24.5% 32.3% 28.1% 2.8% 7 .5% r 4.9% 100%
Puebla 33.9% 36.2% 19.1% 3.1% 4.9% 2.7% 100%
Querétaro 29.4% 34.8% 16.3% 1 5.7% 7.2% j 6.5% 100%
Quintana Roo 24.2% 1 34.2% 20.3% 1 7.3% 9.0% j 4.9% 100%
San Luis Potosí 25.6% 47.2% 13.4% 3.8% 5.6% 44% 100%
Sinaloa —25.5% r 37.7% 25.4% 3.1% 4.0% j 4.2% 100%
Sonora 26.2% 36.4% 20.8% 4.7% 7.3% j 4.5% 100%
Tabasco 19.4% 38.7% 23.7% 5.8% 6.2% r 6.2% 100%
Tamaulipas 29.4% 40.3% 17.1% 3.5% 6.9% 2.8% 100%
Tlaxcala 18.7% 23.6% 35.1% 9.7% 6.6% 6.2% 100%
Veracruz 26.5% 33.6% 23.1% 4.9% 7.4% j 4.4% 100%
Yucatán 21.4% 50.5% 14.2% 5.0% 5.0% 3.8% 100%
Zacatecas 22.5% 35.1% 31.6% 3.1% 3.6% 4.1% 100%
Total 29.4% 34.0% 20.8% 4.8% 6.4% 1 4.6% 100%
Source: Elabórated with data from IFE, Monitoreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
políticas en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana, January l$ n-June 29,h 2000, IFE, México City, CD-Rom.
There were states in which the number of notes on the PRI far exceeded those on the other 
two largest parties. The extreme cases were Chiapas, Yucatan, San Luis Potosi, Guerrero 
and Tabasco where the PRI doubled the number of notes for opposition. Only in Tlaxcala,
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the AM coalition received more notes. The AC coalition obtained more notes in the capital, 
in Guanajuato and in Nuevo Leon. As for the time devoted to each party, the results again 
favour the PRI, who received 40 percent of the time, while the AC and AM coalitions 
obtained 27.8 and 20.2 percent respectively (Table 8.16).
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Table 8.16
Time for Parties on Radio News Broadcasts in the Country, June 4th-June 29th 2000
AC | PRI AM PCD r PARM PDS | Total
Total | 582:01:42 836:34:35 f 423:20:37 78:10:44 | 100:01:44 | 70:54:49 2091:04:14
% 27.8% I 40.0% 20.2% | 3.7% 4.8% 1 3.4% j 100%
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Monitoreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
políticas en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana, January J^-June 29lh 2000, IFE, México City, CD-Rom.
If in the country, the outcome of the monitoring showed a favourable balance for the PRI, 
the situation in Mexico City was instead highly competed, mostly between the official party 
and AC (Table 8.16). Of the fourteen news broadcasts controlled by the IFE between 19th 
January and 29th June, eleven presented more notes on the AC candidate than on any other, 
and only in three news broadcasts (Cupula Empresarial, and the two editions of Antena 
Radio) did the PRI receiving more notes. On two news broadcasts, Monitor de la Noche 
and Hora 7 the AM and the AC received more notes than the PRI.
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Table 8.16
Num ber of Notes on Parties on Mexico Citv’s Radio News Broadcasts, January 19th-
June 29“’ 2000
News Broadcasts* AC PRI AM PCD FARM PDS Total
Radio
Stations
103.3 FM Cúpula Empresarial (6:00-10:00) 858 976 577 92 139 79 2721
1110 AM
Monitor de la Mañana (5:45-10:00) 301 241 216 42 69 51 920
Monitor de la Tarde (13:00-15:15) 180 162 143 23 24 11 543
Monitor de la Noche (17:00-21:00) 283 250 258 46 72 43 952
1220 AM
Antena Radio (6:45-10:00) 372 436 298 116 152 108 1482
Antena Radio (13:00-14:30) 181 191 156 34 48 29 639
1260 AM Panorama Detrás de la Noticia (6:00- 10:00)
1238 1150 837 210 302 183 3920
1500 AM Eduardo Ruiz Healy y sus 40 Comentaristas (6:00- 9:30)
919 886 738 230 244 204 3221
970 AM José Cárdenas Informa (18:00-21:00) 833 738 528 146 196 160 2601
IMAGEN 
FM 90.5
Imagen Informativa (6:50-11:00) 778 629 592 236 274 215 2724
Imagen Informativa (13:00-15:00) 542 496 427 98 115 88 1766
690 AM Hora 7(7:00-10:00) 25 19 20 8 21 11 104
XHMM 
FM 100.1 Enfoque I a. Edición (6:00-9:00) 335 301 253 62
84 84 1119
XHMVS 
Stereo Rev 
102.5 FM
MVS la  Edición (6:30-10:00) 501 427 384 46 86 68 1512
Total 7346 6902 5427 1389 1826 1334 24224
* All the news broadcasts listed here are transmitted from Monday to Friday.
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Monitoreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
políticas en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana, January I9 h-June 29th 2000, IFE, Mexico City, CD-Rom.
As for the time devoted to each party, o f the fourteen news broadcasts being monitored, 
seven tried hard to maintain a fair balance between the three largest parties and coalitions 
(table 8.17). Of the other seven, only one favoured clearly the PRI (Cupula Empresariat). 
On the contrary, Monitor slightly favoured the AC coalition candidate in its evening 
edition. Cardenas, in spite of receiving less notes in Monitor de la Noche and the morning 
edition of Jmagen Informativa, had more time devoted to him in these same news 
broadcasts. This does not mean that all o f this information was necessarily positive for the 
AM candidate, especially in the case of Monitor.
2 8 2
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Table 8.17
Percentage Time for Parties on Mexico City’s Radio News Broadcasts, January 19th-
June 29th 2000
N e w s  B r o a d c a s t s * AC PRI AM PCD PARM DS Total t
Radio
S ta t io n s
103.3 FM Cúpula Empresarial (6:00- 10:00) 10.5% 14.0% 8.7% 4.1% 7.6% 5.9% 10.5% ;
1110 AM
Monitor de la Mañana (5:45- 
10:00) 9.2% 6.3% 8.8% 2.2% 5.9% 2.5% 7.3% :
Monitor de la Tarde (13:00- 
15:15) 2.6% 1.9% 2.6% 1.4% .9% .7% 2.1%
Monitor de la Noche (17:00- 
21:00) 4.7% 4.4% 6.6% 3.3% 3.3% 2.3% 4.7% ■¡
1220 AM
Antena Radio (6:45-10:00) 6.9% 10.1% 7.8% 9.8% 8.9% 11.9% 8.7° i !
Antena Radio 2a Emisión 
(13:00-14:30) 3.3% 3.5% 3.6% 3.1% 2.8% 1.7% 3.3a,
1260 AM Panorama Detrás de la Noticia (6:00-10:00) 10.8% 10.4% 10.0% 13.5% 11.5% 11.4%
10.7% »
1500 AM Eduardo Ruiz Healy (6:00- 9:30) 10.8% 10.3% 10.0% 10.5% 7.0% 7.7%
1
í o . o v  ;
970 AM José Cárdenas Informa (18:00- 21:00) 13.2% 14.6% 11.1% 18.0%
16.9% 20.3% 14.1% i
IMAGEN 
FM 90.5
Imagen Informativa (6:50- 
11:00) 10.6% 8.1% 11.5% 15.9% 16.4% 18.0%
i i . i v  !
Imagen Informativa (13:00- 
15:00)
6.4% 6.2% 7.7% 7.7% 4.8% 4.5% 6.5% ! 1
690 AM Hora 7 (7:00-10:00) .1% .1% .1% .1% 1.1% 1.5% .2% 1
XHMM 
FM 100.1
Enfoque la . Edición (6:00- 
9:00) 4.9% 4.6% 5.6% 6.6% 7.1% 6.8%
< V
i
XHMVS 
Stereo 
Rey 102.5 
FM
MVS la Edición (06:30-10:00) 6.0% 5.4% 5.8% 3.9% 5.8% 4.8%
1
5.6%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
*A11 the news broadcasts listed here are transmitted from Monday to Friday.
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Moniioreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
políticas en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana, January I^-June 29th 2000, IFE, Mexico City, CD-Rom.
i
Now, as Table 8.18 shows, when considering the kind of notes presented on the parties at |
the national level, i.e. taking into account the radio news broadcasts nationwide, one can *
I
see that o f the three most powerful competitors, the coalition that received the highest 
percentage of positive notes was the AM (3.4 percent), while both the PRI and AM ,
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received the same amount of positive notes (3.1 percent). Again, it was the AM coalition 
who received the lowest percentage o f negative notes (5.1 percent), leaving the AC 
coalition with the largest number of negative notes (10.9 percent).
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Table 8.18
Positive, Negative and Neutral Notes on Parties in All Radio News Broadcasts,
January »'"-June 291112000______________________
------------------------------------J-------------------------------------
AC PRIJ AM J PCD 1 PARM PDS Total
1 Negative 10.9% 5.9% 1 5.1% 7.1% j 7.0% 2.7% 7.2%
T A T  A ¥
Neutral 86.1% 90.9% 1 91.5% ] 92.2% j 91.0% 90.1% 89.6%
ICM AL Positive 3.1% 3.1% r 3.4% 1 .7% j 2.0% 7.2% 3.2%
r Total 100% 100% 1 100% 1 100% i 100% 100% 100%
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Monitoreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
politicos en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana. January 19^-June 2?h 2000, IFE, Mexico City, CD-Rom.
When comparing the figures of the country’s news broadcasts with those of Mexico City’s, 
in relation to the type of notes presented on the parties, it is interesting to note that though it 
was again the AM coalition who received fewer negative notes, this time it was the AC 
coalition who obtained the highest percentage of positive notes. In any case, the 
competition amongst the three largest-political forces became more balanced in the ways in 
which the news broadcasts present information (Table 8.19). This time the percentage o f 
negative notes for the AC coalition was not so far removed from the percentage received by 
both the PRI and the AM coalition. When compared with the nationwide results, the 
percentage of Mexico City’s news broadcasts show that the presentation of negative notes 
diminishes in favour of neutral notes, since the percentage for positive notes remains in 
both cases relatively similar.
Table 8.19
Positive, Negative and Neutral Notes on Parties on Mexico City’s Radio News 
_______________ Broadcasts, January 19th-June 29th 2000
1 1 AC 1 PRI AM PCD 1 PARM j PDS Total
) Negative j 8.6% 6.5% ¡ 5.9% 4.5% j 4.8% j 2.3% 6.5%
Mexico Neutral 88.2% 91.4% 91.3% 95.0% 94.4% 92.5% 90.9%
City Positive 3.2% 2.0% 2.7% 0.4% 0.9% 1 5.2% 2.5%
Total 1 100% 100% ¡ 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Elaborated wnh data from IFE, Monitoreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
políticas en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana, January ¡$h~June 29h 2000, IFE, México City, CD-Rom.
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Finally, as for the kind of notes presented on the parties in the different news broadcasts, it 
is interesting to note that though on Tables 8.14 and 8.15 the news broadcast Cupula 
Empresarial devoted more notes and time to the PRI, most of such notes were neutral 
(Table 8.20). The same can be said about AM on both Monitor de la Noche and Hora 7, 
where most of the notes presented on that coalition resulted as being neutral.
Moreover, only four out of all o f the fourteen news broadcasts being monitored presented 
less than 90 percent of impartial notes: José Cárdenas Informa, 84.7%, Eduardo Ruiz 
Healy, 85.7%, Monitor de la Tarde, 86.9%, and Panorama Detrás de la Noticia, 88.5%. 
However, when impartiality was violated, it was usually done by presenting a negative note 
instead of a positive comment, and this was more or less the case for all the parties.
The news broadcasts that presented more positive notes on the PRI were Monitor de la 
Tarde (8.0%), monitor de la Mañana (2.9%), Antena Radio (2.8%), and José Cárdenas 
Informa (2.8%). The news broadcasts who presented the largest number of negative notes 
on that party in their transmissions were: Eduardo Ruiz Healy, 14.2%, Monitor de la Tarde, 
13%, José Cárdenas Informa, 10.8% and Panorama Detrás de la Noticia, 7.5%.
The news broadcasts that presented more positive notes on the AC coalition were: Monitor 
de la Tarde, 6.1%, Eduardo Ruiz Healy, 5.1%, José Cárdenas Informa, 4.8%, and 
Panorama Detrás de la Noticia, 4.8%. Those who presented more negative notes on AC 
were: José Cárdenas Informa, 13.8%, Panorama Detrás de la Noticia, 12.1%, Cúpula 
Empresarial, 11.5%, Antena Radio, 10.2%, Eduardo Ruiz Healy, 9.6%, and Monitor de la 
Tarde, 9.4%. Those who presented the largest percentage of positive notes on the AM 
coalition were: Panorama Detrás de la Noticia, 6.5%, José Cárdenas Informa, 5.3%, and 
Eduardo Ruiz Healy, 2.8%. Those who presented more negative notes on AM were: 
Eduardo Ruiz Healy, 14.2%, José Cárdenas Informa, 10.2%, and Panorama Detrás de la 
Noticia, 5.1%.
As one may see, the news broadcasts that tended to be more critical were doing so to all of 
the three largest political forces, and this is a very important feature of the forms in which 
political information was presented during the 2000 campaign.
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Table 8.20
Positive, Negative and Neutral Notes on Parties on the Different Radio News 
Broadcasts in Mexico City, January' 19th*June 29th 2000
N e w s b r o a d c a s ts * AC PR1 1 AM PCD PARM DS Total
Cúpula
Empresarial
(6:00-10:00)
Negative 1 11.5% 3.8% 1 5.0% r 5.4% 1 6.5% 3.8% 6.7%
1033 Neutral 1 87.1% 94.0%] 9i.9% r 94.6% ¡ 92.8% 87.3% 91.1%
FM Positive 1.4% 2.3% 3.1% .0% 8.9% 2.2%
Total 100% 100% 1 100% 1 100%) 100% 100% 100%
Monitor de la
Negative 1 6.0% 4.6% 4.6% 1 7.1% 8.7% 2.0% 5.3%
Neutral 1 90.0% 92.5% 93.5% 1 90.5% 88.4% 1 82.4% 91.0%
10:00) Positive 4.0% 2.9%] 1.9% 1 2.4% 2.9% 1 15.7% 3.7%
Total 1 100% 100% j 100% 1 100% 100% 100% 100%
Monitor de la 
Tarde (13:00- 
15:15)
Negative ¡ 9.4% 13.0% 1 4 .2% r 4.3% .0% .0% 8.3%
1110 AM Neutral 1 84.4% 79.0% 1 95.1%
95.7% 100% ! 90.9% 86.9%
Positive 6.1% 8.0% J .7% r .0% .0% 9.1% 1 4.8%
Total 1 100% 100%) 100% 100% 100% 100% 1 100%
Monitor de la 
Noche (17:00- 
21:00)
Negative 1 5.7% 5.2% 3.9% ¡ 4.3% 1 2.8% 2.3% 4.6%
Neutral 91.2% 94.8% 96.1% 95.7% 97.2% 1 86.0% 93.9%
Positive 1 3.2% .0% ¡ .0% .0% .0% 11.6% 1.5%
Total 1 100% 100%) " 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Negative 1 10.2% 3.4% 3.4% 7.8% 3.9% i 1.9% 5.4%
Antena Radio Neutral 88.7% 93.8% 95.6% 1 92.2% 94.1% 88.0% 92.4%
(6:45-10:00) Positive 1 1.1% 2.8% 1.0% .0% 2.0% 1 10.2% 2.2%
1 11A A \-f Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% i 100“/« 100%
Antena Radio
Negative 5.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 1.4%
Neutral 94.5% 99.5% 99.4% 100% 100% 96.6% 98.0%
(13:00-14:30) Positive .6% .5% .6% .0% .0% 3.4% .6%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% o o oN © o vç o' 100%
Panorama Negative 12.1% 7.5% 5.1% 5.2% 4.0% 2.7% 7.8%
l ie n  avi Detrás de la Neutral 1 83.0% 90.7% 88.4% 94,8% 96.0% 92.9% 88.5%l¿OU AJ>I Noticia (6:00- Positive 4.8% 1.8% 6.5% 1 .0% .0% 4.4% 3.6%
10:00) Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Eduardo Ruiz 
Healy (6:00- 
9:30)
Negative 9.6% 14.2% 1 14.2% 7.8% 7.0% 5.9% 11.4%
« CAA A M Neutral 85.3% 83.3% 82.9% 92.2% 92.6% 93.1% 85.7%IDUv Aiti
Positive 5.1% 2.5% 2.8% .0% .4% i 1.0% 2.9%
Total 1  100% 100% r 100% r 100% 100% 100% 100%
José Cárdenas
Negative 1 13.8% 10.8% 1 10.2% 1 6.2% 12.2% 3.1% 11.0%
n*7A AM Neutral 1 81.4% 86.3% r 84.5% r 92.5% 1 83.7% 1 90.0% 84.7%7 / U Alvi iniorma
(18:00-21:00) Positive 1 4.8% 2.8% 1 5.3% ¡ 1.4% i 4.1% 6.9% 4.2%
Total 1 i 00% ioo% r 100% r 100%) 100% 100% 100%
Continues
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Imagen
Informativa
(6:50-11:00)
Negative 3.6% 3.5% 4.7% J 1.3% 1 2.2% .5% 3.2%
Neutral 95.4% 96.0% 94.1% 98.3% 1 97.4% 95.8% 95.7%
Positive 1.0% .5% 12% 1 .4% j .4% 3.7% 1.0%
IMAGEN Total 100% 100% 100% 1 100% 1 100% 100% 100%
FM 90.5
Imagen
Informativa
(13:00-15:00)
Negative 1.8% 1.8% .7% j .0% 1 1.7% .0% 1.4%
Neutral 96.5% 97.4% 98.6% j 99.0% j 98.3% 100% 97.7%
Positive 1.7% .8% .7% 1 1.0% j .0% .0% 1.0%
Total 100% j 100% 100% 1 100% I 100% 100% 100%
Hora 7 (7:00- 
10:00)
Negative 4.0% .0% .0% 1 .0% j .0% .0% 1.0%
690 AM Neutral 96.0% 100% 100% j 100% j 100% 100% 99.0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 1 100% 1 100% 100% 100%
Enfoque la . 
Edición (6:00- 
9:00)
Negative 6.9% j" 5.3% 4.7% 1 .0% 1 2.4% .0% 4.7%
XHMM Neutral 92.2% 93.4% 94.1% 100% 1 97.6% 98.8% 94.3%
FM 100.1 Positive .9% 1.3% 1.2% .0% 1 .0% 1.2% 1.0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 1 100% 100% 100%
XHMVS MVS la  
Edición 
(06:30-10:00)
Negative 3.4% 3.7% 3.1% 4.3% j 1.2% 1.5% 3.2%
Stereo Neutral 92.2% 94.1% 95.6% 93.5% j 98.8% 89.7% 93.9%
Rey 102.5 Positive 1 4.4% 2.1% 1.3% j 2.2% .0% 8.8% 2.8%
FM Total 1 100% 100% 100% j 100% 1 100% 100% 100%
*All the news broadcasts listed here are transmitted from Monday to Friday.
Source: Elaborated with data from IFE, Monitoreo sobre el tratamiento de la información sobre las campañas 
políticas en los espacios noticiosos de los medios de comunicación en las entidades federativas de la 
República Mexicana, January 19th-June 29th 2000, IFE, Mexico City, CD-Rom.
The information presented on the radio news broadcasts during the 2000 electoral 
campaigns was quite impartial and^certainly the most non-biased in Mexican history. 
Whenever the newsreaders added any kind of remark or comment on the news presented 
they usually criticised and were seldom supportive of the parties or candidates. And this 
was more or less the same for the three largest parties. Only on rare occasions would the 
different candidates complain about the “unfair coverage” given on the media, and when 
this occurred the complaints were shared by all. In the case of the news broadcasts of 
Mexico City’s and other urban areas a big difference with some rural states, like Chiapas 
and Tabasco (where the dominant interests on radio linked to the old regime), was 
immediately apparent. This raised again the old question on the effects o f the media, since, 
as Table 8.21 show, there seems to be an almost inverse correlation between the time 
devoted on the country’s news broadcasts to the two main competitors and the final voting 
they obtained. On this subject a deeper study is required.
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Table 8.21
Time o d  News Broadcasts in all the Country as Compared to Voting for PRI, AC and
AM
Party Time Voting
PRI 40.0 percent 36.10 percent
AC 27.8 percent 42.52 percent
AM 20.2 percent 16.64 percent
Source: elaborated with data from IFE.
What can be seen in this chapter is the emergence of a more independent radio industry -  
more the case in urban modem Mexico, than in rural areas—that, though still fighting with 
important problems in certain regions to consolidate its autonomy, has overcome with 
relative success the challenge posed by the 2000 electoral process. In the case of big 
national radio networks, usually transmitting from Mexico City, this period helped to 
anchor them to more independent positions from which they now transmit and comment on 
the news and other information. However, in the case of small local radio stations, it is 
necessary make an important remark. Though in certain areas the influence of old-guard 
politicians and caciques on the local stations is very important, the most relevant challenge 
for them now comes from local Mafia and drug dealing cartels that have their bases in those 
regions -like Sinaloa, Nayarit, Guerrero, the mountains of Jalisco, and Colima. Every year 
some local journalists, mostly from the printed press and local radio stations, are murdered 
by these cartels, which have transformed into the main obstacle for consolidating a free 
radio in those regions. In this way, despite the fact that during the period 1994-2000 there 
appeared to be the conditions and incentives for the radio entrepreneurs to move towards 
more independent and autonomous positions in the ways in which they presented 
information, and news on politics, helping to consolidate an open national radio industry, 
new challenges also emerged for local radio stations in certain provinces, making the search 
for independence a task still to be completed.
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Final Remarks
Mass Media and Democracy in Mexico
After decades of under-reporting on public life, in recent years the broadcast media seem to 
have pushed the pendulum to the opposite side, presenting information and news on politics 
with fairness and balance. If for decades, the news broadcasts transmitted generally a 
supportive image of the regime, a daily report on the President’s agenda, and avoided all 
relevant debates on public matters, during the last 15 years they have opened spaces also to 
opposition parties and organisations. The most notorious example of this broadcast media 
openness are the coverage and the reports they did on, (and during), the 1997 and 2000 
electoral campaigns. What were the incentives or the conditions for this media to open their 
transmissions to alternative political expressions?
As has been discussed, political pluralism in Mexico started long before the broadcast 
media began to report on it. There is no coincidence in time between the growing political 
pluralism and the openness of these media. For years broadcast media, especially TV, were 
reluctant to discuss pluralism, so that even though the political transition was well under 
way, it was not reflected in this media. This “silence” of the broadcast media has its roots in 
the fact that since the beginning, the Mexican post-revolutionary regime offered the media 
entrepreneurs different kinds of direct and indirect benefits, from technological support to 
tax exemptions so that they could consolidate and develop an economically strong radio 
and TV industry. Moreover, these entrepreneurs established a Chamber for the Radio and 
Television Industries (CIRT) that successfully pressed on the state for legal and statutory 
modifications on economic matters. The trade-off for such economic advantages were 
usually political. Usually, the same regulations and laws that granted these media the 
economic benefits (the LEC of 1926, the LGVCs of 1937-41, the LFRT of 1960 and the 
RLFRT o f 1973), also established different mechanisms and means for the regime to secure 
the ultimate control over the content o f the transmissions. However, as can be seen through 
the kind of information these media presented on their news broadcasts and the constant 
declarations of their executives and representatives in the CIRT, they were always willing 
to collaborate and support a regime that granted them so many economic benefits (Chapters
1, 2 and 4). In the decades prior to the 1980s no station was interested in “trespassing the 
limits of tolerance”, also because it must be taken into account that in general economic 
growth had created little pressure for démocratisation. The beneficial conditions granted to 
these media combined for decades with a lack of pressure from society for démocratisation 
in order to dis-incentivate them from presenting the few and scattered opposition voices. In 
this way, though the regime counted on several means for securing the exclusiveness of “its 
version” o f reality, the silence o f  the media was a product o f a mutual beneficial exchange 
of economic and fiscal benefits for political support. Self-censorship was the rule and the 
political control over the contents was always used as a last resort for the regime to secure 
the media’s support.
However, in the last fifteen years a clear openness can be noticed in the ways the media 
presents and discusses politics. Undoubtedly, important changes developed at the political 
level for permitting the broadcast media to present other political voices. But as analysed in 
Chapters 5, 7 and 8, it was not this political transformation (i.e. the transition), that 
triggered the “informational abertura” of these media. The elections o f 1988, with fierce 
competition amongst the different political parties and almost exclusive media coverage in 
favour o f the PRI is the best example. The timing o f the political transition was not 
coincident with the media’s openness, except at its very last moments, and it is possible to 
affirm that the transition was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for that openness. If 
then it was not caused by the transition, what were the conditions that favoured that 
openness?
During the 1980s and early 1990s -a  period o f increasing political plurality—there were 
some important Electoral Reforms. These reforms granted the parties better conditions for 
competing and in accessing the media and transmitting their messages, but they were not 
effective for generating more impartial, balanced and fair transmissions within these 
media.1 The key for understanding the broadcast media’s openness is to be found in the 
alteration o f the economic conditions in which they traditionally developed. The economic 
situation in which the media had to play in the 1980s and 1990s was not one o f stability and 
growth, as it had been for decades, but one o f recurrent crises and growing competition.
1 For example, since 1994, the IFE was granted the capacity to monitor the ways the broadcast media present 
information related to the campaigns. In spite of that faculty and of its capacity to make public its findings, it 
was not able to grant a balanced and fair treatment of political information.
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These changes, at an economic level, generated incentives for the entrepreneurs, first on
radio (Chapters 5 and 8) and much later on TV (Chapter 7), to “trespass the limits of what it
was permitted to say”. Economic crises and competition for audiences and resources caused !
radio and TV to turn to the already existing political pluralism in order to make it a
profitable business. Democracy became a good business, and good businesses suddenly I
supported democracy. Therefore a first general conclusion is that the openness o f  radio and
television was led not by the rhythms o f  the political transition, but by the economic and
corporate interests o f  the licensees (i.e. the concessionaires).
However, as Chapters 7 and 8 show, there are interesting differences between radio and
television in their timing for the “informational abertura”. in the case of radio, the abertura
is rooted in two important changes that occurred during the 1980s: on the one hand, the
wider adoption o f innovative forms of broadcasting based on talk-radio formats, and the !!
positive reaction o f the audiences. After being the most important frequency in Mexico,
AM stations started to fall dramatically in the audiences* preferences due to the growing
success of FM for music broadcasting. Still in 1980 audiences in Mexico City were
listening to AM by a ratio of almost 4 to 1 over FM radio (77% against 23%). However by
1985, only five years later, these preferences had almost reversed: 35.1% still preferred
AM, while 64.9% preferred FM. The success of FM stations has to do firstly with the better j.
sound quality of their broadcastings which eventually displaced AM from the people’s •
preferences in the transmission of music, which at that time composed by far the largest !
category of programmes on all radio stations in the country. Another reason related to the !
technological advances that not only reduced the costs of double*band radio sets, but also
created a new generation of gadgets like the “Walkman”, new car stereos, and more
sophisticated home radio sets which helped to make FM radio popular and accessible.
Without the technical capacity for competing in music broadcasting, AM stations opted for !
the introduction of other sorts of programming, mainly composed of talk-radio broadcasts |
that did not require the sound quality expected from music programming. Most o f these 
talk-radio programmes consisted of discussions on various topics ranging from 
housekeeping to football, and in some of them the phone lines were open to the audiences 
to call up and participate. In a country with a very low level of readership and at a time 
when television was not subject to any alternative voice or to any son of audience
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participation, people responded with enthusiasm to these new options. People wanted to 
have media in which they could feel they were listened to and on which they could have a 
voice. These transmissions proved to be widely accepted and by 1990 AM stations had 
recovered 44,5 percent of the audiences in Mexico City.
There is one crucial aspect related to the success of talk-radio: higher tariff rates for 
commercial adverts. As Chapters 4 and 7 show, the stations charged an additional 30 to 50 
percent tariff for inserting commercial breaks during those programmes. Talk-radio was 
soon adopted by news broadcasters as well, leaving behind the old format of reading the 
news without comments and editorials. The first news broadcasters that adopted talk-radio 
formats was Monitor, and by the late 1980s the most important news broadcasts in Mexico 
City had followed its example.
On the other hand, these initial changes in the formats were progressively reflecting on 
the contents as well. This has to do mostly with the growing competition amongst an 
increasing number of radio stations. In a relatively stagnant publicity market, radio stations 
had to imagine more attractive forms of broadcasting and radio programming. The 
economic crisis reduced radio’s share in the publicity market. If during the second half of 
the 1970s, radio’s and TV’s share of the publicity market was of 15 and 62 percent 
respectively, in the late 1990s radio’s share reduced to 9.5 percent while that of TV grew to 
75 percent (Chapters Five and Eight).
This shrink in radio’s share coincided with an important increase in the number of licenses, 
(federal concessions) awarded to operate more stations. From 1970 to 1985 the number of 
commercial stations increased from 579 to 839 stations, but it grew to 1135 stations in 
1995. Thus the publicity market reduced at a time when the number of stations increased, 
and this obliged the stations to compete and adopt more attractive formats, (the talk-radio 
ones), for producing radio shows. Talk-radio was soon adopted by the news broadcasts, and 
FM stations soon inaugurated their own news transmissions as well. In 1995, in Mexico 
City alone there were more than 25 radio news broadcasts transmitting everyday. These 
programmes charged the highest rates for commercial adverts.
In this race amongst stations and networks to increase their audiences and ratings, 
innovative changes and strategies u'ere adopted. Stations affiliated to networks, and 
networks created business alliances in order to offer their clientele better publicity
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“packages”, widen their markets, and reduce operation costs. Other actions taken by the 
stations were the dismissal of employees and the replacing of not-so-profitable 
programming with more profitable options. In the case of news broadcasts, many stations 
hired professional and, at times controversial, journalists as newscasters, and this 
consolidated the talk-radio on these programmes. Competition led also to the eventual 
trespassing of the limits of tolerance of the regime. In other words, the strong competition 
created incentives for some stations to explore the terrain opened by the growing political 
plurality and to provide for the people’s need for information on matters that television did 
not discuss. This attempt at opening the microphones usually met with the regime’s direct 
intervention and censorship. Censorship ranged from "friendly” recommendations to 
modify the formats, to threat to use every legal means for controlling the stations, to 
explicit demands for the replacement of critical newscasters. A common tactic was to call 
the stations from different governmental offices -mostly the General Direction of Radio, 
Television and Cinematography of the Secretariat of Gobernación, and from the Office o f 
the Presidency—to protest against certain comments or opinions expressed on air by the 
newscasters or their guests. Of course every call implied a threat that might even go as far 
as to cancel the license (concession).
The reaction of the radio concessionaires before those threats was normally the removal o f 
the newscasters. Since having renowned and relatively controversial journalists as 
newscasters helped to keep the ratings high and the credibility o f the news broadcasts, there 
was a notable level of mobility among the journalists from one station to another. From the 
1980s to the early 1990s some radio stations took the first steps towards presenting political 
information in more open ways (presenting the points o f view o f other parties and allotting 
air-time to alternative voices), though such cases were still not the rule and the regime’s 
pressure was heavy. In spite of such pressure, some radio stations were willing to explore 
the limits of tolerance, since such a policy in their news broadcasts became crucial for their 
credibility and therefore their survival in an increasingly competitive market.
If radio news broadcasts were already showing signs of openness in the early 1990s in spite 
of the government’s pressure, television had no incentive until very recently for presenting 
alternative information and pluralism on its screens. As discussed in Chapter 4, between the 
1970s and the early 1990s, Televisa’s news broadcasts consolidated as regime’s virtual
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public relations agencies in which official points o f view on domestic politics were 
presented -w ith a special emphasis on the president’s daily agenda.
In the 1980s, when opposition movements began to grow stronger and became more 
important, some small and medium entrepreneurs mostly in the Northern cities of Mexico 
started to sympathise with and affiliate to the centre-right wing PAN. However, the 
strongest entrepreneurs and the largest consortiums -among which Televisa ranked at the 
top—never needed to turn tow'ards opposition, since President De la Madrid was a decided 
promoter o f their interests. In the 1980s, even the old nationalist and populist discourse was 
replaced by another more akin to their interests. Therefore, despite the fact that the political 
liberalisation process was creating new political alternatives, the strongest entrepreneurs 
decided to remain on the side o f the government and maintain -and increase—their 
benefits. Televisa was no exception.
Televisa’s support can be assessed in the way it presented political information, especially 
during electoral periods when important political opposition movements and parties became 
a relative challenge to the PRI regime. In spite o f the political relevance of those opposition 
forces, the company’s information policy sought to downgrade them. During the 1980s, the 
regime gave Televisa privileged treatment that helped the company to become as the largest 
Spanish-language media corporation in the world. Chapter 4 focuses precisely on analysing 
and discussing these mutually beneficial arrangements.
However, by the second half o f  the 1990s an important change in the ways television 
reported on political information was registered. In sharp contrast with what had been its 
traditionally biased handling of political information, after 1996 private television began to 
play a crucial role as a more independent source of political information. These changes 
were noticeable, both during the campaigns of 1997, and the electoral race of 2000, when 
the information presented on the TV screens was not biased in favour of the PRI and its 
candidates, but was actually quite impartial.
As is explained in Chapter Seven, the reasons for such openness have to do, firstly, with 
the emergence of a competition scheme that seriously altered the conditions of the quasi­
monopoly in which Mexican private TV had developed for decades. In 1992 a new private 
terrestrial TV network emerged out of the privatisation of the public TV network 
Imevision. The network was renamed TV Azteca and it eventually became a tme
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competitor against Televisa. As analysed in Chapter 7, by 1995-6 competition was 
developing its most fierce aspects. Competition forced both networks to implement new 
investment and publicity policies, and to seek new alliances to strengthen their positions 
and raise the ratings.
Immediately after the acquisition of the public TV network, its major shareholder and 
chairman, Ricardo Salinas Pliego, invested more than US $ 20 million in expanding the 
transmission capacity of his two channels, Channel 13 and Channel 7, in order to transform 
them into national networks. He also announced a very aggressive policy directed at 
increasing its audiences and eventually producing their own programming at top rating 
times, (between 19:30 and 22:30). TV Azteca also incorporated local programming in the 
states and expanded into the American and Latin American markets. The value of the 
network increased from US S 645 million, (the amount paid by Salinas Pliego in 1992), to 
US $ 2.4 billion in 1997.
In 1996 the competition among the TV networks became so aggressive that the press called 
it “the war of the TV”. An independent study revealed that by m id-1996 TV Azteca's news 
broadcast, Hechos, was 23 percent ahead in the audience preferences than Televisa’s 24 
Horas. In any case, the strong competition for the publicity market showed that during 
1997 Televisa’s share of commercial publicity diminished 14.9 percent, whiie that of TV 
Azteca rose to 18.5 percent. This competition-that almost became a zero-sum game— 
pushed Televisa’s executives to implement deep internal changes, ranging from the 
symbolic, (the traditional logo o f the corporation was renewed), to the structural. The new 
chairman o f  Televisa, Emilio Azcarraga Jean, who assumed the post after his father’s death 
in April 1997, seemed to be more concerned with the economic and the financial success of 
the firm than of preserving old political loyalties. A new Executive Committee was created 
in order to strengthen the direction o f the corporation through a more professional and 
specialised style, instead of relying on the chairman’s leadership, (as was the case during 
the times o f Emilio Azcarraga Vidaurreta). The new policies emphasised efficiency and 
therefore Televisa sold its shares in a large number of “non-strategic businesses”, i.e. those 
that did not concentrate on TV production. At the same time Azcarraga Jean declared that 
“the openness in the Mexican political system required to be mirrored in the openness of
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the presentation o f news and information”.2 Shortly afterwards, the oldest TV news 
broadcast, 24 Horns, transmitted its last programme after 27 years of uninterrupted 
broadcasting. The intention of the young Azcarraga Jean, as clearly stated in an interview, 
was to break with the past that strongly linked Televisa to the old regime.3 However, all 
these changes on TV were accelerated by the opportunities created by the 1996 Electoral 
Law for doing good business with the parties.
A second reason for openness on the TV screens was the passing of a new electoral 
legislation, the Reform of 1996, that granted the political parties the largest amount of 
resources ever for investing in political advertising, a business neither network wanted to be 
kept away from -especially in the middle of their “war”. The issuing of a new electoral 
reform in 1996 not only reiterated the recommendations o f 1994 on the ways these types of 
media should present information on the campaigns, and implemented new mechanisms for 
monitoring that information, but most decisively the Reform of 1996 provided the political 
parties with more air-time on television and the largest amount of resources ever to be spent 
on commercial spots and ads. It was obvious that neither Televisa nor TV Azteca wanted to 
be distanced from the big cake that the electoral resources represented.
In brief, the openness of radio and television was led by the economic interests of the media 
moved by increasing competition among the stations. It was precisely these incentives 
which led the media towards presenting more equilibrated and impartial information on the 
different political figures and forces in competition. They took advantage o f the new 
political conditions for presenting information in a more attractive manner in order to raise 
the ratings and increase their shares in the publicity market. In a moment of crisis and 
increasing competition for resources and audiences, the media decided to “test the limits of 
what was permitted to say”, and thus made of the growing political pluralism, a profitable 
business for themselves. The 1996 Electoral Reform marked, in this sense, a definitive 
incentive for presenting more balanced and impartial information. All these changes were 
reflected during the political campaigns o f 1997 and 2000, and more markedly during the 
electoral journey, making the broadcasting media, but especially the TV screens become a 
crucial factor for maintaining the legitimacy and stability of the whole momentum 
especially when President Zedillo on July 6th 2000 at 8:00 p.m. (when the voting count was
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not finished, but when the PAN had, statistically, an insurmountable advantage) recognised 
the defeat of his party in their bid for the presidency.4
However, in spite o f all these advances, the broadcast media in Mexico still have a lomg 
way to go before becoming more reliable and permanent bulwarks of the démocratisation 
process. There is a dominant conception o f the media in democratic polities that derives 
from the classical liberal tradition.* Though both his father, James Mill, and Jeremy 
Bentham wrote about the freedom of the press,6 it was John Stuart Mill who, in the mid- 
XIX Century, brilliantly synthesised the core of the liberal positions concerning the 
importance of such freedom.7 Though more than 150 years have passed since then, his 
examination of these topics have provided essential arguments for the liberal theories that 
advocate the freedom of the mass media in contemporary societies. For J.S. Mill, freedom 
o f the press was required in order to maintain a space where a free exchange of ideas and 
debates could eventually lead individuals to find the ‘‘truth” (in terms of the most rational 
argument in a public debate that would discard false ideas),8 to avoid the tyranny of the 
overwhelmingly dominant opinion of those who dissent from it, (thus protecting 
individualism),9 and to create a bulwark “against corrupt or tyrannical government”.10
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4 For an account of the 6Ih July 2000 electoral journey on TV screens see Manuel Alejandro Guerrero, “Los 
medios de comunicación y los nuevos retos democráticos en México”, on the journalistic web site 
www.pulso.ore/Espanol Archivo/index.htm For an account of the behaviour o f the radio news broadcasts that 
day see Femando Mejia Barquera, “Nuevo escenario radiofónico”, in Etcétera, México City, no.388, July 7th 
2000.
s It is possible to situate the origins of this tradition in the modem liberal defense of the freedom of speech 
and of the press (that both rapidly became associated, and even equivalent with one another) in XVII 
Century’s England. Milton’s A eropagitica (1644) bravely defended the liberties o f unlicensed printing and 
attacked censorship in the name of God and virtue. In the XVIII Century the Whigs adopted the "liberty of the 
press" as one of their most favoured topics in the name of the natural right of man to express freely and, 
thereby, securing the good functioning of the government under the rule of law. Representative writings on 
this tradition are Matthew Tindal s Reasons Against Restraining the Press {1704) and Thomas Paine’s Rights 
o f Man (1791-1792). For a more detailed account on the struggles for the liberty of the press in this century 
see Jeremy Black, The English Press in the Eighteenth Century, Philadelphia, 1987.
6 By the close of that century and the beginning of the XIX Century, the liberal theories of the press nurtured 
from Utilitarian viewpoints. The idea that good government -the one which produces the greatest happiness 
for the largest number of individuals-- is fostered by open and public discussion and the liberty of the press 
are reflected in both James Mill’s Liberty of the Press (1811) and Bentham’s On the Liberty o f the Press and 
Public Discussion (1820-21).
7 John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty” (1859), in J.S. Mill, On Liberty and Other Writings, edited by Stefan Collini, 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989. See 
especially his second chapter "On the liberty of thought and discussion” and his third chapter “Of 
individuality, as one of the elements of the well-being”.
8 Ibid., p.23.
9 Ibid., pgs. 8-9.
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This liberal account of the media became increasingly identified with democracy --with the 
liberal capitalist democracies that formed in Western societies throughout the XIX and XX 
Centuries. The mass media are conceived of as a sort o f “fourth estate” in the public 
surveillance of the exercise o f power. In this sense, “States are dragged before the court of 
public opinion. In the name o f the common or public interest, the press chides tyrants and 
malefactors who stifle or evade public opinion. The abuse of political power is exposed 
publicly” 11 The media are essential to protect citizens’ civil and political rights and to 
permit accountability in the political decision-making process, which would otherwise be 
"naturally" surrounded by secrecy.
The media are also seen as an open arena for public and rational deliberation in liberal 
democratic polities, through which the society and the government can maintain constant 
communication, and through which the former also exercises an informal control over the 
latter. The notions behind this assumption are that the mass media are neutral and 
essentially reflect a potent, constant and contrasting public debate amongst citizens about 
public affairs, which is free, rational and open in principle to all citizens who want to 
express their ideas. This freedom of discussion benefits the public interest, since it is 
assumed that the most significant points of view are being presented for discussion, and 
also that an immense amount of information will be made available for the individuals.10 2 
In brief, the mass media, according to the liberal tradition are conceived of as institutions 
that, if they are democratic, must:
□ Watch over the uses of power on behalf of the citizens.
□ Provide them w'ith information on which they may base their choices, opinions and 
decisions on public matters.
□ Become themselves an open and free marketplace of ideas in which all citizens can 
participate and where there are no guaranteed a priori predominant points of view, but 
only the results of a permanent rational debate and contrasting of arguments.
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12 David Kelley and Roger Donway, “Liberalism and free speech”, in Judith Lichtenberg (ed.), Democracy 
and the Mass Media, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pgs.89-91.
In Mexico, though the forms in which the broadcasting media have presented information 
since the 1997 electoral campaigns marks a dramatic difference with the traditional bias in 
favour of the PRI, there is still a long way to go before creating a structurally independent 
media regime. Practices and attitudes on informing and reporting on politics have changed, 
but the norms and legislation that rules the broadcast media are still rooted in the past. 
Increasingly, impartiality and balance seem to be finding their places as dominant values in 
reporting on political campaigns, and during non-electoral periods the broadcast media take 
pains to present plural and relatively well balanced information. However, there is still 
much to do, since the whole media regime -laws, regulations, practices, low 
professionalism, etc.—in which they are inserted is still rooted in an authoritarian 
framework. For instance, the Federal Law on Radio and Television (LFRT) of 1960 and the 
Regulation of 1973 (RLFRT) still form the legal precepts within which the broadcasting 
media have to develop, and as previously discussed, they contain a large number of legal 
dispositions that explicitly attempt to restrain the freedom of the broadcasting media. 
Article LFRT 9 gives the Secretariat of Communications and Transports the faculty to 
allocate licenses at its own “free will”. Article LFRT 31-IX gives that same secretariat the 
capacity to revoke them also by “unfulfilling any other condition non specified on any 
previous fraction” (i.e. for any possible reason the authority may present). Article RLFRT 
10 gives the Secretariat of Gobernación an enormous amount of power to revise 
programming and censor if necessary.1-1 The lack of proper regulations, amongst other 
things, make these media vulnerable to the eventual caprices of the authorities and open the 
possibility o f pressures and collusion among stations and politicians. For the Mexican 
broadcast media to consolidate a structurally independent media regime, at least three 
conditions must be met;* 14
□ The existence of proper mechanisms that secure the right to obtain public information.
□ An adequate media legislation that grants their independence from the state.
|J See Chapter Two.
14 Additionally, there must exist a relatively demanding civil society in matters of information and media.
This topic alone requires another thesis, and thus, 1 would only like to point out that though during the last 
decade participation has increased in Mexico in terms of voting, taking pan in demonstrations and 
movements, this is not necessarily translated into a strong and demanding civil society in terms of 
information. The low level of readership, the difficulties in accessing the public records, and in general the 
low level of education of the population, constitute some of the most important obstacles for generating a civil
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□ Higher professionalism of journalists.
As to the first two points, though it is clear that they deal with different problems (one with 
the obligation of the state to provide information and the other with the creation of a legal 
framework for securing the media’s independence in matters of license awarding, operation 
and contents controls), in Mexico for decades they have been considered as one and the 
same discussion, generating great confusion on these two subjects. It was not until the 
issuing of the Basic Plan o f Government, 1976-1982 of the PRI presidential candidate, 
López Portillo, in 1975 when -in  a typical example of the candidate’s populist 
revolutionary tone—it was firstly established that “the Right to Access Public Information 
is a means for liberating individuals, not for preserving the exploitation of alienated 
consciousness with lucrative or power ends (El Derecho a la Información es un 
instrumento de liberación y  no de explotación de conciencias alienadas con fines lucrativos 
y  de poder)”.'3 It also states that the right to access public information is the counterpart of 
the freedom of speech and expression. In 1976, as part of the discussion about the political 
reform that López Portillo was promoting, it was proposed that a last sentence should be 
added to Article 6 of the Constitution,15 6 stating that “the right to access information will be 
granted by the state”. This reform was passed at the end of 1977 along with other changes 
to the electoral law as part o f the Reform of 1977.
There immediately began a great debate on what should be the measures taken by the State 
to grant it. Since the beginning, the discussions emphasised not the obligations of the State 
to provide public information, or to open the public records -which is actually the essence 
of any law on the right to accessing information—, but the possibility o f elaborating a new 
Broadcasting Law that could replace the LFRT of 1960. Obviously, for the media 
entrepreneurs, the discussion of such a law was considered to be part of a wider effort of 
the government to tighten its controls over the private mass media, as occurred in 1969 and
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society that not only demands the public accountability of its government and votes (as is happening now), 
but that also claims better information and presses for better broadcasting quality.
15 Plan Básico de Gobierno, 1976-1982, Partido Revolucionario Institucional, VIII Asamblea Nacional 
Ordinaria, 25 de septiembre de 1975, Ed. PRI, pgs.10-12.
10 The original Article 6 of 1917 said: “the manifestation of the ideas will not be subject of judicial or 
administrative inquisition, but only in those cases in which it constitutes an attack on morals, third parties’ 
rights, or in which it provokes a misdemeanour or disturbs the public peace”.
30 0
1973.17 In October 1978, during the Broadcasting Week, the Secretary of Gobernación, 
Jesús Reyes Heroles, explained before the licensees that a regulatory law would also 
contemplate some changes on the actual media legislation in order to modify the open 
mercantilist and commercial conception o f the broadcasting media, and to foster a larger 
plurality in those media.18 Any debate on the obligation of the State to provide information 
to the citizens was avoided, leaving the emphasis on the possible modifications to the 
LFRT. Therefore, all attempts to discuss an “information law” has been taken to mean 
neither the openness o f the state’s records nor its obligation to provide public information, 
but tighter controls over the broadcasters, thus confusing both issues.
As could be expected, the private licensees strongly opposed any further change in the 
broadcasting legislation. For many of them, the discussion on the right to information was 
only a pretext to further tightening of the political control in the industry. At the end, López 
Portillo’s administration never sent any reform bill and Luis M. Farias, the Priista leader o f 
the Chamber of Deputies and a major licensee himself, convoked at the beginning of 1979 a 
number of public audiences in the name o f the Federal Electoral Commission to discuss a 
possible reform bill. Twenty public audiences were held between 21sl February and 6th 
August 1980 with the participation o f members of industry and unions, academics and 
government officials. However, nothing concrete was achieved by them and the discussion 
was simply postponed,19 in spite of the fact that in the same year the Senate ratified the 
International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, signed in 1966, and the OAS Inter- 
American Convention on Human Rights, signed in 1969, both containing precepts related 
to the obligation o f the state to grant the right to accessing public information.
In 1983 a new attempt was made to discuss the right to information along with a bill on 
social communication. More audiences were organised and, once again, in spite of the 
enthusiasm of academics, politicians, and some licensees that participated, the outcome was
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17 See Chapter Two.
18 In Fernandez Chriestlieb (1996), pgs. 255 and 263.
19 For Deputy Farias the right to information might cause its manipulation and endanger all freedom of 
expression. For him, it was better not to produce more rules and laws stated in relation to defining an adequate 
right to information that the situation was as complex as “making a circle from a square” (UnomasUno, May 
29th 1981).
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the same as in 1980-1: much ado about nothing.20 After these events no more serious 
debates were held on matters of information until the late 1990s.
On April 22nd 1997, the PAN, the PRD and the PT presented a bill on social 
communication that was immediately rejected by the PRI, the Executive and the 
concessionaires alike. Again, confusion was the most defining characteristic of the debates. 
This time, for the Executive and the PRI, such bill was an attempt to restrict the freedom of 
speech of the media by creating more regulations and controls over broadcastings. In 1997, 
on the Day of the Freedom of the Press, (June 7th), President Zedillo remarked that “in 
Mexico, any reform bill that seeks to regulate on the media, directly challenges the freedom 
of speech”.21 In this way, the regime’s officials avoided the true meaning of such a bill: the 
obligation o f the State to provide information to the citizens and to open the public 
records.22 Naturally, the concessionaires supported the president’s position and again 
opposed to the parties’ bill.
However, the debate on the social communication bill and the reform of the 1960 LFRT 
was renewed after the 1997 elections, when the Deputies’ Commission o f Radio, Television 
and Cinema was chaired by PAN’s Deputy Javier Corral. In relation to the reform to the 
LFRT, Corral proposed:
a) To eliminate the highly discretionary procedures o f the Executive for awarding and 
revoking the concessions on radio and television.
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20 More than one thousand conference papers were presented in more than ten states in Mexico. Most of such 
conferences were published by the Presidency as Foros de Consulta Popular in 1983 in ten volumes.
2‘ La Jornada, June 8,b 1997.
22 In Mexico, it is extremely difficult to find any kind of important public information. Since no law obliges 
the State to provide information to society, the forms in which the journalists and the media have obtained 
such information has been through their “good" relations with the government officials, and usually this has 
been part of the “informal arrangements” between the media and the government. However, for everybody 
else the task of obtaining information from the government about, for instance the forms in which the budgets 
are spent, or about current programmes and policies implemented, is very much an impossible mission. The 
most eloquent example was provided by the journalist Fernando de Collado of the newspaper Reforma, which 
between November 23rd 1998 and February 6th 1999, carried out the task of asking the 18 Ministries of State 
(Secretarias) different kinds of data, ranging from the number of employees in their respective ministries to 
the number of policemen fired due to corruption and the number of public schools receiving funds for 
renovations. The outcomes are more than eloquent since out of the 18 ministries not even one provided 
complete answers to the questions asked. See Femando de Collado, “El silencio oficial. ¿Cuál derecho a la 
información?, in Enfoque, weekend supplement oíReforma, February 7lh 1999.
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b) To grant minimum rights to journalists, such as the professional secret23 and the 
freedom of conscience clause.24
c) To create a National Commission of Social Communication with the aim o f 
protecting the freedom of expression from public power abuses, (but without the 
capacity to establish legal sanctions), and to grant the right to obtain public 
information.
d) To secure the right of reply.
The Bill of Social Communication seeks to grant the citizens access to public information, 
and it proposed:
a) To oblige the State to provide public information, except in cases of national 
security or when the information is part of current legal cases in process.
b) To prohibit that public information from being used to benefit personal interests.
c) To make public the State expenditures on advertising.
d) To protect the right to information through the intervention of the National 
Commission of Social Communication.
After the 2000 elections, the debate on both bills was still being leaded by Javier Coual, 
who is now the chairman of the Senate’s Commission of Communications and Transports. 
This time things have drastically changed in relation to the bill and the reform: a consensus 
has been agreed upon the former, resulting in the passing o f a new Federal Law of 
Transparency and Access to Public Information (LFTAIP) in May 24th 2002; whereas in 
regard to the reform of the LFRT nothing new has been discussed, nor any substantial 
agreement has been reached.
At the beginning o f the Fox administration, the scenario for both issues seemed unclear and 
confuse. To start with it seemed that the newf Panista government did not have a clear idea 
on what kind of information should be kept within the classification of national security and
23 According the Reform Bill on the LFRT, the “journalist or reporter has the right not to reveal the name or 
the identity of his/her information sources to the media, to his company, to judicial or administrative 
authorities or to any other party”. In Javier Corral Jurado, “¿Qué busca la iniciativa de Ley Federal de 
Comunicación?”, in Revista Mexicana de Comunicación, no. 5 6, October-Dec ember 1998, p.37.
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therefore not disclosed. President Fox’s first Co-ordinator of Social Communication (his 
actual wife, Mrs. Martha Sahagun) declared to the weekly Proceso that, according to the 
document titled La política de comunicación social del nuevo gobierno, “the government 
will never again feed corruption or favouritism in the media“.-5 In relation to delicate 
information, she said that the government must organise “as many public audiences as 
required with the participation of the Congress, the Judicial and the Civil Society, in order 
to define which files must be opened and which others should remain secret”. For such a 
task, “the prevailing criteria must be the Reason o f State”.
This confusion proved again to be profitable to those who opposed changes to the LFRT, 
i.e. the concessionaires, who, though they agreed on the Social Communication bill (the 
future LFTAIP) and on the elimination of discretionary practices in the awarding and 
revoking procedures for concessions o f the actual LFRT, in relation to the latter’s proposed 
reform they did not accept either the clause on the journalists’ freedom of consciousness,24 56 
or the creation of a National Commission of Social Communication that could eventually 
interfere with the quality of programme content. Moreover, in March 2001 the 
concessionaires created the Auto-regulation Council, a body composed by them meant to 
“reduce possible excesses in the programming”. However, in real terms this has not worked 
because it has proved ineffective in obliging the stations to modify their programming.
By the December 2001 the confusion between the two legal projects, the Information 
Access Bill and the reform to the LFRT, was finally dissipated when President Fox 
submitted to Congress his Bill on Transparency and Access to Public Information and just 
two days after (December 6th) another Bill on Access to Public Information was presented 
by the PRI, PRD, PVEM, PT and also -and curiously—the PAN. After more than five 
months of debates an important agreement was reached to passed a new law on the matter 
that combines the best ideas from both bills. The LFTAIP, passed in May 24th and 
published in the Official Daily in June 1 l lh, was approved in the Chamber of Deputies by
24 Such a clause gives the journalists the right not to participate in any transmission or programme that goes 
against his/her values and beliefs without endangering the journalists position in the company, i.e. without 
losing his/her job. Ibidem.
25 “Advierte Martha Sahagiin: Ni impunidad ni libertinaje en los medios”, interview to the Coordinator of 
Social Communication of the Presidency, in Proceso, no. 1257, December 3rd, 2000.
26 The concessionaires oppose to this, since such a clause impedes them to freely dismiss their collaborators, 
at least in the newsrooms.
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409 votes and one abstention (no vote against it was recorded), and in the Senate by 86 
votes.27
The LFTAIP is a crucial instrument for consolidating the accountability not only of the 
federal government but of all public institutions of the State, since its primary object is the 
promotion of “all necessary measures to secure the access of all people to the information 
under possession of the Union Powers, the autonomous constitutional organs and all other 
federal entities” (Article 1). Article 4 makes it explicit its purpose for favouring the 
transparency in the uses o f public information when it states that the LFTAIP aims at 
“providing access to public records and all other kind of public information and documents; 
making visible the handling of information by the public agencies so that the citizens are 
able to evaluate the performance of the government in its different areas; contributing to the 
démocratisation of society and the enforcement of the rule of law”. Article 7 makes it 
mandatory that all federal entities publish a complete directory of its employees and 
officials including full data relating to the salaries and other kind of economic 
compensations they may receive. This same article obliges all federal departments with the 
faculty of hiring or awarding in concession different services and goods to particular agents 
to make public this information including the complete data of the particular agents who are 
contracted by them. In relation to the federal administrative dependencies, Article 7 also 
makes it mandatory to publish their budget and the forms in which it is allocated to cover 
their programmes and expenditures. Article 11 enables any citizen to receive complete 
information about the budget and the use o f public resources o f parties and other political 
associations.
It is important to note that the LFTAIP states in Articles 13 and 14 which kind of 
information will remain classified as reserved. Article 13 defines as reserved information 
that which could endanger national security o national defence, put at risk the foreign 
relations of the country, damage the economic and financial stability, prevent the 
prosecution of crimes and the administration of justice, disclose relevant information of 
ongoing judicial trials, and disclose banking, fiscal or industrial secrets. Article 14 
emphasises, however, that no information will be classified as reserved if it is related to 
violations o f human and civil rights. Article 15 states that all information classified as
27 In the Chamber of Deputies the votes were as follows: PAN 182 votes, PRI 160 votes, PRD 42 votes, PT 6
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reserved will be disclosed after 12 years (earlier even than in the U.S., where it takes 20 
years to disclose reserved info).
Finally, the LFTAIP establishes in Article 28 “link units” (unidad de enlace) in each 
federal department and office in charge of providing the information to any interested 
individual or group who ask for it. Article 29 also creates a Committee of Information in 
each federal department in charge o f classifying and managing the information and 
documentation. In case, incomplete or no information is provided to the requester, Article 
33 has established a Federal Institute o f Access to Public Information, with the capacity of 
making the necessary recommendations to the dependency to provide the requested 
information, but it can ask the Secretariat of Auditing to establish administrative sanctions 
to the officials who deny or provide incomplete information. This Institute is also in charge 
of revising the classification of information made by the different dependencies, of 
elaborating secondary rules to make easier the provision of information and of protecting 
the personal data of officials and public servants.
In this way, a great step has been given towards consolidating political accountability in the 
new Mexican democratic regime. This is a crucial change in the way the government 
handled information for decades, when this was considered to be a governmental asset 
instead o f a public asset. Now, at least, there is the possibility o f having the right 
information for making the most convenient decisions when election times come. However, 
there are still two remaining gaps to be closed here: on the one hand, the LFTAIP is a law 
that applies only to the federal administration, to the Congress and the Supreme Court, but 
not to the states and local administration and governments, which still need to pass local 
laws in this respect. One might suppose that the most advanced Northern states will do that 
soon, but what about some provinces in the South still controlled by local strong men and 
closed groups? On the other hand, though the LFTAIP secures the openness of public 
records and information, creating the conditions for securing the availability o f government 
information, as long as the LFRT is not reformed in matters o f licenses awarding, 
intervention o f government on contents, regulation of public advertising on media, and 
securing minimum rights to journalists in their profession against different pressures, there 
will still exist at least the possibility for corruption, prevalence of interests alien to
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journalism, and collusion between government and media organisations. The reforms of the 
LFRT are necessary in order to secure definite autonomy and structural independence of 
the broadcasting media from the government and for making clear the rules within which 
they can move and act.
It is now important to make some remarks on the condition of the journalists in Mexico. In 
relation to professional journalism in Mexico, this has for decades been a rara avis. As 
discussed in Chapter One, in this country obtaining public information was for decades a 
matter of complicity between the journalists and the regime; of keeping good relations with 
politicians. As one author points out,
The Mexican presidency, the cabinet ministers, the semi-autonomous agencies, the public 
corporations, and the state and municipal governments -all dominated by federal policies—in their 
daily operations help the power elite manage the flow of news, shaping its emphasis and regulating 
its quantity. These primary news sources can voluntarily offer information or attempt to withhold it 
in ways that contribute to the headline priorities and the descending order of importance of a day’s 
newsworthy events.28
These bizarre relations between the journalists and the regime were maintained not only 
because of low wages, but also because in most cases there seemed to be no other way for 
poorly prepared journalists to do theif job and collect information in a context of secrecy o f 
government internal information (due to the long absence of any right to access records and 
to obtain public information). The combination of low levels of professionalism and 
education for the majority of journalists plus the extreme secrecy of Mexican policy­
making and decision-taking processes, condemned them to reporting only on government 
press releases, bulletins and political speeches. Corruption seemed, to many to be the 
simplest way to carry out their jobs and improve their financial situation.
It must be taken into consideration that the vast majority of journalists in Mexico have been 
self-made journalists without a college education. Most of them have become acquainted 
with the “art” of journalism in the making, and known therefore only the rules to which the 
regime subjected journalism and the relatively restricted spaces left to them for autonomy 
and criticism within journalistic enterprises that lacked for so long any sort of ethics code. 
If one adds to this the fact that until the early 1970s there were very few schools of
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journalism, (before 1949 there were none),29 the low level o f journalistic professionalism is 
not surprising. Moreover, even the majority of schools where it became possible to study 
journalism had, up until the 1980s, a very low quality o f education with vague and 
inconsistent study programmes.30 In other cases, journalism was not an independent 
department or faculty in the majority of schools, which in most cases did not teach 
journalism, but a more generic area under the name o f communications sciences.31 
However, things are changing in Mexico. The earlier openness o f the printed press through 
publications such as the weekly Proceso or independent newspapers like UnoMasUno, La 
Jornada, El Financiero, Reforma and Milenio in Mexico City and like Zeta in Tijuana, El 
Diario de Yucatán in Merida, El Norte in Monterrey or El lmparcial in Hermosillo, was the 
outcome of the conscious efforts o f professional journalists to create independent and 
autonomous spaces for information and criticism. As shown in Chapter Four, the hiring of 
professional printed press journalists as newscasters by the radio stations strongly 
reinforced the growing openness o f the radio news broadcasts (where there were already 
some independent radio newscasters, like Francisco Huerta or José Gutiérrez Vivó). In the 
last years, more universities have opened programmes on journalism,32 and the broadcast 
networks are developing closer links with schools of journalism and faculties for 
recruitment and collaboration.33 It becomes clear that, though the LFTAIP has been passed 
and that, in general terms Mexican journalism has become an independent activity, there 
are still many battles to fight at the local level in some provinces (especially in certain 
Southern states as Tabasco, Guerrero and Chiapas). Today, however, the main challenges
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29 The first school of journalism, Carlos Septién García School, was established in 1949. Since then during the 
1950s the Journalism Faculty of the Universidad Veracruzana was created along with the Faculty of Political 
and Social Sciences of the l ’NAM. which also began communications studies However, it was nor until the 
late 1960s that new schools were inaugurated and more importance was given to the formation of journalists 
in private universities, like the Iberoamerican University (though under the subject Communications 
Sciences).
j0 José Baldivia Urdininea, (ed.), La formación de los periodistas en América Latina (México. Chile y  Costa 
Rica), Mexico City, Nueva Imagen/Ceestem, 1981, pgs.83-84.
3' Torres, (1997), p.147.
32 For instance, the Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey inaugurated in 1998 a B.A. 
on Mass Media and Journalism expressly aimed at forming research journalists.
33 An example is Televisa’s co-sponsorship of the annual “Espacio Universitario de Periodismo y 
Comunicación” with journalism schools and faculties and with the Revista Mexicana de Comunicación.
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facing journalism come not from the political side, but from groups and organisations that 
react against the growing professionalism o f  journalists: Mafia and drug cartels.34
To sum up, though broadcast media in Mexico have developed a greater autonomy and 
openness, there are still important steps to be taken to attain the right conditions, (both legal 
conditions and conditions of security), in order to consolidate a truly independent media 
regime. The changes both on radio and TV in the last fifteen years have undoubtedly 
generated a mass media system that, in general terms, is now quite open. For the licensees 
it is also clear that if  they want to continue making profits with their news broadcasts in an 
increasingly competitive market, they are obliged to improve the quality of these 
programmes, to hire more professional anchormen and newscasters, and to present the 
information in ways that make it credible for their audiences. In this new scenario, the 
media business does not have a determined political preference for all stations all the time. 
However, the openness of the actual broadcast media in Mexico, still requires other forms 
o f support to consolidate a structurally independent media system. The LFTAIP is a great 
step. Also the openness of the media during the last fifteen years has responded to new 
ways o f presenting information due mainly to the emergence of competitive conditions in a 
situation of economic crisis and instability that forced the media to innovate their formats 
and their contents, and thus trespass the limits of tolerance of the PRI regime. It is true, that 
today there is another party in power and there is now a LFTAIP, but the legislation and 
formal rules that govern the broadcast media are still what they have been for the last forty 
years and the rights o f journalists are still not secured. Without proper changes in these 
areas, nothing can ensure that collusion will not develop in the future amongst the media 
and government encouraged by the unclear provisions o f actual legislation. A new Federal 
Broadcasting Law is also required to secure conditions for autonomy and independence of 
the media. This is the only way to ensure that the broadcast media openness consolidates
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drug traffic activities on the Mexico-U.S. border.
309
Manuel Alejandro Guerrero. Final Remarks
into structural independence and autonomy, crucial requisites to allow the media to play a 
truly supportive role for democracy.
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